

FASCISM IN MANCHURIA

The Soviet–China Encounter in the 1930s

SUSANNE HOHLER



Susanne Hohler is Postdoctoral Researcher of History at Heidelberg University. She has won several scholarships for her work on this period and is an expert on Russian fascism.

“The All-Russian Fascist Party is one of the largest and earliest Russian exile fascist organisations in the Far East. According to Susanne Hohler, one out of three children/young adults was in direct or indirect contact with the members of the All-Russian Fascist Party. Hohler demonstrates this astonishing ability to mobilise civil society in detail through a convincing analysis of a variety of sources and material. This marks a valuable contribution to the field.”

Sven Reichardt, Professor of Modern History,
University of Konstanz

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INTRODUCTION

Harbin is an interesting city – in the daytime Tatar, Chinese, Japanese and Russian life flow by in an endless stream. [...] Chinese porters dog-trotting along under burdens parked at either end of long, swaying poles. [...] Japanese ladies prim and neat in their rickshaws [...] whining street beggars [...] army trucks hooting for the right of way [...] Japanese officers with their sabers tucked under their arms [...] bullock carts weaving their slow way through the traffic [...] fish peddlers with their wares in open cans balanced on poles [...] lovely Russian girls with eyes that do not behave [...] Tatars from the cold steppes in rabbit-fur caps and wadded cloth.¹

Harbin is located in Manchuria, a region of competing interests and powers, namely Japan, China, the United States, Russia and, later, the Soviet Union. The city, founded in 1898 by Russians on the banks of the Sungari River, which was Chinese soil at the time, owed its existence to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, built to connect Chita with Vladivostok.² Because the city was a railway junction and had a favorable location in the resource-rich Manchurian plains, Harbin quickly became one of the most important cities in the region and attracted people from around the world with investment and employment opportunities.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Harbin was home to many different ethnic, national and religious groups – at times over 50 different nationalities, including Chinese, Japanese, Manchu, Koreans

and Russians, but also Jews, Poles, Americans, Tatars, Italians and Germans, among others, lived there, making it a truly cosmopolitan and multicultural city amid the Manchurian plains. It was a site of considerable instability and constant shifts of power, a microcosm of many of the twentieth century's cataclysmic events and a destination for the torrents of displaced Eurasians. Manchuria and Harbin were what is often conceptualised as contact zones, "social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in the context of highly asymmetrical relations of power."³

Contact between the different sections of Harbin's multinational and multiethnic population was often dense and extensive. People of different backgrounds met at markets and bazaars, worked together at the Railway Company, attended horse racing competitions or soccer matches and shared boulevards and parks in the center of Harbin. Those transcultural contacts clearly left their marks on the diverse population of Harbin. Chinese cooks spoke Galician Yiddish, German housewives passed the time over a game of mah-jongg, Jewish and Chinese children shared school desks, mixed gangs of Chinese and Russian bandits roamed the hinterland of the city and even today "Russian bread" is sold in Harbin.⁴ As Alexander Menquez, a Jewish emigrant from Poland, described his life in Harbin between 1935 and 1941: "The second six years (of my life in the city) were spent in cosmopolitan Harbin: in a British high school, a Russian music academy, a Japanese-run symphony orchestra [...] and at the YMCA College with its international faculty."⁵

But this was just one chapter of the story. In Harbin, despite numerous manifestations of contact, exchange, cosmopolitanism and entanglement, the various ethnicities that composed the population often preferred to isolate themselves from each other in many areas of daily life. According to the memoirs of former inhabitants of Harbin, most Europeans had little or no social contact with the Chinese segment of the population.⁶ Most foreigners did not learn Chinese, even if they had lived in Harbin for decades, and, aside from a handful of academics, showed at best only little interest in Chinese, Korean or Manchu culture and history. Furthermore, the coexistence of many different ethnicities often proved conflict ridden and was frequently marred by arrogance, distrust, animosity and sometimes even hatred and violence.⁷ Tension and conflict between different ethnic, national or political groups increased over the course of the 1930s. As the German-Jewish violinist

Helmut Stern, who together with his parents fled from the Nazi terror to Harbin in 1938 at the age of ten, writes about his childhood in Harbin:

Sometimes I was beaten by the Japanese boys, because they thought I was Russian. The Chinese children called me "Long Nose". [...] By the way I was teased by Jewish kids for being a German. I got used to being beaten for things I could not be held responsible for.⁸

Furthermore, since the early 1930s violence and crime flourished in Harbin, and the atmosphere of the city became increasingly tense and hostile. More extreme forms of nationalism and militarism, like Russian fascism or Revisionist Zionism, the nationalist and anti-socialist element within Zionism,⁹ spread among émigrés from the former Tsarist Empire. It seems that ethnic or national groups closed ranks and increasingly dissociated from each other.

This development can at least partly be ascribed to the Japanese policies in Manchukuo. Factors like legal ambiguity, Japanese ultra-nationalism, the aggressive identity politics and state repression on part of the new regime, together with a difficult economic situation, contributed to increasing fragmentation of Harbin's society. But this explanation is incomplete because it describes the reasons for change, but not the process. An answer on how the atmosphere in Harbin altered maybe found in a closer examination of the vivid civil society in Harbin.

Civil society organisations are the most appropriate social units to study in this context because they most clearly reveal transcultural and transnational micro-processes of exchange, assimilation and acculturation as well as sharp differentiation and exclusion. Furthermore, civil society organisations also affect many other areas of communal life, like business, education and leisure, but also identity formation, public opinion and the perception of self and others. They can create a sense of belonging and unity, and they are the foundation of individual and group networks.

Moreover, as has recently been pointed out by Sheri Berman and others, under certain circumstances a strong civil society produces closed and self-contained cliques, which can deepen the fragmentation and undermine the stability of society.¹⁰ The essential characteristics of the process are as follows: if poorly designed and unstable political

institutions prevent or offer little meaningful participation in a highly mobilised society, people tend to direct their energy towards the private associations that comprise civil society. If those civil society associations are organised according to the boundaries between groups rather than across them, they foster the formation of exclusive and self-contained circles and exacerbate social cleavages. These criteria all apply to Harbin. Moreover, this process is more likely when civil society organisations promote exclusive and particularistic values and beliefs, as did the Russian fascists in Harbin, who are the focus of my research.

The beginnings of the Russian Fascist Party in the Far East, one of the largest and earliest Russian fascist organisations in exile,¹¹ can be traced back to the mid-1920s.¹² But the appearance of fascist factions prompted the Soviet Union to act, and the Soviet consul in Harbin intervened with the Chinese authorities, who consequently banned fascist propaganda. Nevertheless, in May 1931 a secret gathering of different Russian and Cossack groups from the radical right took place in Harbin. It was called the First Congress of Fascist Groups in Manchuria and resulted in the establishment of the Russian Fascist Party.¹³ In the following months, the Russian Fascist Party eked out a marginal existence on the fringe of the Russian community. After the Japanese occupation of Harbin in early spring 1932,¹⁴ however, the Russian fascists soon ascended to become, if not the largest, at least one of the most influential groups in the Russian émigré community during the 1930s.

To a certain extent, the fascists owed this success to the patronage of the Japanese authorities, who appointed several members and supporters of the Russian fascists to key positions in the Bureau of the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (Biuro po delam rossiiskikh emigrantov v Man'-chzhurii, hereafter: BREM), an institution erected to preside over the Russian population of Harbin. This fact alone, however, cannot explain the deep penetration of the Russian fascist mindset into the Russian community, including the Orthodox Church, sport clubs, cultural associations and schools. Nor can their success only be ascribed to the ideology of the fascists or to their leader Rodzaevskii, who apparently was not an especially charismatic individual.¹⁵ The key to the success of the Russian fascists can be found in their dense network of associations and organisations and how they leveraged these to exert influence on publics in Harbin.¹⁶

I will limit myself to the period between 1932, when Harbin became part of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and 1937, when the Russian fascists lost relevance due to inner factionalism and a change of the Japanese policy in Manchukuo.

The Sinister Side of Civil Society

The concept of civil society is widely used among politicians and academics dealing with processes of democratisation and the preconditions for functioning democracy. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, civil society has been invoked as a social and political panacea. Civil society is said to be the base of resistance against dictatorships and oppressive states as well as a driving force behind processes of democratisation, beyond its imputed role as one of the foundations of a functioning democracy. Despite its popularity, there is no convincing and consistent definition of civil society. Most commonly civil society organisations are defined as some space between the state, the (capitalist) market and the private realm where individuals organise themselves on the basis of voluntary membership independent of the state.¹⁷ But the boundaries between the state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated, since they often also depend on the particular attitude towards the state and the market.¹⁸ Apart from the difficulties of theoretically separating, for example, the market from the private, assumptions about interdependence between the three spheres also differ significantly between authors. If the existence of a free market is a precondition for civil society, because political freedom presupposes economic freedom, as Gellner and others argue,¹⁹ can we still conceive of a civil society in the Soviet Union? Or is the development of a successful market economy dependent on a functioning civil society as Kocka suggests?²⁰

To complicate matters further, the definition of civil society is often normatively limited to meet the high expectations associated with the concept. Civil society is supposed to be tolerant, prepared to compromise and function “with a minimum of violence and a maximum of respect for different lifestyles, openness and civil distribution of power.”²¹ For Gellner civil society “is on the side of angels.”²²

Such a normatively charged definition of civil society organisations might be morally commendable, but it proves insufficient for an analysis of existing civil societies. Such moral predispositions can neither deal with ambivalence within a given civil society organisation nor with shifting or multiple aims. A good example to illustrate this is the Nation of Islam of Louis Farrakhan in the United States, which on the one hand provides financial aid and social services to its members, but on the other hand promotes hatred against gays, Jews and Catholics and is hardly tolerant or democratic.²³ Further, what is considered to be “good” civil society often depends on prevailing perceptions at a specific point in history. Many nationalist movements in Eastern Europe were classified as “good” and included in civil society as long as they resisted the communist regime, but were reclassified as “bad” after the fall of communism, without any change in the character and aims of those movements.²⁴ Moreover, normative restrictions result in the exclusion of organisations and groups that occupy some space between the state, the market and the private realm, but fail to meet the ad hoc normative criteria. Such a limitation to merely the “good” side of civil society hinders any examination of the potentially negative effects of associational life.

This study consequently opts to focus on the functions rather than narrowing the conceptual scope with a normatively charged definition. Hence, it reverts to another influential approach to civil society, which Putnam developed in his widely read *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*.²⁵ Putnam grounds the concept of civil society in the effects it is supposed to have for its members and society as a whole. Based on Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations about associations and the connection he drew between them and democracy in the United States,²⁶ Putnam argues that societies are more successful when their members possess more social capital in the form of social networks, norms and mutual trust. According to Putnam, civil society organisations create this kind of social capital, irrespective of their stated goals, by promoting common norms and values among their members. Therefore, a bowling club, the Boy Scouts, an initiative to support poor children, a human rights group or literature circle can be assessed on the same terms. Civil society organisations also serve as a form of democratic apprenticeship for their members, because they practice democratic virtues within the organisations, during the election of representatives, for example.

Given the period that Putnam describes as the peak of associational life in the United States, namely between the 1910s and 1950s, it is astonishing how he could neglect and downplay the ambiguity of the mechanisms he describes. The type of organisation might not matter for the generation of trust and solidarity, but it is of indubitable importance in determining which values and norms will be promoted. As Amy Gutman writes, “Among its members the Ku Klux Klan may cultivate solidarity and trust, reduce the incentives of opportunism and develop some ‘I’s into we, [...] [but] the associational premises of the solidaristic ties are hatred, degradation and denigration of fellow citizens and human beings.”²⁷ The norms and values that people learn within a civil society organisation need not be democratic or universal. They can be racist and xenophobic, limited to a specific group, or, for example, apply only to men or white people.²⁸

The Russian fascists in Harbin ran several different civil society organisations, among them an organisation for women, literature circles and several groups for children and youth. Since Russian youth in Harbin occupied the central position in the fascists’ effort to build a strong base in Manchuria, they will be at the focus of my analysis of fascist civil society in Harbin. The two biggest and most important youth organisations run by the fascists were the Union of Fascist Little Ones (Soiuz fashistskikh kroshek), for children between the age of three and ten, and the Vanguard Union (Soiuz avangarda), which split into two: one organisation for boys (Soiuz iunykh fashistov avangard) and one for girls (Soiuz iunykh fashistok avangardistok).²⁹ The organisers of the Union of Fascist Little Ones and the Vanguard Union saw their main task in training future fighters against the communists and preparing cadres for the erection of a fascist state in Russia. Besides sport and military training, youth organisations focused on education to instill Russian youth with values like discipline, self-sacrifice and obedience, to impart them with an exclusive and nationalistic identity, and promoted their image of the veritable and pure Russian culture. Children and teenagers were told that they were the true Russian youth, who would save Russia, the Russian people and the Russian culture from communist barbarism. The chapter on “dark” civil society will deal in detail with this construction of an exclusive nationalistic identity and the representation of a pure and true Russian culture by the fascists as well as the impact of these efforts on Russian youth in Harbin.

Civil Society and Publics

In his extensive description of civil society and the establishment of social capital, Putnam never really addresses the question of how social capital extends beyond immediate group members, especially if they promote values other than tolerance, thoughtfulness, respect, generosity and empathy. Put differently: how does, for example, a strong Ku Klux Klan *Klavern* (local chapter) affect a local community? This study will try to answer this question based on three case studies: the Russian Club, Russian education and anti-Semitism in Harbin.

The first possibility for civil society organisations to extend their sphere of influence and promote their objectives is to build networks with likeminded groups and individuals with similar goals and values. This can happen through double membership, cooperation among civil society organisations and even inter-group mergers or takeovers. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the efforts of the Russian fascists and other civil society organisations to build networks using the example of education. It will be demonstrated how they intentionally established close ties to other civil society organisations also tied to the field of education, like the Union of Russian Teachers (*Russkoe uchitel'skoe obshchestvo*) and the Parents Committee (*Roditel'skii komitet*), to widen their influence on Russian education.

Still, networking between civil society organisations alone is insufficient to explain the deep penetration of émigré society in Harbin with norms and values promoted by the fascists. To reach beyond the narrow circle of allied associations and sympathisers, civil society organisations, like the Russian fascists, whose agendas are mainly political and strive for far-reaching social change, must try to influence public opinion. As a preliminary remark, I want to clarify what distinguishes civil society from publics, since differences between the two are often blurred or simply ignored.

It is necessary to differentiate between civil society and publics functionally because of implications for the influence of the former on the later. First, civil society organisations, in comparison to publics, usually have a clearly defined purpose, require formal membership and the acceptance of specific rules determined by the organisation. And, perhaps more importantly, joining such an organisation is a conscious decision.

Publics are said to deal with issues of common concern that transcend private interests.³⁰ This is not necessarily true for every civil society organisation. One could argue that a sports club can teach youth to work in a team or give them more self-confidence by showing them the rewards of perseverance. The well-being of youth and children and their ability to integrate into modern society are surely issues of common concern, but this is not why children and teenagers want to join a sports club. Another example would be mutual help funds. People accede to such organisations for their own safety, not really for the safety of others. There are doubtlessly civil society organisations concerned with issues that go far beyond the private interests of their members, like a human rights group, but this is not a common characteristic of all civil society organisations. This leads to the conclusion that commitment to and identification with a civil society organisation is much stronger than it could be in any public. Members of a civil society organisation have at least one common interest important enough for them to dedicate time to it. And one also has to consider the tighter social control and the closer personal bonds engendered through face-to-face interactions in smaller, clearly defined groups.³¹

Civil society organisations can influence publics in several ways. First, civil society organisations can influence how people perceive a certain issue and their opinions about it by promoting norms and values within those organisations. Second, they can function as a mobilising factor for participation in public debate. They can call on their members to participate in a demonstration or a public gathering and often provide resources for participation, like transportation to a demonstration, posters and banners or information about a certain topic. Beyond that, many civil society organisations seek to extend their influence on society and to alter public opinion by actively participating in public discourse. To do so, they have two strategies at their disposal.

First, civil society organisations themselves can trigger and partially direct, or even stage, public debates to sensitise the public to their concerns and to promote their objectives in hopes of rallying support. In the case of the Russian fascists, I want to illustrate this process using the example of the Russian Club and the debate on Freemasonry in Harbin in 1933 and demonstrate how the fascists succeeded in using the Club to orchestrate public debates in Harbin, which in turn altered public opinion about such topics as the local YMCA.

Secondly, civil society organisations can engage in public discourses by promoting issues that have already attracted wide attention and offer their support. This strategy can enhance the prestige and recognition of a civil society organisation, possibly attract new members, and it can foster the growth of durable networks around the organisation. Further, as will be shown in my example dealing with the Russian fascists, émigré youth and extramural education, this approach can and often is exploited by organisations to promote their own agendas.

The last chapter will examine the growth of anti-Semitism in Harbin during the 1930s. Why was anti-Semitism on the rise and what role did the Russian fascists play? The initial point will be the famous case of Simon Kaspe, a young Jewish pianist, who was kidnapped and killed in August 1933 in Harbin. The Russian fascists skillfully used, if not provoked, conflict between Russians and Jews in Harbin on the basis of the kidnapping. With the help of the fascist newspaper *Nash Put'*, the fascists carried out a large-scale smear campaign against Jewry in general and against the local community in particular. The campaign actually dealt only superficially with the kidnapping and murder of Simon Kaspe or the subsequent trials. Instead, it reverted on the one hand to old anti-Semitic prejudices and stereotypes of Jews as exploiters and charlatans, which were common among the radical Russian right and many other Russians,³² and second to the more modern trope of the “Jewish capitalist–communist”. *Nash Put'* tailored their anti-Semitic propaganda to the local context and deliberately attacked important local Jewish businessmen and representatives of the Jewish community. Anti-Semitic agitation, especially the connection that the fascists drew between the Jews and communism, left obvious marks on the Russian émigré community in Harbin. The increase of anti-Semitism in Harbin during the 1930s even attracted attention beyond the Far East.³³

To illustrate the long-term success of the fascist propaganda campaign against the Jews, I will conclude by analysing the protest against the anti-religious policy of the Soviet Union in February 1937, which turned into the one of the largest anti-Semitic demonstrations in Harbin. For a week in February 1937 émigrés from Russia staged an extensive series of demonstrations and public gatherings to protest the anti-religious policy in the Soviet Union and a congress of atheists that occurred simultaneously in Moscow.³⁴ At the beginning of the week representatives of many different religions, including Rabbi Kislev,

participated in the opening event. By the end of the week, however, the fascists had successfully turned the campaign into an anti-Semitic rally, accusing the Jews of being the driving force behind the oppression of religion and the persecution of believers in the Soviet Union, while the fascists presented themselves as religion's guardian.

In the context of fascist propaganda and interrelations with Russian émigré society, the different forms of frame alignment proposed by Benford and Snow are particularly enlightening.³⁵ Benford and Snow suggest that the strategy employed to recruit supporters depends on the proximity of the receiver's frame to one's own frame. In simple terms, it makes a difference whether one tries to persuade those with similar values and belief systems to join or those who hold divergent values and beliefs. Their rigid classification of frame alignment into the types of bridging (to connect to people who already agree with the speaker), amplification (to build on existing opinions to persuade people), extension (to reinforce or change beliefs) and transformation (to expand one's own frame to draw in others) was not directly applicable. Nonetheless, frame alignment provides some useful clues as to why the fascists chose particular issues over others and why they presented them as they did.

Literature and Sources

Research on Harbin first gained momentum during the 1990s in China and Russia. The impetus for the increasing interest in Harbin was the debate about the city's centennial and the related question of Harbin's identity as either Chinese or Russian. Should the beginning of the railway's construction in 1898 or the establishment of the Special District in 1921 mark the foundation of the city?³⁶ This starting point is probably one of the reasons why the historiography on Harbin is, more often than not, nationally divided, with each group promoting their own narrative and objectives: Russians tell the story about Russian Harbin; Jews about Jewish Harbin.³⁷ These narrow perspectives are particularly evident in many of the memoirs of former *Kharbinsy* published in recent years.³⁸ Each tends to emphasise their own group's uniqueness, solidarity, achievements and contribution to the city's history and have a tendency to omit or minimise the more negative and troubling aspects of life in Harbin, like drug addiction and suicide among the

Russian youth. Moreover, Chinese writing on Harbin has also been seriously restricted by official ideology and doctrine, although Chinese researchers have recently begun to emancipate themselves from such restrictions.

The ethnocentric and nation-based perspective on Harbin's history has been destabilised recently. Due to a growing interest in transculturality and entangled history in the humanities, Harbin has also attracted attention among international researchers. They often focus not on one individual group, but on interrelations, processes of exchange and conflicts between the different communities.³⁹ Since this work mainly deals with Russian émigré, while also touching on the Jewish community, it will unfortunately offer few insights on, for example, the relations and coexistence of Russians and Chinese in Harbin, but it might help to tackle another shortcoming in the historiography on Harbin: the common representation of ethnic and national groups as homogeneous entities, as in "the Harbin Russians" for example.⁴⁰ Such representations grossly overlook, or choose to ignore, the diversity, divisions and conflicts within ethnic and national communities. Such an approach blinds one to other kinds than ethnic affiliations, such as those based on economic and social status. Therefore, an awareness of the diversity of various communities might also help to lever the nationally segregated view of Harbin to some degree. Furthermore, without a more realistic picture of the inner life and dynamics of individual communities, obtaining a sufficient grasp on the interrelations between ethnic and national groups seems unlikely.

The decade of the 1930s, during which Harbin belonged to Manchukuo, appears to be the unloved stepchild of academic research. With the exception of Elena Aurilene and Irina Potapova: *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go: "Emigrantskoe pravitel'stvo"* [Russians in Manchukuo. Emigrant Government]⁴¹ and John Stephan's book on the Russian fascists, there are very few publications on the daily life of the Russian community.⁴² This might be partly due to the intractability of the circumstances, but in academic writing as well as in memoirs, changes, discontinuities and instability are sometimes downplayed or skipped in favor of a narrative emphasising continuity and stability. Of course, the Japanese invasion, brutal violence against Chinese civilians and the merciless suppression of any resistance against the new regime are mentioned in monographs, articles and memoirs, but the events seem to leave the community generally unscathed. The overall picture such

narratives impart is that there were certainly repression and violence, but the Russian émigrés in Harbin persisted as always. Since I will touch on quotidian issues, like education, youth organisations, drug addiction, hooliganism or suicide among Russian youth repeatedly, this work will enhance our knowledge on life in Harbin during the 1930s.

In the context of nostalgia and whitewashing, it is also not surprising that little has been published about the Russian fascists in Harbin, despite the fact that they are mentioned in many publications on Harbin. For instance none of the former members of fascist youth groups has written an autobiography, and if they have, the issue was not raised. The only two monographs dealing extensively with the Russian fascists are John Stephan's *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* and *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia: 1920–1945* gg. [Fascism and the Russian Emigration 1920–45] by Aleksandr Vasil'evich Okorokov.⁴³ Aside from these two books, there are only a handful of Russian articles, and one in English by Erwin Oberländer from 1966, on the Russian fascists in Harbin.⁴⁴

None of these studies treats the daily life of the Russian fascists or their interrelationships with the Russian community in Harbin.⁴⁵ Therefore the history of the Russian fascists in Harbin still contains a surfeit of open questions. For example, all of the publications mentioned above refer only very briefly and superficially to fascist organisations for children and teenagers. Nor do these authors deal with the fascists' social engagement, their role in Russian education or the local economy and the effects of fascist anti-Semitism on the rest of the population. This might explain why the Russian fascists are portrayed as either as a marginal group, a crime syndicate or as a dangerous, but isolated phenomenon detached from the rest of the Russian community. The Russian fascists are said to have "terrorized the population and above all the mass of emigrants."⁴⁶ In contrast, I will argue that the fascists played a very important role in the daily life of Russian émigrés in Harbin, though not necessarily because most Russians in Harbin were fascists of conviction, but because of the fascists' social engagement, their networks and their very active participation in public discourse.

*

Researchers interested in Harbin can refer to a multitude of sources despite increasingly restrictive access policies to libraries and archives in

China.⁴⁷ In particular there are plentiful sources dealing with fascist ideology. The All-Russian Fascist Party published its own serials, called the Library of the Russian Fascists (*Bibliotekha rossiiskogo fashista*), including numerous booklets, brochures and the like on ideology, strategy and other topics like the “Jewish world conspiracy,” the Freemasons and the history of the fascist movement. The most important and widespread publication regarding the party’s ideology and strategy was the so-called *ABCs of Fascism* [*Azbuka fashizma*],⁴⁸ which were to have been studied by each member. Additionally, I have also consulted the various statutes of fascist youth organisations as well as different versions of *Azbuka fashizma* intended for children and teenagers.

Generally speaking, though, this work is largely based on analyses of the Harbin’s vivid daily Russian press, whose scale is indicated by the fact that between 1918 and 1945 a total of 115 newspapers and 275 journals were published in Russian in Harbin.⁴⁹ The main source has been the fascist daily newspaper *Nash Put’* (Our Way), which was published in Harbin from September 1933⁵⁰ until April 1938, when the newspaper was closed by the local authorities.⁵¹ *Nash Put’* had a circulation of approximately 4,000 copies⁵² and was distributed throughout Manchuria, China and beyond, but most copies were sold in Harbin and its immediate surroundings. The head of the All-Russian Fascist Party, Konstantin Rodzaevskii, served as its editor-in-chief, though the party always took great pains to impart the impression that the All-Russian Fascist Party and *Nash Put’* were independent from each other, probably to enhance the credibility of the newspaper. Besides Rodzaevskii, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Karmilov, Vladimir Vladimirovich Kibardin and Vladimir Nikolaevich Vasilenko, all influential party ideologists, were among the most important editors of *Nash Put’*. The front pages usually contained international news, emphasising fascist countries like Germany, Italy and Spain as well as the Soviet Union and communism in general. The newspaper also published local news relating to the Russian community in Harbin and along the railway tracks. Of course, *Nash Put’* also devoted considerable attention to the All-Russian Fascist Party and its activities.⁵³ Further, the newspaper frequently contained special pages for women and to an even greater extent for the Russian youth. The most outstanding characteristic of *Nash Put’* was its unmistakable anti-Semitism. As staunch disciples of the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy, the

editors and contributors of *Nash Put'* ascribed nearly everything, from world affairs to the closure of a local shop to some secret Jewish intervention. Although hardly less anti-Semitic, the second periodical of the Russian fascists, the journal *Natsiia* (Nation), only plays a tangential role in my work, since *Natsiia* concentrated more on ideological debates and fascist theory than on daily life.

Beyond *Nash Put'* the most important dailies in Harbin during the 1930s haven been consulted: *Kharbinskoe Vremia* (Harbin Times), *Zaria* (Dawn), *Rupor* (The Mouthpiece) and *Gun Bao*. *Kharbinskoe Vremia* was the most widely read daily in Harbin during the 1930s and reached a circulation of 25,000.⁵⁴ The newspaper was established in 1931 by the Japanese consulate under its chief editor, Osava. Accordingly, the paper tended to represent the views and interests of the Japanese and functioned as the mouthpiece of the new regime. The newspaper *Zaria* was published from April 1920 until August 1945 and was, therefore, one of the longest-lasting newspapers in Harbin. Slightly less popular than *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, *Zaria* reached a circulation of around 10,000 copies.⁵⁵ In 1942 *Zaria* merged with *Kharbinskoe Vremia* and became *Vremia* (Times).⁵⁶ *Rupor* was an evening newspaper with a fairly liberal orientation, published in Harbin from September or October 1921.⁵⁷ The newspaper is said to have been very popular among Russian émigrés, which is not surprising given its transformation through the mid-1930s into a populist tabloid that published increasingly sensationalist reports on violence, crime and scandals in Harbin.⁵⁸ The bilingual newspaper *Gun Bao* was established in December 1926 and was the first newspaper to appear in Russian and Chinese.⁵⁹ In addition to the daily press, I consulted several journals and periodicals, in particular those published by different youth organisations, like *Avantgarde*, the journal of the fascist youth organisations, or the eponymous journal of the Boy Scout organisation Musketeer.

But despite this multiplicity of newspapers, they are not unproblematic sources. During the Manchukuo period the Russian press, like other newspapers, was under the tight surveillance of the local authorities. Reports on “unwelcome” events or topics were suppressed, certain editions, in particular of newspapers published outside of Harbin or Manchukuo, were sometimes not delivered.⁶⁰ In serious cases the authorities did not shy from closing down newspapers entirely, as in the case of the *Geral'd Kharbina* (Harbin Herald), a newspaper under British ownership, which was banned in May 1933.⁶¹ To compensate for the

difficulties caused by censorship, foreign, newspapers, like the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and, in particular, *Israel's Messenger*, a Shanghai-based Jewish newspaper, have also been consulted whenever possible. Either way, during the period in question the press landscape in Harbin was still quite lively and diverse, until numerous newspapers, including *Rupor* and *Gun Bao*, were closed during 1937–8 in the course of Manchukuo's development towards a surveillance state. Further, many of the topics and phenomena of interest were only marginally affected by censorship, if at all. For example, the local authorities never attempted to curtail the anti-Semitic propaganda in *Nash Put'* in earnest, despite numerous appeals and sharp criticism from several international Jewish organisations and *Israel's Messenger*.

But why newspapers? First, newspapers provide a general overview of important events in Harbin, which other sources, like memoirs, cannot provide due to their limited perspective. This matters since the literature on Harbin in the 1930s is rather sparse. Analysing newspapers also allows one to identify issues, events and topics of general interest and concern. Further, such analysis enables tracing public discourses on such issues since they reflected and reproduced in the media. As the number of Russian newspapers and their circulation, which reached 30,000 to 40,000 per day, show, newspapers were very important in Harbin. The price for an annual subscription ranged between 8 and 26 Manchukuo dollars – an affordable amount, since an average employee made about 35 to 40 dollars a month.⁶² The majority of Russians in Harbin probably read one, if not two, newspapers daily. Therefore, almost Russians in Harbin were exposed to these public discourses to some degree.

Second, newspapers are vital for an analysis of civil society in Harbin. While other sources, like statutes or minutes of meetings, also provide information about organisations and associations, these sources are insufficient to analyse of the relations between different civil society organisations and the public. They neither shed light on the connections and networks between different organisations, nor do they say much about the interrelations between civil society and the public. By contrast, newspapers can, do and did function as a kind of interface between the two – not only for researchers, but for civil society organisations in Harbin themselves.

Through newspapers civil society communicated with each other as well as with the wider public. Civil society organisations represented

themselves in newspapers and were represented. They sought new members or supporters and promoted their causes. Above all, some civil society organisations, like the Russian fascists, used newspapers to participate in public discourses or to initiate discourse on issues important to them and, therefore, could alter public opinion. The Russian fascists and the Revisionist Zionists even published their own newspapers. *Nash Put'* was vital for the fascists to maintain contact with the émigré community and to promote their values and *Weltanschauung* (world view). The fascists, for instance, carried out their campaign against the local Jewish community through *Nash Put'*. The public response to such tactics and their impacts can then again be found in newspaper articles.

CHAPTER 1

THE SETTING: HARBIN

The Beginnings

Russia founded the city of Harbin on Chinese soil in 1898 in the course of building the Chinese Eastern Railway to connect Chita with Vladivostok. This sentence alone can induce condemnation and criticism, not so much on the part of the Russians, but the Chinese.¹ When the centennial anniversary of the city approached in the 1990s a heated debate arose about the correct date for the celebration in Harbin and beyond. Most people in China rejected the notion that the beginning of the railway's construction in June 1898 also marked the birth of the city, because "attributing the foundation of the city to the Chinese Eastern Railway strikes a blow to China's dignity." Alternatively, many proposed to celebrate the creation of the so-called Special District in October of 1921, when the Chinese took Harbin over from the Russians.² The dispute over the original founders' nationality and the proper date of Harbin's establishment illustrates the persistent conflict over the identity of Harbin as either a Russian or Chinese city. Regardless, from an outside perspective it is undeniable that both Russians and Chinese played a role in building Harbin.

At first glance, the Russian government had very pragmatic reasons to build the railway on Chinese instead of Russian territory. The distance to cross was reduced considerably, and construction was much easier in the flat Manchurian³ plains than along the Amur River. But pragmatic considerations were not the sole motivation; the desire to gain control of the region was another reason for that particular route. The construction

of the railway through Chinese territory was a way to gain a foothold in the region and offered a possibility to exploit the rich resources of Manchuria. The Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte called this strategy “peaceful economic penetration.”⁴

Representatives of the Russian Tsar and the Chinese Emperor began negotiating the construction of the railway shortly after the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894–5. Russia had aided China to rebuff Japanese demands for the entire Liaodong peninsula. In return for their support, the Russian government pressed for concessions to build their railway through Manchuria. The secret Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance was consequently signed in June 1896.⁵ Article 4 of the treaty outlined the Chinese Eastern Railway as a purely commercial enterprise. To ensure the apolitical nature of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to prevent compromising Chinese sovereignty, the Russian government was formally prohibited from exercising any direct control over the railway. The company itself was formally to be jointly managed by Chinese and Russians or, rather, the Russo-Chinese Bank on behalf of the Russian government. In reality the Chinese were fobbed off with the rather ceremonial post of the president, while real power lay with the Russian vice-president. The contract between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank was signed in September 1896. Whether by accident or design, the fact that the treaty was drafted in French led to a variety of disagreements about the character of the railway company and its rights and privileges. The company’s administrative rights were a particular source of contention. The word used for “administration” in the Chinese version of the contract was *jingli*, meaning exclusively the administration of a business, not political administration, which would have been *guanli*.⁶ This “mistranslation” was the prelude for a struggle between China and Russia over the control of the railway and the region in general, in which the latter usually prevailed. In the following years, Russia used every pretext to extend their control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, to enlarge the company’s purview within the concessions – a stretch of land of six miles on each side of the tracks and to marginalise the Chinese government. For instance, in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion, which swept over Northern China in 1900 but only sporadically affected Manchuria, the railway company expanded its jurisdiction over all people, Russian and Chinese alike, who lived or worked inside the concession.⁷ The post of the president of the Chinese Eastern Railway, contractually reserved for a Chinese occupant, was vacant

from 1900 until 1920. The railroad's civil department gradually assumed control over virtually every aspect of daily life, including education, taxation, medical facilities, the police and the court system. The Chinese Eastern Railway was always more than a simple business; it was also "the means and the end, the alpha and the omega, of Russian colonialism in Manchuria."⁸

Due to its location at a railroad junction, Harbin quickly developed into one of the commercial and economic centers in the region and attracted many workers, traders and entrepreneurs representing several nationalities, including French, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Turks and Greeks in addition to the Russians and Chinese. Thousands of Russians and Chinese gravitated to Harbin, due to the employment and business opportunities offered by the railway company. In particular Russian Jews settled in the city, attracted by the special privileges granted to them in Harbin. Since the city was located outside of the empire, and the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway wanted to promote the economic development of the region, the civic administration ignored the economic and social restrictions that made life difficult for Jews in Russia proper.⁹

In 1903, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 people lived in Harbin, and the great influx of Russians from the north and Chinese from the south continued until the 1930s. By 1912 the population had risen to around 110,000 in the greater Harbin area, including 25,000 Chinese in the adjoining settlement of Fujidian (Daowai), which lay outside the concession.¹⁰ As early as 1913, 53 nationalities and 45 languages were represented among the residents of Harbin proper.¹¹ With few exceptions, they lived together fairly peacefully.

The Russian Revolution in February of 1917 and the Bolshevik takeover in October of the same year disrupted everything.¹² After the news had reached Harbin, General Horvath, the effective head of the Chinese Eastern Railway since 1902, was unable to assert himself and maintain order when tensions arose between Bolshevik-oriented workers and supporters of the old regime. When crime and violence on the streets of Harbin threatened to erupt out of control and the Russian-dominated police force was on the brink of dissolution, Chinese troops stepped in and restored order. General Horvath had to resign soon afterwards from his post as the director of the railway company.¹³ This was the precursor to the takeover of Harbin by the Chinese, who in the

following years gradually gained control over the city and the former Russian concessions along the railway line.¹⁴ In September 1920 China ceased recognising the Russian Diplomatic Mission as well as the Russian consulates, and a couple of days later on 23 September the Chinese government annulled Russia's extraterritorial rights and ended all relations with representatives of the fallen Tsarist Empire. As a result, thousands of Russians who refused to obtain a Soviet passport became stateless overnight.

The collapse of the Russian Empire and consequently of Russian control in Harbin for the first time confronted the Chinese with the problem of how to deal with a sizable foreign population under their direct control. To cope with this new challenge, the Chinese elite launched an administrative experiment unprecedented in China. As opposed to simply integrating Harbin and the former concessions along the tracks into the Chinese administrative system, they sought to include the Russians. As a result, the Special District of the Three Eastern Provinces was created on 31 October 1921. Through the creation of the Special District, the Chinese gradually gained full control over the local Russian court system, municipal governments and the police, but without marginalising their new subjects.¹⁵ Instead, the Russians were largely included in the new administrative system. And even though the new Chinese-controlled administration of Harbin and, in particular, the court system attracted considerable criticism among the foreign residents of the city – the Russian lawyer Vologodskii called it “gogolesque” and “operetta-like”¹⁶ – the creation of the Special District was a pragmatic solution.

Since Russia was in turmoil and the old Tsarist regime had tumbled, the question arose as to what should happen with the Chinese Eastern Railway. In October 1920 the Chinese government reached an agreement with the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the French parent company of the railway enterprise, formally known as the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the railroad's majority shareholder. China would manage the railroad alone until the Russian state became functional again. In the course of the negotiations the Chinese also succeeded in amending regulations that had previously been to their own disadvantage. For example, all lower-ranking railway posts would be evenly distributed between Chinese and Russians, and in future the railway company would be a strictly commercial enterprise, prohibited from engaging in any political activity whatsoever. Political

and administrative functions previously performed by the railway company devolved to the Chinese. Boris V. Ostroumov, an engineer and former member of the White Army, became the new director and stayed in office until the Sino-Soviet Agreement in 1924. But under his leadership, contrary to Chinese intentions, the Chinese Eastern Railway remained a stronghold for the Russians in the region. Under Ostroumov's management, the company in opposition to previous agreements still preferentially hired Russians over Chinese, especially for the Chinese Eastern Railway police forces.¹⁷

Already in 1920 the Chinese government had initiated talks with Soviet officials about the future of the railway, but the unstable conditions in the early period of the Soviet Union rendered an agreement impossible. The disappointment with Ostroumov revived the negotiations with the Soviet Union and led to the Sino-Soviet Agreement in 1924: the Chinese Eastern Railway was supposed to be jointly and equally managed by China and the Soviet Union. A.N. Ivanov, who had been the railroad's chief controller of the railway under Ostroumov, became the new director of the company.¹⁸ However, this new partnership proved to be at least as problematic as the old one.

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To adapt to the new circumstances was not the only challenge Russians and Chinese faced in the early 1920s. In the years following the revolution between 100,000 and 200,000 refugees from Russia flooded the city. Especially after the Civil War in Siberia ended in January 1920 with the fall of Admiral Kolchak's Omsk Government, and in the Russian Far East in October 1922 when the Priamur Government based in Vladivostok fell, thousands of Russians crossed the border into Manchuria. Peasants and workers accounted for the bulk of refugees, but they also included many former soldiers and officers of the White Movement, Russian nobles and priests, German Baptists, members of the intelligentsia, who all for one reason or another could not live under Bolshevik rule.¹⁹ Among the 15,000 refugees that arrived in Harbin in the first half of alone 1920 were:

17 generals, 8 former ministers, 13 clergymen, 239 landowners, 43 doctors, 40 engineers, 6 former governors and vice-governors, 5 aides-de-camp of the imperial court, 3 railroad managers, 850

gendarmerie officers, 3 leading bankers, 11 owners of large Russian shipping companies, 3 ladies-in-waiting of the Tsar's family, 1 imperial head chef, 2 princes, 4 barons of high rank and 2 commanding officers of military districts.²⁰

To be sure, not all refugees stayed in Harbin. Some moved on to other cities with substantial foreign communities, like Shanghai, or left China for Australia, France or the United States. Still, living conditions for newcomers as well as long-established citizens of Harbin deteriorated. It was impossible to provide adequate housing for everyone, and the unemployment rate was very high. The Russian poet Kruzenshtern-Peterets remembers: "At this time Harbin was clogged with refugees: there was a crisis in housing, a crisis in employment, wherever you looked – crisis everywhere."²¹

The situation of Russian émigrés in Harbin was further complicated and aggravated by problems regarding their citizenship. When China ceased recognising the Tsarist government and terminated all relations to its representatives, there were immediate and severe repercussions for all former subjects of the Tsar living in Manchuria. Since China no longer recognised their passports, they all suddenly became stateless. The question of citizenship became especially urgent in 1924, since the Sino-Soviet Agreement stipulated that the railway company would employ only Chinese and Soviet citizens. Some willingly and gladly obtained Soviet citizenship, others simply did not want to lose their jobs and became so-called radishes – red on the outside, but white on the inside. Others obtained Chinese citizenship, but a considerable number of the Russians remained stateless and many lost their jobs.²²

The agreement between China and the Soviet Union regarding the railway also caused an influx of Soviet workers and railroad personnel into Harbin. After 1924, "red Harbin and white Harbin lived side by side," an uneasy coexistence that resulted in regular tensions and occasional violence.²³ Soviet employees of the railroad celebrated the commemoration day of the October Revolution, while for many Russian émigrés this was a day of mourning. Émigré children were excluded from schools run by the railroad. Still, the gravity of the situation in daily life should not be exaggerated. Apparently, many "white" adolescents, who were regularly involved in fistfights with Soviet youth, were still quite willing to date a "red" girl from the Soviet Union.²⁴

In 1929, persistent and intensifying attempts on the part of the Soviet Union to use their share of the Chinese Eastern Railway for political purposes and Chinese desires to strengthen their sovereignty over Manchuria led to a major conflict.²⁵ Although the conflict had many causes, it revolved primarily around the hiring policies of the railway company, especially among the police forces and railway guards, which until 1929 disadvantaged Chinese and non-Soviet Russians workers. For example, in 1929 the Soviet management attempted to dismiss all émigré policemen and simultaneously ordered the police to curtail any anti-Soviet activities in Harbin. In return, on 27 May the Chinese authorities ordered the arrest of 38 Soviet citizens for communist propaganda and undermining the Special District's authority before searching the Soviet consulate. In July the Chinese seized the telegraph of the Chinese Eastern Railway, dissolved several communist organisations, like the Soviet Trade Mission or the railway's Soviet Labor Union and dismissed all holders of a Soviet passport from the company. In August 1929 the confrontation assumed alarming proportions when Soviet troops attacked villages and stations on Chinese territory along the border. The conflict was finally settled in December of the same year, and a new joint administration was established. Nonetheless, the position of the Soviet Union in the Chinese Eastern Railway had been substantially weakened, and many Soviet employees were dismissed and left with little choice but to return home or to join the ranks of stateless émigrés in Harbin.²⁶ In any event, the agreement between the Soviet Union and China was soon rendered obsolete when Japan, the "third player" in the history of Harbin, entered the stage.

Manchukuo

The Japanese presence in Manchuria dates back to the nineteenth century. After Japan defeated China in 1895 in the first Sino-Japanese War over Korea, the Japanese sought concessions on the strategically important Liaodong Peninsula as part of the peace treaty to protect their interests in Korea. With the support of the Russian Empire, this demand was temporarily rebuffed, but after Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty forced the Tsarist regime to transfer all its rights in South Manchuria to Japan. Japan won a 25-year leasehold over the Liaodong Peninsula as well as the

southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway (renamed the South Manchurian Railway, hereafter SMR), including the railway zone along the tracks. In the subsequent years, particularly following the annexation of Korea in 1910 and during World War I, Japan was able to expand its influence and consolidate control over the region even further.²⁷

After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in China in the course of the revolution of 1911, Manchuria gradually came under the control of the warlord, Zhang Zuolin. Formally the region was still part of China, but despite calling himself a Chinese nationalist, Zhang Zuolin reigned over Manchuria as if it were an independent state. Furthermore, Zhang's ambitions to extend his rule throughout China led to frequent and very costly military campaigns against the Chinese heartland, which seriously burdened the Manchurian economy. His relations to the Japanese and, in particular, the Kwantung Army were also quite tense. Zhang was intermittently supported by the Japanese, but his sharp criticism of the Japanese involvement in Manchuria was a source of friction. Moreover, the Japanese feared that Zhang Zuolin's military campaigns might ruin the regional economy and, in case of defeat, a new government might be even more hostile to Japan than Zhang Zuolin himself. As a result, Japanese agents assassinated Zhang Zuolin in 1928. But his son Zhang Xueliang, who succeeded his father in power, was even more hostile towards the Japanese. In the eyes of the Japanese, he did not show any consideration for their economic interests, and they disapproved of his intention to reach an agreement with the Kuomintang government to reintegrate Manchuria into China proper.²⁸ Losing patience with Zhang Xueliang, Japanese officers of the Kwantung Army staged the so-called Mukden Incident. On 18 September 1931, Japanese soldiers blew up the tracks of the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway near Mukden (today Shenyang) and used the explosion as a pretext to attack the nearby Chinese garrison. In the following months the Kwantung Army occupied the four provinces of Rehe, Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang, as well as parts of Mongolia, which collectively became the state of Manchukuo on 1 March 1932.²⁹ The nominal head of state was the last Chinese Emperor, Pu Yi, who first became president and was crowned Emperor of Manchukuo in 1934.

Manchukuo is typically characterised as a puppet state totally dominated by Japan and subservient to its needs. In China it is very

common to refer to Manchukuo as “false Manchukuo” (*wei Manshouguo*) to emphasise the illegitimacy of the state.³⁰ But this perception has recently been reconsidered and somewhat revised. Instead of simply denouncing it as a puppet state, Manchukuo is now increasingly perceived as a state characterised and driven by ambivalence, paradoxes and contradictions.³¹ This reassessment of the predominant narrative, which is principally characterised by nationalism and victimisation, allows the examination of aspects, developments and approaches that researchers have so far overlooked. For example, the long-term effects of modernisation and industrialisation or Manchukuo as a retreat and testing ground for Japanese liberals are neglected topics worthy of investigation.³² Historiographically speaking, the tendency to extrapolate from the conditions of the 1940s in Manchukuo, when the regime was exceedingly repressive and all other considerations were subordinated to the war effort, over the entire period of Manchukuo is even more problematic.³³ This habit leads researchers to disregard the process of development and to overlook conflicts, diverging opinions, movements and interests among the different factions in the new administration in early Manchukuo, before the newly established state had been consolidated. Conversely, a broader perspective must not downplay or even deny the brutality of the regime and the atrocities it committed, like in Unit 731, a facility for biological and bacteriological experiments on humans, nor the suffering and great losses of – mainly Chinese – victims. Between 1932 and 1940 alone, approximately 66,000 people in Manchuria were killed by Japanese forces.³⁴

To overcome these deficiencies, the history of Manchukuo will be divided into three phases. The first ranges from the beginning of the Japanese invasion in 1931 until 1933, when most organised and regular Chinese resistance had collapsed.³⁵ The second phase stretches from 1933 until 1936/37. During this period, the new institutions were still being erected and resolutions were often rather provisional and tentative. There were still regular debates, disagreements and contrasting opinions among the Japanese rulers and administrators about the future of the new state.³⁶ Furthermore, in this early period of Manchukuo one can still observe an effort to involve the local population and “to win the hearts and minds” of the local inhabitants on the part of at least some Japanese factions. Vast resources were dedicated to building infrastructure, to reconstituting the education system, to promoting and supporting the

different religious congregations or to spreading the new ideology, for example by organising conferences and distributing literature. As the war with China began in June of 1937, but also during its prelude, the new state, its economy, resources and its people were increasingly drafted to support the Japanese war effort. This development also seriously impinged upon and altered the ideological foundation of Manchukuo and resulted in an increasing cultural orientation towards Japan and everything Japanese.³⁷ These shifts in the history of Manchukuo are particularly evident in relation to the ideological foundations of the new state, including the “harmony of the races”, the “kingly way”, and education.

Furthermore, the Russian émigrés, who are the focus of this work, occupied a special position outside the new state's identity politics and state building efforts in early Manchukuo until 1937, giving these émigrés more latitude than the rest of the population. Within a circumscribed framework the Russian émigrés maintained a certain degree of administrative autonomy. For instance, the émigré education system was left largely untouched, and the work of most civil society organisations of Russian émigrés, with some exceptions, continued relatively undisturbed until 1937. In the course of the final period the Russian émigrés gradually lost this privileged position and were increasingly pressured to integrate and to become “Manchukuoans”.

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When soldiers marched into Harbin in 1932 Japan was already experienced in administrating colonies, but owing among other things to its formal independence, Manchukuo differed substantially from Japan's formal colonies, which had far-reaching effects on the ideological foundations as well as the identity politics of the new state. The inhabitants of Korea and Taiwan were considered to be subjects of the Japanese Emperor and therefore had to be assimilated and would finally be fully legally and administratively integrated into the realm. By contrast, in Manchukuo the initial goal was to create a distinctive identity separate from Japan.³⁸ Due to the multicultural and multiethnic composition of the Manchurian population and attempts to distance the new state from growing Chinese nationalism, this identity could neither be based on ethnicity nor on the Western notion of the nation. To cope with the reality of a multiethnic and multicultural

state and to create a common national identity based on shared interests and a common goal, namely the building of Manchukuo, the new rulers propagated the so-called “harmony of the races”, which became one of the state’s founding principles. “Harmony of the races” meant that the so-called five “founding races” of Manchukuo, namely Han, Manchu, Mongols, Koreans and Japanese, were to be equal and cooperate in building Manchukuo. “Harmony of the races” did not imply homogenisation; rather, each “race” would retain its unique character and be esteemed for it. This inclusiveness across ethnic and class divisions distinguished “harmony of the races” from both nationalism and communism. Consequently the principle of the “harmony of the races” was simultaneously presented as an Asian alternative to aggressive Western nationalism or to “narrow” Chinese nationalism and communism.³⁹ Accordingly, the 1932 Proclamation of the Establishment of Manchukuo stated:

There shall be no discrimination with respect to either race or caste among those people who now reside within the territory of the new State, including the races of the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Japanese and Koreans; nationals of other countries as well may, upon application, acquire, as permanent residents, equal treatment with others and their rights shall be guaranteed thereby.⁴⁰

The notion of the “harmony of the races” first arose within the Manchurian Youth League, an organisation founded in the Kwantung territory before the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, probably as a reaction to increasing Chinese nationalism in the region,⁴¹ but it also had precursors in Chinese thought. Japanese thinkers often invoked Sun Yatsen, the founder of the Kuomintang and first President of Republican China, as the source of the principle of “harmony of the races”. To distance himself from anti-Manchu attitudes among Chinese nationalists, Sun stated in a renowned 1912 speech that “Chinese national” should refer to any Asian born on Chinese territory and not be narrowed to Han Chinese. Sun also mentioned the five races of China.⁴² This and other frequent recourses to Chinese or Confucian models were probably attempts to gain the support of the local Chinese population.

The second principle of early Manchukuo was the “kingly way” (*wangdao*) meaning, roughly, to “follow the mandate of heaven and bring

peace to the people,” and can also be traced back to Confucianism. It represented the opposite to *badao*: “western” hegemonic rule.⁴³ Conceptually, *wangdao* was based on the morality and virtues of the leader, whose legitimacy depended on providing fair and impartial government instead of relying on raw power. The most troubling aspect of the “kingly way” for the Japanese in Manchuria was the legitimization of the ruler by “the mandate of heaven,” which was usually interpreted as “declared through the will of the people” and, therefore, would at least theoretically allow for a change of power by popular uprising or revolution.⁴⁴ But since other aspects of the principle were vague and malleable, it could be adjusted to the needs of the new regime and remained expedient. As the historian and sinologist Naitō Konan asked in 1933, “This kingly way slogan is being repeated and celebrated as the nation-building ideal for Manchukuo, [...] but could someone please explain what it actually means?”⁴⁵

The equal treatment of Japanese, Chinese, Mongols and Manchu that had been promised and the “harmony between the races” was never realised because the majority of the Japanese in Manchukuo were unwilling to forgo their privileges and the common self-perception of the Japanese among the new rulers as a superior and unique race. The obvious discrimination in favor of the Japanese in daily life, as was evident in segregated tram cars and living quarters reserved for the Japanese in Dairen, for example, dispelled any appeal the principle might have had for Han and Manchu living in Manchukuo.⁴⁶ Still, the ideals formally contained in the policy held enough promise to reveal contradictions in the Japanese colonies. Administrators and officials in Taiwan and Korea repeatedly pressured for the “harmony of the races” and the “kingly way” policies to be rescinded, fearing that they might foment unrest and even rebellion in the formal colonies.⁴⁷

It would be too easy to dismiss the principle of the “harmony of the races” and the “kingly way” as mere hollow propaganda or masks for colonial rule. Though some Japanese contributed to the project of state-building in Manchukuo cynically, a considerable number truly believed in the new state and its ideology, and they were seriously committed to the development of Manchukuo as a state independent of Japan.⁴⁸ Some were also quite critical of Japan and hoped Manchukuo could serve as a model or corrective for Japan itself. For example, the prominent and influential Sinologist and journalist Tachibana Shiraki⁴⁹ believed: “[...]

that in the multiethnic state promised by the harmony of the five ethnic groups, the downtrodden Chinese peasantry would find liberation from rapacious landlords and Japanese expansionism would make peace with Chinese nationalism.”⁵⁰

In particular, in government run school education there was a fairly ubiquitous and sincere commitment to realising a new form of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between different ethnicities as well as severe criticism of Japan and Japanese nationalism. For example, Kamimura Tetsuya, the first General Affairs Chief of the Education Ministry in Manchukuo, in a book for Chinese school teachers, questioned the idea of uniqueness and superiority of the Japanese: “All of the leading countries have mistaken ideas of selfish nationalism. Even present-day Japan is influenced by this narrow nationalism.”⁵¹

The education system in Manchukuo exemplified that early Manchukuo was more than a place for members of the Kwantung army and others to fulfill their imperial ambitions. It was also a testing ground for ideas propounded by liberals and the Japanese left, who were under increasing pressure in Japan itself.⁵² Until the end of the 1930s representatives of the so-called Reform or New Education Movement, which were inspired by Western reformers like Pestalozzi and Montessori, dominated education in Manchukuo.⁵³ They focused on practical learning, promoted the use of physical objects in teaching and believed that, instead of reinforcing group conformity, the individual should be encouraged.⁵⁴ Giving a speech at a pedagogical training seminar in spring 1932, the same Kamimura Tetsuya from the Education Ministry said:

We can describe a pen, tell about its shape, and observe that despite a flaw at the top, the ink still comes out well. We give this information to the student and the student can make a judgment based upon that information. This is education, letting the student make his own choices rather than giving our own predetermined judgment. Propaganda is the opposite, telling them that there is only one pen and that they don't have a choice. This kind of education is truly an evil thing, but tragically it is the norm today, not just in the Chinese Republic, but also in Japan [...] My hope is that education can be separated from propaganda and become true education.⁵⁵

This understanding of education was far removed from pure indoctrination or pressure to assimilate. The speech was also printed and sent to Chinese teachers throughout Manchukuo.

In contrast to Taiwan and Korea, education in Manchukuo did not aim for cultural adaption and assimilation until the school reform 1937/8. Japanese language education, for instance, only played a minor role in schools. Until the school reform in 1937/8, usually just two hours per week were dedicated to Japanese instruction, which contrasts starkly with, say, Korea, where even in first grade Japanese was taught for ten hours per week.⁵⁶ Similarly, Japanese culture, history, and traditions were nearly absent from early Manchukuo schoolbooks. Instead, in accordance with the principle that each race in Manchukuo should be appreciated for its particular characteristics, schoolbooks focused on Chinese or Mongol traditions and culture with a heavy emphasis on Confucianism.⁵⁷ For example, a 1934 schoolbook for Chinese used in the third grade included one chapter on the Chinese mountain climbing festival and one on traditional Mongolian customs.⁵⁸

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The year 1932 when the Japanese conquered Harbin, commenced with one of the most severe incidences of interethnic violence between Russians and Chinese in the history of the city, demonstrating how tense the relation between those two groups had become in the preceding years. The trigger had been the rumor that a Chinese shopkeeper had beaten, perhaps even fatally, a Russian boy for stealing a cookie. When outraged Russians gathered in front of the shop, started to smash the windows, and resisted the Chinese police, the situation got out of hand. Three Russians were killed and several others were wounded.⁵⁹ In the following weeks the situation remained fraught.

On 5 February 1932 the Japanese Army marched into Harbin, one of the last cities in Manchuria to be occupied.⁶⁰ The Chinese troops in and around the city were not able to offer much resistance. Still, around 800 Chinese defenders were killed on the outskirts of Harbin.⁶¹ According to the British Consul in Harbin, most of the Russian émigrés “enthusiastically welcomed” the Japanese troops.⁶² Three weeks later, on 1 March, the new state of Manchukuo was declared. The first weeks and months brought little change to the administration of Harbin. Most of the Chinese elite, including the Chinese mayor of the city, Bao

Guandeng, initially stayed on their posts.⁶³ After the situation had settled later in the spring, the Japanese gradually adjusted the administrative structures, courts and police and replaced a substantial amount of the personnel. By 1934 this process was complete.⁶⁴

In regard to minorities not belonging to one of the five founding races of Manchukuo, like the Russian émigrés, the new government initially only made perfunctory attempts, if any, to equate them with the rest of the population and integrate them into the new social fabric. They were not included in the identity constructions and official identity politics of Manchukuo. The Concordia Association, a state-sponsored mass organisation in Manchukuo, is an apt example of this exclusion. Originally, the Concordia Association was founded to represent the different ethnicities of Manchukuo – Han, Mongols, Manchu, Japanese, and Koreans – and to promote peaceful coexistence and cooperation as well as Pan-Asianism. The Concordia was even intended “to counter the homogenisation of differences produced by nationalism itself”; therefore, members were pooled in different subsections according to their ethnicity.⁶⁵ But, when a “Russian Section of Concordia” was founded in Harbin, it was immediately opposed by the Japanese and actually banned. The Military Mission would only agree to the establishment of a “special department” within Concordia. The official explanation referred to the need to study the life of the émigrés in order not to violate their rights.⁶⁶ Consequently, Russian membership in Concordia was limited to Russians working in the administration or other state-run institutions, who were, like all other state employees, obliged to join.⁶⁷ The denial of a “Russian Section” indicates that the Japanese administration did not consider Russian émigrés to be part of the “the peoples of Manchukuo.” Instead, they occupied a special role. This special position and latitude are again particularly evident within the realm of education.

When the first Russian school in Harbin opened with 11 children in December 1898, the founder, I.S. Stepanov, even had to write his own textbook because none were available at the time.⁶⁸ But on the eve of the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, the railway company had already been running a total of 66 elementary schools in Harbin and other settlements along the tracks.⁶⁹ Beyond these schools, a number of private, church-run schools, some administered by the city council were opened in the city during the following years. Until the mid-1920s, all schools run by Russian individuals or organisations followed the structure and

curriculum of schools in the Tsarist Empire proper.⁷⁰ With the advent of the Chinese–Soviet Agreement on the joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1924, schools run by the railway became Soviet, which meant that they only accepted children of Soviet citizens and taught according to the Soviet curriculum. Many teachers and all émigré children were excluded and had to re-enroll elsewhere.⁷¹ Until the departure of the Soviets in 1935, both school systems existed side by side. At the time of the Japanese invasion, there were 17 Russian elementary schools (*nachal'ye*), three junior high (*vysshie nachal'nye*) and 15 high schools (*srednie*) for émigré children in Harbin.⁷²

Under the new Manchukuo government, the Russian émigré educational system remained generally intact and mainly under the émigré community's own supervision until 1937. They still followed the model and curriculum of pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia with a heavy emphasis on the study of Russian culture and traditions as well as the Orthodox faith. Russian school children occasionally had to participate in public assemblies and observe official Manchukuo holidays,⁷³ but neither Manchukuo and its ideology nor Japan and Japanese culture became prominent in the curriculum until 1937/8. The German envoy Wussow reported: "My Russian teacher, who also worked at the commercial school in Harbin [...] did not even know where the province of Jehol is located – let alone that it is part of Manchukuo."⁷⁴ The governments first attempted to alter the structure and curriculum of Russian schools in the course of buying the Soviet Union's railway shares in 1935 but, due to Russian resistance, postponed far-reaching changes until 1937, when all Russian schools underwent a profound reorganisation.⁷⁵

Because of the exceptional position of the Russian émigrés, the new authorities also took a different approach to administer and control the Russian community. In December 1934 the Japanese Military Mission announced the creation of the Bureau of the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (BREM).⁷⁶ The BREM was charged with providing basic public services for Russian émigrés, consolidating all Russian organisations, protecting and promoting the economic and cultural interests of the émigrés, and representing them before the Manchukuo government.⁷⁷ The institution was responsible for nearly all aspects of émigré life in Harbin and in the settlements along the railway tracks, including Russian émigré schools and other cultural institutions, like theaters and the opera, publishing, as well as settling Russian émigrés in the countryside. It also served as an

employment agency and charity organisation. The BREM even had limited jurisdiction in civil cases between Russian émigrés.⁷⁸

The BREM is often characterised as a means of controlling and instrumentalising the Russian émigré community on behalf of the Japanese. This is especially true of the period after 1937. One motivation for uniting all Russian émigrés in a single institution was doubtlessly the strong presence of Soviet Russians in Harbin and the tense relations between the Japanese and the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1930s. Fear of espionage, undercover agents, infiltration and dubious loyalties among Russian inhabitants of Harbin, not always unfounded, was pervasive and must have inspired the desire to exercise more control over this segment of the population.⁷⁹ Further, the BREM also served to bring the fragmented and disunited community together, possibly to make them a more useful and effective force in the fight against communism and the Soviet Union. The Americans even suspected the BREM might actually have become the germ of a White Russian buffer state in the Far East.⁸⁰ The Soviet Union actually objected to the establishment of the BREM, saying that even though Moscow had protested against the bureau, the Japanese were supporting the anticommunist elements by licensing it.⁸¹

The desire to gain some control over the émigré community, to be able to monitor them and potentially to exploit them against the Soviet Union assuredly played a part in the establishment of the BREM, but practical and pragmatic considerations were at least as important. Fully integrating Russian émigrés into the new administration and state apparatus would have been difficult for several reasons. First, the Russians had been able to secure special privileges and exemptions under Chinese rule in civil law and other areas, which would have hampered the inclusion of the Russians into the general legal system.⁸² That the first legal code of Manchukuo did not take effect until 1937 did not ease or hasten this inclusion. Moreover, the Japanese were likely concerned about foreign reactions, fearing that a full incorporation of "whites" into the new system would have further damaged Manchukuo's already battered reputation. Judging from the experiences of the Chinese in the 1920s, the Russian émigrés would have certainly resisted such equalisation. It is also possible that the Japanese simply did not consider the Russian émigrés as a proper part of Manchukuo at that stage because of the state's pan-Asian orientation.

The Japanese probably still saw the need to establish one institution to administer the quarrelsome and fragmented émigré community. After all, marriages and deaths had to be registered somewhere, the education system needed supervision, and a justice system and charitable redistribution were not going to organise themselves. Among other reasons, the fact that many Russians spoke neither Chinese nor Japanese would have made it fairly impractical for the regular local authorities to deal with the émigrés. And since previous attempts by both the Japanese and the Russians themselves to unite the Russian émigré community behind an existing group or individual had failed, the Japanese presented the Russians with a fait accompli.⁸³

As of February 1935, all Russian émigrés older than 17 (later 14), including members of non-Russian nationalities of the former Tsarist Empire, like Tatars, Ukrainians or Georgians, were called to register with the BREM.⁸⁴ Each registered émigré had to pay 1 per cent of his or her salary to the BREM.⁸⁵ Still, despite claims to the contrary, registration was voluntary, even if people were highly “encouraged” to do so.⁸⁶ Professor Guins, for example, did not register, because he rightly feared that the data collected by the BREM could be used by the GPU, the Soviet secret service, in the case of a Soviet invasion.⁸⁷ It is also still unclear from the sources whether any Russian Jewish organisations or Russian Jewish inhabitants ever registered with the BREM. Several revisionist associations, though, did press for membership in 1936, arguing that they also belonged to the Russian emigrant groups and the anti-Bolshevik coalition, but there is no clear indication that they ever formally joined the BREM.⁸⁸ Either way, by the end of 1935, one year after its establishment, 23,500 of around 33,500 Russian émigrés in Harbin (70 per cent) were registered with the BREM, but by far not all.⁸⁹

The BREM was, of course, under the control and supervision of the Japanese Military Mission in Harbin, but it is unclear to what extent they actually interfered in the daily work of the bureau or any other Russian organisations in the early period – provided no political matters involving or threatening the interests of Manchukuo or Japan were involved.⁹⁰ Alexander Gurvich, one of the leaders of the Jewish community, replied thusly to a question about Japanese interference in his work for the Revisionist Zionists⁹¹: “I would say no. They did not interfere in our work. The journal [*Hagadel* (The Flag), a Jewish weekly]

was censored, but I don't remember that they did not allow something to be published.”⁹²

The community structures and Russian civil society remained mostly intact, apart from a few exceptions, for a time. In contrast to political or military associations, the authorities disbanded none of the bigger Russian youth, professional, or charity organisations, like the Boy Scouts, the Union of House and Property Owners (Kharbinskoe obshchestvo zemlevladel'tsev i domovladel'tsev),⁹³ or the Russian Societal Committee (Russkii obshchestvennyi komitet or ROK), which all continued work during whole the Manchukuo period. Leading representatives of the Russian community who were already active prior 1932/3, like Andrei Vasil'evich Linder, the head of the Harbin Union of Doctors (Kharbinskoe obshchestvo vrachei) throughout the 1920s and 30s, continued to play an important role in different unions and associations. By the same token, meetings, conferences and discussions of the BREM and other Russian organisations usually took place without any representatives of the Japanese Military Mission or the local authorities present until at least 1937. For example, all meetings of the influential Parents Committee (Roditel'skii komitet) in 1935 proceeded without any apprehend Japanese guidance, supervision or control, which is to say without any Japanese officials.⁹⁴

Nor did the BREM become an authoritarian surveillance apparatus over the émigré community until the late 1930s. Well-known and financially independent people, like Prof. Guins, could evade its grasp. The same applies for some organisations and associations. When the BREM proposed a resolution to affiliate the Harbin Exchange Society the members of the Society refused and rejected the resolution.⁹⁵ And although most Russian organisations registered with the BREM, they remained financially and administratively independent from the bureau. The Japanese or, rather, the Japanese Military Mission, also exercised only limited control at least until the late 1930s. For instance, they were unable to resolve the recurrent conflict between the BREM and the “special Russian department” of the Concordia Association.⁹⁶ And the BREM was even permitted to criticise the authorities in a limited fashion. As a case in point, the Russian community repeatedly groused about the legality of trade in opium, heroin and cocaine at meetings and in the Russian media despite Japanese attempts to oppress public criticism of this policy.⁹⁷ Even in the 1940s Harbin still saw

public demonstrations against the sale of narcotics, which progressively acquired an anti-Japanese undertone.⁹⁸ Similarly, the first attempt to reform Russian schools in 1935 had failed, and the second reform planned for 1937 had to be postponed until 1938 because of resistance on the part of the Russian émigrés, including the BREM.⁹⁹

In brief, Manchukuo in its early period was not yet the repressive totalitarian police state it would later become, notwithstanding its obvious deficiencies and injustices. There remained latitude, in particular for those, such as the Russian émigrés, who did not belong to the “five races” and were not subject to the state’s intense identity politics. It seems that, as long as the Russian émigrés played by the rules by refraining from communist, anti-Japanese or anti-Manchukuo activities, they were, with exceptions, left to their own devices.¹⁰⁰

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The year 1937 was, in many regards, a pivotal year in the history of Manchukuo. The first legal code of the young state came into force, and the Japanese extraterritorial rights were finally revoked. The first five-year plan for the economy was adopted.¹⁰¹ The succession law was altered to enable a child of Pu Yi’s brother and his Japanese wife from the imperial family to ascend the throne of Manchukuo after the death or abdication of the emperor.¹⁰² A reform of the communal structures curtailed local autonomy.¹⁰³ Internationally, attempts to gain diplomatic recognition for Manchukuo started to bear fruit. After being recognised only by the rather small countries of El Salvador (1934) and the Dominican Republic (1934), besides Japan (1932) of course, Manchukuo was also finally able to gain diplomatic recognition from the first influential European powers: Italy and Spain. In June of that year war against China erupted. These developments also reflected in the ideological foundation.

Looming shifts in the ideological basis of Manchukuo and the orientation of the new state towards Japan and Japanese culture were implemented. Political symbolism as well as symbolic politics in Manchukuo relaxed the emphasis on the independence and uniqueness of Manchukuo, increasingly focusing instead on Japan and the Japanese emperor. This can be demonstrated, for example, by the changing status of the Emperor of Manchukuo, Pu Yi. Instead of being legitimised by “the will of the people” and the “kingly way”, as was the case in the early period, however hollow and superficial this legitimisation might have

been, Pu Yi now received his legitimisation only and directly from the Japanese *Tennō*. The two emperors were not coequal anymore, but Pu Yi was subordinated as “a son” to the Japanese emperor, who was depicted “as the father.”¹⁰⁴ These shifts affected not just courtiers and officials, but also the practices of all Manchukuo’s inhabitants, including, for example, schoolchildren, who had to participate in regular rituals to “celebrate” Japan and the Japanese emperor. Isabelle Maynard, who visited the Jewish school in Tientsin, describes such a ritual during a regular visit of the Japanese school inspector as follows:

Abruptly he [the Japanese school inspector] stopped in the middle of the stage and stared at the assembly. Then, with a sudden jerk, like a marionette pulled by an unseen hand, he swung his body round, faced east, thrust both hands upward, fingers spread out wide, and screamed, “BONSAI! BONSAI!” The entire student body leapt to their feet at this cue, thrusting their hands upward, rotating abruptly eastward, and yelling “BONSAI! BONSAI!”¹⁰⁵

The “harmony of the races” and, in particular, the formal equality of the five “founding races” gave way to the representation of the Japanese as unique, superior and a model for all others. Pressure to assimilate to Japanese culture increased. These shifts were not least reflected in the sensitive area of education. The second founding principle, *wangdao*: the “kingly way”, downplayed since 1935, totally disappeared from formal official publications after 1940 and was replaced by an ideology oriented towards the Japanese *Tennō*.¹⁰⁶

The impetus for these changes came from two directions. First, this development was probably owed to the increasing stability and unity of the new regime. In 1937 the new institutions were by then firmly established, and regulations lost their provisional character. Second, and probably more importantly, in June 1937 the war against China began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (in China, Lugouqiao Incident).¹⁰⁷ Japan’s resulting need for soldiers, natural resources, and industrial products shifted from the endeavor from building Manchukuo as a unique state to the exploitation of Manchuria to Japan’s benefit.

Late Manchukuo (1937–45) was characterised by increasing control, surveillance and instrumentalisation of the population from members of the imperial court down to Chinese migrant workers.¹⁰⁸ Especially the

Concordia Association became an instrument to monitor and indoctrinate the population. In August 1937 membership to the Concordia Association, which had previously only admitted local elites, officials and state employees, was “opened” to all citizens. Pressure to join increased substantially, and membership to the organisation became compulsory for teenagers aged 16 to 19. Concordia gradually became a truly mass organisation. Membership rose from about 1 million in 1938 to nearly 4.3 million in 1943, which accounts for about 10 per cent of the contemporary population. Parallel to this growth, the government replaced the old leadership and began to use Concordia to monitor employees more extensively and to exert pressure for higher productivity. To be sure, these changes did not pass without criticism from the association’s newly unoccupied leaders.¹⁰⁹

Even pressure on the Japanese living in Manchukuo also rose. On 1 December 1937 the Japanese Society, an organisation that took care of the local Shinto shrine in Harbin, was forcefully dissolved against the vehement opposition of the Japanese community in the city.¹¹⁰ A newspaper article informed the protesters that “[...] if they wanted to have a chance to discuss political or other matters, they could do so in the Concordia Society”¹¹¹ and “that the Concordia Society is the sole avenue through which they [the Japanese] can express their opinions on public matters.”¹¹² Thereupon an anonymous Japanese citizen criticised the Concordia Association in a letter to the editor of the Japanese newspaper, Harbin *Nichnichi*, and stated “that he was ignorant of the true nature of the Society and suggested that its sole purpose was to lead demonstrations and hold meetings.”¹¹³ But his protest went unheard. Even the Japanese, the privileged race in Manchukuo, were no longer able to evade control and state supervision. As the American consul wrote to his superiors: “The reason [for the dissolution of the Japanese Society] is the determination of the military to prevent the formation of anything even remotely resembling a bloc.”¹¹⁴ According to the American consul in Harbin, however, many Japanese avoided joining the Concordia “unless they are forced to comply, because of their official positions.”¹¹⁵ To evade further pressure, some Japanese apparently even started to wear the distinctive Concordia uniform without ever joining the association.¹¹⁶

The Japanese Society was not an isolated case. Many other organisations were dissolved or incorporated into the Concordia Association.¹¹⁷ Another example of this intensified *Gleichschaltung* (forced

conformity) and comprehensive control of the population is to be found in the fate of a soup kitchen that was planned by the foreign community in Harbin to support poor Russians in fall 1937. The committee included representatives and employees of different consulates, but also local Japanese residents, among them the vice mayor of the city. After the group had already raised 1,700 yuan, the Military Mission refused to approve the charity organisation, and the money had to be returned to the donors.¹¹⁸

Similarly, the Jews living in Manchukuo, who had so far escaped aggregation into an umbrella organisation and, until 1937, were still able to maintain the old community structures, were now also incorporated into the system of official “ethnic” organisations. In December 1937 the National Council of Far Eastern Jewish Communities was established in Harbin, the future headquarters of the Council. All formally independent Jewish communities in Manchuria, Japan, and Northern China fell under the Council’s purview, which would represent them before the Japanese authorities. However, the internal life of the individual communities remained virtually untouched.¹¹⁹ Apparently, the actual motivation for this group was not so much to intrude into the mundane activities of the communities, but to instrumentalise the Jews for the benefit of Manchukuo and, in particular, the Manchurian economy. The Manchukuo authorities tried to use the organisation and its representatives to gain prestige in the eyes of American Jews and to attract their investment, using techniques such as sending representatives to the United States to promote Manchukuo among their fellow Jews.¹²⁰

The changes to Manchukuo’s orientation and ideology also affected Russian émigré communities. They too were subject to tighter control and surveillance. And, in contrast to the earlier period, Russian émigrés lost their special status and were increasingly pressured, or even forced, to participate in “the building of Manchukuo.” Again, the education policy provides an apt example. Until 1937 Russian émigré schools in Manchukuo were still fairly free and, in the eyes of the Japanese, “in the process of 5 years did not convey an education in accordance with the building spirit of Manchukuo.”¹²¹ To overcome these “shortcomings” of Russian schools, a school reform program was prepared in 1937 and implemented the following year.¹²² The old Russian classifications of *nachal’nye* (elementary), *vysšie nachal’nye* (middle school) and *srednie* (high school) were abolished and replaced with a uniform system of a

four-year primary, two-year advanced and four-year high schools, modeled after the structure of schools for Chinese and Manchu.¹²³ The study of Japanese, the history and culture of Japan as well as the ideology of Manchukuo occupied more and more of the curriculum.¹²⁴ In 1938 Japanese became the only language taught in public schools, and the number of hours of Japanese instruction per week were increased from an average of two to 6–8 hours.¹²⁵ And in the same year a new subject, so-called “civic morality” (*grazhdanskaia moral'*) were introduced at Russian émigré schools. The subject included familiar topics, like Russian literature or communism and the Russian Revolution, but also units on hygiene, “Overview over the State Cult in Nippon,” “Comparing Nippon and Manchukuo,” or “Sincerity and Complete Confidence in the Relationship between Nippon and Manchukuo – Their Customs, Language and Economic Life.”¹²⁶

The German envoy, Wussow, assessed the Japanese motivation for the school reform as follows: “The Russian emigrants are to be integrated into the great mass of the Manchurian population in order to achieve even greater success by collective exertion.”¹²⁷ And “without doubt, this [school] reform contributes to the realisation of the aim to make Russians equal citizens of the empire. It [the reform] forces the Russians to align their thinking with Manchukuo.”¹²⁸ Alternatives to a “Manchukuo education” were severely restricted in some cases and completely eliminated in others. As a case in point, schools that were run by and for foreigners, which until then had been open to the children of Russian émigrés, like the German *Hindenburgschule* or the Catholic Polish School in Harbin, were prohibited from admitting any Russian pupils or any belonging to any of the five races of Manchukuo.¹²⁹

The changes in the position of the Russian émigrés also affected the BREM. Until the reforms in winter 1937–8,¹³⁰ the bureau was mostly an administrative institution, caring however inadequately for the daily needs of the Russian émigré community. Thereafter the Bureau increasingly became a tool for indoctrination and propaganda to instill émigré Russians with the “right” attitude and to ensure their loyalty towards Manchukuo and the new regime. For example, the BREM became responsible for ideological instruction in schools.¹³¹ To be sure, at no point was the BREM entirely free from propaganda, but the scale and content changed significantly. Instead of being “kindly accommodated” as refugees, the Russians were now considered an

integral part of Manchukuo with full duties and responsibilities. This shift is also mirrored in later justifications for the establishment and existence of the Bureau. While in 1934–5 the organisation mainly focused on securing the economic and cultural interests of the Russian émigrés and representing them before the government,¹³² a commemorative publication on the occasion of the ten-year anniversary of Manchukuo stated:

At the beginning of the year 1932 everywhere Russians have settled, and in particular in Harbin, many organizations of Russian émigré emerged. This made it much harder to unite the émigrés and has had negative effects, because this did not lead to a crystallization of the émigré masses into one monolith, but the opposite, to fragmentation [...] This situation was undesirable for the government of the young empire, based on its policy regarding the principle of the cooperation of the nations, wishes that each national group would become part of the state [...] and make its own contribution to the construction of the young empire.¹³³

Moreover, as the decade was closing, the Japanese increasingly pressured important companies, like the trading house Tschurin, to employ only registered émigrés and dismiss all others.¹³⁴ In some cases registration became necessary to obtain a residence permit or an exit visa.¹³⁵

Nor did Japanese efforts stop at compelling registration. From 1941 onwards, the department for management and statistics of the BREM was ordered to tighten the classification of registered Russian émigrés according to their trustworthiness and, for example, their usefulness in the event of a Soviet invasion. Émigrés were classified as either “under observation,” passive or active anticomunists as opposed to the previous categories of political, apolitical and anticomunist.¹³⁶ Consequently, political neutrality, formerly denoted with the category “apolitical” was no longer an option. Émigrés were defined as either anticomunists or suspicious and subject to surveillance. The regulations were tightened still further after 1943.¹³⁷ As part of the instrumentalisation of Russian émigrés, the Bureau also began to recruit for the so-called Asano Brigade and other military units aggressively among young Russian émigré males as early as 1938. The Russian

émigré soldiers fought on the Soviet border, sometimes as partisans on Soviet territory, but also in the war against China.¹³⁸

The intrusive control techniques of the Japanese were felt also in the realm of Russian associations. In 1940 several Russian organisations, like the Union of Doctors or the Union of Home Owners, which were previously only registered with the BREM, then fell under the direct control of the Bureau. At the same time one can observe that a few people, in particular representatives of the BREM, increasingly held posts in several organisations at once.¹³⁹ For instance, General Kislitsin, head of the BREM during 1938–43, was also the leader of the Union of Russian Home Owners, the Anticommunist Russian Youth Union of the Far East, head of the Military Union of the Far East, as well as head of the Russian Section of the Concordia Association and a member of the Committee for Economic Matters.¹⁴⁰ This tendency for authority in the émigré community to be concentrated in fewer hands was probably also due to tightening Japanese supervision. While organisations were formally able to determine their leadership, it seems that the Japanese in fact permitted only reliable or pliable people to lead.

Conclusion

Manchukuo fell woefully short of its promises of a harmonious, prosperous society where all ethnicities would live together on equal footing and in mutual respect. Until 1937, however, Manchukuo was not a total surveillance state. Instead, some latitude still existed. This was especially true for non-Asian minorities, like the Russian émigrés in Harbin and other settlements. As they had long not been conceived as part of the people of Manchukuo, the Russians and others were not subject of the official identity politics and the new state's ideology. This special role was reflected, for example, in the field of education, where the Russians were able to maintain their school system until 1937/8, and in the realm of civil society organisations, where the Russians were left mainly to their own devices. This changed over the course of 1937/8, when official surveillance became nearly omnipresent and extended to all aspects of life. The Russian émigrés lost their special status and were increasingly incorporated into the “people of Manchukuo,” which allowed their instrumentalisation by the regime.

CHAPTER 2

THE ALL-RUSSIAN FASCIST PARTY

History

The origins of the Russian fascists in Manchuria can be traced back to the mid-1920s, during the period of joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway between China and the Soviet Union. The increasing presence of Soviet railroad workers, including conductors, technical and administrative personnel, amplified anxiety within the Russian émigré community and tensions between “red” and “white” Russians in Harbin for a number of reasons.¹ First, attempts to dismiss Russian employees without a Soviet passport from the railway company on the part of the Soviet government threatened to deprive many émigré families of their livelihood.² Some Russian émigrés in Harbin were holders of a Chinese passport, but most were stateless, often because they were refused a Soviet or Chinese passport.³ And as mentioned above, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company not only conducted and administrated the railway, but ran numerous other institutions, organisations and enterprises, like model farms, a bank, factories, mines, research societies and educational institutions.⁴ As a result, the Chinese Eastern Railway was one of the biggest employers in the city and in the villages along the railway line. Around 900 Russians were affected by the anti-émigré policy of Soviet officials. Second, the presence of Soviet citizens in Harbin presented not only an economic danger, but they also increasingly influenced daily life in the city and society as a whole. This, of course, was especially noticeable within the Chinese Eastern Railway and the social, cultural, medical and

educational institutions associated with the company, like the Faculty of Law, which was one of the focal points of tension between “red” and “white” Russians after the Soviet Union had gained control over the Russian educational institutions in Harbin. And precisely at the Faculty of Law, the first fascist organisation – the Russian Fascist Organization (Rossiiskaia fashchistkaia organizatsiia), a faction within the Association of Russian Students (Russkoe studencheskoe obshchestvo) – was formed by professors and students in 1925.⁵ The organisation engaged in agitation and propaganda among students and aimed to prepare the foundation of a fascist party in the city.⁶ Key leaders and ideologues of the future All-Russian Fascist Party, like Mikhail Alekseevich Matkovskii⁷ or Vladimir Nikolaevich Vasilenko, who later became the editor of the fascist newspaper *Nash Put'*, were among the founding fathers of fascism in Manchuria.⁸ Konstantin Rodzaevskii, the future leader of the All-Russian Fascist Party, joined shortly after his arrival in Harbin in 1926.⁹ Rodzaevskii was born in Blagoveshchensk in 1907 to a middle-class family. His father worked as a notary. Why Rodzaevskii fled from the Soviet Union to Harbin in 1925 is still unclear. It seems that the family was not persecuted or a victim of repression. At some point later in his life Rodzaevskii claimed that he emigrated because his bourgeois background prevented him from going to university, notwithstanding his membership in the Soviet youth organisation Komsomol. Rodzaevskii's younger brother and his father joined him later in Harbin. His mother and sisters visited him in Harbin, but went back to the Soviet Union, where they were arrested and deported. In 1927 Rodzaevskii, professor Nikolai Ivanovich Nikiforov, Aleksandr Pokrovskii, the initiator of the Association of Russian Students and others formed a second fascist organisation at the Faculty of Law under the name Union of the National Syndicate of Russian Fascist Workers in the Far East, or Union of the Fascist Syndicate (Soiuz natsional'nykh sindikatov russkikh rabochikh fashistov Dal'nego Vostoka or Soiuz sindikalistov-fashistov), which not only distributed fascist propaganda among Russian students, but also tried unsuccessfully to set up underground guerilla troops to infiltrate the Soviet Union.¹⁰

To establish a broader and permanent foundation, which would reach beyond the faculty and the student body, Rodzaevskii, Matkovskii, Vasilenko and others declared their withdrawal from the Russian Fascist Organization and the Syndicate to form the Russian Fascist Party

(Rossiiskaia fashistskaia partiiia) in spring of 1931. The first founding congress of the new party had to be held in secret, because the Chinese administration prohibited the gathering at the request of the Soviet Union.¹¹ Nevertheless, during the congress delegates from Harbin and other cities and settlements in Manchuria devised the first party program and framed the basic structure of the party.¹² Vladimir Dmitrievich Kos'min,¹³ a former general of the White Army, served as the formal head of the new party, while Rodzaevskii, as a former member of the Komsomol, perhaps taking a cue from Stalin,¹⁴ contented himself with the post of a party secretary.¹⁵ But at this time the Russian fascists were still just one of several political groupings and organisations in Harbin with whom they had to compete, including various Cossack organisations, a variety of monarchist fractions, liberals and democrats. This changed fundamentally after the Japanese occupation of Harbin on 4 February and the establishment of Manchukuo two weeks later on 18 February 1932.

First the arrival of the Japanese considerably weakened the position of the Soviets in Harbin. In April, for instance, shortly after the invasion, several white Russians broke into the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway and harassed Soviet employees.¹⁶ Second, because Rodzaevskii and his All-Russian Fascist Party became the protégé of certain influential factions and representatives of the new Japanese regime in Harbin. Namely, Akikusa Shun of the Tokumu Kikan, a special department of the Japanese Army intelligence service responsible for espionage, counterespionage and supervision of the population, Konstantin Ivanovich Nakamura¹⁷ from the Kempeitai, the military police, and the editor of the newspaper *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, Osava, are said to have supported the Russian fascists.¹⁸ It is still unclear why the Japanese, in their search for a reliable partner, of all possible factions and émigré organisations, chose to back the Russian fascists. It is unlikely that the sole motivation of the Japanese to cooperate with the fascists was to have a couple of "young men of fair intelligence who will be proud to accept some sort of rank and who will be disposed to do what we want"¹⁹ on hand, as Amleto Vespa, an Italian mercenary who worked for different secret agencies in Harbin, probably including the Tokumu Kikan as well as the Kempeitai, claimed.²⁰ Given the economic crisis at the time, in combination with widespread drug and alcohol abuse, there should not have been a shortage of young men in Harbin who would have sold their

last scruple. The combination of personal contacts, a common enemy and the reluctance of other possible candidates, like the monarchists, likely brought the Japanese and the Russian fascists together. Rodzaevskii and the formal head of the Russian Fascist Party, Kos'min, presumably had been in contact with the Tokumu Kikan as early as the fall of 1931 – long before the occupation of Harbin.²¹ Still, personal relationships alone are probably insufficient as the sole explanation. Nor can the fierce anti-communist attitude alone explain the choice of the Japanese, since the Russian fascists were far from the only group with a pronounced anti-Bolshevik stand. Various monarchist groups, the liberals, Polish and Ukrainian nationalists, Jewish Zionists and the Orthodox Church shared this orientation. Probably the Japanese chose the Russian fascists as their partners because their headquarters and leadership were based in Manchuria itself. In contrast to other political groups, like the Legitimists, whose leader and would-be Tsar resided in Paris beyond reach of the Japanese, the fascist leader Rodzaevskii and his clique could be more readily manipulated and, if needed, intimidated. While the same can be said about the second Japanese protégé and Rodzaevskii's opponent, Ataman Semenov, Semenov's position was probably much stronger. Not only was he older, more experienced and connected to better networks than Rodzaevskii, but as Ataman of the Cossacks in the Far East, he could rely on historically established power structures and the strong cohesion of the Cossack community.

Rodzaevskii's willingness to cooperate with the Japanese resulted in the first schism of the fascist movement in Harbin. Most remaining members of the Syndicate objected to such collaboration.²² In response the Japanese banned the Syndicate. The dubious blessing of Japanese patronage and the dependence it induced permeated the entire history of Russian fascism in Manchuria and repeatedly caused profound problems, debates and conflicts.

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During 1932 and 1933 the Russian Fascist Party gained a considerable number of followers and sympathisers. Party membership numbers rose to around 5,000.²³ The reasons for Russians' attraction to fascist organisations lay at least partly, if maybe not mainly, in the weakness of competing political movements. Monarchs were still mired in endless debates between Legitimists and the so-called Unpredetermined

(*nepredreshentsy*) about who should inherit the Romanov throne.²⁴ Neither they nor any of the other right-wing movements offered any real alternative to communism beyond a restoration of Tsarist autocracy.²⁵ Several attempts to unite the Russian émigré communities had failed, and their struggle against communism in Russia was conspicuously fruitless. The fascist appraisal of the situation was probably not totally inaccurate: "The situation within the emigrant community until the appearance of Russian fascism can be characterised as a situation of nearly total apathy and passivity regarding the fight against communism."²⁶

The phenomenon of Russian fascism was not exclusively limited to Manchuria and the Far East, but occurred in nearly every larger émigré community around the world: Argentina, France and Yugoslavia were important centers of Russian fascism in addition to the United States.²⁷ In Putnam, Connecticut, one of the most enigmatic figures of the Russian Diaspora, Anastasii Vonsiatskii, husband of a wealthy American heiress, launched an organisation called the All-Russian Fascist Organization (*Vserossiiskaia fashistskaia organizatsiia*) in spring 1933, with which the Manchurian fascists would conclude an abortive merger in 1934. How Vonsiatskii and Rodzaevskii discovered each other remains obscure, but both men sought to unite the Russian fascist movement in exile and, naturally, to widen the influence of their own movements within the émigré community. However it came to pass, Vonsiatskii travelled to Manchuria on his so-called fascist world tour in June 1934 to negotiate the merger of his All-Russian Fascist Organization and Rodzaevskii's Russian Fascist Party.²⁸ Ideological as well as personal differences and animosities between the two men became evident soon after Vonsiatskii's arrival. In brief, besides Vonsiatskii's skepticism about the Japanese, the two main points of disagreement centered on the inclusion of Ataman Semenov²⁹ and the deep-rooted anti-Semitism of the fascists in the Far East. Both points were rejected by Vonsiatskii, whose first wife was Jewish. He did not hold any prejudice against the Jews and would have even been willing to include them in his fascist movement.³⁰ Rodzaevskii and Vonsiatskii managed to allay their differences during Vonsiatskii's stay in Harbin. The Second Party Congress sanctioned the merger of the two organisations into the new All-Russian Fascist Party (*Vserossiiskaia fashistskaia partiiia* or, VFP).³¹ But the truce between the two leaders did not last long. At the end of the year Vonsiatskii was officially excluded

from the party, which kept the new name, but otherwise cut all connections to Vonsiatskii and his followers. Vonsiatskii continued his attempts to unite Russian fascists his brand of Russian fascism until he was arrested by the FBI in 1942 and sentenced to five years in prison for his contacts to Nazi Germany.

However, the failure to unite with the American branch of Russian fascism did not discourage the fascists in Harbin. 1935 and the Third Party Congress, which took place in June and July of that year, actually marked the heyday of the Manchurian brand of Russian fascism. Over 1,000 delegates from Manchukuo, Japan and China, but also countries like Morocco, Poland and the United States, attended the Congress and adopted a revised version of the party program.³² Even more important for the future of Russian fascists in Manchuria was the announcement of Rodzaevskii's so-called three-year-plan: the overthrow of communism in Russia within the next three years.³³ To achieve this goal, fascist propaganda, agitation and sabotage in the Soviet Union would have to be intensified on a large-scale because, although the Russian fascists had repeatedly tried to gain a foothold in the Far East of the Soviet Union since the days of the Russian Fascist Organization and the Syndicate, the movement had not been able to establish a basis beyond the border.³⁴ Once again Rodzaevskii's plan predictably failed. Very few partisans ever made their way back to Harbin, but were instead shot somewhere on enemy territory, often right at the border.³⁵ The only recorded and truly successful attempt of sabotage and infiltration took place in Chita, where a partisan group managed to distribute anti-Stalin leaflets during the public celebration of the October Revolution in 1936. But even in this instance half of the men were killed on their way back to Manchukuo.³⁶ Furthermore, Rodzaevskii's high hopes in the Japanese were not fulfilled. Instead of supporting Russian partisans against the Soviets, they used them for their own ends to secure railway lines or hunt Chinese bandits and insurgents and later for their war with China.³⁷

When it became clear that Rodzaevskii's prophecy – the fall of the communist regime by 1938 – would remain unfulfilled, membership in the All-Russian Fascist Party began to decline fast. The All-Russian Fascist Party was under increasing pressure, and it was becoming difficult to hold the party together. The ill-attended Fourth Party Congress in January 1939 finally revealed deep and lasting disagreements and conflicts within the All-Russian Fascist Party,

especially between the two leading figures Rodzaevskii and Matkovskii. The latter and his followers criticised Rodzaevskii's growing attraction to Hitler and the German National Socialists and even started to question the utility of the party's anti-Semitic bias.³⁸ Matkovskii demanded that the All-Russian Fascist Party cut all ties with the German National Socialists, which were at best quite loose anyway,³⁹ and remove the swastika from the party emblem, because he rightly believed that Hitler was not a friend of the Slavs.⁴⁰ His position was supported by influential party representatives, like Vladimir Kibardin and Gennadii Taradanov, two of the party's most important ideologues as well as Sergei Razhev, one of the editors of *Nash Put'*.⁴¹ An open schism was yet averted, but the skirmishes in connection with declining membership severely weakened the Russian fascists.

The Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany in August of 1939 and the Japanese–Soviet ceasefire caught the Russian fascists in Harbin off-guard. It suddenly seemed very unlikely that either Japan or Germany would attack the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. The situation for the Russian fascists worsened further in 1941. First, the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union allowed the Japanese to shift their focus from the Far East to the Pacific. Second, the long-desired German attack on the Soviet Union did not have the expected effect, but rather the opposite. Party membership again dropped sharply in light of Russia's ordeal, because many former followers and sympathisers felt that their loyalty should lay with their fatherland despite the communist regime. The head of the branch of the All-Russian Fascist Party in Paraguay even called on party members to join the Red Army to help Russia against Germany.⁴² Among those who left the party in summer 1941 were several important party functionaries, like the head of the political division, Nikolai Petlin, who left Harbin for Shanghai accompanied by Rodzaevskii's wife.⁴³ In spring 1943 Rodzaevskii was arrested under suspicion of espionage, based, of all things, on evidence from Germany. Rodzaevskii could prove his innocence, but the days of the Russian fascists in Manchuria were numbered. The Japanese banned the All-Russian Fascist Party in July 1943.⁴⁴

When the Red Army marched into Harbin in 1945, Rodzaevskii fled south, but he voluntarily returned after receiving guarantees from Soviet officials. Specifically, they assured him that he would not be persecuted in exchange for a confession and an expression of regret for his

wrongdoing and his misapprehension of Stalinism in a public letter to Stalin. In this letter Rodzaevskii argued that Stalinism and Russian fascism had basically the same aims, which he and his followers just failed to see. He even addressed Stalin repeatedly as “leader of the people” (*vozhd narodov*) and portrays him as the true leader of Russian fascism.⁴⁵ The promise of an amnesty was, of course, insincere. Stalin would not have missed the chance for a public trial against the leader of the Russian fascists. On 2 August 1946, Rodzaevskii went on trial in Moscow. He was executed four days later in the Lubianka together with five other convicts from the Far East, including Ataman Semenov, as an enemy of the Soviet people.⁴⁶

Ideology and Political Program of the All-Russian Fascist Party

Perfect our weapon – the idea, which shines like a steel blade in
bright beams of the spring sun!

Rodzaevskii in the preface to *Azbuka fashizma*

From the very beginning the Russian fascists in Harbin attached great importance to ideology, propaganda and the elaboration of their party program, especially in regard to the basic principles and structures to be implemented in a potential fascist state in Russia, even if its realisation was beyond reach. The cornerstones of the ideology of the Manchurian branch of Russian fascism were set in the 1920s with the so-called *Theses of Russian Fascism* by the members of the Russian Fascist Organization and the Association of Russian Students.⁴⁷ This document already initiated some of the central convictions and maxims of the coming All-Russian Fascist Party: the Russian nation as a cultural entity, the role of the individual, harmony between the classes and a corporatist state.

In addition to the daily newspaper *Nash Put'* and the more intellectual journal, *Natsiia*, Russian fascists in Harbin published numerous books, pamphlets, essays and brochures on a wide range of topics and for different audiences on ideology and the tactics of the All-Russian Fascist Party.⁴⁸ The magnum opus of Russian fascist ideology was *Azbuka fashizma* [The ABCs of Fascism], a book written to answer “the elementary questions arising in the mind of each Russian person

when conceiving the word fascism.”⁴⁹ *Azbuka fashizma* was published first in 1934 and again in 1935.⁵⁰ The title referred to the very popular *Azbuka kommunizma* [ABCs of Communism] written by Nikolai Bukharin and Evgenii Preobrazhenskii in 1919/20.⁵¹ The authors of *Azbuka fashizma*, Gennadii Taradanov⁵² and Vladimir Kibardin,⁵³ were among the leading ideologues of Russian fascism. The book itself was divided in three or rather two parts in the second edition. The first part dealt with general conceptions of fascism, its enemies, the Freemasons and the Jews, and the situation in the Soviet Union, while the second part mainly outlined the party’s program for a future fascist state in Russia and the tactics of the All-Russian Fascist Party. The book was structured according to a question–answer scheme with a hundred questions and answers and included a section for the reader to monitor his or her own progress in learning the basics of Russian fascism at the end of each chapter. At least in theory, all members of the party were required to study the *ABCs of Fascism* intensively and take regular exams, but to what extent this order was observed in practice is an open question.⁵⁴ Since *Azbuka fashizma* was the key document of Russian fascism in Harbin, it has also been the main, but not only, source for the ideology and the political program of the All-Russian Fascist Party.

At first glance, it appears that the Russian fascists oriented themselves toward their European fellows, the Italians in particular. And indeed Rodzaevskii and other ideologues of the All-Russian Fascist Party were quite familiar with the ideas and concepts of European fascism, especially with the writings of German or Italian fascist thinkers. *Azbuka fashizma* itself repeatedly refers to the history and ideology of German and Italian fascism.⁵⁵ The Russian fascists in Harbin had access to several, mainly German, fascist newspapers, like the notorious anti-Semitic *Der Stürmer*⁵⁶ and occasionally published translations of articles or summaries of speeches by important members of the National Socialists in their local mouthpiece, *Nash Put'*.⁵⁷ Further, a Russian translation of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* apparently circulated among the Russian fascists in Harbin and some excerpts were published in fascist journals and newspapers.⁵⁸ Rodzaevskii, Matkovskii and other founding members of the fascist movement in Harbin also became acquainted with Italian fascism during their time as students at the Faculty of Law in the 1920s, especially through the writings and teachings of Professor Nikolai Vasil’evich Ustrialov, a former member of the Cadets and

supporter of the Whites in Siberia.⁵⁹ Ustrialov wrote one of the first scholarly books on Italian fascism in 1928 and a second book on German fascism in 1933. Ustrialov taught history of the philosophy of law, state law and theory of law at the Harbin Faculty of Law from 1920 until 1934.⁶⁰ It is known that at least Rodzaevskii attended some of Ustrialov's lectures.⁶¹ Because of this pedigree, many historians misleadingly assume that Russian fascism in Manchuria was more or less a mélange of Italian fascism and German National Socialism.⁶² But instead, it can be shown, that the ideology and the political program of the All-Russian Fascist Party was generally more heavily influenced by Russia's past and the contemporary situation in the Soviet Union.⁶³

There is much to recommend this reading. First, the ideologues of the All-Russian Fascist Party claimed that Russian fascism had deep roots in pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia: in Zubatov's police socialism,⁶⁴ in the reforms, particularly those relating to agriculture, of the former Prime Minister of the Russian Empire, Petr Stolypin,⁶⁵ and to a limited extent in the traditions and convictions of the pre-revolutionary extreme Russian right – the so-called Black Hundreds (*chernye sotni*).⁶⁶ Both Zubatov and especially Stolypin at different times were characterised as “the first Russian fascist” and a school founded by the Russian fascists in Harbin to educate party members was even named after Stolypin.⁶⁷

Second, the contemporary circumstances in the Soviet Union, which the Russian fascists often analysed and understood with surprising clarity, similarly influenced their outlook.⁶⁸ The Russian fascists seemed to be very well informed about, for example, the results of the collectivisation (see below), political trials, the conditions and demands of the working class (see below) and the persecution of religious dignitaries as well as believers. The fact that “Russian fascism should replace communism, while fascism in Italy and Germany replaced a liberal-democratic state and a capitalist system”⁶⁹ greatly influenced the party program of the All-Russian Fascist Party, which in many respects differed considerably from the Partito Nazionale Fascista (National Fascist Party) of Mussolini and Hitler's *Nationalsozialisten* (National Socialists).

The different initial points in Germany, Italy and Russia were particularly reflected in the political program and attitudes of the Russian fascists towards the individual, the question of class and class relations as well as their vision of economic policy. Because, argued the Russian fascists, the Russian people were suppressed, enslaved and denied any

personal or civic freedoms in the communist system, Russian fascism “had to take the path of emancipation,” bestow “particular rights and freedoms to the Russian people” and virtually “reach the same aim (as Italian and German fascism) from opposite sides.” Specifically, the Russian fascists promised the acceptance and protection of private property, free choice of occupation, the freedom of religion and science, freedom of opinion and the press.⁷⁰ Moreover, private property and individual initiative were to be central to their proposed economic system. Most sectors of the economy, with the exception of banks and a few other institutions, would be privatised, and everyone would have the right to acquire personal wealth, although not by speculation or usury.⁷¹ The Russian fascists were partisans of a planned economy, but in contrast to the communists, the state administration would be restricted to setting general targets to guarantee proportional development in different economic sectors without imposing any detailed plans comparable to those under the Soviet government.⁷² In contrast to the Soviet Union, where trade restrictions caused a lot of resistance, there would be no restrictions on internal trade, but international trade would remain completely in government hands to secure Russia’s economic independence.⁷³

Peasants and workers occupied a special position in the politics of the All-Russian Fascist Party. This privileged status was not only because they constituted the overwhelming majority of the Russian population, but also because the Russian fascists had to present a real alternative to the communist model to these two groups in order to attract any support within the Soviet Union. Therefore, they responded to the most widespread grievances and shortcomings of Soviet politics. As an alternative model to Soviet collectivisation and the *kolkhoz* system, they resorted to the agrarian reforms outlined by a former Prime Minister of the Russian Empire, Petr Stolypin, after the first Russian Revolution in 1905. The reforms aimed to replace collective ownership of land by the village commune with individual ownership by heads of families as well as to consolidate land holdings to create a class of wealthy peasants. These reforms had proven quite successful, and the Russian fascists saw their own beliefs, convictions and philosophy reflected in Stolypin.⁷⁴ In the book *First Russian Fascist Petr Arkadevich Stolypin*, which was published in Harbin in 1928, the author F.T. Goriachkin writes about Stolypin and his reforms in connection to fascism:

Fascism – is a new system of power – a power built on principles of a new economic reform: and such a reform has been drafted by premier Peter Arkadevich Stolypin [...] The program of Stolypin – is the program of Russian Orthodox fascism, it is the program of a Christian economic policy [...]⁷⁵

Furthermore the Russian fascists were well aware of the disastrous consequences of the communist collectivisation in the Soviet Union,⁷⁶ which caused a dramatic drop in agricultural production followed by catastrophic famines:⁷⁷

All agricultural products made by the Russian peasantry are actually taken away from them under the pretext of unreasonably high taxes, grain-collections, compulsory sales of surpluses to the state, etc. [...] The regular famines can serve as a clear indicator of position of peasantry in the USSR from which, by approximate calculations, during the last years about 10,000 000 peasants have lost their lives.⁷⁸

To free the peasants from this modern “slavery,” the Russian fascists announced their intention to de-collectivise (*raskollektivizatsiia*) Russian agricultural production upon taking power in Russia. But this did not mean a reintroduction of *obshchina*, the village commune as the holder of collective property rights, because all land would be given to the peasants, as their “indivisible and inheritable property.”⁷⁹ Indivisible here meant that ownership of the land, consistent with Stolypin’s reform, would be granted to the head of a family instead of the family as a unit, as was practiced prior the first Russian Revolution of 1905 to prevent the perpetual fragmentation of plots.⁸⁰ They also promised to prevent the emergence of a new cast of landowners and to inhibit speculation on land.⁸¹

In their perception and attitude towards Stolypin’s agrarian reforms, the Russian fascists differed markedly from their pre-revolutionary forerunners, the so-called Black Hundreds, who strictly rejected the policies, especially the dissolution of the *obshchina*. The Russian fascists however, like Stolypin, sought to erect a wealthy and strong class of farmers and believed that the system of the *obshchina* had outlived itself, since it discouraged investment and innovation. Their rejection of the

obshchina is particularly noteworthy because the village commune was a salient model of an archetypal corporatist system in action.

For the Russian émigré workers, also very well aware of the conditions in the Soviet Union,⁸² the Russian fascists promised a real and noticeable reduction of working hours and working days, substantial social insurance, and sufficient wages – enough to “live a free life.” They also promised special laws for the protection of female and minor workers.⁸³ Workers and employers would be socially equal and conjointly manage factories and industrial enterprises through a so-called business council (*delovoi sovet*). Workers would receive a share of the profits, because a certain percentage of the capital stock in private and state owned enterprises would belong collectively to the workers.⁸⁴ In short, the Russian fascists promised to follow through with many of the communists’ empty pledges.

The Russian fascists acknowledged the reality and, to a certain degree, the propriety of different classes in Russia as “a group of people unified by common social conditions and common economic interests” and “organs of one body – the state.”⁸⁵ According to their party program, the fascists did not strive for an elimination or dissolution of classes, but “to destroy class antagonism, to reconcile class interests, to replace class struggle by class cooperation with the blessing of the nation.”⁸⁶ To achieve this, the fascist Russian state and the economy in particular were to be organised in a corporative way, because “the corporate system provides the government above class – independent of class and personal influences.”⁸⁷ The population was to be divided according to their professions and occupations, i.e. classes, into different corporations, each headed by elected representatives. Those representatives would administrate and govern the county together with the fascist party.⁸⁸ This idea of a corporative state seems to have been taken directly from Italian fascism, but again probably deprived at least equally from Russian thinkers, models and traditions.

Corporatism was already popular in ultraconservative and far right circles in pre-revolutionary Russia to shield the country from capitalism and its effects. For them as well as All-Russian Fascist Party ideologues like Taradanov, in a striking historical misinterpretation, corporatism in Russia had its roots in the so-called *zemskii sobor* (estates general) in the sixteenth century.⁸⁹ However, since the *zemskii sobor* could only serve as a crude model, if only due to the scarcity of sources – the term was

actually a Slavophil invention of the nineteenth century, the Russian fascists had to turn to other more contemporary inspirations. They conveniently found one in Harbin in the teachings and writings of Georgii Konstantinovich Guins (or Gins), professor at the Faculty of Law and one of Harbin's most renowned intellectuals.⁹⁰ In his dissertation on water supply in Turkestan, Guins started to develop an idea of solidarism as a system based on "solidarity that united people with common interests."⁹¹ It is important to note that Guins developed the basic principles of his concept of solidarism before Mussolini assumed power in Italy. It is virtually impossible to determine how deeply the Russian fascists were in fact influenced by Guins and his concept of solidarism,⁹² but, like Guins, the Russian fascists talked early about solidarism as a "third way between capitalism and communism,"⁹³ and *Azbuka fashizma* described solidarism as one the leading principles of Russian fascism and fascism in general.⁹⁴

In the new fascist state corporatism and solidarism would lead to harmony and cooperation between the different classes and end class struggle and class antagonism.⁹⁵ This was to be accomplished by dint of the individual professional corporations, which on the one hand would represent the interests of their members and on the other hand guarantee the even development of all classes. Again, the Italian syndicates suggest themselves as a model. After all, one of the first fascist organisations called themselves "syndicate," but Russia itself also provided a precursor: Zubatov's labor unions. Sergei Vasilyevich Zubatov, a former director of the security office (*okhrana*) in Moscow, was the inventor of so-called police socialism. To gain support for the autocracy among workers in Russia, he founded several unions that were faithful to the regime under the supervision of the police. Despite his success, his union had several thousand members in Moscow alone, Minister of the Interior Pleve put an end to this experiment and Zubatov was exiled. General Kos'min, leader of the Russian fascists in Harbin, declared Zubatov and his unions to be the first Russian fascist organisation.⁹⁶ The historian A.I. Spiridovich even claimed that instead of Russian fascism being inspired by Italy, it was the other way around – Mussolini modeled his trade unions after Zubatov.⁹⁷

But, as the fascists repeatedly stressed, in accordance with other European fascist movements, all class, group or individual interests would always be subordinated to the interests of the nation.⁹⁸

“Individual and class – in the service of the nation [...]” was said to be the most important slogan of Russian fascism. But because of the multiethnic and multinational population of the former Tsarist Empire, the definition of the nation posed a challenge for the fascists and could not be based simply on race and genetic ancestry, as it was in Germany. The Russian fascists resolved this problem by defining the nation as a historical and cultural unity instead of one based on race or ethnicity:

The nation is a spiritual unity of people based on the awareness of a common historical destiny in the past, a common national culture, national traditions and so on, and the aspiration to continue their (common) historical life in the future. [...] The nation is first of all a spiritual unity.⁹⁹

This attitude is also reflected in the diction. Instead of the ethnically defined term *russkaiia natsiia* (“ethnic” Russian nation), they used the more open *rossiskaia natsiia* (*Russlandish/Russian nation*), which included all peoples living in the Russian Empire regardless of their ethnicity. As Heinz-Dietrich Loewe has pointed out, the Russian fascists’ heavy emphasis on cultural and educational work was probably due to this quite modern awareness of the nation as a cultural construct.¹⁰⁰ To be sure, the Russian fascists in Harbin were indeed not entirely free of chauvinism, since they claimed that the “Russians, Ukrainians (*Malorossy*) and Byelorussians made the most valuable contributions” to the national Russian culture, but they acknowledged that “all peoples of the Russian nation” had a part in the common historical destiny¹⁰¹ and “therefore not just great-Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (*Malorossy*) belong to the Russian nation, but also other peoples of Russia: Georgians, Armenians, Tatars and so on.”¹⁰² In the planned fascist state, cultural, administrative and political autonomy would be granted to all peoples of Russia – with the exception of the Jews – who participate in the “national revolution” to dispel communism and as long as this autonomy would not be contradictory to national interests.¹⁰³ Consequently, the All-Russian Fascist Party in Harbin welcomed not only ethnic Russians and Orthodox believers, but also many Ukrainians, Protestants and Muslim Tatars as party members.¹⁰⁴

With regard to the form of government, the Russian fascists did not commit themselves to any specific form of government for a fascist

Russia. It is often argued that the Russian fascists avoided committing themselves to any form of government so as not to alienate the monarchists among the Russian emigrants.¹⁰⁵ However, in the light of their attitude towards and disregard of the monarchists, this seems unlikely – the Russian fascists actually advocated a state without privileges based on wealth or birth in the form of exclusive rights for the nobility.¹⁰⁶ But they also refrained from excluding the reintroduction of a monarchy, because, in the eyes of the Russian fascists, the form of government was irrelevant, since “this does not play any essential role for the life of a state, because, instead of the form, the social essence, the social nature of a political system is important.”¹⁰⁷ Italy and England, they argued, were both monarchies, but Italy was governed by a fascist regime, while England was a liberal and capitalist state.¹⁰⁸ As within Russia, totally independent of the actual form of government or a possible Tsar, the actual rulers would be members, or more precisely the elite of the All-Russian Fascist Party, who would hold all key positions in politics, the economy and the cultural life of the fascist state.¹⁰⁹

It is apparent that Russian fascism differed greatly from German or Italian fascism in many respects. It incorporated and combined European fascist theory with Russian historical heritage, politics from the last years of the Tsarist Empire and lessons drawn from the contemporary Soviet Union. For Rodzaevskii and his followers, fascism was a “synthesis of the lessons to be drawn from the failure of the White movement, the experience of Italian, German and Japanese fascism, Russia’s glorious past and the present post-revolutionary reality.”¹¹⁰

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Were the Manchurian fascists true fascists? What constitutes a fascist: a fascist party, movement or a fascist regime? This has been a contentious issue since the foundation of the fascist regime in Italy in the 1920s and is still hotly debated among academics from various disciplines.¹¹¹ There are several definitions available. As Kevin Passmore remarked, there might be nearly as many definitions of fascism as there are researchers.¹¹² According to the narrowest definition, the term “fascism” applies only to Italy, while others at least include the National Socialist regime in Germany. Pursuant to such an understanding of fascism, the All-Russian Fascist Party would clearly not qualify as a fascist movement. In the following I will briefly expand upon an indicative, not

comprehensive, list of definitions of fascism that might better suit the All-Russian Fascist party.

In the debate about the nature of fascism, the All-Russian Fascist Party presents a special case, a form of what one might call exile and diaspora fascism. This would preclude some abstract definitions of the term, especially those whose criteria and attributes pertain more to fascist regimes than to movements. The closest Harbin fascists ever came to setting up a regime was their utopian vision of a future fascist Russia, which existed only in their fantasies and writings. They were never able to implement or alter state institutions. They never had any police or other form of repressive apparatus at their command. In other words, the All-Russian Fascist Party lacked any institutionalisation on the state level.¹¹³ Rather, they constantly had to compromise with the prevailing local authorities.

One group of researchers, exemplified by Stanley Payne, tried to define the phenomenon with a list of criteria that are supposedly characteristic for fascist movements and ideology such as ultra-nationalism, cross-independence, militarism, charismatic leadership, anti-capitalism and so on.¹¹⁴ Based on such a typology one could even identify fascist movements without regard to their self-perception. The All-Russian Fascist Party clearly ticks some boxes on this “fascism checklist”. Ultra-nationalism, anticommunism and anti-Semitism unquestionably featured among the key features of the party, though it is debatable whether Konstantin Rodzaevskii was in fact charismatic leader. But the problems with such a “checklist” are more fundamental. First, must a movement possess all the criteria? Which are necessary, and which are sufficient, and what combinations of necessary conditions are sufficient? Second, some criteria on the list(s), such as “anti-capitalism”, are highly controversial even alone. Third, what are the criteria for inclusion on any list, and how does one choose from among the various lists available? Therefore, defining fascism with a set of more or less essential characteristics is increasingly contested, especially in the context of global or transnational fascism.¹¹⁵

Another branch of research tackles the problem of defining fascism with reference to an ideal type, a generic fascism to allow identification of fascist tendencies across movements and regimes. Roger Griffin, the most well-known advocate of this approach, defines fascism as “a political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism”.¹¹⁶ The idea of mystical

rebirth of the Russian nation through fascism is without doubt a core element of Russian fascist thinking and worldview in Harbin and is at the heart of their ideology and propaganda, to which one could add apocalyptic visions about the fate of Russia under communist rule. But the ideal-typical minimalist definition suffers from a major flaw in that it limits fascism to ideology and reduces fascism to a political religion. Other important elements of fascist movements and regimes, like exclusion and force, are not taken into account. Moreover, the definition is vague and ahistorical, which led Gentile to call it an “elastic fascism, which always expands and contracts in space and time”.¹¹⁷

In his book *The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain and Romania, 1870–1945*, Dylan Riley has lately taken a similarly minimalistic approach by defining fascism as an authoritarian democracy. He argues that as long as we do not confuse democracy with liberalism, fascist claims to represent the will of the people by means other than elections or parties, through new institutions and forms, do not put them in opposition to democracy. Rather, fascism constitutes a particular form of democracy. This authoritarian democracy is also reflected in the writings of All-Russian Party representatives. *Azbuka Fashizma* states: “The main difference between the highest representative body of the people’s interests in a fascist state and a democratic parliament is that there are no amorphous ‘people’, which means in fact, different groups of financial capital through political parties” rather “all categories of the population of Russia, all social groups, all the peoples of the Russian nation.”¹¹⁸ But at the same time the party’s power over the state and its institutions should be unlimited and all-encompassing: “[the] All-Russian Fascist Party [...] should be the de facto leader of the national state, social, economic and cultural life. It should be present in all public corporate bodies: national unions, councils and corporations.”¹¹⁹ As with Griffin’s definition, however, certain decisive aspects of fascism, like the exclusion of certain sections of the population for racist or anti-Semitic reasons and especially the importance of ultra-nationalism, fade into the background. In contrast to Griffin, Riley also downplays the role of ideology in the definition of fascism.¹²⁰

In his definition, Roger Eatwell emphasises the paradoxical character of fascism, its ambiguous position between the left and the right. “[Fascism] preaches the need for social rebirth to forge a holistic-national radical Third Way.”¹²¹ The idea of fascism as an alternative between left

and right was also propagated by the Harbin branch of Russian fascism. For them, fascism was supposed to correct and overcome the flaws of liberalism, especially its materialism and individualism, as well as Marxism with its narrow focus on class and class struggle, but also the old pre-revolutionary order and privileges. Fascism represented a “third way” between old order capitalism and communism based on class solidarity and labour.¹²² But like other attempts to define the characteristics or essence of fascism, Eatwell’s definition has its flaws. For example, Kevin Passmore supported the notion of the “contradictory nature of fascism”, but in the second edition to his book *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction* he writes, “In fact my definition was as reductionist as any other, in that I sought to reduce the great richness and variety of actual movements and regimes to the priorities of my definition.”¹²³

I will not attempt here to add yet another definition of fascism, but I will conclude with some remarks about the importance of ideology, self-perception and positioning as well understanding of fascism by the fascists and other contemporaries for the historical analysis of fascist movements. As Kevin Passmore writes, “While we may be aware of the impossibility of defining fascism, protagonists believed that the concept was very real, and what they thought fascism was shaped their views and the way groups responded to each other.”¹²⁴ Taking this call for sensitivity to one’s sources, and my sources’ own views, seriously, I will now examine what Harbiners actually thought about the nature of fascism. In particular, I want to address their understanding of fascism as a transnational movement and a fairly flexible concept. In my eyes this could be a fruitful approach for studying what is often termed as “minor” or “unsuccessful” fascist movements in Europe and beyond, like the Russian fascists in Harbin. It might help to evaluate such groups on their own terms, not only as cheap replicas of their more successful relatives, Italy and Germany.

Like other people and movements, the Russian fascists did not simply choose the label “fascist” without reflection.¹²⁵ On the contrary, they debated and dealt with the concept critically and they explained in detail why they considered themselves to be part of the fascist movement.

Russian fascists, like many others, had a multidimensional understanding of fascism. Fascism for the Russian fascists was a transnational movement and a universal idea, which assumed distinct

attributes depending on the specific characteristics and particularities of each nation, its culture and history.¹²⁶

The fascism that had emerged from Italy was, for the Russian fascists, “a global movement that manifests itself in various forms in all countries of the modern world”, from Europe to the Americas and Asia.¹²⁷ “In the Netherlands [there is the] Dutch National-Socialist Party [...] Denmark, Sweden and Norway have their national-socialistic parties [...] Switzerland has its Swiss National Union. In Czechoslovakia there is the Czechoslovak National Union of Fascists. [...] Even in the United States [...] there is the Union of the Silver Shirts. Even in very distant and exotic countries there are fascist movements.”¹²⁸ Fascism would eventually seize the “whole civilized world” and all nations. It was, therefore, a truly global movement.¹²⁹

All fascist movements belonged to one community, sharing a set of values and convictions, and formed a global movement. According to *Azbuka fashizma* this global fascist movement “aspires to reorganise the modern liberal-democratic (capitalist) and socialist (communist) states on the basis of supremacy of the spirit over matter (religion), Nation and Labor (social justice) – fascism is a religious, national, labor movement.”¹³⁰ All fascists all shared the same fundamental ideas and the same goal: “Italian, German and Russian fascists aspire to implement its fundamental ideas about the establishment of a state, which has its spiritual core philosophy: the principle of serving the nation and a social system that recognizes the value of labor and class-solidarity – therein consists their commonality.”¹³¹

For the Russian fascists, the idea of multiple national manifestations was inherent to the essence of fascism. Because the wellspring, substance and goal of fascism was the nation, its unique particularities, its past, present and future, its soul and spirit, individual national manifestations of fascism had to be different. Fascism as a world movement formed a common framework, while the nation, its historical development and current fate determined the details of fascist ideology and the actual politics of local groups.

Fascist studies have without doubt greatly benefited from the exercise of defining fascism, because it nourished debates about the essential characteristics of fascism. But it is also true that none of the definitions are sufficient; they all highlight some aspects while understating others. Nevertheless, it is possible, with reservation, to classify the particular

case of Russian diaspora fascism under at least some current definitions. Still, the self-identification of Harbin fascists outlined above as part of a transnational fascist movement is the decisive justification for depicting them as such.

Conclusion

In many ways the fate of the All-Russian Fascist Party seems to resemble that of many small or medium-sized fascist groups and parties in Europe in several aspects.¹³² A fairly steep rise in the wake of the national socialist success was followed by a fairly steep decline. In the case of the Russian fascists, as with their counterparts in Europe, this decline was mainly due to internal conflicts and hubris on the one hand and political circumstances on the other. But in some regards the situation of the Harbin fascists was special. First, they were particularly dependent on the internal and external politics of the Japanese in and outside of Manchuria. Japanese officials supported Russian fascists as long as they seemed useful, but easily sacrificed them when doing so seemed opportune. Second, the All-Russian Fascist Party was an exile organisation targeting Russian émigrés, who were victims of the Bolshevik takeover. This experience permeated their fairly sophisticated and original ideology.

Owing to the political constellations as well as the party's own weakness, though, there was never even the slightest chance that the party would actually come to power – even in parts of the former Tsarist Empire. Their elaborate plans and strategies could and would never be implemented. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the All-Russian Fascist party was insignificant. On the contrary, it played an important part in the life of many Russian émigrés, particularly the youth, and other inhabitants of Harbin.

CHAPTER 3

“DARK” CIVIL SOCIETY

Fascist Civil Society

The goal of the Union is the creation of a new Russian man: A fighter for Russia, a true son of the religion of the forefathers, a vanquisher over Jewish communism, the creator of a new Russian life under the rays of the true ideals, a builder of a new Russia.¹

Before describing fascist organisations for children and youth in detail, one must explain how and why the All-Russian Fascist Party and its sub-organisations can be conceptualised as part of civil society. As mentioned above, I employ a purely functional definition of civil society, stripped of all the normative implications usually connected with the concept of civil society. Civil society organisations in this sense are voluntary associations of people and are mostly independent of the state financially. For now, the actual purpose and aims of such organisations are immaterial to this definition.

It is indisputable that membership in the Russian Fascist Party and associated organisations was voluntary. Indeed, the fascists took great pains to increase membership to the party. The party had a special department for agitation under the leadership of Vladimir Rodzaevskii, Konstantin's brother, and regularly organised special events to recruit members. One such meeting organised by the Russian Women's Fascist Movement (Rossiiskoe zhenskoe fashistskoe dvizhenie) in 1937 reportedly attracted over 700 visitors. Furthermore, party members had to enlist new members in order to climb the party ranks.² But some

other definitive criteria of civil society organisations are not so easily assessed in this case. Can a (political) party be part of civil society? Was the Russian Fascist Party financially independent of the state, or was it in fact reliant on the financial support of the Manchukuo government or local authorities? And finally, can an organisation that supposedly resorted frequently to violence still qualify as part of civil society?

In the debates relating to the definition and characteristics of civil society organisations, there is still considerable controversy about whether and when political parties can be considered part of civil society. On the one hand, this disagreement results from the classification of civil society somewhere between the state, the market and the private sphere.³ Since the borders between those three spheres are blurred and any analysis of the interrelationships between the three and civil society must be context-dependent and tends to be colored by ideological or normative assumptions, there is much room for disagreement. On the other hand, the classification of a political party is contingent on the period under observation and the approach. In analyses treating contemporary civil society, political parties are usually considered part of the state, while historically they have been considered part of civil society to avoid trivialising the development of democracy and civic participation.⁴ Therefore, the Russian Fascist Party cannot be considered a (political) party according to this logic. It never participated in any election, simply because elections were not part of the political system in Manchukuo, and political parties of the current model did not exist.

The Russian fascists in Harbin are also frequently given the epithet of “puppet racketeers” of the Japanese authorities and are subject to claims that the party was completely dependent on Japanese grants.⁵ But so far these claims lack documentary substantiation. Of course, this might be simply attributed to censorship or a lack of sources from the Manchukuo period, since many were lost, destroyed or unavailable today as a result of China’s restrictive archival policies. According to the German consulate in Beijing, the party in Harbin incurred monthly expenses of about 3,500 Manchukuo dollars. In addition, they had to compensate for a monthly loss of 2,500 Manchukuo dollars incurred by the newspaper *Nash Put'*. The Fund for the Anti-Communist Struggle (*fond protivokommunisticheskoi bor'by*) spent around 6,000 Manchukuo dollars on expenses such as benefit payments for dependents of dead partisans.⁶ Still, there are many reasons to doubt the assumption that the fascists received most of their funds from

the Japanese. First, the party had several other sources of revenue. Employed members over the age of 16 were required to render 1 per cent of their wages as a membership fee,⁷ and each sub-organisation had to finance itself without help from the party headquarters.⁸ Second, the fascists launched several fundraising campaigns with some success, like the so-called Day of Hunger (*golodnyi den'*)⁹ or the Fund for the Anti-Communist Struggle.¹⁰ Book sales, tickets to lectures, balls and performances provided the party with additional income. Occasionally, receipts from other institutions like the Russian Club were allocated to the party's needs. For instance, in summer 1933 the revenues from a lecture series at the Russian Club were used to launch the newspaper *Nash Put'*.¹¹ Last but not least, affluent party members and sympathisers also donated to the party's coffers.¹²

Nevertheless, the party was never particularly well-funded and often in a precarious financial situation, especially when membership numbers dropped sharply in the second half of the 1930s. This is evident in the case of *Nash Put'*, which in 1937 was printed on substandard paper with a machine obviously in poor repair, as the indistinct and poorly aligned type makes apparent. Moreover, even high-ranking party functionaries had to find gainful employment in addition to their duties to the party because the positions were unpaid. It is true that many worked for the Japanese, in Bureau of the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (BREM) or one of the police or security forces, but this can hardly be regarded as financial support for the party.

In sum, financial support can neither be proven, nor definitely excluded. Even if the Russian Fascist Party received some financial support, however, it could not have been very substantial, and the party would still meet the criterion of approximate financial independence.¹³ Beyond the empirical state of affairs, financial independence is losing currency as a necessary requirement of civil society organisations conceptually, since many organisations considered part of civil society depend on governmental resources – from their own state or some other. Many civil society organisations, including those often subsumed under the term Non-Government Organisations (NGO), are actually dependent on government funding. Additionally, many Western governments have recently started to finance civil society organisations in other countries, like Russia, until this practice was hindered by the Russian government.¹⁴

The relation between civil society and violence must also be addressed, since they are often represented as incompatible. But if one abandons normatively utopian notions of civil society and instead analyses actually existing civil societies, then civil society and violence are not mutually exclusive.¹⁵ An impartial view on historical, and in many cases contemporary, civil society reveals that “civil societies can never become a haven of nonviolent harmony.”¹⁶ Although communisation (*Vergemeinschaftung*), that is to say the emergence of solidarity, reciprocity and trust between group members, is said to be one of the key elements and functions of any civil society organisation, but if one leaves aside normative expectations of civil society and focuses strictly on the function of fostering reciprocity, the use of violence might be excluded within the group, but not necessarily with the outside world.¹⁷ Furthermore aside from such purely theoretical considerations, in this context, it is important to differentiate between violence and crimes committed by members of the Russian Fascist Party as private individuals and those committed by the party as an organisation when appraising the use of violence among the Russian fascists in Harbin.

Most typically the Russian fascists are inculpated of a series of kidnappings involving mainly Jewish and foreign citizens in 1932 and 1933 and in particular the kidnapping and murder of Simon Kaspe, a young Jewish pianist, in August 1933.¹⁸ But, as will be shown in Chapter 5, a direct and conclusive tie to any member of the Russian Fascist Party in any of the kidnappings was never established beyond doubt. Of course, this does not absolve the party of any (moral) responsibility due to their dire anti-Semitic agitation and propaganda. In regard to anti-Semitism, the Russian fascists were what the Germans call “*geistige Brandstifter*” (intellectual provocateurs).

The Russian fascists are also said to have often used violence against their political enemies, namely the communists. The first instance of such violence associated with the All-Russian Fascist Party was the murder of Dimitrii Vasil’evich Ognev in December 1932. Ognev had joined the party in 1928, but was expelled in 1932 because he challenged the leadership and tried to split the party. On 6 December Ognev’s head was found in the backyard of the Soviet consulate in Harbin. Suspicion that he was acting as a Soviet spy and GPU (State Political Directorate/Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie) agent was the presumed motive for the murder. His left cheek bore the text:

“Death to the agent provocateur.” Soon afterwards the rumor spread that the fascists had killed their former *sobraniki* (comrade in arms), but, again, this was never verified.¹⁹

Most cases of small-scale political violence, at least in Harbin itself, did not extend to murder, but were usually limited to street brawls between juveniles, disturbances and assaults. However, the Russian fascists were hardly alone in skirmishing with Soviet youth. Especially monarchist youth groups, like the Musketeers,²⁰ also frequently clashed with young communists.²¹ Ustina Valdimirivna Kruzenshtern-Peterets describes such an incident in her memoirs:

In the beginning the fights were common brawls. Neither Musketeer nor the Komsomolsk could get one past the other [...] In these small battles brass knuckles, knives and even guns were used [...] Both organizations were threatened with dissolution. Then someone thought of stopping the individual brawls and put the matter “on a military footing”. A codex for brawls was devised.²²

Nor did the Russian fascists always instigate the violence; their members were occasionally victims, too.²³ For instance, to protect their gatherings from disturbances by drunken Komsomol members, “who were sent to discredit the events with their drunkenness, vice and hooliganism,” Russian fascists even felt compelled to restrict entry to guests with invitations or for whom a member had vouched.²⁴ Such disturbances were not only a problem of the Russian fascists, but also occurred during church services and other social events not directly associated with the fascists, but also other émigré organisations.²⁵

Recently groups of red youth have been appearing at evening events and balls, behaving in an extremely provocative way. These youths had their debut two days ago during the ball organized by the school of dentists at the chamber of commerce. Right at the beginning of the ball a small group of young people strolled in looking for a fight. They were representatives of the communist “golden” youth. One of the [other] young people [present at the ball] finally got picked as the victim. “He has relations with the Musketeers – beat him.”²⁶

Memoirs of former Jewish citizens, who spent their youth in Harbin, also frequently mention violent clashes between anti-Semitic and Jewish teenagers and young adults.²⁷ Charles Clurman, member of the Revisionist Zionists, recalls from his youth:

I never got beat up. I could beat anybody fighting [...] I always carried this kind of a stick like my father carried. I carried it right here, in my sleeve [...] And my books, I never carried them in my hands. My books were always in my belt, so both arms were free. Because my job was to see that we did not get in the short end of a stick. So anybody would pick up on the Jewish boys in school, I had to go and fight with them [...] We had a lot of these (fights) because a guy called me, "Dirty Jew". And I said, "Bang!" (and hit him). They used to bait me like that. One time, a guy called me "Dirty Jew" and I didn't see nothing, and right in front of the teacher... (bang!).²⁸

But in this, as in many other narratives, the assailants are not explicitly identified as members of the All-Russian Fascist Party or any of their sub-organisations. They are sometimes identified as "White Russians,"²⁹ "gangs of anti-Semitic Russians"³⁰ or simply "anti-Semites." As a result, one cannot determine with certainty in each case whether those brawls always involved members of the Russian fascists rather than followers of other associations like the Musketeers, Legitimists or any of the Cossack Unions that also hated the Jews. This is not to say that fascist were never involved. Doubtlessly, assaults and brawls between Jewish and fascist youth occurred. Alexander Menquez, for example, describes such an incident: "I remember once when one of our boys showed up at the Betar club after having been beat up, an elaborate strategy was worked out by dressing our boxing champion, Isia Kagan, in a dress and having him accompany a couple of younger kids a decoys."³¹ And Yaakov Liberman recounts in his memoirs:

They [the fascists] had decided to beat up Jews [...] And so we sent out several youngsters in different directions in town, each followed by a group of older boys in ambush. It did not take long before one of the youngsters was attacked by a dozen visiting and

local hooligans. Within moments, Betarim pounced on the attackers and a classical street fight ensued.³²

Without downplaying such incidents, there is an element of playfulness and sporting competition in both narratives. Weapons were not employed, and no evidence indicates that any teenager or child was ever seriously harmed in one of these skirmishes, which cannot be compared, for example, with the political violence in the Weimar Republic or Italy, which claimed numerous lives.³³ And as the quote of Ustina Kruzenshtern-Peterets above shows occasionally opponents even agreed on certain rules. The situation might be best described by the assessment of Hellmut Stern, a Jewish refugee from Germany: “They [members of the Jewish Betar] roamed the streets armed with clubs and sang their songs. If they and the Russians bumped into each other there was a fight.”³⁴

Excursus: Civil Society in Harbin

Civil society had always been very vibrant in Harbin. Numerous cultural, political, religious and professionals unions and associations dated back to the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1923 around 50 civil society organisations were registered, and only three years later there were already over 70 of them, including several sports clubs as well as charity and professional organisations.³⁵ By the mid-1930s over a hundred Russian organisations were active in the city.³⁶ The reasons for this “bloom” of civil societies were manifold. First, neither the Russian state, the railway company nor later the local administration were in a position to provide adequate institutions to satisfy the needs of the population despite generous financial support from St. Petersburg. For instance, the first Russian school in Harbin was funded by a private initiative. The lack of adequate institutions was related to the administrative structures in Harbin. Until 1907/08, when the first local self-government was implemented, the railway company was responsible for all aspects of daily life in the city and in the settlements along the tracks. After 1909 municipal councils assumed many tasks from the Chinese Eastern Railway, but they were chronically underfinanced and put firmly under the control of the company’s management, who appointed some of its members.³⁷ Second, rapid population growth would have made it difficult to satisfy all needs even with an

independent, functional and sufficiently financed local administration. Attracted by the new job opportunities, thousands of Russian and Chinese were pouring into Harbin. In 1903, 50,000 to 60,000 people lived in the city, and in 1915 the number of inhabitants had increased to over 100,000 in Harbin proper without including the Chinese settlement Fujadian.³⁸

The waves of refugees from Russia caused by the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 and the following Civil War made the necessity for private contributions even more urgent, since the city administration was completely overwhelmed and unable to provide shelter, food or medical care for all in need. The misery of refugees triggered the foundation of a whole wave of new organisations like the Harbin Association for the Help for Invalids (Kharbinskoe obshchestvo pomoshchi invalidam), which offered free medical care for former soldiers of the White Army among other things, or the Harbin Relief Committee of Russian Refugees (Kharbinskii komitet pomoshchi russkim bezhentsam – also called Refugee Committee/Bezhenskii komitet), which provided shelter, medical care and food for refugees.³⁹ Both organisations remained active and continued to support the Russian poor until the invasion of the Red Army in 1945.

Another reason for Harbin's lively civil society is again closely connected to the deficits in the municipal self-government, namely the absent or inadequate opportunities for political participation. Owing to the turbulent history of Harbin, political institutions in the city were either simply nonexistent or unstable, short-lived, insufficient and sometimes ethnically divided. After its foundation in 1898, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was in charge of administering Harbin, including policing, education, taxation and the judiciary until the Municipal Government was properly established in 1908.⁴⁰ Although people could vote for the municipal councils, this right was limited to people owning property worth more than 500 rubles a year, which excluded many, if not most. Moreover, the general manager of the railway retained the power to veto any decision of the new municipal government. Later, indistinct purviews and conflicts over these as well as the mounting rivalry between the Chinese and Russians after the Chinese takeover in 1920 further impeded meaningful political participation. After the Japanese conquered Manchuria in 1931 and established the state of Manchukuo the following year, which ended the Chinese administration of Harbin, any inclusion of

the people into political decision making processes disappeared. Due to this lack of political participation, many turned to private initiatives, which is to say civil society.

The heterogeneous composition of its population of the city also contributed to Harbin’s lively but divided civil society. Each ethnic group founded its own charity organisations, youth groups, women’s association and so on. The tendency to create one’s own civil society organisations based on ethnic affiliation was particularly pronounced within the Jewish community in Harbin. With the help of their umbrella organisation, HEDO (Kharbinskoe evreiskoe dukhovnoe obshchestvo/Harbin Jewish Religious Community), the Jewish community gradually established a branch of the Committee for Jews for Resettling in Palestine (also called the Palestinian Committee), a home for seniors (*moshav zkenim*), a Talmud Tora (primary school) a communal kitchen (*deshevaia stolovaia* or cheap kitchen) and the *mishmeret holim* (sick fund), a benevolent ladies committee, the Jewish Peoples Bank, a Jewish hospital, branches of the youth groups – Betar and Maccabi – and of the Women’s International Zionist Organization (WIZO), as well as branches of the two big international Zionist organisations – the Revisionists and Herzl’s *Allgemeine Zionists*, among others.⁴¹ This particularly profuse involvement was partly owed to religious requirements, like *matzab*, but there was also an element of tradition. Other ethnic groups similarly established their own niches. Armenians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars, Poles and others all created their own cultural, religious and charitable organisations. The Tatars founded the Turkic–Tatar ethnic and religious community, which ran its own nursing home and an orphanage. The Armenians coalesced around the Harbin Armenian National Society and the Ukrainians around the Ukrainian Club. The Polish–Catholic Community ran religious as well as secular organisations, the most important of the latter being Gaspoda Polska.⁴² Ethnically based civil society organisations helped various ethnic groups to preserve their culture, traditions, language and to practice their religion, thereby reinforcing ethnic identity and cohesion within the community. However, the development of civil society along ethnic lines also contributed to the fragmentation of Harbin’s civil society and, as a result, the society as a whole.

Of course, there were associations that welcomed members of different ethnic origins and organisations, like the International Committee for the Help of Russian and Chinese Poor Population in

Harbin (Mezhdunarodnyi komitet po okazaniyu pomoshchi russkomu i kitaiskomu bednuiu naseleniiu v Kharbine)⁴³ and the local YMCA⁴⁴ promoted cooperation and exchange between different ethnicities in Harbin. But such organisations played a more peripheral role in daily life than ethnic-based associations. It seems that, as a result of the segregation along ethnic lines, people in Harbin often felt most strongly connected with their ethnic own communities and defined themselves along those lines rather than as citizens of Harbin or émigrés from the Russian empire. Alexander Gurvich, one of initiators of the youth group Betar in Harbin, described this mechanism in an interview:

A Jewish boy who goes to a German school and finds anti-Semitism there could try not to be Jewish, but to be German [...] In Harbin, if he finds anti-Semitism in the class, in the Russian Gymnasium, he cannot even think about stop being a Jew and trying to be Russian, because all of his life outside the school is among Jews, the Russian Jews [...] So there is no question that they couldn't escape from it, even he wanted to.⁴⁵

Evsey Domar, a Betar member, confirmed Gurvich's assertion:

The isolation between Jews and Russians from each other became even stronger after the appearance of the Betar in Harbin. Most Jewish boys, but not so many Jewish girls, in my class joined. Now the Jewish boys had a common interest, which the Russians of course would not share.⁴⁶

He also claimed in the same interview that he would not have even thought about joining a gentile organisation and did not want to have any non-Jews in the cultural club he and his friends founded.⁴⁷ If an admittedly nationalistic organisation like Betar could have such an effect on Jewish boys, what repercussions did fascist organisations have on Russian youth?

Children and Youth in Fascist Organisations

A young fascist [girl] strives to be Russian in everything and everywhere. She rejects the imitation of everything foreign.

She makes sure that her apartment has a Russian appearance. She sees to a Russian evening program on all celebrations she visits.⁴⁸

Russian fascists in Harbin set up several special sub-organisations and special-interest groups fairly early in their history. The first was the Russian Women's Fascist Movement (Rossiiskoe zhenskoe fashistskoe dvizhenie) established in spring 1934 under the leadership of Valentina Efremovna Abaimova. She was dismissed for infringing party discipline in 1936 and replaced by Evlamiia Georgievna Okhotina⁴⁹, whose husband, Lev Pavlovich Okhotin, was the head of the party's section for organisation (*organizatsionniy otdel*). The organisation offered courses on needlework or first aid, staged theatre pieces and organised balls. Besides these rather “traditional” fields of activity, members also managed their own radio show, hosted propaganda events and gave lectures.⁵⁰ Member of the Russian Women's Fascist Movement were not generally housewives, but employed at local newspapers, banks, educational institutions and in other sorts of clerical positions.⁵¹ Based on the Russian Women's Fascist Movement the party established a whole set of organisations to promote fascism among children and adolescents.

This development of a well-structured and stratified set of organisations for children and youth was part of a strategy to broaden the party bases, since it coincided with the expansion of the All-Russian Fascist Party beyond Harbin and the establishment of branches outside of Manchuria in 1934 and 1935. The party opened branches in Shanghai (1934), Mukden (1934), Dairen (1934), Tokyo (1933), Bern (1935), San Francisco (1935) and elsewhere.⁵² Moreover, as will be shown, the Russian fascists considered the education and indoctrination of Russian youth of uttermost importance, since they would be the foundation of a future fascist Russia.

The first organisation founded by the Russian fascists expressly for juveniles was the Union of Young Fascists Vanguards (Soiuz iunykh fashistok avangardistok) for girls age 10 to 16 in April 1934. Just a few weeks later the so-called Union of Fascist Little Ones (Soiuz fashistskikh kroshek), a unisex association for children between the ages of three and ten, came into existence. An equivalent to the Union of Young Fascists Vanguards (Soiuz iunykh fashistov avangard) for boys age 10 to 16 followed in June of the same year.⁵³ As is known, Rodzaevskii was an admirer of Mussolini and the Opera Nazionale Balilla are mentioned at

least once as a model for the fascist youth organisations of the Russian fascists. The name Vanguard Union was almost certainly taken from the Italian Avanguardisti, Mussolini's youth organisation for teenagers between 14 and 18 years old. The Vanguard Union was augmented two years later with the foundation of the Union of Fascist Youth (*Soiuz fashistskoi molodezhi*), an organisation for young people between 16 and 30 years of age. The aim and purpose of this organisation was to convey fascist juveniles into the All-Russian Fascist Party proper and to train the future leaders and ideologists of Russian Fascism.

Unfortunately, there are no consolidated findings on how many children and youth were actually members in any of these organisations, but the Union of Young Fascists for girls in 1936, for instance, had about 350 members alone in Harbin proper. There were still 153 members in 1941, when the Russian fascists in Manchuria had already lost most of their members and organisational capacity.⁵⁴ In addition, all organisations operated branches in nearly all districts of Harbin itself and other settlements in Manchuria.⁵⁵ Hence, one can assume that membership in fascist youth organisations reached several hundred in the middle of the 1930s, when the Russian Fascist Party was at its apogee. According to a German consular report, membership in all fascist youth organisations in Harbin amounted to about 1450 in 1937. That there was only a total of 7156 Russian boys and girls attending school in Harbin that year indicates just how great the fascist influence on Russian youth in the city must have been. If those numbers are even approximately correct, it can be safely assumed that at least one in six or seven Russian youths of school age was actually a member of a fascist organisation.⁵⁶

Women, as initiators, founders and supervisors, were at the forefront of the youth outreach work in the All-Russian Fascist Party. Maria Aleksandrovna Rychkova, wife of General Rychkov, head of the BREM from 1934 to 1935, Zoia Grigor'evna Bulycheva and Pats-Pamarnckaia, all members of the Russian Women's Fascist Movement, were particularly dedicated to the establishment of fascist youth organisations. Many of the organisers were already experienced in pedagogy with children and juveniles. Maria Rychkova, for example, leader of the Union of Young Fascists for girls as well as the Union of Fascist Little Ones, had run a kindergarten in Moscow before the revolution and Bolshevik takeover in 1917. In Harbin she worked for a children's home

run by the Orthodox Church.⁵⁷ Her colleague Zoia Grigor'evna Bulycheva studied at the pedagogical institute in Harbin⁵⁸ and was but one of several teachers who worked for one of the fascist organisations for children and youth.⁵⁹

Fascist organisations for boys were, as a rule, run by former members of the White Army. The boys' section of the Union of Young Fascists, for example, was first headed by Pavel Ivanovich Prokof'ev, a Cossack and himself a former member of the cadet corps in Khabarovsk.⁶⁰ He was long a companion of Rodzaevskii and among the founding members of the All-Russian Fascist Party in 1931. For reasons unknown he was replaced in 1935 by Sergei Ivanovich Tsvetkov,⁶¹ and was transferred to the section for military training.

Besides the organisation for children and teenagers, the Russian fascists also established two associations for young adults: the Union of the Fascist Youth for young men between the ages of 16 and 30 and the Students' Group of the Russian Fascist Party (*Studencheskaia gruppa VFP*) for scholars of the institution of higher education in Harbin. Perhaps because they were established quite late, neither group ever acquired the prominence and importance of the *kroshek* or the Vanguard Union.

The Union of the Fascist Youth, established in 1936, was designed as a transition between the youth organisations and the Russian Fascist Party. Its objective was to select and train the incipient leadership and future cadres of the All-Russian Fascist Party and, eventually, a fascist state.⁶² Members were required to develop a sound knowledge of fascist ideology and were therefore expected to study intensively at the party's so-called Stolypin Academy, a school established by the party in August 1936 to train and educate members and candidates.⁶³ The curriculum included fascist theory, political criticism, the Soviet Union and communism, but also units on how to agitate in a hostile environment and organisation techniques.⁶⁴ Further members, had to acquire expertise in one of the Union's so called core areas, such as politics, literature, Freemasonry, philosophy or science and technique.⁶⁵

The second organisation for young adults, the Students' Group of the Russian Fascist Party, established in February 1936 under the leadership of Evgenii Aleksandrovich Lukin to improve the party's ideological basis.⁶⁶ Gennadii Taradanov, the secretary of the department for agitation and propaganda justified the group's existence as follows:

We must recognize the flaw in our party is that we have insufficient intellectual forces. Our leadership has kept a small handful of educated workers, and we must, we are compelled, to expand their circle [...]; In general, it would be very good to create special lines of work for intelligent party members. This could be a fine field of work for fascist students in special circles at this or that higher educational institution. Here, their party work can be closely connected with their studies.⁶⁷

However, the statutes of the student group suggest that the fascists did not fully trust their “intelligent” members, since they emphasised above all religiousness, obedience, discipline and subordination to the party’s leadership.⁶⁸ This might be one of the reasons why apparently little became of the students’ group.

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Like the All-Russian Fascist Party as a whole, the Union of Fascist Little Ones and the girls’ section of the Union of Young Fascists were structured and organised along two axes: vertically along a hierarchical system of titles and ranks and horizontally through the so-called hearth (*ochag*) system.⁶⁹ A hearth was the smallest organisational unit and consisted of roughly four to six members of different ranks from the same neighborhood or school. Each new member was assigned to one particular hearth.⁷⁰ The hearth was supposed to function like a family and was for any member the most important peer group. The members of a hearth attended classes together, played or did sports together and worked together.⁷¹ Leaders of a hearth were not adults, but chosen from the younger rank and file members of the respective organisations.

With the hearth system, the Russian fascists pursued two seemingly contradictory objectives: to teach the children or teenagers cooperation, solidarity and collective responsibility; and to encourage competition between the individual members of a hearth as well as between different hearths. This competition was further intensified by the elaborate system of titles and ranks, which was called the “stepladder” of fascist education. In the Union of Fascist Little Ones, for instance, one started as a tenderfoot (*novichok*), then became a trooper (*kroshka*), ascended to a “wise *kroshka*” (*umnaia kroshka*) and finally rose to the highest rank of “omniscient *kroshka*” (*vseznaiia kroshka*) after passing the requisite

exams. Each member's rank could be discerned by the different badges and insignia on the uniform, which “proved to be a strong motor in the work with the children.”⁷²

The Union of Little Fascist Ones was the foundation of fascist national-patriotic education. An article in *Nash Put'* by Petr Olishev explained main aims of the Union of Fascist Little Ones as follows: “Rearing the children to believe deeply in God; to develop a sense of nationalism, love for the fatherland and a thirst for knowledge [...].”⁷³ The organisation modeled itself after the Japanese school, where “beginning with the first year the children are taught about the fatherland, the duty of each citizen and the adoration of war.”⁷⁴ In the Union the children were to “understand what is our duty, our foremost obligation – that the only meaning in our life is to fight for our fatherland and the right to live and work there.”⁷⁵ Activities included sports and physical training, games like “Cossack and Robber,” drawing, needlework and other kinds of handicraft. Among other handiworks, the children made their own badges and insignia. They practiced reciting fascist poems and giving short speeches.⁷⁶ The Russian Fascist Party was particularly proud of the Union of Fascists Little Ones, since no other fascist movement or party incorporated children at such a young age.⁷⁷

The girls' section of the Union of the Young Fascists was divided into five different ranks, starting at the rank of a “junior” Young Fascist and rising up to the honorary title “Vanguard of the National Revolution.”⁷⁸ While religious instruction and “love for the fatherland” were the principal goals of fascist education in the Union of Fascist Little Ones, so-called self-discipline and self-improvement were the focus in the Union of the Young Fascists for girls. Accordingly, for promotion to the highest level of “Vanguard of the National Revolution,” it was not enough to pass the required exams in Russian history, religious studies, *Vaterlandskunde* (homeland studies), home economics, ideological and political education. Much more important was the internal conversion, self-sacrifices and an “internal moral self-perfection.”⁷⁹ A “Vanguard of the National Revolution” was “a young fascist who has already started to change inwardly, a girl who has stepped out of the sphere of insouciance and superficiality onto the path of conscious self-education and SELF-IMPROVEMENT in the Name of the fatherland and service for HIM.”⁸⁰

The Union also offered girls courses in more “traditional” subjects like home economics, first aid, needlework and pedagogy, but also a

wide range of music, drawing and dancing lessons, writing workshops and German lessons.⁸¹ At the age of 17, the girls automatically transferred into the Russian Women's Fascist Movement. Girls who showed themselves to be particularly dedicated and talented would also rise into the leadership circles of the *kroshek* or the Union of Young Fascists.⁸²

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The Union of Young Russian Fascists for boys differed significantly from the other fascist organisations for children and teenagers. Formally, the Union was equally concerned with education, self-improvement and character formation, but these ideals yielded to intense military training in practice, especially towards the end of 1935, when the Union was reorganised and remodeled to introduce strict military discipline.⁸³ This reorganisation was probably due to Rodzaevskii's ambitious three-year-plan. If the Russian fascists were to have any chance of success in invading the Soviet Union, they needed to swell their troops with all possible haste. Therefore, the mission of the boys' section of the Union at this stage was not so much to foster the potential architects and leaders of a fascist Russian state, though this was repeatedly stated, but to produce soldiers for a possible war with the communists.

The Union of the Vanguard-Cadets [...] has as its main objective to provide basic military training, to strengthen the children physically, to develop their fighting spirit, a sense of corporatism, to teach them military discipline, to develop a sense of love for the country and to make them active fighters for the liberation of Russia.⁸⁴

Members of the Union practiced, for example, marksmanship and how to throw hand grenades. The fascists even had smaller rifles produced, which could be handled by a 10-year-old boy. Apparently, the military training of such young children aroused criticism and skepticism. To justify the induction of very young boys to military and combat training, the fascists pointed to Mussolini's fascist youth organisation, Opera Nazionale Balilla, which already trained boys at the age of eight. Those boys allegedly benefited from this training, including, it was claimed, in terms of academic performance.

Instead of guiding boys to self-discipline and self-improvement, the Union aimed to accustom them to military discipline, to instill them with a bellicose spirit and esprit de corps. The epitome and role model of the Union were the cadet corps of pre-revolutionary Russia and during the Civil War. The Union especially admired the heroic deeds attributed to the teenage cadets, their patriotism, courage and endurance during the Civil War, which, according to the fascists, by far outclassed the regular adult soldiers.⁸⁵

With the beginning of the Civil War, around 5,000 cadets from the fifth, sixth and seventh class, in total 30 cadet corps of Imperial Russia, joined the ranks of the anti-Bolshevik units – most of them the army of General Kornilov at the Don. And with them, the young officer-commanders like Captain Chernetsov made their daring raids on the backs of the Bolsheviks and smashed the Red Army in such a panic, after which they disappeared for a very, very long time.⁸⁶

The deputy leader and effective administrator of the Union of Young Russian Fascists for boys in 1935, Vasilii Vasil'evich Alekseev, was himself a former cadet who had fought the Red Army during the Civil War in Siberia.⁸⁷

It would appear that the Russian fascists in Harbin devoted more effort to the political and ideological education of girls than boys. The role of boys within the fascist movement was clearly defined. They were the soldiers to-be for a future army that would fight and hopefully overthrow the communist usurpers in Russia. Therefore, military training and drill was of utmost importance in the short term at least. In contrast, the role of girls was not so obviously predetermined, and this was especially true in regard to the “national revolution,” that is, the fight against communism. The Russian fascists did not promote an image of women strictly as wives and mothers, as did the National Socialists in Germany or, especially, the Italian fascists under Mussolini.⁸⁸ This enlightened view was to hold at least until the fascist takeover in Russia, but probably no longer. The task that the Russian fascists finally assigned to girls, and women for that matter, was agitation and propaganda as becomes evident in an apocryphal conversation between two girls published in *Nash Put'*:

I don't understand, what you, as a girl can do to help the fatherland. You say yourself that Russia can only be saved from its enemies by fighting. But how can you go into battle? You cannot even lift a rifle [...] Nina, you have totally the wrong notion of fighting [...] You have to eliminate the communist idea, which helped the Bolsheviks to betray the Russian people. Ideas have to be subdued by means of agitation. In this fight we girls have the active role.⁸⁹

To fulfill this task children and juveniles need the armamentarium to convince their fellow Russians about advantages of fascism, that means they needed to be educated.

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From the very beginning, education was at the core of fascist work with juveniles. One reason for the heavy emphasis on education was the Russian fascists' notion of the nation. Since they conceived the nation as a cultural entity, which, because it was not solely based on race or ancestry, had to be forged. Émigré children, who were usually born in exile and had never been to Russia proper, had to be made into Russians or, as the fascists put it, one had to develop their "Russianness".⁹⁰ Second, Russian émigré schools in Harbin and other places in Manchuria also strived to convey anti-communism, patriotism and love for the fatherland to their pupils, but, in the first half of the 1930s, those schools were still under the control of old monarchist émigrés, who were in the majority and would definitely not teach fascist ideology and theory. The fascists themselves regularly criticised Harbin schools:

The chief defect of the Russian schools at the present time is that they show the Russian children that they must love their country, but they do not strengthen this love and develop it by explaining why they (the children) have to fight against the communist power, and they do not prepare (the children) for this fight, they do not even give them minimal political preparation.⁹¹

The stated goal of the Russian fascists was, therefore, to give the children and teenagers of the Russian emigration a "national-patriotic" education, which included *Vaterlandskunde* (homeland studies), Russian history, religion as well as ideological and political instruction.⁹²

For this purpose members of the Russian Fascist Party developed a whole set of teaching materials like books, leaflets and brochures, especially different age-appropriate versions of the fascist “bible” – the *ABCs of the Russian Fascists*.⁹³ The fascists also wrote and staged fascist-oriented theater pieces, songs, poems and even operas, for children in particular.⁹⁴ For instance, the play *Red Hill* tells the story of a couple of young children, who, after hearing about the Union of Fascist Little Ones, long to join the Union to serve Russia.⁹⁵ Another theater piece describes the life and struggle of the hero Sergei, who lives in the Soviet Union, but is a secret fascist aching to fight for the national revolution and to overthrow the communists.⁹⁶ Young people in the Soviet Union with a secret devotion to fascism were a common and popular topic in fascist plays for children and teenagers. The drama *The Fateful Hour*, for example, tells the story of three young Komsomol; Tania, a victim of her times who had already had relationships with 16 different men, Petr, a bandit and Stalinist, and Fedor, the fascist incognito.⁹⁷

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At least in theory, much of the curriculum for children and youth consisted of ideological instruction. Members of the Union of Young Fascists, boys and girls alike, had to prepare themselves to combat the physical and mental presence of communism in their fellow Russians, using regular lectures and seminars on ideology and politics. Even the Fascist Little Ones had to attend political and ideological classes once or twice a week to learn about fascism and communism, to “develop an age-appropriate understanding of fascism.”⁹⁸ Members of all organisations also had to take regular exams on ideology and politics. Pursuant to the fascist curriculum children and youth would be educated about the meaning and, of course, the evils of communism, Freemasonry and the Jews as well as the basics of fascism.⁹⁹ Despite the emphasis on ideological and political education, the actual contents seemed to be fairly vague, superficial, and highly repetitive and not very elaborate. For example, the ABCs for Young Fascists (girls) defined communism as follows:

Communism is a doctrine that says people are like animals and they are made for a beastlike life. Communism negates god und considers all men to be equal. This means fools are equal to the intelligent, sluggards and layabouts are equal to the eager and

hard-working. Communism disavows the fatherland and the family. Communism demands that everything is collective. A communist is a person who believes in communism.¹⁰⁰

The definition of fascism in the same publication was similarly superficial:

Russian fascism is a movement that fights against communists, Freemasons and Jews, for a world without the Soviet Union, without Jewish power and Russian slavery. [Russian fascism] fights for a new great Russia, based on belief in God, love of the fatherland and honest work. Hence our slogan “God, Nation and Work”.¹⁰¹

As one can see, ideological and political education was not intended to give children and youth a deeper understanding of communism, or fascism for that matter, but to instill them with simple and clear conceptions of the enemy, the communists, the Jews and the Freemasons. Communism was simply inherently evil, and fascism, on the other hand, was pure and good. Developments, events, ideas and grievances that triggered the February Revolution and the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 were simply omitted. Perhaps, since the restoration of the old order was clearly not on the agenda of the Russian fascists, a deeper understanding of their failures was deemed unnecessary or even harmful.

Religious education and *Vaterlandskunde* were not elaborated much further. Although the Russian fascists was never tired of stressing the importance of religion and piety at every occasion possible and Orthodox priests, like Pastor Nosov or Pastor Mukhin, who were also members of the All-Russian Fascist Party, conducted the courses,¹⁰² religious education itself was superficial. The first statute of the Union of Young Fascists indeed stated: “A Vanguard is a true son [or, for girls, daughter] of the Orthodox Church – without religion there is no beauty and no sense in life.”¹⁰³ Beyond going to church regularly and reciting their morning and evening prayers every day, however, teenage members of the Union of Young Fascists were simply expected to memorise the names of important, mainly contemporary, representatives of the Orthodox Church as well as the name of their confessor and the meaning of selected religious symbols.¹⁰⁴ The fascists seem to have attached rather more importance to the strict observance of rituals and religious regulations than to obtaining a deeper understanding of scripture.

Russian history, as taught in the fascist organisations for children and youth, was also limited to a carefully selected and small set of names, events and dates without any background, analysis or connection between those events. The *ABCs of the Union of Young Fascists* (girls) read under the heading “Important Dates of Russian History”:

The Russian state started to exist in 862. In 988 St. Vladimir was baptized. 1223 the Rus' were conquered by the Tatars and fell under the Tatar yoke. In 1480 Russia was freed from the Tatar yoke. 1598 was the beginning of the Times of Trouble (*Smuta*), which ended in 1613 with the election of Michail Fedorovich Romanov as Tsar. In 1682 began the reign of Peter the Great, and in 1721 he renamed “the State of Moscow” into “Russian Empire” and was crowned as the first Russian Emperor. In 1917 came the revolution, and in the beginning power went to the masses and then to the communists under the leadership of Lenin.¹⁰⁵

As Wussow, secretary of the German consulate in Hsingking, later remarked: “The representation of old Russia, with all its shortcomings and long outdated traditions, is not the objective, but the All-Russian Fascist Party wants to instill the youth with the spirit of the Russian nationalist. Russian history is taught in a totally different light by the fascists [...].”¹⁰⁶ The Russia that the fascist youth were to remember and long for was not simply the lost Romanov Empire but much more. It was one continuous idea or entity, defined much more by its culture, historical destiny and the uniqueness and spirituality of its people than by its rulers or the form of its government.

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Being a member in any of the fascist organisations was rather time-consuming and probably did not leave much time for any other leisure activities. Three to four meetings a week were effectively the minimum for adequate attendance. For instance, *kroshki* too young for school had to attend meetings three times a week, while those of school age had to come only twice, plus a general meeting and a “day of work” per week. Attendance was strictly monitored. When children missed a class or any other meeting, they had to submit a written exculpation including the reasons for their absence.¹⁰⁷

The Russian fascists also tried to monitor and dictate the lives of adolescent members outside of classes, meetings, services and training with a set of rules, which, if actually obeyed, determined and regulated virtually all of the private, cultural and social lives of children and youth. Within this set of regulations there are both vague, general guidelines of behavior and quite detailed instructions and regulations. For example, the statutes of the Fascist Little Ones stated: “A Little Fascist is never moody and all papas and mamas can always present the Fascist Little One as an example to their children”¹⁰⁸ – a very demanding commandment for boys and girls under the age of ten.

The attempts of the Russian Fascist Party to control and influence every aspect of their young members’ lives did not even stop at the thresholds of private homes. Girls, as well as women, were enjoined to furnish their houses or flats in Russian style and to set up a “national corner” equipped with the Russian flag, the flag of Manchukuo and of the All-Russian Fascist Party as well as a picture of the fascist leader Rodzaevskii.¹⁰⁹ This “national corner” is reminiscent of the Russian tradition of displaying an icon with a holy lamp in a corner of the living room, but also of the personal cults around Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin although Rodzaevskii was never very successful in his attempts to establish a cult around himself.¹¹⁰ Whichever allusion was intended, having such a display in an apartment or room revealed the occupants’ affiliation to the Russian fascists to every visitor at a glance.

A special concern of Russian Fascists Party was to protect Russian children and youth from being infected by foreign, or perhaps more precisely western, culture and preserving what the Russian fascists perceived to be a pure Russian culture. Western culture was often described as a poison or an epidemic that infected the émigré youth, alienated them from their inherent “Russianness” and bred delinquent behavior, drug addiction and even suicide. A contributor to *Nash Put'* described the supposedly short step from reading detective novels to suicide in a kind of cynical manual to self-destruction:

It is the first duty of Russian youth to seek to escape the custody of their parents. In doing so it helps to lie. And the entire future life is built on these lies. Having read exciting novels, learned a lot from movie stars, the Russian boy begins to apply all this in his life. And concludes with suicide.¹¹¹

Those concerns were also reflected in the charters of fascist youth organisations. Young Russian fascists were only allowed to read Russian literature and poetry, listen and perform only Russian songs or music in general, and by order they had to prefer Russian art and architecture over western forms. Moreover, they were strictly forbidden to dance the foxtrot, which was particularly disliked by the Russian fascists, because “the foxtrot, like an anesthesia, completely envelops the youth, boys and girls alike, and they lose their purity.”¹¹² The young Russian fascists were also obligated to promote Russian culture at every possibility by giving speeches, reciting patriotic poems or singing patriotic songs.¹¹³ Most importantly, they were forbidden from attending events and entertainments that did not qualify as Russian by fascist standards.¹¹⁴ Members of the Union of Young Fascists were also obligated to obtain permission from their superiors before visiting the cinema or events not organised by the Russian fascists.¹¹⁵

The motivation behind these regulations was not only to protect Russian children and youth from contamination by Western culture, but also to restrict social contact to outsiders who were not associated with the Russian fascists or even opposed them. Not surprisingly, in the light of the Russians fascists’ pronounced anti-Semitism, this applied doubly to any social contact with Jews. Children in the Union of Fascist Little Ones were taught never to play with Jewish children, not to talk to any Jew nor to accept anything from them.¹¹⁶ Girls in the Vanguard Union were forbidden from buying anything in shops in Jewish or Soviet possession, “because their hands are stained with the blood of the Russian people.”¹¹⁷ They were further urged to “allow nobody in their presence to talk against the All-Russian Fascist Party as a proof of love.”¹¹⁸

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There is a puzzling but unavoidable question as to why any parents would choose to enlist their children, especially those under 10, in one of the fascist youth organisations instead of any of the other numerous youth groups existing in Harbin. First, members of the Russian Fascist Party, women in particular, were obligated to provide their children with a fascist education, which probably also meant to enroll them in the appropriate fascist organisations.¹¹⁹ Second, the Russian fascists actively advertised their educational program to parents, as the following possibly fake letter published in *Nash Put'* shows:

When I joined the Union I often came unkempt and bedraggled, and my supervisor often reprimanded me. I felt very bad after each reprimand, and I wanted to better myself and be a good kroshek. And when I became acquainted with the other girls and the ABC of Fascism I knew what I had to do to be a good kroshek. [...] Now I always have a neat hair-do. And always when I see grubby girls I want to invite them to join our Union.¹²⁰

This story was definitely not directed towards the children themselves, who often could not even read, but towards parents as an offer to help with the daily struggles of raising children. Similarly, the Laws of the Union of Fascist Little Ones enjoined the children not to be lazy, to get up every morning and to brush their teeth.¹²¹ Fascist organisations also stressed and actively encouraged the subordination of children and youth to their parents and demanded strict obedience towards them.¹²² Teenagers looking to advance to the next rank within the Union of the Young Fascists had to produce a letter from their parents testifying to their good behavior.¹²³ Beyond this, however, parents were not involved in the activities of fascist youth groups.

Another reason that many parents sent their children to a fascist organisation or encouraged them to join was the precarious situation for many children and adolescents in Harbin. Some parents were simply incapable of adequately supervising their children and keeping them away from the dangers and temptations that awaited children and teenagers on the streets of Harbin. Alcohol and drug abuse was endemic among Russian adolescents, but also adults, throughout the 1930s.¹²⁴ In the mid-1930s, 56 opium dens operated in Harbin and 194 shops sold narcotics in Harbin proper and several hundred in the adjoining Chinese settlement Fujiadian.¹²⁵ According to BREM, over 2,000 Russian addicts to heroin, morphine, cocaine and/or opium were officially registered in the spring of 1936 – the actual number was many times higher.¹²⁶ The majority of drug addicts in Harbin were under the age of 30, and many started already in their early teens.¹²⁷ Drug abuse among Russian youth was apparently so widespread that a newspaper article remarked about the arrest of a gang of juvenile burglars, age 12–15, that at least they had used the money to buy alcohol rather than narcotics.¹²⁸ Finding drug addicts' corpses on the streets of Harbin, especially in districts of Pristan and Nakhalovka, was a common occurrence during

the 1930s. According to the *China Daily News*, up to six bodies would be discovered on some mornings.¹²⁹ The Russian community in Harbin tried to cope with the problem in different ways. Some hospitals offered special treatment for drug addicts, different organisations and community representatives, among them the Russian fascists, pressured for the closure, or at least tighter restriction, of opium dens and pharmacies and others demanded the closure of certain bars and billiard halls.¹³⁰

Stephan, in his book on the Russian fascists in exile, and Helen Jacobson, a former inhabitant of Harbin, in her memoirs, accused members and the All-Russian Fascist Party in general of dealing in drugs.¹³¹ One cannot rule out that individual members of the party might have been involved in drug dealing, trafficking and some indeed were themselves users, but in public, at least, the Russian fascists did much to fight drug addiction among youth of Harbin. For example, in summer 1937 *Nash Put'* published a list of shops and pharmacies that sold narcotics and demanded their closure from the local administration.¹³² Towards addicts themselves the fascists favored severity. To cure Russian youth from drug addictions, the fascists suggested establishing forced labor camps outside of the city and to publish the names of addicts and their families in newspapers and public places to apply pressure on them.¹³³ But neither the efforts of the community nor new laws that, at least in theory, restricted the sale of opium, heroin and other narcotics were particularly successful.¹³⁴ The Russian fascists intentionally addressed parents of such difficult or “problem” children and promised that their program would help to get them back in line.¹³⁵ Even if the fascists probably failed to live up to this promise, they still offered a place where children would be off the streets and not exposed to drugs and alcohol, which were strictly banned from all events organised by and for the fascist youth.¹³⁶

But what drew Russian children and especially Russian teenagers to fascist youth organisations? At first glance, neither the strict discipline and hierarchical structures nor the numerous lectures, prayers and marches seem to have been particularly attractive to young people. The first reason is that, despite possibly boring lectures and long church services, being a member in one of the fascist organisations was probably a lot of fun. Members could attend summer camps to escape the city and parental supervision.¹³⁷ What boy would not be excited about the

chance to learn archery, to shoot a rifle, to acquire scouting skills and basic guerilla tactics? Especially the wide range of sports offered by the Russian fascists to their younger members probably attracted many children and teenagers, who could otherwise doubtfully afford to join a sports club, to fascist organisations. Although other youth organisations, like the various Boy Scout associations, also organised sports, summer camps or scavenger hunts,¹³⁸ they stopped short of the fascists by foregoing such activities as shooting or throwing grenades. A second and more relevant reason for the fascists, attractiveness among youth compared to other youth organisations was that the fascists seemed to offer the Russian youth a solution to one of their most burning desires: the prospect of changing their situation.

One of the elementary problems of Harbin's Russian youth was a lack of opportunity, possibilities and perspectives. Many families lived in great poverty, and the economic crises that struck Harbin at the beginning of the 1930s and intensified after the sale of the railway in 1935 made it increasingly difficult to eke out a living.¹³⁹ More than 25 per cent of all adults in the Russian émigré community are said to have been unemployed during the mid-1930s.¹⁴⁰ Drug addiction and, especially, alcohol abuse were common not just among teenagers but also adults. Many émigrés suffered from depression as a result of losing their former, and sometimes pleasant, lives in Russia in exchange for miserable circumstances in Harbin. Some parents could not or did not want to care for their children anymore, abandoning their offspring or chasing them out of the house.¹⁴¹ Street children were a growing problem in Harbin, particularly in winter.¹⁴² Even if families stayed together and managed to send their children to school, the prospects and possibilities of Russian youth in Harbin were still very limited. For one thing the local economy deteriorated continuously throughout the 1930s. This was a consequence of the global economic crisis at the beginning of the 1930s, which hit Manchuria hard, as well as of the Japanese economic policies in Manchukuo during the 1930s, which were much more oriented towards the needs of Japan than Manchuria. The exodus of Soviet citizens after the sale of the railway further intensified the dire economic straits.¹⁴³ Furthermore the opportunities for higher education in Harbin dwindled over the course of the 1930s. Many of Harbin's previously flourishing post-secondary educational institutions, like the Harbin Polytechnic Institute, the Pedagogical Institute or the

Institute of Oriental and Commercial Studies, were closed by the Japanese authorities over the decade. Other institutions, like the St. Vladimir Institute or the Faculty of Law, were severely constrained in their activities.¹⁴⁴

Leaving Harbin in search of a better life elsewhere was not an option for most Harbin Russians. Many young people and their parents did not have any recognised passport and were stateless. Further, the Manchukuo government severely restricted mobility within Manchukuo as well as exit opportunities from the new state.¹⁴⁵ Beyond the restrictions on leaving, it was very lengthy, difficult and expensive to obtain an immigration visa for other countries, especially the United States, which rigorously restricted the entry of refugees in general. Still, thousands of Russians who somehow managed to leave Harbin moved to Shanghai, Beijing or left China entirely. Many accepted the Soviet offer of the mid-1930s to repatriate. This decision proved to be a grave, and often fatal, error.¹⁴⁶ So called returnees were viewed with suspicion and hostility, were extensively questioned by the authorities and had to recount their past and their lives in Harbin. About 4,500 repatriates were under suspicion as terrorists and spies for Japan and often disappeared in Stalin's gulags. The situation worsened still when, in September 1937, being a *kharbinets* or a *kharbinka*, that is, a Russian from Harbin became a crime under order no. 000593 of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).¹⁴⁷ Russians in Harbin were perhaps not fully informed about events on the other side of the border, but they learned enough from letters, local and foreign press or new arrivals to be aware of the persecutions, purges and the labor camps.¹⁴⁸ Returning was, therefore, not an option for many.

The most compelling sign of desperation and despair was the series of youth suicides in the 1930s, which at times reached epidemic proportions.¹⁴⁹ Mainly young adults in their early 20s, men and women alike, but also teenagers killed or attempted to kill themselves, in many cases using strychnine, a knife or a gun.¹⁵⁰ Despite the steps taken to stem youth suicide, incidence rose during the 1930s, which could be due to the ineffectiveness of the available measures to deal with the actual problems of Russian youth in Harbin. When the suicide rate peaked in November 1935, and in September alone 12 young Russians took their own lives, the reasons were obvious for contemporaries: “Out of 12 cases, only two can be ascribed to romantic reasons, four killed themselves

because of hopeless poverty and in six cases [...] out of disappointment and because they lost all faith in life [...] The oldest was 30 years.”¹⁵¹

The Russian fascists, in contrast to the monarchists and other youth organisations, inspired Russian youth with the possibility, or at least the illusion thereof, of taking immediate action. No other fraction within the émigré community pursued any plan as ambitious as Rodzaevskii’s three-year-plan. Instead of being solely the keepers of pre-revolutionary Russian culture and society, which had disappeared nearly two decades before, the fascists restyled Russian youth as the creators and builders of a new Russia. Therefore, in fascist propaganda directed towards teenagers, words like “creators,” “founders,” “reincarnation” or “innovation” were much more prominent than “liberation,” “restoration” or even “renovation”. For instance, paragraph 2 of the charter of the Union of Young Fascists read: “The objective of the Union is the creation of a new Russian man, a fighter for Russia, [...] creator of a new Russian life under the ray of light of true ideals, [...] an erector of a new great Russia.”¹⁵²

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Civil society organisations influence the identities and outlook of their members. According to Putnam’s theory, civil society organisations promote social integration, willingness to cooperate, a stronger public spirit and, finally, to more democracy, because members of such organisations practice democratic virtues within the organisational contexts.¹⁵³ These effects occur generally regardless of the actual purpose of the civil society organisation, but they are much more pronounced if the stated objective of a civil society organisation is to alter the identity and perception of its members. The promotion of certain norms, beliefs, modes of behavior and values are accordingly at the core of such an organisation, and it might in fact be the prime reason why people join such organisations in the first place. This is probably the case in many religious and political organisations, but especially in organisations targeting children and youth, like the fascist youth groups, where the notions of education and, concomitantly, identity, character formation and imparting values are emphasised.

The Russian fascists deliberately and openly aimed to alter the identity, personality and outlook of their young and of their adult members as well. In doing so the Russian fascists offered two models that partially reinforce each other: the true Russian and the Russian

fascist. The true Russian was a religious person and a firm believer in God. This status was not, however restricted to Orthodox Christians, because the Russian fascist also admitted non-Orthodox believers, mainly Muslims in the form of Tatars.¹⁵⁴ The true Russia had a Russian soul and a Russian heart, adored Russian culture and exceptionally loved his fatherland. In a way, the true Russian was the perfect *kroshka*.¹⁵⁵ This notion of Russianness was shared by many other organisations and individuals among the Russian emigrants, even if they stopped short of the fascists' fierce rejection of Western culture. The Russian fascist, on the other hand, was in a way a step beyond the true Russian. A Russian fascist was a warrior, a champion for Russia, who sacrificed himself willingly and happily for his fatherland. He was a creator, the builder of a glorious new Russia. He was the vanguard of Russian youth. While the ideal of the “true Russian” at least conceptually included all young Russian emigrants, the Russian fascists were part of the elite.

For whatever reason, children or teenagers joined the Vanguard Union or Fascist Little Ones, fascist propaganda and ideology socialised them. Unfortunately, but somehow understandably, none of the erstwhile members of fascists organisations wrote memoirs or an autobiography, unlike so many other former inhabitants of Harbin. Letters and personal ads from juveniles in the fascist newspaper *Nash Put'*, however, might shed some light on the influence of fascist education on the identity, self-perception and *Weltanschauung* of fascist youth.

About every two weeks *Nash Put'* contained a special page entitled “Young readers’, correspondence,” where their young readers could find pen pals, exchange notes or debate certain topics of interest – a quasi-social network for fascist Russian youth in Harbin. I have singled out three; Patriot, Leonid Nikolaev and Gypsy to stand for typical adolescents’ submissions, because their true identities were revealed by other correspondents. This confirmation is desirable because it is conceivable that the editors of *Nash Put'* fabricated some submissions to present their preferred image of Russian youth.¹⁵⁶ A further reason to select Patriot, Leonid Nikolaev and Gypsy is that they roughly typify the average contributor to “Young readers’ correspondence.” They are all between 13 and 16 years old, still attend school and are members in a fascist youth organisation.

The pseudonyms chosen by the correspondents of “Young readers’ correspondence” speak volumes: Patriot, Comrade-in-Arms, Fighter for

Russia or Black Swastika. One boy also chose the pseudonym Young Hero of Hitler's Germany – apparently the Russian title of the famous national socialist propaganda movie *Hitlerjunge Quex* (Hitler youth Quex) from 1933, which was quite popular among young fascists in Harbin.¹⁵⁷ Choosing the “wrong” pseudonym could arouse suspicion and attract criticism from other correspondents:¹⁵⁸

Blues Eyes! Why do you write under this alias? That is to say it reminds me of something alien. “Blue Eyes”, that seems to be a new foxtrot. Uh all this foreignness. Please excuse the fact that I write this: Are you a foreigner? Write which kind of foreigner? Patriot.¹⁵⁹

This letter also clearly demonstrates the derogatory attitude acquired by members of fascist youth organisations towards foreign, especially Western, culture, which is here typified by the foxtrot. Similar stances can be found in quite a few other letters. For instance, Gypsy wrote about (Western) cinema, the other poison of the Russian soul in the fascists’ estimation:

I think in general there is nothing good about movies, but rather they debauch the soul of the Russian youth and instill them with foreignness. Of course, if our movies would be Russian, they could be beneficial, but for now, in my mind, they just ruin the youth.¹⁶⁰

One of the most active and popular contributors in “Young readers’ correspondence” was an adolescent under the alias Leonid Nikolaev, who corresponded with many different youths in 1935, preferring girls. The pseudonym referred to a young former communist who shot Sergei Kirov, the first secretary of the Leningrad branch of the Communist Party, on 1 December 1934 and whom Russian fascists in Harbin consequently regarded as a hero.¹⁶¹ For his pen pals, the fact that Leonid Nikolaev was a fascist seemed to be his greatest attribute, as the two following examples from his correspondence with Black Swastika and Marfusha show:

Leonid Nikolaev: I want to exchange letters with you. I am a girl age 13. I love the Russian fascists. I believe you are a fascist. Please answer. Black Swastika.¹⁶²

Leonid Nikolaev: I want to exchange letters with you. I am a girl age 15 [...] I am a Vanguard and often in the Russian Club. I seem to know you. You are, I think, P.G., because you choose a hero of the national revolution as your pseudonym [...] I want to talk to you about Russia, since I do not know it very well. Marfusha.¹⁶³

Leonid Nikolaev also insisted that his acquaintances share his political convictions and were themselves members or sympathisers of the Russian fascists. This becomes apparent in his answer to Marfusha: “Marfusha! [...] I am so happy that you are a Vanguard, because I am a fascist [...] Glory to Russia! Leonid Nikolaev.”¹⁶⁴

The letter leaves the impression that a relationship between the two young people would have been impossible had Marfusha not been a member of the fascist youth organisation Vanguard. Membership as a precondition for friendship was typical for Leonid Nikolaev and others.¹⁶⁵ Apparently, the Russian fascists’ attempt to restrict social contacts and friendship to likeminded juveniles seemed often to have succeeded. Emphatic self-identification first and foremost as a “fascist” was rife throughout the pages of “Young readers’ correspondence”.¹⁶⁶ However, the contributors were often at a loss to explain the content of that identity, usually writing only the declaration, “I am a fascist.” This could be explained by the rather superficial and hollow “ideological” and “political” education that adolescents received in the Union of Young Fascists, which rarely exceeded short slogans and a few hollow quips.

Conclusion

Education programs in fascist youth organisations were not intended to impart knowledge or understanding of historical, social or political relationships nor for the development of well-grounded political opinions and convictions. Rather, fascist education sought to isolate youth from inimical ideas and to produce a deep emotional attachment to the movement and its attendant ideas, but the ideas themselves often remained superficial. The fascists demanded from their youth voluntary and all-embracing commitment to the movement to be indicated by self-improvement and studious effort. They tried to instill a self-image of the “chosen” youth or vanguard of Russia, but actually developing a

mature and autonomous personality was not a priority. Nor were they really interested in supporting children and youth in making the transition to adulthood. Instead, the fascists encouraged subordination, obedience and strict discipline in nearly all aspects of daily life.

The identity politics of the Russian fascists included a seemingly contradictory approach – total personal commitment in all aspects of life with only a superficial ideological basis reduced to a couple of slogans repeated ad infinitum – yet they were successful despite, or perhaps because of, this incoherence. Youthful members increasingly identified themselves first and foremost as fascists and aligned their daily lives accordingly. Being a fascist determined which movies they saw, what friends they had, what books they would read, what music they would like and how they danced.

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIAN FASCISTS AND HARBIN CIVIL SOCIETY

“Zhidomasonstvo”: The Fascists, the Russian Club and the YMCA

It is desirable that members of the VFP join any national or professional union and any organization with the objective to draw people into the VFP, establish fascist factions [within these organizations] or gradually turn the organization into a completely fascist one.¹

Since their foundation, the Russian fascists had always coveted prominence in the public life of the Russian-speaking community in Harbin. Even the organisation's precursors, the Russian Fascist Organization and the Union of the National Syndicate of Russian Fascist Workers in the Far East, had sought to agitate and gain new members by distributing propaganda material and organising lectures.² However, their efforts were mainly limited to young men, like law students and railway workers, without aiming at a broader audience. The All-Russian Fascist Party, in turn, aspired to extend their influence into the heart of émigré society and consequently had to develop new ways to get in touch with the Russian community. To do so, they pursued a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they promoted fascism by giving lectures and organising informational meetings in various non-political institutions and associations to canvass their program and to raise party membership. In September 1932, for example, Rodzaevskii gave a series

of lectures about fascism to students and faculty at the Harbin Pedagogical Institute, the city's only institution for training Russian teachers.³ In January 1933 a similar event took place during a meeting of the Refugee Committee (Bezhenskii komitet), where both leaders of the Russian fascists, Rodzaevskii and Matkovskii, participated in a public discourse on the differences between fascism and bolshevism.⁴ On the other hand, the Russian fascists sought to integrate themselves in events, problems, and debates that concerned the entire Russian émigré community to present themselves as an integral part of that community.⁵ During the disastrous flood in August 1932, which destroyed the districts along the river Sungari, killed many people, and deprived hundreds of families of their homes, the Russian fascists organised their own rescue teams consisting of several hundred party members. Those teams rescued people from their flooded homes, delivered provisions, and collected donations for the flood victims. In this effort the fascists cooperated with other Russian organisations like the Russian Community Committee (Russkii obshchestvennyi komitet), which became one of the most respected charity organisations in Harbin.⁶ Their engagement during times of crisis showed their concern for the community and helped the fascists to gain a good reputation as responsible and committed members of society. Recognising their contribution was effortless, since the fascist rescue teams were easily identifiable by their armbands imprinted with a conspicuous "F" for fascists.⁷ But these rather sporadic and limited possibilities to promote the new organisation and its agenda could hardly satisfy the burning ambitions of Rodzaevskii and his followers. Therefore, the Russian fascists devised new and superior strategies to propagate the movement.

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The first coup in the fascists' attempts to gain a foothold within the Russian émigré community of Harbin was the foundation of the so-called Russian Club in 1932/3. Initially, the Russian Club was intended to, and often did, serve as a community and cultural center for the Russian-speaking émigrés since the Japanese occupation and the lack of any official representation as well as the acute need for self-organisation due to the lack of adequate institutions certainly primed demand for a community center. This need was particularly urgent until

the mid-30s, because many of the main venues of Russian emigrants, like the club of the railway employees, were until then under the control of the Soviet part of the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway and therefore inaccessible for White Russians.

The Russian Club itself was subdivided into different sections with an emphasis on cultural activities, like theater, music, and literature, which reflected the Club's agenda of "satisfying the cultural needs of the Russian people [...] in Harbin."⁸ The Club ran its own library, which held thousands of fiction and non-fiction books as well as newspapers and journals from Asia, Europe, and the Americas in different languages.⁹ In addition the Russian Club provided the opportunity to pursue different kinds of sports or to partake in technical courses and other form of vocational training.¹⁰ Members could use the library for free, visit all events and lectures at the Club, and had the right to participate in any of the Club's subsections. The membership fee of one Manchukuo dollar per year was probably affordable for most Russian émigrés. In the late 1930s, when the economic situation was even more tense than in 1933, the average employee of a trading company earned between 35 and 40 Manchukuo dollars a month.¹¹

From the very beginning the fascists made sure that they would maintain control of the Russian Club. Immediately following the Club's foundation, the steering committee, or presidium as it was called, did not consist of fascists only. However, a closer look at the key positions shows that the fascists, or more precisely Rodzaevskii, controlled the Club. The first chairman was a respectable doctor, Andrei Vasil'evich Linder, who was at the same time the head of the Doctors' Union. Linder was not a fascist, but a Legitimist, even if he assisted the fascists occasionally.¹² But Linder's role seemed comparable to that of General Kos'min within the fascist party, who was also just a straw man. Linder hardly ever appeared in any media coverage of events in the Russian Club or spoke publicly in its name. Although Rodzaevskii, once again, was satisfied with the post of vice-president,¹³ it was he who represented the Club before the general public, talked to the press, and determined its course. The second vice-president of the Russian Club was Vasili Fedorovich Serebriakov, who in 1934 became one of the leading figures of the Russian fascists in Mukden.¹⁴

Membership to the Club, like the fascist party, was not limited to ethnic Russians, but was granted to "persons of all nationalities who

exercised citizen rights in the Tsarist Empire,” were approved by the steering committee, and paid their fees.¹⁵ For one thing, the inclusion of non-ethnic Russians, like Georgians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and so on, clearly reflected the fascists’ notion of the Russian nation as a cultural instead of a racial or ethnic entity. What is more, the restriction to those nationalities that had had citizen rights in Russia was an elegant and expedient way to exclude Jews from the Club, since their rights, despite all promises and intentions after the Revolution of 1905, had been severely limited under the Tsarist regime.¹⁶ By formulating this exclusion so obliquely, the drafters could avoid the impression that the Russian Club was an openly anti-Semitic institution, which might have scared some people away or provoked the authorities. “Diffidence” was quite typical for the outreach strategy of the Russian fascists. At least initially they often abstained from their usually menacing propaganda and seldom used the word “fascist” at all in context of the Russian Club at all.

Formally, the Russian Club committed itself to political neutrality and was open to “representatives of all political movements and fractions of the emigration, for members of all organisations, groups and associations,” but with the constraint that they “subordinate personal, group, class or party interests to the interests of the Russian nation.”¹⁷ Theoretically speaking, even Soviet citizens could file a membership application, because they were only explicitly excluded from honorary or lifelong membership.¹⁸ However, for the Russian fascists political neutrality was obviously just lip service. Even a brief glance at the program for the first week after the Club’s opening was enough to identify its ideological inspiration. When the Club finally resumed work in March 1933, the following lectures were scheduled: “National Socialism and the Jews,” “The Battle against the Denationalization of the Local Russian Youth,” “The Future Development of Germany,” and “Germany and Russia.”¹⁹

Still, the question remains as to why the Russian fascists would invest their rather limited resources into an organisation that at times seemed eager to avoid any explicit connection to fascism? First, if we take the fascists’ perception of the nation as a cultural construction seriously, the Russian Club as a cultural center was an appropriate tool to construct a common cultural identity. If one had to “turn the people into a nation” by making them aware of their “common past, common national culture and traditions,”²⁰ education in and cultivation of “traditional” culture and a

common history was of the utmost importance. Therefore, establishing an institute committed to the promotion of Russian culture and cultural education surely promoted the interests of the Russian fascists.

Second the fascists' aspiration to unify the Russian émigré community surely played a role in the foundation of the Club. The disunity among Russian emigrants in Harbin and beyond was lamented by leaders and representatives of virtually all political factions and groups, including the Russian fascists. In spite of this desire for consolidation, attempts to create a united front against the communist oligarchy in Russia usually failed due to personal ambitions, political dissent, and quarrels over strategy, not just in Manchuria but in all concentrations of the Russian diaspora. As Grand Duke Aleksandr once said: "Pink and reddish, green and whitish, they all waited for the Bolsheviks to fall so they could go back to Russia and resume their feuds interrupted by the October Revolution."²¹ In Harbin even the Japanese had difficulty finding any public figure able to serve as a consensus leader of the émigrés and to collaborate with the new authorities in their attempts to unify the different factions of the white Russian emigration.²²

The initiators of the Russian Club explicitly declared the unification of the diverse émigré groups as one of their main objectives and ostensibly placed unity above politics and ideology. As Vice-President Serebriakov wrote:

Only political neutrality enables the Club to have complaisant relations with all Russian organisations, without exception [...] We hope that assemblies, cooperation and a continuous exchange of ideas will foster [...] the awakening of an overall solidarity among Russians and the development of a strong and efficient unity of the whole Russian emigration.²³

But the limits of this statement were soon demonstrated when the management of the Club declared in already in October of the same year that the Russian Club would not welcome any liberals or democrats.²⁴ The Russian fascists were willing to cooperate with groups that harbored conservative, monarchist or radical right views, but not on equal terms. For instance, in November 1933 the Russian Fascist Party sent a questionnaire to various public figures, asking them about their views on unification not on equal terms, but *under* the presidency of the fascists.²⁵

It will be argued here that the Russian fascists in the beginning deliberately tried to disguise the intimate association of the All-Russian Fascist Party with the Russian Club. This duplicitous approach offered several benefits. First, the establishment of the Russian Club enabled the fascists to ally with respected and influential representatives of the émigré community, like Doctor Linder, and to be associated with them, which presumably enhanced their reputation. At least initially, the Steering Committee of the Russian Club included several important public figures, among them the chief editors of *Zaria* and *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, Zhilov and Vladimir Nikolaevich Blagorazumov, as well as Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasil'ev from the board of the reputable Refugee Committee.²⁶ This seems to have changed in summer of 1933, as evidenced by the fascists' accusations against the Russian press for ignoring or slandering the Russian Club in the fall of that year.²⁷ One would generally not expect such a volte-face as long as several of the most important newspaper editors were still sitting on the Steering Committee.

A second benefit of the fascists' subterfuge with regards to the Russian Club was the ability to make contact with the Russian population on seemingly neutral political ground, often with the attractive pretense of leisure and entertainment. By focusing on the arts, the fascists could instill Club members with their version Russianness and patriotism, reinforcing the fascists' notion of a national identity and awareness, but without demanding any clear commitment to fascism on the part of Club members. Attending public lectures or participating in one of the workshops at the Club did not require full acceptance or even familiarity with the fascist party's program and ideology. In other words, the Club enabled the Russian fascists to propagate their values, beliefs and worldview and to reach people who might otherwise be reticent toward events openly organised by the fascists. As a pamphlet published by the Russian fascists in 1936 states: "the Russian Club was deliberately established to get in contact with the Russian emigration."²⁸ Moreover, this institution enabled the Russian fascists to trigger and direct public debates, as will be illustrated based on two debates that took place at the Russian Club in the spring and summer of 1933: the debates about the consequences for Russia and the émigrés of the national socialist takeover in Germany, which occurred in April, and the debate on Freemasonry in July of the same year.

The first debate “The Future Development of Germany” took place on two days after the inception of the Russian Club in spring 1933.²⁹ This debate is the first example of how the Russian fascists employed the Russian Club to trigger and choreograph public debates on topics dear to them in order to shape the public opinion of the Russian émigré community. The announcement for the debate in *Kharbinskoe Vremia* alone speaks volumes about the fascists’ efforts to uphold the façade of political neutrality and objectivity. Rodzaevskii told the reporter: “Because the Steering Committee wants to make this an entirely apolitical debate and to demonstrate its impartiality, the Committee invites representatives of all political movements within the Emigration as well as [representatives of] German and Jewish [political movements].”³⁰

At that time, the list of speakers published in the announcement indeed included, for example, Professor of Law Guins as well as Dr Abraham Kaufman and Dr Salomon Ravikovich from the Jewish umbrella organisation HEDO (Kharbinskoe evreiskoe dukhovnoe obshchestvo/Harbin Jewish Religious Community). But none of them actually took part in the debate. It remains unclear whether they refused because they did not want to stoop to that level of discourse, or they simply were never invited. Either way, despite declarations of political neutrality and impartiality, at least half of the twelve speakers were in fact members of the fascist party: Iakir Vasil’evich Lavoshnikov, Nikolai Petrovich Medi,³¹ at the time vice-president of the party, the journalist S.A. Sergeev, pastor Aristorf Rafailovich Ponomarev, Jurii Fedorovich fon Ziberg, who became the editor of the fascist journal *Natsiia*, and Ivan Matveevich Stanovkin.³² Furthermore, the introductory lecture and the closing remarks were given by Rodzaevskii himself in his capacity as vice-president of the Club. But by admitting at least two representatives of with dissenting opinions, namely N.N. Gorchakov and Evgenii Ivanovich Zdanskii, the fascists avoided the impression that the event consisted strictly of propaganda, while still controlling the actual course of the debate.

As a result of the selection of speakers, the debate was far from being either apolitical or impartial. The discussion was originally supposed to focus on the question of whether the takeover by Hitler’s National Socialists would benefit Russia; that is, whether or not Hitler’s regime would accelerate the fall of the Soviet regime. Instead the focus shifted to Russian fascism as the movement that would unify the émigrés and save

Russia from the Bolsheviks. Gorchakov, one of the two speakers who did not support the fascists' position and argued that there was little difference between fascism and bolshevism, was attacked and confronted with the demand "to do penance and admit his mistakes as a democrat."³³ The debate also quickly developed an anti-Semitic undertone. Pastor Ponomarev trilled that "Hitler removed the stigma of anti-Semitism." Kunin and Stanovkin both ranted about the evils of the alleged Jewish world conspiracy. The debate closed with the final statement of Rodzaevskii, who ended his speech by crying out: "Fascism will save Russia!" and, according to *Rupor*, called on the audience to honor Hitler with the Nazi salute.³⁴

Kharbinskoe Vremia succinctly summarised the debate: "12 speakers took part, of whom nine expressed support [for the fascist position that a national socialistic government in Germany is good for Russia], two were against, and one undecided."³⁵ The first day of the debate attracted a large audience, among them several Germans with swastika insignia, who were probably members of the local NSDAP.³⁶ In raising the question about the national socialist takeover and the consequences for the Russian émigrés, the fascists apparently struck a chord with positive resonance based on the enthusiastic reception on the first day. However, the second day of the debate attracted a much smaller audience. Furthermore, Rodzaevskii and other participants of the debate were ridiculed in the liberal *Rupor* for ignoring Hitler's pronounced Russophobia and low esteem of the Slavs in general. For example, *Rupor* remarked accordingly on Marakov's contribution: "Marakov said that the slogans of Hitler and Mussolini will prove to be beneficial. Whether he also noted Hitler's idea to transform Russia into a German colony among those useful slogans remains unclear."³⁷ From this comment one can assume that the debate on Germany at least partially backfired. As *Rupor*'s rather sarcastic comment illustrates, many Russians in Harbin were well aware of Hitler's condescending and menacing attitude toward the Slavs and, therefore, were not convinced that the national socialist takeover in Germany would benefit Russia. In addition, unlike in the later campaign against Freemasonry, the Russian fascists could not count on the support of the very influential Orthodox Church, due to the church's mistrust of German Nazis' anti-religious ideology.

The presence of several swastika-decorated Germans might indicate that the Russian fascists also tried to establish closer ties to the German

community in Harbin, and NSDAP members in particular, by publicly declaring their support. But in 1933 the National Socialists in Harbin were having difficulty in convincing the *Auslandsdeutsche* (Germans living abroad) of the fatherland's new doctrine. The German organisation Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung (Association of German Nationals) resisted the Nazi intrusion and rejected NSDAP demands that the Vereinigung change its membership requirements. The Vereinigung only required that applicants hold a German passport, but it did not require them to be "Aryan".³⁸ Moreover, in Harbin, as elsewhere, membership to the NSDAP was still marginal and consisted mainly of people of low social status and little prestige.³⁹ Obviously, the German fascists in Harbin could and would not be of much use for the Russian fascists in the foreseeable future.⁴⁰

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On two days in July 1933 a second series of panel discussions took place at the Russian Club. The topic, Freemasonry, attracted even more public attention among the Russian émigrés than the previous debates on Hitler and Germany, probably because they touched on issues that were already familiar to many Russians in Harbin. All meetings were very well attended. According to the newspaper *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, on 4 July alone over 2,000 people listed to the debate, which took place in the garden of the Russian Club, even though it rained continuously.⁴¹ Among the audience were many representatives of the Orthodox, Catholic, as well as the Protestant churches in Harbin, who seem to have taken an interest in the topic.⁴² The events themselves were not actual panel discussions, but consisted of several short lectures on topics like "The Freemasons and Judaism" by Konstantin Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, "The Freemasons and Religion" by Pastor Ponomarev, "The Freemasons and the Revolution" by Rodzaevskii himself, or "The Freemasons and the Emigration" by the journalist Sergeev.⁴³ This time the Russian fascists refrained from admitting any speakers who would have presented an opposing view. Instead, the great majority of the speakers were themselves members of the All-Russian Fascist Party.⁴⁴

The inspiration for the debate was, according to the Russian fascists, a series of photographs allegedly picturing Harbin Freemasons of the Sungari Loge, which someone "leaked" to the Russian fascists.⁴⁵ Most of the people on these photographs were American and British citizens who

represented foreign banks and business in Harbin. They included for example, the director of the City Bank Curtis (Kretis in Russian), a man named Meisen from the company Texas and Co., and the car dealer Raymond Kabalkin. The pictures were shown to the public during the first debate on 4 July and later published in a book entitled *Freemasonry in Harbin (Masonry v Kharbine)*, written by Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Karmilov, one of the editors of *Nash Put'*. It is unclear what those photographs really depicted, but, in light of the numerous expatriates in Harbin, the existence of a Freemason lodge is quite likely. But presumably, given the frequently bouts of hostility toward Western foreigners, potential members would have preferred to keep their affiliation private. A man named Gutman, depicted in one of the photographs, apparently lost his position as a broker upon publication of the pictures.⁴⁶

During the debates, the speakers portrayed the Freemasons as the “conductors” or “an instrument” of the Jewish conspiracy to achieve world domination. They would “hide behind ideals like charitableness, mutual help, and brotherly love,” but actually strive “to destroy religion and the nation.”⁴⁷ Furthermore, since the Freemasons were claimed to serve as the auxiliary troops of the Jews, they were also supporters of the other Jewish “scourge of humanity,” communism, and especially the Chinese communists, who they ostensibly supported and protected during the 1920s.⁴⁸ In the eyes of the Russian emigrants this had to be a particularly threatening scenario. Even though Manchuria was under Japanese control at the time, the vision of being cornered between two communist regimes must have been terrifying.

In the content of their talks, fascist speakers also denounced several prominent representatives of Harbin society, including General Khorvat, the long-time head of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as members of the Freemasons⁴⁹ – an attempt to denounce old leaders of the émigré community and to break up established networks. The journalist Sergeev also insistently cautioned the audience that even their close acquaintances could be secret Freemasons, thereby discrediting any potential critic as part of the “Jewish–Masonic conspiracy”.⁵⁰

In his closing statement Rodzaevskii proposed several steps to counter the threat, which allegedly emanated from the Freemasons and their masters: the Jews. The first order of business was to antagonise the Jews “on all fronts of modern life – the religious, psychical, economic and political fronts” as an act of “self-defense,” because “anti-Semitism

[...] is not a pogrom movement, but natural self-defense.”⁵¹ Another defense mechanism was total devotion to Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Church as “the main enemy of Freemasonry.”⁵² Rodzaevskii also proposed establishing, protecting and supporting “true” Russian literature and media “absolutely free from Jewish capital” as a third step. Accordingly the money generated by the debates at the Russian Club was reserved as start-up funding for the fascist newspaper *Nash Put'*. Fourth, all Russian entrepreneurs, retailers, and manufactures in Harbin were to join forces to force Jewish businessmen and Jewish capital out of the market. Finally, Rodzaevskii called for unification of the Russian émigrés to fight against the Freemasons and the Jews, bringing them incidentally also behind the Russian fascists.⁵³

Presumably, the fascists’ main motivation for these attacks on the liberal representatives of the American and European communities was to attract attention to the movement and thereby allure new members and supporters to the party. Rodzaevskii himself later described the debates as the moment when the All-Russian Fascist Party entered the world stage and exposed itself to its enemies.⁵⁴ This is a gross exaggeration. There is no indication that these debates were noticed anywhere beyond Manchuria. And even if they attracted attention elsewhere, it probably would have been limited to smaller conservative and radical right émigré factions. Nonetheless, the debates succeeded in drawing at least some attention and approbation from parts of the Russian émigré community in Harbin, because, with their “Judeo-Masonic” conspiracy theory, the Russian fascists recalled long-held prejudices and beliefs dating back to pre-revolutionary Russia.

Because these pre-revolutionary conspiracy theories played such a formative role in the later ideology in Harbin, they deserve examination in more detail. In imperial Russia the myth of the “Judeo-Masonic” conspiracy gained prominence among ultraconservative and radical right circles, like the Union of the Russian People, at the turn of the century.⁵⁵ The myth emanated from the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a bogus document about a conspiracy of the Jews to subdue the world. Point 15 of the protocols declares:

We shall create and multiply free Masonic lodges in all the countries of the world, absorb into them all who may become or who are prominent in public activity, for in these lodges we shall

find our principal intelligence office and means of influence. All these lodges we shall bring under one central administration, known to us alone and to all others absolutely unknown, which will be composed of our learned elders. The lodges will have their representatives who will serve to screen the above-mentioned administration of *masonry* and from whom will issue the watchword and program. In these lodges we shall tie together the knot which binds together all revolutionary and liberal elements [...]⁵⁶

The rumor of a global Jewish conspiracy supported by the Freemasons to gain world domination was spread principally by radical right circles, often called Black Hundreds. Such gossip was especially rampant after the Revolution of 1905 and became a common myth in the closing years of the Tsarist Empire.⁵⁷ This popular misbelief was also widespread and gained momentum throughout the Russian diaspora, and Harbin was no exception.⁵⁸ The popularity of the myth among certain circles of Russian émigré is reflected in the number of books published on the “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy” in Harbin, mainly by the two chief apostle of the conspiracy theory, Vasilii Fedorovich Ivanov, a former minister of the Far Eastern anti-communist government during the Civil War and Iurii’ Nikolaevich Lukin, head of one of the ultranationalistic Boy Scout organisations in the city.⁵⁹ Already the precursor of the All-Russian Fascist Party, the Russian Student Society, had referred to the “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy” in order to gain supporters among faculty members for their organisation.⁶⁰

Since this body of thought was already familiar to most émigrés and shared by at least some, the fable of a “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy” was suitable to bridge the gap between the fascists and at least certain section of émigré society. In 1933 the nascent fascist party itself had not existed for long and, in comparison to their political competitors, could not count many, if any, respectable public figures among their members, nor could the predominantly young Russian fascists claim much experience as political leaders. In 1933 Rodzaevskii himself was only 26 or 27 years old. Understandably, this did not convey an image of longevity or trustworthiness. Furthermore, their pride in defying the established émigré parties and movements, presenting themselves as the new vanguard in the fight against communism, and the fascists’

unconventional plans for a future fascist state likely intimidated or alienated especially the elderly émigrés. Reverting to old and established beliefs and convictions could bridge this generational gap and mitigated the conflicts between older émigrés and the younger generation. In this context the fascist “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy” theory fulfilled two functions. First, it served as a fine excuse for the failures of the White movement and other émigré organisations in the past: how could the Russians withstand the combined forces of Jewish and American capital, the Bolsheviks, and liberal intellectuals, especially since these antagonists did not act openly, but in secret. Second, the fight against the Jews and the Freemasons had at least the potential to unify the various interest groups and political currents of the right-wing Russian émigrés, since such prejudice and misbeliefs were shared by many throughout a broad political spectrum. Correspondingly, Rodzaevskii called for the unity of the Russian emigration in the fight against the “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy”.

For obvious reasons, the campaign did not evoke a very positive echo in the liberal Russian press. The newspaper *Rupor* aptly referred to the debates as pogroms.⁶¹ Despite this dismissal, the fascists’ tactic of invoking the phantasmagorical conspiracy was surely not a failure, since the Russian fascists repeatedly revisited the debates in subsequent years.⁶² In 1936 they even published a selection of lectures given in 1933 in pamphlet form.⁶³ The “Judeo-Masonic” conspiracy emerged as one of the core elements of fascist ideology, rhetoric, and propaganda. Most speeches and printed propaganda material included some reference to the “Judeo-Masonic” theme. For instance, they also reprinted books on the “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy” from the pre-revolutionary era, like Butmi’s *Secret Societies and the Jews* (*Tainye obshchestva i iudei*).⁶⁴ Moreover, the Russian fascists continued to malign alleged or real Freemasons through their newspaper, *Nash Put'*, until it was closed in 1938.⁶⁵

Other than the discussion on Germany, the so-called “Debates on Freemasonry” were clearly a success, but the camouflage tactics the Russian fascists used in infiltrating the Russian Club did not totally evade detection. In October 1933 the fascists felt obliged to “prove” that the Russian Club was not a purely fascist enterprise by arguing that the Club was also used by the Legitimists and Cossack organisations. And, so the argument proceeded, since the fascists, Legitimists, and Cossacks participated in the Refugee Committee or the Russian Society

Committee and cooperated with the Orthodox Church, all three had to be considered respectable organisations with no agenda but the good of the community.⁶⁶ However, the Russian fascists abandoned any attempt to maintain pretense of a politically neutral Russian Club shortly thereafter. The Russian Club became known as a fascist bastion even though they maintained their official party headquarters at a different location.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the Club was still a place for fascist networking and public outreach beyond fascist circles. Other social, professional and cultural organisations and associations, such as the Union of Russian Teachers (Russkoe uchitel'skoe obshchestvo), used the premises of the Russian Club for their meetings and events. Special social gatherings took place at the Russian Club and usually attracted many guests.⁶⁸ For instance, around 500 children attended a Christmas party organised by the Russian Women's Fascist Movement (Rossiiskoe zhenskoe fashistskoe dvizhenie) in 1939.⁶⁹ The Russian Club was such a success that the fascist opened several Russian Clubs in different districts of Harbin and other places in Manchuria, like in Manchuli, where they took advantage of the proximity of the Soviet border and placed a gigantic swastika on the roof, which was illuminated at night so that it could be seen from far away.⁷⁰

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The strategy of the fascists seemed to pay off, since the debates and lectures staged at the Russian Club indeed had an impact on the public opinion of Russian émigré society and altered the atmosphere in Harbin. One of Harbin's largest non-governmental institutions, the local YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association – in Russian Khristianskii soiuz molodykh liudei or KhSML), was among first ones to feel the effects. In the fall of 1933 the fascists launched a smear campaign against the YMCA and, in particular, the famous literary circle Churaevka, which contributed to the demise of the circle and caused long-term damage to the reputation of the YMCA.

Although the YMCA played a rather marginal role during the panel discussions on Freemasonry at the Russian Club in July, they can be considered as the ignition of a fascist assault against the institution, which continued throughout the 1930s. The first salvo of the main accusation against the YMCA, namely of corrupting and ruining the

Russian émigré youth, was launched during the debates in July. Rodzaevskii said in his closing remarks to the first debate: “[...] the Harbin YMCA is an anti-Orthodox and secret organisation, which instills the youth with religious indifference and everything evil.”⁷¹ And L.I. Trifonov, another participant of the debate, continued the barrage by claiming: “Everywhere in the YMCA there is religious indifference and masonic cosmopolitanism – a dreadful poison for the adolescent generation.”⁷² In October 1933 the fascists took next step in vilifying the YMCA, to destroy its good reputation as an educational institution and thereby relegate the YMCA to fringes of the Russian émigré community. The American consul in Harbin, who took a special interest in the YMCA, reported:

As the campaign began adversely to influence Russian parents who had their children in the Young Men’s Christian Association schools [...] The Young Men’s Christian Association did not reply to the attacks, but contented itself with publishing in the Russian press on 29 July the following: (1) The YMCA is not a secret association and is in no way connected with secret activities such as Masonry (2) the YMCA carries on all of its activities quite openly and (3) it conducts its work connected with the religious and moral upbringing of young men with the complete approval and with direct and active participation of representatives of the Orthodox Church.⁷³

The Harbin branch of the YMCA, established by American missionaries, had existed since the early 1920s.⁷⁴ Only a decade later the YMCA ran its own kindergarten, a high school, an American style college and, from 1932, a polytechnic institute for the children of Russian émigrés.⁷⁵ The languages of instruction were Russian and English, and graduates from the college were admitted to American universities. The YMCA also offered vocational training as well as a wide range of leisure activities for children, teenagers, and adults. For example, it operated several large sports facilities and conducted different workshops and study groups, like the Club for Natural Science and Geography (Klub estestvoznaniiia i geografii) under the guidance of Professor Anert. Furthermore, two youth clubs or Boy Scout-like associations were associated with the YMCA, the Kostroye bratia for boys (Campfire Brothers) and the Kostroye sestry for

girls (Campfire Sisters).⁷⁶ Several representatives of Harbin's Russian and European business elite were involved in managing the YMCA.

The position of the YMCA in Harbin had been increasingly delicate since at least the mid-1920s. In 1927, the Archbishop of Harbin, Mefodi, published an article in the Orthodox journal *Bread of Heaven* (*Khleb Nebesnyi*), claiming that the YMCA was merely a branch of the Freemasons. According to Archbishop Mefodi, the YMCA did not actually propagate any particular anti-Orthodox ideology, but promoted religious indifference by treating all Christian denominations equally.⁷⁷ According to the Archbishop, the outcome of this approach was religious indifference among the Russian youth attending any of the schools associated with the YMCA.⁷⁸ In light of the importance of the Orthodox Church for the Russian émigrés as a unifying factor and its status as one of the core elements of Russian identity, such a statement could not pass without consequences and aroused suspicion against the YMCA.⁷⁹ Thus, in attacking the YMCA, the Russian fascists secured the support of a powerful ally: the Orthodox clerics in Harbin. The fascists compounded the reproach of teaching religious indifference by adding that the YMCA also promoted renouncing the nation, indicating internationalism and cosmopolitanism.⁸⁰

The rhetorical dismantlement of the YMCA by the Russian fascists began early in the spring of 1933, when the YMCA initiated a discussion about the future and the possibilities of the Russian émigré youth in Harbin. In this debate members of the YMCA were of the opinion that, despite the undoubtedly difficult circumstances, the situation in Harbin also presented new opportunities for Russian youth. Specifically, they had the chance to broaden their horizons beyond narrow national and cultural borders.⁸¹ This prospect, which the Russian fascists labeled as "denationalization," was against everything the Russian fascists believed and sought. In fact, the struggle against this "denationalization" would become one of the most important fascist shibboleths during the whole period of 1930s.

The Russian fascists quickly responded to the initiative of the YMCA and, only a few days later, announced their own debate on Russian youth, which finally took place on 2 May 1933. The event, however, was a veritable debacle. Very few adults and apparently even fewer adolescents attended. Moreover, the debate quickly got out of hand. The speakers, like Rodzaevskii and Kunin, barely touched upon the question of

Russian youth, pontificating instead on the shortcomings of old émigré leaders and praising fascism as the solution to all of Russia's problems.⁸²

Nash Put' raised the issue of the YMCA and its impact on Russian youth again in October 1933. This time the famous literary association for young Russian poets and writers, Churaevka, which included well-known émigré writers and poets like Arsenii Nesmelov (whose real name was Mitropol'skii), Lydia Khaindrova, Larisa Andersen and Valerii Pereleshin, prompted the assault.⁸³ Churaevka was famous in Harbin for promoting young Russian protégés, providing them with a stage and the possibility to publish in the group's own literary journal, which was also named Churaevka and was even noticed and reviewed in Paris.⁸⁴ Members met for regular reading sessions, called "Evenings under the green lamp," at the YMCA building in Sadovskia Uliza, where they would either read their own works or give lectures on famous Russian and non-Russian writers.⁸⁵ The founder of Churaevka, the Russian poet Aleksei Achair (whose real name was Gryzov), worked as the Russian secretary at the YMCA, but the association itself was not incorporated into the YMCA proper. Churaevka was of tremendous importance for young aspiring writers as a stepping-stone for their further careers and for the Russian émigré community as a whole.⁸⁶

Already in 1932 Churaevka was criticised in parts of the Russian media for their supposedly anti-Russian and anti-nationalistic bias and was pressured to take a more nationalist stand.⁸⁷ This criticism catalysed a debate within the association about the orientation of Churaevka, which provided the fascists with a means to undermine the position of the YMCA in Harbin. In October 1933 *Nash Pur'*, in an article entitled "Who is responsible for the breakdown of Churaevka? How the YMCA destroys Russian Culture," accused YMCA management of deliberately trying to destroy the Churaevka as part of a campaign to "disintegrate" and "de-nationalize" the Russian émigré youth.⁸⁸ The YMCA was rumored to be taking advantage of the material dependence of Churaevka and, according to *Nash Put'*, simultaneously exploiting them financially by collecting half of Churaevka's revenues and charging them for administration services. According to *Nash Put'*, the ideological paternalism of the YMCA over Churaevka, in combination with the financial exploitation, drove some members into rebellion. At a meeting of Churaevka a group of people was said to have withdrawn from Churaevka and founded of a new literary circle called the Circle of Poets

(*krug poetov*), which would conform to the group's "nationalist agenda" and meet at the Russian Club. *Nash Put'* further reported that, in answer to this rebellion and to avoid a split of the prestigious literary circle, the YMCA started feigning sympathy with Russian nationalist feelings and falsely promised "to educate Russian youth in a Russian nationalistic spirit," while in reality sparing no effort to finally destroy Churaevka. Under the pretext of building renovations, the group was disbarred from meeting at the YMCA and, according to the article, the YMCA management enjoined Churaevka to accept any support from professors, intellectuals and other experts not associated with the literary circle itself or the YMCA.⁸⁹

The account of the events as presented in *Nash Put'* is simply wrong chronologically. The Circle of Poets had existed long before 1933 and met at the Russian Club,⁹⁰ but it did not attract much attention in the Russian media, which did, however, often report about Churaevka. Therefore, to raise the prestige of the Russian Club, the fascists first tried to coax Churaevka to meet at the Russian Club instead of the YMCA.⁹¹ In light of Churaevka's centrality for Russian culture in Harbin and the fascists' intensive efforts to establish the Russian Club as the center of Russian culture in the city, this would have been a great success. But Churaevka obstinately continued to meet at the YMCA.

Since Churaevka was unwilling to cooperate, the fascists adopted a different approach to sabotage the group. One tactic they tried was to undermine their rivals by scheduling the meetings of the Circle of Poets concurrently with those of Churaevka. With somewhat less subterfuge, the Russian fascist and likeminded groupings also continued to slander the YMCA and finally Churaevka itself, which hastened the decline and, eventually, the end of Churaevka, though the fascists could not claim sole credit for its demise. For the time being, in the fall of 1933 Churaevka still defended itself against the attacks emanating from nationalist circles by saying that "the canonization of nationalism [...] should not bring us even one step closer to national, racial or religious intolerance and the chauvinism of patriots [...]"⁹² However, cleavages between the more moderate, liberal minded members of Churaevka and those who preferred a much more radically nationalist path, backed by *Nash Put'* in 1933, became evident in the beginning of 1934.

Not all members of Churaevka were immune to the rise of extreme nationalism promoted by the Russian fascists and likeminded émigré

circles. Several Russian poets and writers willingly put themselves at the service of the fascists or even joined the All-Russian Fascist Party. The most fruitful and lasting association developed between the Russian fascists and Arsenii Nesmelov (whose real name was Arsenii Ivanovich Mitropol'skii),⁹³ a popular journalist and one of the most famous writers among Russian émigrés in the Far East and beyond. Although Nesmelov appears never to have been a member of the All-Russian Fascist Party, he became the unofficial party bard. Under a second pseudonym, Nikolai Dozorov, Nesmelov published articles in *Nash Put'* and composed dozens of fascist poems and songs. The most popular were often performed or recited at fascist meetings and celebrations,⁹⁴ in particular poems from his collection *Only Those! Poems about the Fight for the Fatherland [Tol'ko takie! Stikhi o bor'be za rodinu]*.⁹⁵ The fascists considered the publication of *Only Those!* as one of their biggest successes in what they called “artistic agitation.”⁹⁶

Among those who joined the party proper was Boris Mikhailovich Iul'skii (also known as B. Jary and Adrian Lugovoi), according to many contemporaries the most talented Russian writer in Harbin.⁹⁷ He had already joined the so-called Musketeers, a radical right youth organisation, in 1930 and, like many other Musketeers, switched to the Russian fascists two years later in 1932.⁹⁸ Iul'skii published several of his novellas and short stories in *Nash Put'*⁹⁹ and remained with the fascists until he was excluded for his persistent cocaine addiction in 1938.¹⁰⁰ The third member of Churaevka to join the Russian fascists was Georgii Granin (whose real name was Saprykin), a close friend of Iul'skii. Granin probably did more damage to Churaevka and the YMCA than anyone else. He had been one of the secretaries at the YMCA but later, after he had joined the fascists, he was expelled from the YMCA and Churaevka for drunkenness and indecent behavior.¹⁰¹ After his expulsion, Granin began to publish slanderous “revelations” about the YMCA and Churaevka in *Nash Put'*. Valerii Pereleshin, a member of Churaevka, remembers: “*Nash Put'* took Granin in with open arms. The newspaper began to publish revelations of Granin, in which he did not just sling mud on the YMCA (Baptist missionaries who became masons and destroyers), but also his recent friends – the *Churaevtsi* [...]”¹⁰² For example, Granin claimed that Achair, the founder of Churaevka, and other members of the YMCA attempted to sacrifice a young girl in a satanic Freemason ritual, only to be interrupted by the writer

Slobodchikov and a friend, who incidentally entered the room.¹⁰³ The prototype of this form of defamation was the notorious ritual murder libels against the Jews, which were a popular fallacy at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁴ On another occasion, "accusations were also made that the Harbin YMCA and certain employees of the Consulate General were interested in the white slave traffic."¹⁰⁵ Needless to say, such outrages accusations were completely unfounded, but they certainly contributed and aggravated the mistrust that many Harbin Russians harbored against the YMCA.

The fate of Churaevka was finally sealed by a tragedy in the winter of 1934, shortly before the group's tenth anniversary. On 5 December Georgii Granin and Sergei Sergin (whose real name was Petrov), another member of Churaevka, were found shot in a room of the Hotel Nankin. In all probability they committed suicide together.¹⁰⁶ Soon rumors spread, however, according to which Sergin was to have shot Granin before killing himself. *Nash Put'* quickly picked up on this story, adding the spin that Sergin had been a communist covert agent who had killed Granin for his affiliation with the fascists. The newspaper substantiated this story with reference to a note praising Stalin that had reportedly been found in Sergin's possession. The relationship between Granin and Sergin was to all appearances peculiar. According to Sergin's mother, Granin frequently visited her son, wearing his fascist uniform and a revolver. The two young men then locked themselves into Sergin's room and conducted long secret conversations.¹⁰⁷ The nature of the relationship and their deaths is a secret the young men took to their graves, but the Russian fascists seized this opportunity to resume agitating against the YMCA and again urged Churaevka to move to the Russian Club all the same.¹⁰⁸ Instead, the YMCA took the initiative and closed what remained of Churaevka, presumably to avoid deeper involvement in a scandal and adding to the hostility and criticism directed at the association.

The examples of the debate on Freemasonry, the YMCA and Churaevka show how the Russian fascists managed to influence public opinion by instrumentalising the Russian Club, their mouthpiece *Nash Put'*, and willing collaborators, like Granin and Arsenii Nesmelov alias Dozorov. By establishing an ostensibly apolitical, or at least impartial, institution, the Russian Club, the Russian fascists were able to raise issues and trigger public debates beyond the narrow circle of party

members, while still being able to control the debates to some extent. The Russian Club's affectation of impartiality lent fascist theses, statements and outlooks more credibility.

The smear campaigns referenced to pre-existing biases and fears with which their audiences could relate and that functioned to bridge different generations. The effectiveness of this tactic was magnified by securing the support of influential allies, in particular the Orthodox Church, and still further by embedding those prejudices and abstract fears in a concrete local context with references to local institutions, like the YMCA. Although, the YMCA maintained some supporters, as demonstrated by the following passage from *Rupor*, a liberal newspaper:

Lately *Nash Put'* has gained a position to harass certain sections of the population. Based on personal sympathies and antipathies, it allows itself to attack individuals and organize campaigns to harass [individuals and groups], like the YMCA. For some reasons *Nash Put'* discredits the YMCA, which does great work and whose doors are open for all, in every way.¹⁰⁹

But fascist ploys rendered countervailing attempts to defend liberal institutions futile. The YMCA itself lamented in the annual report that many Russians and even intellectuals in Harbin were biased against its work due to the intensive propaganda against the YMCA.¹¹⁰ Igor Konstantinovich Koval'chuk-Koval' confirms in his memoirs that many Russian emigrants, including students of the YMCA collage themselves, were hostile towards the local YMCA and were actually convinced that the YMCA was just a front for the Freemasons.¹¹¹ In the following years the Russian fascists would launch sporadic attacks on the YMCA in their mouthpiece, *Nash Put'*, but never again mounted such a public debate as they did in 1933/4.¹¹²

Real or manufactured fears of religious indifference, cosmopolitanism, "denationalization," denoting the alienation from Russian culture and traditions among the Russian émigré youth in particular, which were voiced during the debate on Freemasonry and the campaign against the YMCA, permeated the fascists' involvement in the field of youth affairs and education in subsequent years. The campaign against the YMCA is an especially unmistakable indicator of how the Russian

fascists would continuously attempt to alter education practices and to gain influence over Russian youth.

Russian Fascists and Émigré Youth

Russian children need to be educated in the awareness that they belong to the great true Russian nation and this awareness should make them proud.¹¹³

Rearing and educating children and teenagers was simultaneously a source of pride and anxiety for Russian émigrés in Harbin. On the one hand, it was naturally considered important to offer adolescents an education that would enable them to find employment and earn a living. More importantly, however, Russian emigrants in Harbin also saw themselves as a kind of sanctuary where the pre-revolutionary culture and the old Russian way of life was preserved and, more to the point, had to be preserved. This desire was present in other centers of the Russian emigration, but it seems to have been particularly pronounced in Harbin. This can perhaps be attributed to the spatial proximity to the Soviet Union and to the generally Russian character and appearance of Harbin, with its Orthodox churches and cathedrals, Russian shops, businesses and movie theaters, Russian street signs and European architecture.¹¹⁴ With little hyperbole, one could say that, since the communist regime in the Soviet Union at the time showed hardly any traces of imminent collapse, the desire to preserve the culture could be fulfilled only if the émigré community in Harbin succeeded in making the Russian youth born in China, who had no experience of Russia proper, the torchbearers of prerevolutionary Russian culture. The only way to achieve this was through education, and Russian émigré schools still taught the prerevolutionary curriculum until the school reforms of 1937/8.¹¹⁵

Education was also of utmost importance for the Russian fascists because, firstly, they viewed the nation as a cultural construct. National identity could and had to be learned. Further, the fascists maintained a youth cult, in the belief that the émigré youth would save and recreate Russia. In light of these priorities, Russian fascists found the schools in Harbin to be failing miserably in their most important task, because

they neglected political “enlightenment,” meaning an anti-communist political education.

The main defect of Russian schools today is that they teach the Russian children that they have to love their fatherland. But they neither develop nor strengthen this love by explaining why they [the children] have to fight against the communist power. And they do not prepare them [the children] for this fight; yes, they do not even give them minimal political preparation.¹¹⁶

And: the main defect of emigrant schools is that they give an education [*obrazovanie*], but conduct no national nurturing [*vospitanie*].¹¹⁷ Consequently, it is not surprising that the fascists were particularly engaged in the field of education, but their strategy differed markedly from that of the Russian Club. Instead of promoting their own objectives, the fascists seized issues and anxieties of parents, in particular about antisocial behavior, often termed hooliganism, among Russian youth, and offered solutions. However, as it turned out, those solutions served their own interests much more than those of the families concerned.

Although the leader of the Russian fascists, Konstantin Rodzaevskii, headed the second department of Bureau of the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (BREM), which was responsible for cultural institutions, education and sports. But despite this position, Rodzaevskii's influence on the curriculum, the daily business of schools, and the hiring of teachers was limited. Even well into the 1930s, BREM primarily performed administrative tasks and was barely involved in the everyday business of schools, so “every school conducts business in its own way and differed often considerably from each other.”¹¹⁸ An exception was the secondary school of Harbin's Pedagogical institute, which was put under direct management of the BREM in 1935 and, therefore, under the direct control of Rodzaevskii and his co-workers at the second department. Sergei Ivanovich Tsvetkov, who became the school's first director, was also a member of the fascist party as well as head of the boys' section of the Union of Young Fascists (*Soiuz iunykh fashistov avangard*). The Russian fascists advertised this school aggressively in their newspaper *Nash Put'* to increase enrollment. But since the Pedagogical Institute remained the only educational institution under

direct control of the Bureau during the 1930s Rodzaevskii's direct influence on the content of teaching at Russian schools remained limited.¹¹⁹

Above that Rodzaevskii even had to come to terms with teachers, parents and affiliated organisations, who had their own ideas about how and what to teach the Russian youth. And finally, in his official role as head of the second department Rodzaevskii had to deal and cooperate with individuals and institutions, namely Jews and the YMCA, he combated fiercely as the leader of the fascists. Members of the Jewish revisionist youth organisation Betar and athletes from the YMCA repeatedly participated in sporting events organised by the second department of BREM.¹²⁰ In November 1937, for example, Iliia Kagan, one of the most talented boxers from Betar, the youth organisation of the Revisionist Zionists, competed in a BREM-sponsored series of boxing matches.¹²¹ This practice was repeated by Betar's volleyball, ping-pong, and track and field teams, who all took part in tournaments organised by the BREM.¹²² Rodzaevskii was also obliged to cooperate with the principal of the YMCA college, who participated in meetings concerning schools and education hosted by the bureau or events organised by BREM, like the yearly Day of the Russian Child (*den' russkago rebenka*).¹²³ Since Rodzaevskii and his followers had only limited means to influence Russian schools directly through BREM, the Russian fascists employed other tactics to affect the upbringing and education of Russian children and youth.

In his capacity as the head of the second department, Rodzaevskii promoted his view of a proper education in public speeches and newspaper articles, calling for the intensive study of communism, fascism, and Freemasonry at school or raising the specter of "denationalization."¹²⁴ These included paying special attention to teachers and pedagogues, participating in and cooperating with other civil society organisations engaged in education, and quasi monopolising the education and leisure activities of children and youth outside of schools.

Although many teachers in Harbin apparently already belonged to the Russian fascists,¹²⁵ the party still sought deliberately to win educators as members or, at least, to win their favor and draw them closer to the movement by providing lectures or teaching materials. The so-called Special Group of Educators (Osobaia gruppa pedagogov),

which the fascist party founded in 1937, provides an apt example. The group's purpose was to support the youth organisations of the party, but also to support and instruct teachers in Russian schools with printed material, lectures and courses relating to communism or new political and economic movements, probably meaning fascism.¹²⁶ Similar courses and lectures were also offered by members of the All-Russian Fascist Party through BREM.¹²⁷ Moreover, the fascists organised special gatherings, so-called Cup of Tea (*chashka chaiu*) for teachers, which were sometimes attended by as many as 200 educators.¹²⁸ But the fascists did not simply wait for teachers to show up at one of their events and ask for teaching materials; the party also sent so-called "agitators" to schools and youth groups to rally for the Russian fascists.¹²⁹

Furthermore, the Russian fascists sought to cooperate with influential public representatives, particularly those directly involved in education, like Konstantin Ivanovich Podolskii, the head of the Union of Russian Teachers. It remains unclear whether Podolskii was ever a full member of the All-Russian Fascist Party, but he often attended fascist events,¹³⁰ and one can assume that he sympathised with them. From 1924 until 1934 he had also been the director of the Russian House, a children's home founded by the Orthodox Church and known for its strict discipline as well as its ultraconservative orientation.¹³¹ Besides Podolskii headed the so-called Special Group of Educators. In his role as head of the Teachers Union, Podolskii participated in various commissions dealing with schools and education as well as the meetings of the powerful Parents Committee (Roditel'skii komitet).¹³² As a result, he was in a position to influence the agenda of debates on education. Podolskii also enjoyed a certain degree of influence over teachers, since the Union would provide financial support for teacher who were unemployed or who simply were not paid for their work, which happened frequently due to the financial difficulties at many Russian schools. In spring of 1936, for example, all teachers from the Dostoevskii Gymnasium resigned after several weeks without receiving pay, but the Dostoevskii Gymnasium was not the only school struggling with financial problems. In the course of the decade several private schools went bankrupt and either had to merge with other schools or close during the 1930s.¹³³ Therefore more and more teachers were dependent on Podolskii and maybe more willing to follow his agenda.

Members of the All-Russian Fascist Party also became directly involved in other civil society organisations dealing with education.¹³⁴ For instance, Iakir Vasil'evich Lavoshnikov, a participant in the notorious debate on Freemasonry at the Russian Club in 1933, served as the secretary of the Parents' Committee from 1935.¹³⁵ Members of the committee had the right to attend exams as well as school conferences and councils in an advisory capacity. They had a say in questions concerning school budgets and were to be consulted if a student was to be expelled from school for inappropriate behavior.¹³⁶ Therefore, membership on the Parents' Committee entailed a certain amount of power, for example over parents whose children were at risk of expulsion. It is noteworthy that, immediately after Rodzaevskii became head of the second department at the beginning of the new year, debates began about how to strengthen the influence of parents over the education of their children. While this might have been merely a coincidence, it is also possible that Rodzaevskii was trying to build a coalition for his educational policies. This is likely given that, with the help of the Parents' Committee, the Russian fascists gained instant access to children and adolescents who were not members of any fascist youth group, by extending their engagement beyond the classroom.

In early 1935 a discussion on the extramural education and supervision of Russian émigré youth was first initiated in the Parents' Committee. The debate was triggered by concerns about the increasing prevalence of various forms deviant and antisocial behavior among youth after school, including vandalism, public drunkenness, brawls and assaults on innocent passersby, all of which were often subsumed under the label hooliganism.¹³⁷ Parents and teachers were anxious about what they termed "undesirables" entertainment, like billiards or frequent visits to dance halls and the cinema.¹³⁸ The Russian fascists and Rodzaevskii, using his position in the BREM, readily offered to support the parents, but he probably went further than intended by the Parents' Committee.¹³⁹ Instead of just supporting schools, which wanted to offer out-of-school education and supervision, as the Committee envisioned, Rodzaevskii initiated the establishment of the so-called BREM Youth Groups (*Kruzhki molodezhi BREMa*): associations officially intended to offer children and teenagers something useful to do after school and keep them off the street. The BREM established several such youth groups in various districts of Harbin, its suburbs, and in settlements with a

Russian population along the railway tracks.¹⁴⁰ Membership was voluntary, and apparently many students joined one of the groups. The youth group at the St. Vladimir Institute is said to have had 250 members in September 1935.¹⁴¹ The groups were usually affiliated with a Russian middle or high school and met on its premises.¹⁴² Each group was in turn divided in various sections, such as drama, art, architecture, sports, ethnology and archeology, radio, chess, and literature, from which the members could choose. In addition to these sections, the groups organised public events, like the so-called literary-music Thursdays. The choice of this might have been intended deliberately to follow the “Evenings under the green lamp” of Churaevka.¹⁴³

As an article in *Nash Put'* stated, the BREM only provided the logistical necessities for the youth groups and largely left the actual organisation, activities and content to the groups and sections themselves. Although students, teachers and schools themselves were expected to be proactive, to develop plans, and to set their own objectives,¹⁴⁴ in reality the Russian fascists often took command over groups and sections. At musical recitals “patriotic” poems and songs composed by fascists were performed.¹⁴⁵ Members of the party appeared as initiators, organisers, and lecturers. For instance, Gennadii Stepanovich Naumov gave lectures on the origins of the Japanese and Japanese history.¹⁴⁶ Mikhail Arkhipovich Talyzin¹⁴⁷ presented a talk about “Soviet humanism” and one on “The Course and Quest of Soviet Youth” during a public meeting of a youth group in Pristan.¹⁴⁸ Konstantin Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, concurrently a member of the Russian fascists and president of the Russian Club, functioned as treasurer for several youth groups.¹⁴⁹

The infiltration of the Russian fascists in the BREM youth groups can be illustrated with an assembly to celebrate the relocation of the youth group of the suburb Modiagou to the Drisul' school. Members of the All-Russian Fascist Party represented the majority of speakers at the event: Gennadii Taradanov, the secretary of the department for agitation and propaganda of the party and one of the editors of the fascist journal *Natsiia*;¹⁵⁰ Vladimir Nikolaevich Vasilenko, founding member of the All-Russian Fascist Party and spokesman for the Russian Women's Fascist Movement; the head of the Modiagou division of the party, Grigorii Stepanovich Olekminskii; Pastor Mukhin, who worked for the various fascist youth organisations;¹⁵¹ and the lawyer N.G. Dandurov, head of the Armenian section of the All-Russian Fascist Party, addressed

the youth present. The speakers “urged the young people to work together with VFP [All-Russian Fascist Party],” “because we [the Russian fascists and the émigré youth] have one and the same goal and objective.” As expected considering the speakers, the meeting ended with diatribes against the Jews, in particular against Soviet Jews, the “archenemy” of the Russian fascists and, according to Gennadii Taradanov, the entire Russian youth: “The Jewish power that exists in the SSSR, seeks to corrupt and destroy the Russian youth. The Russian diaspora has to educate the youth in the spirit of nationalism [...] because representatives of the Russian nation abroad will be the foundation of a future Russia.”¹⁵² The lawyer Dandurov sang a similar tune, declaring: “Finally, after the murder of the emperor Nikolas II and as a result of the socialist theory of the Jew Marx – the Russian state is a heap of ruins and the Russian people are the slaves of the international Judeo-Masonry.”¹⁵³ In this case the speakers participated officially as representatives of the All-Russian Fascist Party, but on many other occasions the fascist affiliations of the speakers were not publicised.¹⁵⁴

It is likely, that Rodzaevskii and his followers had always planned to infiltrate the BREM youth groups in order to seize control of them. After all the Russian fascists and their newspaper, *Nash Put'*, were the quickest to respond to the anxieties of parents and to offer assistance. No other Russian newspaper or organisation appears to have taken up the issues of extramural education or parental anxieties. At a meeting of the Parents' Committee, the secretary, Iakir Vasil'evich Lavoshnikov, officially “thanked the All-Russian Fascist Party for assisting the work of the parents, noted of the Russian Fascists that their good work is always carried out with hot zeal, and offered to make a collection of gratitude for *Nash Put'* and the All-Russian Fascist Party.”¹⁵⁵ Another indication is that “infiltrating” organisations was part of the strategy to extend fascist influence elsewhere in the émigré society beyond the youth groups. The instructions for those seeking full membership in the fascist party stated: “It is desirable that members of the VFP [All-Russian Fascist Party] join any national or professional union and any organisation with the objective to draw people into the VFP, establish fascist factions [within these organisations] or gradually turn the organisation into a completely fascist one.”¹⁵⁶

Moreover, the Russian fascists had tried before to establish a youth organisation formally and officially separated from the fascist party at

the Russian Club in 1933. Subsections of this organisation, called the National Association of Russian Youth (Natsional'noe ob'edinenie russkoi molodezhi – short NORM), intended for young people between the ages of 16 and 32, were established at different Russian schools in Harbin with headquarters at the Russian Club in similar fashion to the BREM youth groups. Many Russian fascists who later worked for the BREM youth groups, like Konstantin Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, were also counted among the leaders of NORM.¹⁵⁷ For reasons unknown, NORM was dissolved probably in the first half of 1934, which would coincide with the establishment of the Vanguard Union.¹⁵⁸

Regardless of those reasons, the fascists used the BREM youth groups to spread their message. The issues raised in the youth groups closely resembled the fascist idées fixes described above. Members of the Anti-Jewish and Anti-Freemason Section would learn about secret societies, the Russian Revolution, and the Jewish world conspiracy, among other things, by studying the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.¹⁵⁹ The history section sought to teach the history of Russia “without a liberal bias” since the Russian past “is and was slandered by liberal historians,” who ignored “the destructive role of the Freemasons.” Topics included: “The Freemasons during the times of Catharine I, Nicholas I, or Alexander II”; “Freemasons and Socialism” and “The Freemasons and the Jewish Capital.”¹⁶⁰

The rhetorical tropes of the BREM youth groups resembled those of the fascist youth organisations: the image of fighters for and creators of a new Russia, conjuring the dangers of “internationalism” and the obliteration of the Russian-national spirit, the promise of the reincarnation of Russia and so forth.¹⁶¹ Some publications of the youth groups actually seem to be drawn directly from the Russian fascists. For instance, they lamented in the newspaper *Zaria*:

The communist power is the power of Russia's destruction, the destruction of the Russian Nation. Systematically and methodically they infiltrate the hearts of the Russian people with internationalism und destroy the Russian-national soul. Unfortunately the destroyers of Russia achieved some success in their satanic work – the undermining of the foundation of the Russian-national essence.¹⁶²

An article in *Nash Put'* stated: "The goal of the unification of all Russian youth is to prepare cadres of creators of a reborn Russian state equipped with the know-how to be the **Vanguard** of the reincarnation of our fatherland Russia."¹⁶³

The main difference between the BREM youth groups and fascist youth organisations was that the words "fascist" or "fascism" never appeared in the context of the youth groups. Perhaps the fascist sought to conceal their involvement in the youth groups and to give the impression that the youth groups were patriotic but politically neutral. Igor Konstantinovich Koval'chuk-Koval' claims that the BREM youth groups were actually intended to counterbalance the fascists, because "who with all their might tried to make the emigration and in particular the youth into fascists."¹⁶⁴ If this is true, this approach apparently failed miserably.

The Russian fascists also used the youth groups to recruit new members for their own youth organisations. According to *Nash Put'*, one of the fascists' motivations to promote the youth groups was "to support existing national youth organisations" by "gathering the best parts of children and youth in the national organisations."¹⁶⁵ This clearly indicates the Russian fascists intentionally canvassed adolescents with the BREM youth groups. For instance in May 1937, the fascists invited representatives of various youth organisations, who "often visit the Russian Club and were sympathetic to the work of the VFP" with the declared objective of establishing "a network of organisations for children, teenagers and adolescence as an integral part of the VFP."¹⁶⁶ The representatives were entertained with lectures, songs, poems, and a lesson in target shooting. On another occasion the youth organisations of the Russian fascists invited all students who had received an award for their school achievements for a fun day at the Russian Club.¹⁶⁷ Igor Konstantinovich Koval'chuk-Koval' also recollects in his memoirs that Rodzaevskii himself asked him to join the Russian fascists, because Koval'chuk-Koval' proved to be such a good organiser in his work for the naturalist and ethnographer section of the BREM youth groups.¹⁶⁸

In October 1936 BREM announced the establishment of yet another youth organisation, named the Association of Russian Youth (*Ob'edinenie russkoi molodezhi*). The Association functioned as a kind of umbrella organisation for the larger conservative and right wing associations in Harbin, the Fascist Little Ones, the Vanguard Union,

various Cossack youth organisations, the Musketeers, the students and sports group of the All-Russian Fascist Party, a number of local (ultra) conservative Boy Scout associations, and several of the BREM youth groups. The two leaders of the Russian fascists, Matkovskii and Rodzaevskii himself, were among the heads of the new organisation.¹⁶⁹ Many of the association's aims again resemble those of the fascist youth organisations, but the first omens of the changing treatment of the Russians in Manchukuo were appearing on the horizon.¹⁷⁰ The Association of Russian Youth was not just to prepare the Russian youth for the fight for Russia against the communists, to save them from "denationalization," and to give them a national education, but also to promote the study of Manchukuo, develop feelings of friendship for the Japanese people and "to integrate the Russian children into the family of the children of Manchukuo."¹⁷¹

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The Vanguard Union, the *kroshek* of the Russian fascists, and the often fascist-controlled youth groups of BREM were far from the only organisations for Russian children and youth in Harbin. There were various sports organisations, a variety of Boy Scout associations, religious, Cossack and monarchist youth groups, and even professional organisations, like the Union of Russian House and Property Owners (Kharbinskoe obshchestvo zemlevladel'tsev i domovladel'tsev) had a dedicated section for adolescents.¹⁷² Despite the dissimilar backgrounds and aside from a few exceptions, all these organisations shared the desire and objective to preserve the "Russianness" of Russian youth, although their understanding of "Russianness" sometimes differed substantially. Even the youth section of the Club of House Owners did not include preparing young or future house owners for the difficult real estate market in Harbin among its objectives, opting instead for "the mental and spiritual development of Russian youth."¹⁷³

Beyond examining the context of the increasing fascist dominance among organisations for children and youth in Harbin, the question arises as to its consequences. How did other youth groups react and relate to the Russian fascists, especially in light of the slander against the YMCA and Churaevka? Did the aggressive agitation and propaganda of the Russian fascists and their persistent attempts to gain influence on Russian youth affect other, more liberal, organisations?

In the following the various Boy Scout organisations in Harbin will be used to illustrate the repercussions of a growing influence of the Russian fascists on the émigré youth and youth organisations. They are representative, first, because different kinds of scout organisations were very popular among Russian children in Harbin and other centers of Russian emigration. Second, because religious, political, cultural, and ethnic aspects played a significant role in the program and ideology of various Boy Scout organisations as well as in their relationships with each other and the community as a whole.

The Union of the Musketeers of his Highness Prince Nikita Aleksandrovich¹⁷⁴ (*Soiuz ego vysochestva kniazia Nikity Aleksandrovicha mushketerov* – in the following Musketeers), which came into being during the peak of Soviet–émigré tensions in the 1920s in Harbin, was probably closest to the fascists in its formal characteristics and in the substance of its pronounced anti-Communism.¹⁷⁵ Under the leadership of Viktor Semenovich Baryshnikov, the Union spread throughout Manchuria and Northern China, but it was never able to penetrate émigré communities outside of Asia.¹⁷⁶ Sources indicate that the main activities of the Musketeers consisted of sports, in particular boxing and martial arts, military training and brawling with members of Soviet youth organisations and pro-communist youth – at least until the Soviet government sold their shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to Japan.¹⁷⁷

The relationship between the Russian fascists and the Musketeers in Harbin was cordial. The Musketeers were one of the only other youth organisations to be mentioned and, to a certain extent, promoted in *Nash Put'*. Many members of the Russian Fascist Party were actually former Musketeers, such as Lev Okhotin, who joined the Musketeers in 1928 and switched to the All-Russian Fascist Party in 1934.¹⁷⁸ Members of the fascist party participated in the Musketeers' events and gave lectures.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Russian fascists organised special meetings for members of the Musketeers to cultivate and maintain close relationships.¹⁸⁰ For their part, for instance, the Musketeers participated in the welcoming committee for Vonsiatskii and other public gatherings of the Russian fascists, like the *chashka chaiu* organised for leading cadres of youth organisations.¹⁸¹

Members of the Musketeers also participated in the hapless partisan raids on Soviet territory in cooperation with the Russian fascists or with

the Japanese army.¹⁸² Although closer cooperation or even a merger between fascists and Musketeers might have been expected, political differences prevented this. After all, the Musketeers strongly supported the restoration of the monarchy in Russia, which many fascists opposed. Political differences like these might explain why the Russian fascists tended to represent the Musketeers as a sporting club rather than a political organisation by falsely claiming that the Musketeers lacked any program for the future of Russia.¹⁸³ Over time, the Musketeers seemed to become more willing or, perhaps more accurately, pressured to align with the fascists. For instance, they increasingly deployed fascist tropes, like the “national revolution.” In an open letter to the fascists, Baryshnikov wrote: “Our indispensable duty to the fatherland and the fate of the Russian people requires us to be not only pioneers but also the first Vanguard of the National Revolution. Form us, like form you fascists.”¹⁸⁴

The second organisation that occasionally cooperated with the Russian fascists was the National Organization of Russian Pathfinders (Natsional’naia organizatsiia russkikh razvedchikov – in the following NORR), together with the Union of Musketeers, one of the most nationalistic and militaristic scout organisations in Harbin. The NORR was a splinter group led by former officers of the imperial army under the leadership of Pavel Nikolaevich Bogdanovich. The NORR’s nationalist credentials were established when it separated from the umbrella organisation, the World Organization of the Scout Movement, in 1925 because of the latter’s “internationalism and cosmopolitanism.”¹⁸⁵ The Harbin branch of the NORR had existed since 1926, but initially had difficulty gaining a foothold in the city according to its own statements. Allegedly, the Komintern sabotaged their work and intimidated possible members or supporters. More probably, the NORR simply could not compete with other, more moderate and well-established Boy Scout organisations in Harbin. The situation changed in 1929 when Viktor Fedorovich Lukin, the initiator of the NORR in Harbin, successfully enticed several old scoutmasters to join the NORR on the basis of the organisation’s “patriotism”. One of these old scoutmasters, Berezovskii, was appointed head of the organisation in 1929. As with General Kos’mnin and the All-Russian Fascist Party, Berezovskii’s post seemed to be largely titular rather than a position of actual power and influence. During the Japanese occupation of Harbin, membership of the

NORR increased rapidly and, by the end of 1936, the organisation maintained 36 different divisions for boys and 14 for girls all over Manchukuo.¹⁸⁶ The NORR who modeled themselves after the *poteshnye [voiska]* (literal translation: “fun”), a group of childhood friends Peter the Great played “soldiers” with in his youth, committed itself to training Russian youth for their fight with communism and to giving them an Orthodox national education. Specifically, this meant both intensive military training as well as giving lectures on religion, Russian culture, and politics.¹⁸⁷

At first glance, the NORR and the Russian fascist youth organisations were very similar, especially in terms of their fight against dreaded cultural assimilation, cosmopolitanism, and the “denationalization” of Russian émigré youth. Therefore, it is not surprising that the two organisations occasionally joined forces and worked closely together. The bulwarks of this cooperation were the leaders of the NORR, Lukin and lieutenant colonel Aleksandr Petrovich Zelenii, the latter of whom joined the NORR in 1933. But political differences again prevented more intense cooperation between the NORR and other fascist organisations, since the NORR supported the Legitimist monarchists.

Together with the Russian fascists, both the Musketeers and the NORR contributed in creating an atmosphere of sometimes nearly hysterical ultra-nationalism among youth organisations in Harbin, in which an apolitical stance was increasingly seen as verging on treason. For young people in Harbin pursuing personal ambitions and desires was scandalous, because everything had to be subordinated to and sacrificed for Russia. Space for a moderate approach or even liberal or democratic values effectively vanished, despite having been enthusiastically promoted by some organisations in the 1920s. The Russian fascists ensured that every sphere, from sports to literature, music and architecture became charged with nationalism and could be perceived and valued only as extensions of “true” Russianness and the fight for the fatherland.

The victims of this development among Harbin’s youth organisation were the Kostrovye bratia, the Kostrovye sestry, the Boy Scouts of the YMCA,¹⁸⁸ and the National Organization of Russian Scouts (Natsional’naia organizatsiia russkikh skautov – in the following NORS) especially. The NORS, whose history dated back to the pre-revolutionary Russian empire, was the largest and most important

Russian scout organisation in exile. It was actually the head of the NORS, Oleg Pantiukhov, an officer of the Russian imperial army, who established the first Boy Scout chapters at *Tsarskoe Selo* in 1909.¹⁸⁹ The NORS can be reckoned among the more liberal groups in the Russian émigré communities. Their inclination and program were quite close to the original Bader Powell Boy Scouts: patriotism without ultranationalism, equal treatment of all Christian denominations, character building without a cult of self-sacrifice and promotion of international cooperation instead of national separation.¹⁹⁰

The first Harbin branch of the NORS, at that time still called “the Russian Scouts”, was probably founded in 1917 or 1918 at the commercial school of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company.¹⁹¹ By 1924 the NORS had succeeded in recruiting over a thousand boys and girls into the organisation. But when the Chinese and Soviet governments agreed to jointly manage the Chinese Eastern Railway Company and its subsidiary institutions, the NORS was banned from Russian schools associated with the railway company and many branches ceased to exist. Nevertheless, despite the very difficult financial situation, the NORS survived with the help of several émigré organisations and private individuals, among them the local YMCA. By the end of the decade, it had recovered from this blow. The activities of NORS members typify what one would expect Boy Scouts: camps, scavenger hunts, sports, learning first aid or flag signals, storytelling, sing-alongs and attending different courses, like radio engineering.¹⁹²

Although Boy Scouts at the NORS would wear a uniform and practice seemingly militant activities like marching, the NORS managed to resist the waxing aggressive nationalism and militarism in Harbin, at least for a time. By mid-1936, however, when NORS became part of the Association of Russian Youth, the pressure to adopt a nationalist stance and to drop the organisation's international orientation and ecumenism increased considerably. The NORS and their leaders were accused of being part of the “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy,” like the YMCA, to contaminate Russian youth with internationalism, cosmopolitanism and religious indifference, and to refrain from fighting communism in Russia.¹⁹³ Moreover, Lukin, head of the NORR, alleged that the NORS received financial support from the “stronghold of Jewish–Masonic conspiracy”: the YMCA.¹⁹⁴

Of far more interest than those rather familiar accusations were the NORS's arguments in its own defense. In an open letter to the newspaper *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, the leadership of NORS pointed out that many unambiguously anti-communist youth organisations were headed by former NORS members. The majority of those mentioned in the letter were functionaries and officials of the All-Russian Fascist Party.¹⁹⁵ The NORS's tactic in this case of associating itself with the Russian fascists evidences first that linkage to Russian fascists was not shameful per se, but could rather serve to indicate sincerity and trustworthiness. Moreover, the NORS's defense highlights how pervasive the ideology and rhetoric of the Russian fascists in Harbin was at the time. Instead of attempting to discredit these accusations by questioning the fascist practice of propagating ultra-nationalism, martial rhetoric and wild conspiracy theories, the representatives of the NORS sought inclusion. This trend persisted. In 1937 the leader of the NORS, Oleg Pantiukhov, wrote a personal letter to Rodzaevskii as the head of the All-Russian Fascist Party saying:

Let me thank you for your kindness in relation to our national movement of Russian Scouts, which otherwise could not be [...] I have always read your articles, which are suitable to inspire people for the active struggle for Russia, with pleasure [...] I ask for your support for our leaders in Manchukuo in their hard work. We all live in one hope – the belief in the liberation of our native Russia and the collapse of the internationalists who captured her. Oleg Pantiukhov¹⁹⁶

Conclusion

In their attempts to gain a foothold in the Russian émigré society in Harbin and to spread their ideas, the Russian fascists deployed several strategies. First, they sought to publicise important topics beyond the captive audience of party members. Here it appears that the Russian fascists were more successful when they embedded their propaganda in the local context and reverted to existing patterns of thought and prejudice, as was the case during the debates on Freemasonry in summer of 1933. Although one could say that such strategy is nothing unusual for a political movement, it is noteworthy that, in founding the Russian

Club, the fascists established a partially independent platform for this purpose. This approach offered several advantages. First, the Club allowed them to feign political impartiality for a time, adding to the credibility of the so-called “debates”. Second, the Club enabled the fascists to promote a mindset in a seemingly apolitical and even enjoyable atmosphere.

Further, the Russian fascists extended their influence on émigré society by means of cooperation, networking, and even infiltrating other civil society organisations, like the BREM youth groups. Finally, as in the case of the debate on extramural education, the fascists took up an issue of public concern and presented solutions, which they subsequently managed to instrumentalise for their own benefit. By this method, the fascists were able to gain access to many adolescents and promote their ideology far beyond the limited scope of their members.

The result was the greater prevalence of fascist ideology and outlook in the Russian émigré community in Harbin. In particular among Russian youth groups, increasingly aggressive nationalism and anti-Semitism proliferated while ever more adolescents came under the influence of the fascists without ever joining any of their organisations. Among the victims of this development were more liberal groups, who either had to live with the hostilities, like the YMCA, or had to conform like NORS.

CHAPTER 5

RUSSIAN FASCISTS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE PUBLIC

The Kaspe Case: Anti-Semitic Agitation 1933–7

The White Russian press in Harbin has given great prominence recently to the trail of the kidnappers and murders of Simon Kaspe [...] The accounts published were so colorful that the readers were led to believe that very light sentences would be imposed, especially after [...] the defending counsel had brazenly quoted citations from various alleged authors in which the Jews are shown as a race who “should be removed from the face of the earth.”¹

On the evening of the 24 August 1933 the talented young Jewish pianist Simon Kaspe was kidnapped out of his car while he escorted some friends of his home. Simon was the son of Joseph Kaspe, one of the wealthiest and well-known Jews in Harbin and owner of the famous Hotel Modern, which included a cinema and an exclusive jewelry store.² The pianist, who usually lived with his mother and brother in Paris and had acquired French citizenship, was on a concert tour in Manchuria. The kidnappers demanded the enormous sum of 300,000 yen in ransom, which Joseph Kaspe would not or could not pay.³ After three month in captivity the kidnappers killed Simon Kaspe on 24 November. After a sensational trial, four of the six kidnappers, all émigrés from the Russian Empire, were sentenced to death and the remaining two to a life of hard labour in

June 1936 in the district court,⁴ but the Supreme Court in the capital Hsinking refused to ratify the verdict. In a second trial, initiated by the Japanese authorities, all six kidnappers were pardoned and released in February 1937.⁵

Simon Kaspe was far from the first and certainly not the last victim of the so-called “kidnapping industry” in Manchuria. Foreigners, Jewish and non-Jewish émigrés, as well as wealthy Chinese and their families were possible victims.⁶ It is even said that the American consul Hanson never went anywhere without his gun, even in the consulate, because he was afraid of being kidnapped.⁷ And like Kaspe many other victims did not survive the ordeal. In June 1932 the Jewish pharmacist Michael Kofman was found tortured to death after his family had had difficulty paying the huge ransom of \$30,000.⁸ But no other kidnapping victim has ever attracted so much publicity and attention, which leads one to wonder what was so remarkable about the Kaspe case.

Despite its prominence, not much has been written about the kidnapping of Simon Kaspe.⁹ The main narrative is more or less as follows: Simon Kaspe was kidnapped by members or sympathisers of the Russian fascists with support or even on instigation of the Japanese authorities, who were looking for a way to seize Joseph Kaspe’s prestigious Hotel Modern. The kidnappers stooped to this crime because they were staunch anti-Semites and hated Simon Kaspe’s father, because he was said to have sold the jewels of the Romanovs on behalf of the Soviet Union and embezzled the money. According to Igor Koval’chuk-Koval’ many people in Harbin only referred to him as “*zbid Kaspe*.¹⁰ Since at least some Japanese individuals and security or police agencies were involved in the kidnapping, nothing was done to save the young man’s life and no proper investigation ever took place. To cover their involvement and not to alienate the radical right and ultra-patriotic elements in the Russian emigration, the Japanese authorities released the criminals in the second trial. They justified this by arguing that the motive behind the crime was love for the fatherland rather than personal gain, since the kidnappers wanted to use the money not for themselves, but to finance their fight against the communists:¹¹

The accused are the sworn enemies of Communism, the greatest current enemy of humanity and modern civilization, whose agents are terrible criminals and are causing great harm to the world.

The healthy part of mankind is faced with the task of destroying them.¹²

Today the Kaspe case or Kaspe affair is considered to be the decisive expression of, and symbol for, violent anti-Semitism in Harbin during the 1930s. I will argue in favor of a competing interpretation. The primary significance of the kidnapping is not so much as an indicator of anti-Semitism in the city, but the controversies and tensions that arose around the kidnapping as well as the media coverage of the crime and the subsequent trials aggravated the divisions between Jewish and non-Jewish émigrés, actually abating the rise of anti-Semitism in Harbin. The Russian fascists around Rodzaevskii and their newspaper *Nash Put'* were instrumental in this process, even if they were probably not directly involved in the kidnapping.¹³ They used the attention and discord induced by the Kaspe case to slander the local Jewish community and its public representatives as a means of spreading their anti-Semitic gospel. With little exaggeration, one could say that it was the Russian fascists who made Simon Kaspe a symbol. Before describing the fascist anti-Semitic campaign about the kidnapping of Simon Kaspe in detail, I first want to briefly address the question of the involvement of the Japanese and the Russian fascists in his kidnapping and murder. I will further touch on the issue of anti-Semitism in Harbin prior to 1933.

As Sabine Breuillard admits in her article, there is no actual proof whatsoever that either the Russian fascists or the Japanese were directly involved in kidnapping Simon Kaspe.¹⁴ Both trials against the kidnappers were public and attracted large audiences. Further, long tracts of the hearings were published verbatim in various Harbin daily newspapers, like *Rupor*, *Zaria*, *Gun Bao* and the Japanese-controlled *Kharbinskoe Vremia*.¹⁵ Such publicity would be counterintuitive had important Japanese figures been directly involved in the kidnapping. If the Japanese had wanted to conceal anything, they probably would have and certainly could have avoided such publicity and prevented the censored media from reporting on the case in any detail. Beyond that, according to the newspaper coverage, the Russian fascists did not play any role during the trial. They were not even mentioned. When the defendants tried to justify their felonies as acts of patriotism, they never referred to fascism, but to monarchism instead. “Our slogan is – for Religion, Tsar and the Fatherland [Za Veru, Tsariia i Otechestvo]”¹⁶

announced one of the principal defendants, Martynov – not the fascist slogan “God, the Nation and Labor [*Bog, Natsiia, Trud*].” It would not have made any sense for the defendants to conceal any close affiliation with the Russian fascists during the trial, especially if speculation the Japanese authorities supporting the fascists had been true. Still, the lack of proof might simply be the result of tight censorship or that many sources concerning the Manchukuo period in Manchuria remain inaccessible for researchers in China and Russia. Therefore, a conspiracy between Russian fascists and the Japanese cannot be categorically ruled out, nor can it be simply be assumed as is often the case.

*

To be sure, anti-Semitism existed in Harbin prior to the 1930s. But it was mostly limited to far-right and ultraconservative circles.¹⁷ Open anti-Semitism in the local Russian daily press was more or less unknown until *Nash Put'* took the stage. Until the late 1920s the Jews of Harbin seem to have been well integrated in the Russian community. Jews worked for the local administration and were active in various Russian professional associations, charity organisations, sports clubs and so on. For instance, the vice president of the Chamber of Commerce and one of the presiding officers of the Commercial Club were Jewish.¹⁸ Several members of the Exchange Committee were also Jews and the Jewish merchant Kabalkin long served as the chairman of the Harbin exchange.¹⁹ He was also repeatedly elected as a member of the board of arbitrators of the prestigious yacht club.²⁰ Other Jews were among the leading members of the International Committee (Mezhdunarodnyi komitet) or the Obshchezhitie patronate, an organisation to help poor children.²¹ These examples show that at least some Jews were an integral part of Russian civil society in Harbin. Certainly, there were conflicts and tensions, but to a large extent Jews and Russians shared their daily lives together. Although Harbin was probably never the multicultural, tolerant utopia, as it is sometimes portrayed, but it seems that, at least during the 1910s and 1920s, Jewish and gentile Russians could live peacefully together. Yaakov Liberman describes the coexistence of Jews and gentile in his memoirs as follows:

Both groups enjoyed Russian theater, ballet, and occasional performances by local and visiting opera ensembles. They also mixed socially in various clubs, commercial societies and sports

organizations, and occasional friendships were forged in school. Of course, there was no lack of competition and a healthy rivalry that sometimes erupted into unpleasant confrontations and intense animosity. Both groups read Russian-language newspapers and journals, frequented libraries and public concerts, lectures and discussions.²²

Another indication that anti-Semitic feelings were not shared by broad levels of the population even in 1933 was the funeral of Simon Kaspe on 5 December, which turned into a huge public procession through the commercial district of Harbin, Pristan. Thousands of people followed the coffin from the Jewish hospital to the Main Synagogue, over Kitaiskaia Street to the New Synagogue and finally to the Jewish cemetery. Besides the Jewish population of Harbin, representatives of different consulates and employees of Kaspe's different businesses and enterprises as well as many ordinary Russians, Chinese and Japanese lined the streets, many holding flowers. Most shops along the route were apparently closed out of respect for the deceased.²³ This shows the deep sympathy and dismay about the young man's terrible fate among large sections of the population.

But Kaspe's funeral also catalyzed the smear campaign of the Russian fascists and *Nash Put'*. *Nash Put'* was and is often characterised as an extraordinarily anti-Semitic newspaper. This is certainly true, but it is important to note that prior to December 1933 *Nash Put'* published only few openly anti-Semitic articles. In the days following Kaspe's funeral, however, the local section of the newspaper contained a massive amount of anti-Semitic articles – far over 30 by the end of the year compared with a total of 7 in October and November of 1933 combined. The campaign overall was intended both to create an atmosphere of “us, the Russians against them, the Jews” as well as to discredit Jewry in general and members of the Harbin community in particular by portraying them as selfish and aloof, completely uninhibited in the pursuit of their own benefit. The goal was clearly to sew animosity between the Jewish community on one side and the Japanese authorities and the Russian émigré on the other, thus isolating the Jews from the rest of the population. In the following the fascists' approach will be analysed in more detail. I will first focus on the inception of anti-Semitic propaganda in December 1933 and a second period of intense anti-Jewish propaganda in fall 1935, which coincided with the beginning of

the trial against Kaspe's murders. From this point, it will be shown how fascist propaganda ignited anti-Semitism among the Russian émigré community, leading to further isolation of the Jewish community.

Initially it was the goal of the fascists' anti-Jewish campaign to create a united front against the Jews. By portraying themselves as the only defenders of the Russian émigrés, who allegedly were, just like the fascists themselves, slandered by the Jews and Western foreigners, they tried to unite the émigré community against the Jews. An unfavorable report by the French Vice-Consul in Harbin on the police investigation of the Kaspe case provided the pretext for the fascists to rally their efforts. Vice-Consul Albert Chambon carried out his own investigation with Joseph Kaspe due to Kaspe's French citizenship, and neither had much faith in the diligence and conviction of the local authorities to see justice be done. Although the French consulate was legally entitled to investigate, Chambon overstepped his authority, by employing several private investigators, questioning witnesses and even detaining and interrogating suspects without authorisation. In his report to his superiors, Chambon sharply criticised the work of the police, particularly Nikiforov, the chief of the criminal department, making them partly responsible for Simon's death.²⁴ Somehow the Japanese authorities obtained a copy of this report and passed it on to the Russian press, who proceeded to make it public.²⁵

In his report Chambon mentioned almost in passing, that the Russian fascists, among others, were suspected of plotting the kidnapping and murder.²⁶ Interestingly, the only other local contemporary source for such claims seems to be *Nash Put'* itself, the mouthpiece of the Russian fascists. Only days after Simon's body was discovered, *Nash Put'* published a lead story about rumors and accusations against the Russian fascists among the Jews in Harbin and in foreign newspapers. According to *Nash Put'*, the English-language newspapers *Peking Times* and the *North China Daily News* as well as Soviet newspapers reported that the Russian fascists were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Kaspe.²⁷ One day later *Nash Put'* reported on an alleged conspiracy against the All-Russian Fascist Party. One of the private investigators employed by the French consulate and Joseph Kaspe, Kimstach, allegedly offered the Russian fascists exemption from punishment and 50,000 yen for the release of Simon. The fascists are said to have simultaneously received an anonymous call, warning them that the

actual kidnappers were planning to bring Simon into the Russian Club at night, as the newspaper suggested, to discredit the fascists. Ostensibly both Kimstach's offer and the anonymous call were part of the "attempt to entrap the Russian in a net of provocations."²⁸ Most likely those crude stories were fabricated by the fascists themselves; otherwise, they surely would have published these stories earlier or informed the authorities. These rumors served the Russian fascists in their attempt to stylise themselves as the victims of the whole affair, which in turn buttressed their anti-Semitic campaign around the Kaspe case.

The suspicions against the Russian fascists were doubtlessly a result of their open and pronounced anti-Semitism. The fascists, however, presented the case as if they were being attacked for being the only torchbearers of the truth, willing to stand up against dark international Jewish forces and their allies. With the help of *Nash Put'*, the Russian fascists portrayed themselves as the only defenders of the pitiful Russian émigrés, who were vilified by Western media and most direly by the local Jews and the French Vice-Consul as ruthless bandits and violent anti-Semites.²⁹ Rodzaevskii wrote in an editorial of *Nash Put'*:

And now they [the Jews and the West] are busy robbing the Russian population of the right to express their opinions and sentiments [...] we are convinced that nothing will come of their intrigues *against Nash Put'* [...] We merely reveal. We serve the truth. We safeguard the interests of the Russian population and *Nash Put'* will not leave its guard post because of this handful of Jewish comrades.³⁰

At no point did either the French consul or the Jewish community of Harbin ever hold the Russian émigrés collectively responsible. The criticism of the French Vice-Consul referred to the ineffectiveness, inaction and incompetence of the local police forces, not the Harbin Russians in general. The "collective responsibility" was a fascist invention, but with the help of *Nash Put'* they created the impression of the Russian population of Harbin being outraged *en masse* about the behavior of the French Consul and the Jews. According to *Nash Put'*:

The Russian population cannot fail to condemn the statements of Chambon and hotly protests against the actions of the French consulate, seeing these actions as yet another insult from a former

ally of Russia [...] The Russian population unanimously protests against the Jewish slander, as though Kaspe was killed because he was a Jew, as though the murder should be ascribed to the Russians alone [...]³¹

The Russian fascists further attempted to provoke a conflict between the Jews and the authorities by questioning the loyalty of the Jews towards Manchukuo. During Kaspe's funeral procession, while stopping by the New Synagogue, Doctor Kaufman, one of the leaders of the Jewish community, addressed the crowd and, according to the newspaper *Rupor*, said the following: "The Jews were the first to give the world the commandment "Thou shalt not kill." We do not call for revenge. We are against violence and murder. We just ask for protection of our life, property and our honor [...]."³²

This speech, which was relatively moderate in light of the circumstances, was taken up by the fascists to condemn the Jews as disloyal to Manchukuo. According to *Nash Put'*, Kaufman also said: "We protest against the inactiveness of the authorities, which allowed this dastardly crime and that it was impossible to protect a civilian from the hands of the murderers."³³ In the opinion of *Nash Put'*: "There has never been such a mendacious and curt speech of a Jew in these parts. And instead of a natural expression of gratitude, as Manchukuo deserves, it only received undeserved insults. That is Jewish thankfulness." The newspaper also gave currency to the rumor that, because of this "slander," Kaufman would be banned from Manchukuo. Since *Rupor* did not publish Kaufman's speech in full, it is possible that he actually uttered those words. The accusation of inactiveness cannot be totally dismissed either, given the French consular reports. According to the memoirs of Evsey Pratt, who grew up in Harbin, Kaufman held a "rather strong speech" at a public meeting of the Jewish community, "demanding equal protection from the Japanese authorities."³⁴

The accusation of disloyalty towards, and criticism of, Manchukuo was a very serious one. Japan had just withdrawn from the League of Nations in March, owing to the unfavorable Lytton Report, and the only state that recognised Manchukuo in 1933 was Japan itself. One of the main claims for the legitimacy of the new state, beyond the purported support of the local Chinese and Manchu population, was in reference to the so-called "harmony between the races" and the "equal treatment of

all nations" as one of the founding principles of Manchukuo.³⁵ Calling this principle into question – however hollow and superficial they might have been – by accusing the authorities in Manchukuo of anti-Semitism and discrimination represented a challenge to the legitimacy of the entire state in the eyes of those in power.

It is questionable, though, whether the Japanese authorities would have reacted at all had *Nash Put'* not publicised the topic in a whole series of articles all dealing with Kaufman's "lying speech"³⁶ and the outrage it reportedly caused.³⁷ In all probability the authorities never considered banning Kaufman from Manchukuo, but it was the Russian fascists who demanded it and thus pressured them.³⁸ Such demands and accusations were not in fact directed towards the Japanese authorities as much as towards the Russian émigré population. First the "lying speech" and the attendant accusations served as another proof for the ingratitude and arrogance of the Jews, who demanded special treatment for their kin. And second, *Nash Put'* gave the impression that the Jewish community lost the support and backing of the Japanese authorities and, therefore, could be offended and slandered without reprisal.

The Japanese authorities reacted by saying that they would uphold the equal treatment of all nations living in Manchukuo, but those unsatisfied with the circumstances were free to leave.³⁹ They demanded from Kaufman and the rest of the Jewish leadership that they set the record straight or, preferably, that he retracts his words so as not to damage the prestige of Manchukuo any further. Accordingly, Doctor Kaufman and HEDO published open letters on 8 and 10 March in *Rupor* and *Kharbinskoe Vremia*.⁴⁰ In this letter Doctor Kaufman disclaimed that he had never said anything to question the work of the police or the integrity of the authorities in Manchukuo. He also declared that he had spoken purely as a private person, not as a representative of the Jewish community.⁴¹ In its letter the Jewish community declared that its members were totally satisfied with the police's handling of the kidnapping and expressed their gratitude for the work of the police. The letter continued, expressing HEDO's appreciation of the equal treatment of all citizens in Manchukuo, irrespective of their nationality or religion, and its gratitude for the support the Jewish community of Harbin had received from the new authorities since the establishment of Manchukuo. The letter closed by calling on the Jewish inhabitants of Harbin to "control themselves and attend to their affairs peacefully and

quietly.⁴² The open letters could probably not have dispelled tensions between the Jewish community and the authorities entirely, but *Nash Put'* did not follow up on the matter of Jewish disloyalty towards Manchukuo for some time, perhaps after having been ordered to stop.

Excursus: The Poster Campaign: Anti-Semitism and Public Space in Harbin

In addition to the slanderous articles on the pages of *Nash Put'*, the Russian fascists started a public poster campaign immediately following Simon Kaspe's funeral. They displayed huge posters, which were hung outside the windows of the newspaper's office on Kitaiskaia Street, the main street in Pristan, the commercial center of Harbin. To the great advantage of the Russian fascists, the office was actually located close to the Hotel Modern on the opposite side of the Kitaiskaia Street, making the posters visible from the hotel, which added to the provocation.

On 6 December, the first day of the campaign, the posters concentrated on the kidnapping itself. The posters read:

How the Komintern tries to provoke the Russian Fascist Party in the case of the kidnapping of Simon Kaspe – The kidnapping was planned in a Jewish nest – The conspiracy was hatched in a Jewish restaurant, in a Jewish house beside the Hotel Modern, which belongs to the murdered Kaspe and his father.⁴³

The slogans were taken verbatim from headlines in that day's issue of *Nash Put'*. It goes without saying that any claims about Jewish involvement in or responsibility for the crime were devoid of any foundation.⁴⁴

One can only imagine the pain and outrage the sight of those signs caused in particular for Simon's father the day after his son's funeral, but for other Jewish passersby as well. Around noon the Jewish merchant Zondovich, whose name and address later appeared in *Nash Put'*, apparently tore the posters from the wall and disposed of them in a trashcan in the lobby of the Hotel Modern. The employees of the Hotel, probably to avoid further disturbances and harassment, restored them to some members of the Russian Fascist Party. Later attempts to destroy the posters were thwarted by the police.⁴⁵

Encouraged by the success of the first posters, which attracted a large crowd of people, the fascists continued the campaign on the following day. This time the new posters contained insults to individual Jewish residents of Harbin:

The Jew Mazin declares that he is going to wipe out all Russian bakers by the means of his capital – I am a Jewess and should therefore get the preference, declared Mrs. Okun-Furman – The Jew Akershtein slaps Russians at his cinema; it is time that Russians stop visiting this cinema – Dr. Kaufman, you have murdered my daughter.⁴⁶

With these slogans the fascists insulted and vilified individual Jews, in particular those known and respected beyond the Jewish community, like Doctor Kaufman. The fascists were invoking old anti-Semitic stereotypes and fears of Jews gaining power and dominating (Orthodox) Christians by means of their economic strength, which the Jews would use to impoverish, humiliate and oppress gentiles.

This time the posters caused an altercation between employees of the newspaper and furious members of the Jewish community. The head of the local Jewish youth organisation, Betar Leo Piastunovich, reportedly grabbed a man by the throat who had tried to protect the posters and, together with two other young men, Neiman and Drizin, used a knife to remove the posters before bringing them into the shop of the Jewish merchant Bent. *Nash Put'* predictably published the names and addresses of all Jews involved and informed their readers that the merchant Bent had supplied the Red Army in the past.⁴⁷ To prevent further escalation, the same Bent returned the posters and persuaded Piastnukovich, Neiman and Drizin to appeal to the police. The police, however, informed the four men that, because *Nash Put'* was under government supervision, like all other newspapers, the posters were published with official consent and destroying them was a crime. The complainants left empty handed,⁴⁸ which must have been terribly demoralising.

Why the police and the authorities tolerated such provocation of the Jewish community, jeopardising its stability in the tense atmosphere following the Kaspe murder, remains unclear. A patron of the Russian fascists among the Japanese administration might have had a hand in this. Maybe the Japanese underestimated the outrage such posters would

cause. Whatever the reason, the poster campaign stopped after just two days, possibly with discreet intervention by the Japanese authorities. By this time the fascists had already attained their objective: to provoke the Jewish community, to advertise their newspaper, which was sold beside the posters, and to attract public attention. This was also the first time that the fascists were able to single out the Jews in public space, rather than merely in the closed space of their propaganda events or on the pages of *Nash Put'*, which both appealed only to a limited segment of the population. In light of the meaning of public space in Harbin, this must have been a particularly scandalous experience for the Jews.

Representation and design of, as well as behavior in, Harbin's public space⁴⁹ was of the utmost importance and frequently disputed for several reasons. First, the importance of public space was related to the city's multiethnic and multicultural population, its history of repeated changes of power and an ongoing struggle about the city's identity as either a Chinese or Russian town. By means of architectural design, both Russians and Chinese sought to leave a mark on Harbin. When power in the city shifted from the Russians to the Chinese in the 1920s, the new administration took great pains to change the appearance of Harbin to make it appear more Chinese and less Russian. Especially the Confucian temple, looming over the Russian and Jewish cemetery at the end of Bolshoi Prospect (Main Avenue), signified the change of power and increasing Chinese self-confidence.⁵⁰ Second, the presence and behavior of different ethnic groups, in particular the Manchu and Chinese, in public spaces could be a source of conflict. Russian and Western foreigners, for example, complained that the presence and behavior of the Chinese in public parks made it nearly impossible for whites to enjoy them:

The recently restored boulevard Shirokaia ulitsa [the Broad Street], which is brightly illuminated by electric light, proved to be one of the most popular places for evening amusements with regard to the Chinese people [in the city of Harbin]. Every evening such a [large] crowd of people gathered on the boulevard that all stalls (kiosks) are occupied, they are sitting [everywhere] on the roadside, while others revel in bliss stretching themselves at the full length in the meadow. For a European it is impossible to put the foot anywhere, as the Chinese crowd emits a certain,

unpleasant smell. Because of that hardly any European public can be seen on the boulevard. And in this way the “Yellow Peril” is overwhelming [the Europeans/Russians].⁵¹

When the first Chinese demonstrators marched through the multicultural district of Pristan and the Russian-dominated New Town in 1922, the non-Chinese population was startled. Such demonstrations had previously only occurred in the Chinese districts, like Fujadian (Daowai), even though Harbin was already under Chinese administration.⁵² Significantly, the celebration of laying the cornerstone of the Confucian temple was not held at the construction site itself, but at St. Nikolai Cathedral on Cathedral Square, the symbol of the Russian presence in Harbin.⁵³

The significance of public or urban spaces in the city is also reflected in the frequent processions, parades and marches by virtually all of the various ethnic, religious, military, political and social groups. For instance, thousands of Orthodox believers went to the river Sungari and erected a cross made from ice several meters tall to celebrate the birth of Christ each winter. Various Boy Scout groups in full uniform would regularly march the streets of Harbin, and hardly any festivity or holiday could pass without a public parade.⁵⁴ It was apparently very important that signs of identity be displayed as publicly as possible. As Yaacov Liberman, a former member of Betar, claimed: “Many would agree that Betar’s colorful parades on the streets of Harbin, Shanghai and Tienstin, [...] contributed greatly to the prestige and honor of all Jews in China.”⁵⁵ Citizens apparently turned to more symbolic politics because the political and administrative system of the city often lacked opportunities for meaningful political participation or ethnic representation. Consequently, such symbolic politics and representation in public space became even more important during the Manchukuo period. On the one hand, even limited political participation was eliminated and, while on the other hand, the new regime relied heavily on the illusion of public support since Manchukuo lacked international recognition and legitimacy. As a result, the visual display of public support through parades and celebrations was of great significance for the new regime to conjure the semblance of public support and legitimacy. Such displays were of course carefully planned and orchestrated.⁵⁶

Conversely, the “prestige and honor” of a group could be seriously damaged and its status diminished if it was pressured or attacked in a public space, in particular if, as in the case of the fascist poster-campaigns, the group obviously could not defend itself or secure protection from the authorities. The public attacks on the Jewish community could, therefore, be interpreted as condonation by the authorities. Besides, given the importance of public space during the Manchukuo period to display support, togetherness and solidarity as manifestations of the “harmony of the races”, the poster campaign could even be understood as a symbolic exclusion of the Jews from the community. The poster campaign was probably also a reaction to the huge funeral procession for Simon Kaspe in order to communicate to the Jews: Yesterday the street might have been yours, but today it is ours.

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Concurrent to their posters, the Russian fascists started a smear campaign against the Harbin Jewish community and individual members, in particular the head of the community, Doctor Kaufman. None of those defamatory stories were directly or explicitly linked to the kidnapping and murder of Kaspe. They were designed to discredit the Jews in the eyes of their fellow citizens by again evoking old anti-Semitic stereotypes and to malign the character of local Jewish dignitaries, like, for instance, Iakov Salomonovich Matlin, the inspector for Russian sports and manager of the city stadium.⁵⁷ *Nash Put'* defamed Matlin in an article at the end of 1933 for alleged mismanagement:

During the long period of his service as the inspector for Sports, the Jew Matlin was mainly busy systematically wasting the property of the stadium. The debt totals 10,800 rubles. This debt was caused by negligence and because Matlin subordinated the interests of the stadium to his own interests [...] *Nash Put'* has testimonies indicating that Matlin is practically a criminal.⁵⁸

They also accused Matlin and the caretaker of the stadium, who happened to be a member of the Jewish youth group Betar, of failing to protect stadium property during the catastrophic flood in the summer of 1932. *Nash Put'* demanded Matlin's dismissal because of fraud and misappropriation. Presumably, this effort to strip Matlin of his

prestigious positions was part of the fascists' attempt to relegate the Jewish community to the fringes of Harbin society. Although Matlin kept his post and continued to play an important role in the administration of Harbin's sports facilities, such accusations polluted the relations between Russian and Jewish functionaries.

The favorite target of the Russian fascists was Doctor Kaufman himself, who was not only one of the leaders of the Jewish community, but also worked as a doctor in various hospitals and enjoyed great prestige among Jews and non-Jews. Only a few days after Kaspe's funeral had deeply moved the people in Harbin, *Nash Put'*, as a kind of reply or "counterweight" published the tragic story of Lydia Telezhnikova. The girl fell sick with cholera in 1932, which, like the plague, repeatedly broke out in Harbin and other parts of Manchuria, even more so after the great flood in 1932.⁵⁹ As *Nash Put'* reported, because of the carelessness and fear of a Jewish driver, the girl ended up in a small hospital for Chinese, where she received inferior care, and the facilities were inadequate and unsanitary. Therefore, the father wanted to take his daughter elsewhere but, according to the testimony of the father, Kaufman repeatedly refused to transfer the girl to a different, that is to say Russian, hospital, against the appraisal of some of his colleagues. Lydia eventually died in the Chinese hospital. *Nash Put'*, and possibly the father too, not only blamed Kaufman and the Jewish driver for the girl's tragic fate, but also Lydia's former employer, a Jewish merchant, because the hard work she had to carry out for him made her weak and sick.⁶⁰ This story seems tailor made for *Nash Put'* and might even have been the newspaper's own fabrication, containing a series of common fascist tropes: the Jewish exploiter, the cowardly Jewish driver and the heartless Jewish doctor who together "kill" an innocent Russian girl. *Nash Put'* could present itself as the voice and defender of the poor father, who reportedly plead:

I appealed to the only true Russian newspaper in Harbin [...] with the plea to illuminate this terrible thing. I demand that the Jewish doctor Kaufman, who speaks so much about humanity and the defenseless Jews, answers me – where is my daughter? Mister Kaufman, you killed my daughter [...] I declare this in public!⁶¹

Kaufman here was not just presented as a bad or incompetent doctor, but above all as a heartless person, who both complained about the handling

of the Kaspe case and lamented Simons death while simultaneously and callously letting another man's daughter die. The story naturally reflected badly on the Jewish community in Harbin, because they had made such a man their longtime leader.

In the following years the fascists continued to publish such "lies that are actually fabricated against individuals," as the Shanghai based *Israel's Messenger* put it.⁶² The objective was either to make the object of the report seem absolutely ridiculous or to represent them as self-absorbed, arrogant, and narcissistic. For example, Harbin's "sugar king", Lev Zikman, owner of one of the biggest sugar mills in the area, was mocked in an article because a bust of him, made for him by the wife of a consular employee, broke on delivery.⁶³ Since the report contained no important information, the prime motive would appear to have been Zikman's humiliation. Similarly, an article on Piastunovich, one of the leaders of Betar, only served to inform readers about his alleged past as a member of the Soviet Komsomolsk and to defame him as a Soviet agent.⁶⁴

In general, the Russian fascists pursued a two-pronged strategy. One the one hand they deployed rather traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes and myths that had been circulating for centuries in Europe. The Jews were accused of ritual murder, for example, and it was said that they had slaughtered a child in Afghanistan⁶⁵, and they were held responsible for the crucifixion of Christ.⁶⁶ *Nash Put'* also repeatedly alluded to old stereotypes about Jewish doctors and medical personnel that were common in Western Europe, although such stories were not widely spread in pre-revolutionary Russia.⁶⁷

Above all, the fascists focused on the trope of the "Jewish capitalist–communist," an image already popular in pre-revolutionary Russia. Briefly stated, the myth of the "Jewish capitalist–communist" implied that the Jews instrumentalise both capitalism and communism to subjugate the entire world and, as it would seem, in particular Russia. That capitalism and communism are hardly compatible was irrelevant, since in the eyes of the Russian fascists, as for their precursors, both served to destroy and hijack Russia. *Nash Put'* repeatedly published articles dealing with the involvement of Jews in the Soviet regime⁶⁸ and their alleged control of Soviet Russia.⁶⁹ Simultaneously the Russian fascists and, in particular, Rodzaevskii propagated the myth about "the Jewish capitalists", who not only

attempted to control and undermine European states by means of their capital, but also to finance the oppression of the Russian people by supporting the Soviet regime.⁷⁰ The commemoration of the October Revolution and the memorial of the imperial family inspired the strongest waves of anti-Semitic agitation.⁷¹

In Harbin the Russian fascists found a projection surface for their personification of the “Jewish capitalist–communist” in the brothers Arkardii and Iakov Markovich Bent. The brothers Bent were Jewish merchants originally from Irkutsk, who had lived and worked in Harbin intermittently since 1906, but also run businesses in Vladivostok and Irkutsk as well as Paris and London. From Harbin and their branch offices in Siberia, the brothers did business with the Soviet Union and Soviet officials, as did many merchants while the railway was under joint management. In Harbin the Bents operated several department stores selling textiles and manufactured goods as well as furs in a more exclusive shop on Kitaiskaia Street. Among their most successful businesses was the so-called Trading House, which was very popular among Chinese and Russians because it sold everything at fixed prices, sparing their customers endless haggling. Iakov Markovich Bent also held shares of different enterprises in Manchuria and was on the board of the stock market committee and several banks. Commensurate with their social standing and wealth, the Bents were very active in charity and sponsored several functions in different clubs and associations. For example, Iakov Bent was a member of the steering committee of the Novoe sportivnoe obshchestvo (New Sports Organization/NSO), Harbin’s biggest sports organisation.⁷²

At first glance, the brothers Bent seemed the perfect target for the Russian fascists and their anti-Semitic propaganda: rich, innovative and successful international merchants who supported communism by doing business with the Soviet regime – the “Jewish capitalist–communists”. But in the fall of 1935, just as the trial against Kaspe’s murderers was gaining momentum, the brothers, like many other Jewish and non-Jewish merchants, transferred their business to Shanghai. They did so because they saw better business opportunities there, foreseeing that the sale of Soviet shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway would seriously damage trade in Harbin.

In the course of liquidating their assets, the younger brother Arkardii Bent disputed with some of his employees regarding the amount and

terms of payment for their wages in the fall of 1935. He had apparently promised a bonus, but instead of paying he tried to cut the wages. As a result the staff went on strike in early October, but the conflict was quickly solved with the mediation of the Bureau of the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (BREM), and the staff returned to work.⁷³ In its coverage of the strike, *Nash Put'* depicted Arkadii Bent as haughty and pretentious. According to the newspaper, Bent said, when asked to confirm the bonus in writing: "What? You do not believe me? I am Arkadii Bent! I give my word as Arkadii Bent!"⁷⁴

The strike was the prelude for *Nash Put'* to publish an entire series of articles in October and November to stir up hatred against the brothers Bent and the Jewish merchants in Harbin generally. The brothers were accused of not paying their creditors and wholesale dealers, even though they had made considerable profit doing business with the Soviets. When the creditors came to confiscate property as compensation, everything of value was reportedly already gone because the Bents had sent all their high-quality goods to Shanghai and would only sell junk at inflated prices in Harbin to clean out their stocks.⁷⁵

Above all, though, the fascists were hostile to the brothers because of their business relations with the Soviet Union. Not only did the Bents support communism and oppress the Russian people by trading with the Soviet Union and supplying its military, so the fascists claimed, but they were unable to conduct business successfully without such duplicity. According to *Nash Put'*, the Bent brothers' move to Shanghai resulted less from generally declining business prospects in Harbin and more from the loss of specific opportunities in their kind of "business" with the Soviets: "Ia. M. Bent has no reason to continue trading in Harbin as he chases the big business [*geshevṭ*] and does not know normal trade."⁷⁶ The newspaper implied that the Bents, as a proxy for all Jews, were unable to make a living with honest trade, but would only fiddle with money and shady business ventures in alliance with the Soviet regime at the expense of the Russian people.⁷⁷ In this manner, the "Jewish capitalist" worked together with the "Jewish communist" to gain control over Russia and elsewhere. Therefore, despite rising unemployment, the Russian fascists welcomed the exodus of Jewish businesses from Harbin, arguing that the city would thereby lose nothing.

Rising Anti-Semitism in Harbin 1934–7

It is impossible to describe the terrible condition in which the Jews in Harbin are living. The latter are encircled by a horde of bloodthirsty beasts who are after Jewish blood.⁷⁸

The fierce and perpetual anti-Jewish propaganda of *Nash Put'* and the Russian fascists did not leave the Russian émigré community in Harbin untouched. Still, claims made by the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* and the Shanghai-based *Israel's Messenger* that "Jews are attacked daily on the streets, but no one dares complain for fear of imprisonment by the gendarmerie in cellars, where they are reportedly kept indefinitely and tortured"⁷⁹ or even that "white Russians [...] are even holding people in concentration camps"⁸⁰ are likely exaggerations and cannot be confirmed by memoirs or other sources. Starting in late 1934, however, attacks and assaults on Jewish inhabitants of Harbin became more common. For instance, on the night of 18 December 1934 a young Jewish married couple, named Al'tman, was assaulted by a group of drunken students from the Polytechnic Institute on Kitaiskaia Street, the main street of Pristan. They first insulted Mrs Al'tman, then started to beat her husband and tried to take his hat, possibly aware of the importance and meaning Jews ascribed to covering one's head. The offenders finally fled when the police arrived on the scene.⁸¹ Only days later, on 4 January 1935, a young Jewish man named Veizman was attacked by four Russian youths at the skating rink, one of the most popular meeting places for adolescents in the winter. Two of the attackers held him while the other two beat him. Veizman was rescued by the facility's security guards.⁸² In July 1936 *Israel's Messenger* reported:

Recently a group of Russian youths under the influence of the "Nashput" attacked Jewish young men in the streets. A Mr Piastunoff has been wounded and removed to the hospital, while Messrs. Gourevitch and Gitomersky and others have been molested without any arrests being made.⁸³

This also corresponds with the memories of a former Jewish inhabitant of Harbin, who recalled often being beaten up by Russian adolescents. Evsey Domar remembered about his time in Harbin: "In the city of

Harbin things were quite different. Jewish kids (myself included) were beaten up quite a few times.”⁸⁴

The kidnappings of Jewish inhabitants of Harbin also continued. In June 1935, 20-year old Leib Mail, son of a Soviet railway employee, was kidnapped directly in front of the synagogue. He was freed 26 days later, after his father Jacob Mail paid a ransom of \$3,000, and the two immediately left for the Soviet Union.⁸⁵ In the same year a Jewish merchant, Mendel Leonson, was killed by his kidnappers even though his wife was willing to pay ransom.⁸⁶ Gentiles were also becoming targets for kidnapping,⁸⁷ but, in proportion to their percentage of the population, Jews were much more likely to be victims.⁸⁸

Of course each act of violence against a Jewish person was a crime and intimidated the Jews of Harbin. Nonetheless, anti-Semitic violence in Harbin never reached the levels seen in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s.⁸⁹ Physical assaults remained mainly confined to adolescents and young men without ever becoming a daily occurrence. In fact, physical violence was manageable compared to the increasing prevalence and acceptance of anti-Semitic prejudice, which fostered a hostile atmosphere against the Jews and led to the progressive exclusion of Jews from Harbin society and the Russian émigré community in particular. The Jews were losing their status as part of the exile community, all of whom shared a common fate, becoming perceived instead as a different, alien and even antagonistic group. As a result, openly anti-Semitic hostilities in word and deed acquired public acceptability.

In an open letter to the liberal newspaper *Rupor*, a man calling himself Shvil Dzhinzhikh complained about the repeated violation and defilement of the New Synagogue in Diagonalnaia Street, Harbin’s largest Jewish temple:

But recently, probably under the influence of the intensified agitation, the louts became even bolder and, in comparison the riots they started in the night of the first everything else pales. First of March was the coronation day of the Emperor of Manchukuo. For the attack on the Synagogue they chose the eve of that day, so that their deeds darkened the holiday mood of the Jews at the very moment when all other parts of the population rose in joyful spirit to pray for the health and well-being of the Emperor. In the night of the first of March they destroyed all panels and

windows, so nearly no window was unbroken, and in the morning no service could be held, because no one could stay there because of the cold.⁹⁰

As the letter shows, the attack on the New Synagogue on the night of 28 February was not the first time that the Synagogue was damaged, but the suspicion that this date was deliberately chosen to prevent the Jewish community from celebrating Pu-Yi's coronation with the rest of the population clearly upset the writer. This indicates that it was trivial that it was the Japanese who orchestrated the celebration or whether the Jews or anyone else actually condoned or condemned the coronation. Rather, it was the intention to exclude the Jews that made the attack so outrageous.⁹¹ Moreover, the disinterest, if not tacit consent, of passersby seemed to have deeply disturbed the author:

In light of this destruction, the question arises: There are many churches, temples and houses of prayer in Harbin. Why is none of those exposed to such destruction, and the only object of hooligan sacrilege is the Jewish Synagogue? Why, during all this time, has not one of the thousands of people who pass by this iniquity, as if nothing had happened, raise their voice in outrage about this sacrilege against God and the authorities.⁹²

The rhetorical question as to why only Jewish institutions were damaged indicated that the window-smashing was not just an indiscriminate prank by some unruly teenagers, but was purposefully directed against the Jewish community. The proximity in time to the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Russian fascists after the discovery of Simon Kaspe's body was most likely not accidental. On the contrary, like the author suspects, the violators of the Synagogue were possibly inspired by the inflammatory articles in *Nash Put'*.

Such public anti-Semitism became more common, indicating that people felt increasingly safe and accepted with their anti-Jewish bias. In February 1934 an article in *Rupor*, entitled "All Jews will be crushed! The fruits of the anti-Semitic campaign," reported on a Russian named Khrebsov. Khrebsov had apparently been yelling anti-Semitic slogans and clamoring to kill the Jews at the corner of Kitaiskaia and Diagonalnaia Streets in the center of Pristan, after he had caused a traffic

accident involving a Jewish driver.⁹³ According to the article, none of the bystanders or passersby objected to Khrebsov's rant. Like Shvil Dzhinzhikh, the author of the reader's letter, *Rapor* ascribes the anti-Semitism of Khrebsov and others like him to growing anti-Semitic agitation: "This case clearly reveals the fruits of the anti-Semitic agitation, which has recently grown relentlessly in Harbin. Open calls for pogroms and the most disgusting forms of hate find an ideal hotbed in the human filth [...]".⁹⁴

In the following month, the situation of the Jews in Harbin worsened, which aroused international attention, in particular among Jewish communities and institutions in Shanghai, Great Britain and the United States. This prompted the Japanese to act out of concern for their image among the American Jews in particular, who were valued as potential investors in Manchukuo.⁹⁵ The idea that the Jews would be powerful enough to support the economic development of Manchukuo and even to obtain international recognition resulted from a specific form of quasi anti-Semitism in Japanese thought.

The Japanese, who as a non-Christian and non-Islamic nation were free from religiously determined anti-Jewish prejudice and lacked any experience with Jews, had no tradition of anti-Semitism, since the first small Jewish community in Japan only appeared in the nineteenth century in Kobe.⁹⁶ They also never adopted, and even opposed, the race-based anti-Semitism of the West, since the Japanese had been discriminated against on racial grounds themselves. Within Nazi ideology, they were seen as a people who preserved a foreign culture (*kulturtragend*) without creating a culture of their own (*kulturschaffend*), a mark of inferiority to the Germans.⁹⁷ Two events were decisive in shaping the image of the Jews among the Japanese in the twentieth century: the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and the Siberian intervention during the Russian Civil War. When Japan was in danger of losing the war against the Russian Empire in 1905 due to a lack of funding, a Jewish-American banker, Jacob Henry Schiff, helped Japan to obtain credit in excess of 50 million dollars to pursue and finally win the war.⁹⁸ The significance of Schiff's help should not be underestimated, since the Russo-Japanese War was the first war that an Asian state won against a western power in modern times and was consequently a grand propaganda victory for Japan. These events simultaneously provided the basis for the Japanese image of the Jews as a formidable economic force

that could be used in the future for the benefit of the Japanese Empire. Through their involvement in the Russian Civil War on the side of the White Russians, Japanese military personnel encountered Russian anti-Semitism, especially due to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This text was a hoax of Russian origin that accused the Jews of pursuing world domination by all means possible, but especially by revolution, communism, capitalism and economic domination. The Protocols were first translated into Japanese in 1924 by Yasue Norihiro, an army officer who became an anti-Semite after his participation in the Siberian Intervention. The text then circulated widely in Japan, and few questioned its authenticity.⁹⁹ The Protocols, in combination with Jacob Schiff's timely assistance, led to a very ambiguous image of the Jews as an omnipotent force that could be potentially useful or very dangerous, which accordingly needed to be controlled as carefully as possible. In particular American Jews were said to be exceptionally influential.¹⁰⁰ Therefore the Japanese authorities in Harbin took a rather cautious approach in regard to criticism of their treatment of Jews in Harbin.

In February 1935 two representatives of the Jewish community, Doctor Kaufman and I.M. Berkovich, met with the Japanese Consul General Morishima in Harbin to discuss the situation of the Jews living in the city and the problem of increasing anti-Semitism.¹⁰¹ The Jewish representatives reminded Morishima that the Jews had lived in Harbin for over 30 years and had greatly contributed to the economic development of the region. They also assured the Consul that they were loyal citizens who were not interested in politics. Moreover, Kaufman and Berkovich also complained about the smear campaign of *Nash Put'*, which had called for a boycott of the Jews, denounced all Jews as communists and claimed that it was the Jews who killed Christ. For his part, the Consul emphasised the good relationship between the Jews and Japan and promised that the Jews would be treated and protected like any other nationality living in Manchukuo. However, he was apparently also quite upset about unfavorable articles in the foreign press on anti-Semitism in Harbin and, according to the American Consul, Morishima wanted the names of those Jews who complained to the foreign press. He probably referred to *Israel's Messenger* and its chief editor Ezra, who initiated a campaign to fight anti-Semitism in Harbin by, for example, complaining to Katsuo Usami, Councilor of the Manchukuo government and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in Japan

Shigemitsu.¹⁰² Kaufman is said to have answered that the anti-Semitic bias in some of the Russian press is so obvious that no one actually needed to complain explicitly about it to garner foreign attention.¹⁰³

Despite the fact that the Japanese authorities arranged for a summary of the Consul's conversation with the Jewish leaders to be printed in the Russian press, sending an unmistakable, though not forceful, signal to anti-Semites in Harbin, the situation did not improve. The exclusion of Jews in multicultural Harbin worsened and spread beyond Russian émigré circles. In one instance in spring 1935, the members of the Polish Club, Gospoda Polska rejected the request of the Polish Consul General, despite his repeated attempts, to strike a paragraph from the club charter stipulating that club members had to be Catholics, which necessarily prevented Polish Jews from joining.¹⁰⁴ In this context it is interesting to know that *Nash Put'* notably began to publish anti-Semitic articles at roughly the same time, which were clearly directed more towards a Polish audience, for instance on the Jews during the elections to the Polish *sejm*.¹⁰⁵

Again, neither the interventions of Ezra, the Jewish community in Shanghai, international Jewish institutions, nor the consultations with the Japanese Consul General improved the situation of the Jews in Harbin. In August 1935 police searched the Main Synagogue. "The entire compound was encircled by police and every corner of drawers, boxes, including the Holy Ark, where the sacred scrolls of the law are deposited, was submitted to a search for arms and banned literature."¹⁰⁶ *Israel's Messenger* blamed *Nash Put'* and the Russian fascists who incited the local authorities "by means of a false insinuation and accusation."¹⁰⁷ Only a month after the private home of Rabbi Levin, head of Harbin's Jewish primary school, Talmud Torah, was searched, as was Kaufman's – of all times – on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), the holiest and most solemn day of the year.¹⁰⁸ *Israel's Messenger* attributed this second round of searches to their intervention on behalf of the Jewish community in Harbin, for which the fascists wanted retaliation: "[...] the raid on the synagogue was [...] actually designed to humiliate the Jews and heap ridicule upon them."¹⁰⁹ The American Jewish Committee came to a similar conclusion on assessing the incidents: "These and similar anti-Jewish activities were believed to be inspired by White Russians, in retaliation for a protest campaign by Shanghai Jews against their Jew-baiting activities in Manchukuo."¹¹⁰ *Nash Put'* vehemently

protested against the intervention of *Israel's Messenger* and its editor in chief Ezra in a series of articles.¹¹¹

Similar searches again took place in fall 1936, when the police again searched several Jewish institutions in Harbin, among them the Synagogue, the Home for Aged Jews (*moshav zkenim*) and the Jewish hospital.¹¹² Although the press in Harbin was forbidden from reporting on the searches of Jewish institutions, the news certainly spread in Harbin since passersby and bystanders must have witnessed the operations. The combination of fearful gossip and the searches that inspired it, which seemed to give credence to the stories about Jews being communist agents plotting a Soviet invasion, must have magnified the tension in Harbin's Jewish community.

It remains unclear who was behind the searches. *Israel's Messenger* reported with considerable plausibility that members or sympathisers of the Russian fascists, the Musketeers or other anti-Semitic-minded persons inspired the searches with collusion of the Japanese authorities, who ordered or at least condoned them. It must not be forgotten, however, that the situation in Harbin was generally very tense in 1935, and many Russians also fell victim to wrongful accusations and arrests for being Soviet spies.¹¹³ Still, no other group came under blanket suspicion (*Generalverdacht*), as did the Jews, and no other group had to suffer searches of their houses of prayer or community institutions. As a reader's letter to the *Israel's Messenger* put it:

It is unheard of that Government officials would make a raid on a sacred place of worship on the strength of some accusation by irresponsible Jew-haters. Has it ever occurred that in the twentieth century a whole congregation can be accused by some irresponsible people, and the government will act on the strength of it? Has it ever occurred that the police will enter a Russian church and will touch the holy vessels there?¹¹⁴

Another sign of growing anti-Semitism and its toleration was the spread of anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudice in the Russian press. At the same time, liberal newspapers like *Rupor*, which had previously defended the Jews and criticised *Nash Put'* and the fascists, fell silent.¹¹⁵ The anti-Semitism propagated by *Nash Put'* gradually started to appear in other newspapers, mainly *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, which increasingly adopted the

anti-Jewish legends, accusations and slanders spread by the Russian fascists. For instance, an editorial commented the National Socialist Party congress in Nuremberg in September 1936:

We cannot disagree with many positions expressed today, in particular during the session of the National Socialists in Nurnberg. In fact, communists are mainly led by Jews and all the really important posts in the Soviet Union are filled with Jews. In fact, the Jews interfere with the internal affairs of many European states. In fact, the Jews play a dirty and bloody role in relation the Russian people in Russia.¹¹⁶

During the Kaspe case, *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, like no other newspaper, except of course *Nash Put'*, supported the representation and interpretation of the Russian fascists. In an editorial in June 1936, *Kharbinskoe Vremia* called the murderers of Simon Kaspe "heroes," "who acted solely for the sake of worthy objectives." Maliciously, the article compared the kidnapping and murder of Simon Kaspe with the shooting of the journalist and former Ukrainian head of state, Simon Petliura, in 1926 in Paris by Sholom Schwarzbard in revenge for the pogroms during the Civil War in the Ukraine.¹¹⁷ The newspaper argued that, since Schwarzbard had been acquitted because of his political motive, the same should apply to the Kaspe murders:

The Kaspe affair is unintentionally reminiscent of the murder of Petliura and the scandalous trial of Schwarzbard in Paris. As is well known, Schwarzbard, Petliura's murderer, told the court that he had "fulfilled purely idealistic aims, and took vengeance on Petliura for the pogroms in the Ukraine and the murder of Jews." The jury acquitted Schwarzbard.¹¹⁸

Nash Put' made similar comparisons.¹¹⁹ With this crude argument, the author implied that, if the Jews claimed the right to self-defense and vigilante justice for themselves, they could not complain if others, in this case the White Russians, did the same. In other words: if the Jews could take the law into their own hands, everybody else had the right to do the very same. According to *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, the real culprits of

Simon's death were "those who prompted the accused" – "the communists and their agents" – meaning the Jews themselves.

Furthermore, on the same day and even on the same page the newspaper published a lead article entitled "In defense of law and justice," in which Joseph Kaspe, Simon's father, was accused of being a secret agent of the Soviet secret service.¹²⁰ In so doing, the newspaper not only promoted precisely the anti-Semitic prejudice of Jews as traitors and supporters of communism, but also blamed Kaspe himself for the death of his own son.

The transformation of *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, the most widely read newspaper in Harbin, is striking, since the newspaper had been quite conciliatory towards the Jewish community in Harbin well into the 1930s. At least until 1936 it published a special page called "The work of the Jewish community" (*Rabota evreiskoi obshchestvennosti*) bimonthly, reporting on the activities of the Harbin community as well as on other Jewish communities and developments in Palestine. The page included articles on the maltreatment of the Jews in the Soviet Union,¹²¹ demands to open Palestine to Jewish settlers,¹²² and the situation of Jews in Germany.¹²³ *Kharbinskoe Vremia* seems to have even retained a correspondent in Palestine for a time.¹²⁴ The extensive coverage on topics of interest for the Jews in Harbin indicates that the newspaper had a significant number of Jewish readers and subscribers.

Though it is unclear why *Kharbinskoe Vremia* became increasingly anti-Semitic, a few likely inferences are possible. First, the attitude was perhaps the result of the "fight against communism" proclaimed by the Japanese and the increasing political affinity to Nazi Germany. However, the Jews in Harbin, voluntarily or not, espoused the so-called "fight against communism": a propaganda campaign initiated by Manchukuo officials.¹²⁵ Moreover, the Japanese generally ignored German demands that they change their policy towards the Jews, although they occasionally made concessions.¹²⁶ It is much more likely that the newspaper simply reflected the convictions and beliefs of a good portion of their readers, who increasingly harbored anti-Jewish bias. After the conviction of the Kaspe murderers in the first trial, the BREM launched a petition asking the emperor to pardon the kidnappers. Over 10,000 people apparently signed this petition.¹²⁷ This number seems to be incredibly high, considering that, according to newspaper reports of May 1937, just over 25,300 Russian émigrés lived in Harbin, including more

than 5,000 children.¹²⁸ Even taking into account that the list might include Russian émigrés living outside Harbin as well as signatories who did not belong to the category “Russian émigré”, it would still follow that every fourth or fifth adult Russian in Harbin must have signed the petition.¹²⁹

Of course, there were likely other factors contributing to the rise of anti-Semitism beyond the anti-Jewish agitation of the Russian fascists and *Nash Put'*. These would include the weakening economy and commensurate unemployment, political instability, disappointment with the old leaders of the Russian emigration, and the feeling marginalisation among the former colonisers surely played a role in making Harbin Russians susceptible to fascist propaganda. Furthermore, Japanese ultra-patriotism, the successes of German and Italian fascism, and growing Chinese nationalism probably contributed to the rise of radical trends among Russian émigrés. Nevertheless, as has been shown, contemporaries were convinced that fascist agitation caused the growing anti-Jewish sentiments among Russian émigrés and, therefore, lobbied against it. In one instance the editor of the *Israel's Messenger* responded to an article in the Japanese-owned newspaper the *Manchurian Daily News*, which belittled fascist agitation by saying, “sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never hurt me”:

You say ‘If the Nashput vilifies, the paper probably will not profit from it and the Jews will come to no harm.’ This, to my mind is fallacious reasoning. The Nashput is defaming the honor and reputation of the Jews everywhere with no chance of refuting them [...] This is not honest journalism, but a willful movement to wreck homes, ruin trade and murder and plunder the innocent. Are you aware of this?¹³⁰

Political and economic crises might also have encouraged radical nationalism and the exclusion of minorities, but anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices still had to be spread and promoted. Anti-Semitism, in a way, had to be “learned” or at least reactivated. Therefore, anti-Semitism would have never reached the intensity seen, for example, during the protest against the anti-religious policy of the Soviet Union in February 1937 without the fascists’ skillful agitation.

On 14 February 1937, a demonstration consisting of several thousand participants marched through the districts of Pristan, Old Town and New Town. Leading the march on an open truck decorated with fascist flags were the leaders of the Russian fascists: Konstantin Rodzaevskii, Lev Okhotin, Aleksandr Vinogradov and Vladimir Vasilenko. Those following the truck sang the Russian and the fascist anthems. Posters hung from houses along the route, reading:

Communism = Godlessness, Fascism = Believe in God and Eternal Life; With God against the Antichrist – the Communists; Fascism the Mortal Enemy of the Atheist; In the Soviet Union they destroy our sanctuaries – Synagogues are sacrosanct; Answer Kaganovichsh! Where are our sanctuaries? In whose dirty hands are our holy vestments and our icons?¹³¹

The demonstration stopped at various houses of prayer, including a local mosque, Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox churches, where speeches were given and different clerics, among them Archbishop Nestor, recited blessings and prayers. According to conservative estimates, between 8,000 and 10,000 people participated in the demonstration.¹³²

The occasion for this demonstration was the “Week of Protest against the International Godlessness,” which was held on 7–14 February 1937 in Harbin, to protest against an international conference on atheism, which the communist regime in Moscow had organised.¹³³ But the demonstration was also probably the largest anti-Semitic rally that ever took place in Harbin.

The idea to protest against the conference on atheism and the anti-religious policies of the Soviet Union in general emanated from the Orthodox parish in Harbin, but other religious denominations participated from the beginning. For many, if not most, Russian émigrés, religion was very important and occupied a special role. First, it was a core element of many people’s identity and a source social cohesion among parishioners as well as a link to their forefathers’ lives in pre-revolutionary Russia. Second, faith, piety and the importance assigned to both could serve as a common element among Russian émigrés of different denominations, especially when contrasted with the atheism promoted in the Soviet Union.

This associational affect was eagerly appropriated by the Russian fascists and in particular Rodzaevskii, who, as the head of the second department of the BREM, took the initiative to organise the protest. At the first meeting at the BREM it was agreed that the BREM and the Orthodox Church would organise a general protest meeting on 7 February, which would include representatives of all religions present in Harbin, while the fascists would sponsor a “Week of Protest” by organising events and activities throughout the week. The fascists invited all denominations to participate in the “Week of Protest,” and many accepted, except of course the Jewish community.¹³⁴

There had been close cooperation between the Russian fascists and the Orthodox Church long before 1937. Unlike other fascist movements, the Russian fascists in Harbin always made an effort to be on good terms with the Orthodox Church. Although in contrast to radical right circles in the Tsarist Empire, which sometimes even excluded converts to the Orthodox faith from their organisations, the Russian fascists did not identify Orthodox faith strictly with the Russian nation.¹³⁵ Consequently, they also admitted believers of different faiths, like Tatar Muslims, but not atheists. Nevertheless, nearly every event organised and hosted by the Russian fascists included prayers, hymns or at least an address by some Orthodox cleric, who was himself often a party member.¹³⁶ Even high clerics graced the fascists with their presence at special occasions. From 1936, for example, the party organised the so-called St. Vladimir’s Day together with the Episcopalian Counsel in Harbin.¹³⁷ At this occasion in 1937, the Metropolitan of Harbin Meleti addressed a crowd of fascists standing under a swastika flag.¹³⁸ Especially the Bishops Filologov and Dimitri often participated in fascist events, giving speeches and citing prayers. For instance, Bishop Filologov spoke as a representative of the Episcopalian Counsel of Harbin during the fascist commemoration of the October Revolution in 1935 and on the celebration of the Olga Day¹³⁹ by fascist youth organisations in 1937.¹⁴⁰ From the mid-1930s the connections and the cooperation between the Orthodox Church and the fascists intensified. The party increasingly urged their members to be true and devoted, not merely nominal, believers.¹⁴¹ The Orthodox Church was also quite willing to cooperate with the Russian fascists. As Archbishop Melitii said during a meeting celebrating the fifth anniversary of the All-Russian Fascist Party:

Your Party is the most powerful, the most active and vigorous in the emigration, and it is especially pleasant for us to see that this movement is purely Russian and completely corresponds to Russian historical traditions of the spirit of Orthodox belief, and it is necessary for all Russian people to welcome and support it only.¹⁴²

The second motivation for the fascist engagement in religion was briefly mentioned above: the communitarian appeal of religion in Harbin. Religion and religiosity could be stylised as a characteristic of Russianness regardless of denomination and, therefore, facilitated the inclusion of non-Orthodox believers, especially Muslims, into the fascist movement. Much more important, however, was the potential of the fascists' demonstrative dedication to religion and the defense and protection of faith to unite to people not yet associated with the fascist movement. Through religion, the Russians were temporarily able to overcome political and social differences by emphasising essential values and commonalities like piety and common projects.

Therefore, already in the prelude to the demonstration, the Russian fascists portrayed their branch of fascism as inherently religious and the fascists as the true guardians of faith, declaring their fight against communism and the “Jewish–Masonic conspiracy” a religious war. Similarly some of the posters carried during the demonstrations read: “Destroy our Temples (but) the Flame of Belief burns in the Fascist Hearts!; Fascism rises for the Protection of Religion!; Communism = Godlessness – Fascism = Believe in God and Eternal Life!”¹⁴³

Without question (Orthodox) faith always mattered for the Russian fascists, but in the period around the “Week of Protest,” Russian fascism and religiosity was represented as virtually the same. Fascism meant believing in God. Conversely, this suggested that, if one was a seriously devoted believer in any God or Gods, one could not be against Russian fascism in principle, because there would be at least some shared values and metaphysical beliefs.¹⁴⁴ For every true believer, existing political differences had to be subordinated whenever such superior goods as piety, faith and the free practice of religion were under threat. In their call to participate in the demonstration, the fascists even went a step further by declaring:

Tomorrow all righteous people, regardless of nationality or religious denomination, should join the demonstration [...] One can have different views on this or that political, social or other question, but all of civilized humanity is united in the belief in God. The moment has come when all those who are united by the ideals of civilized humankind have to join together and take up the active fight against the Godless [...] By fighting against Godlessness, we protect humanity. Therefore, everyone who has not lost his human dignity [...] has to take to the streets tomorrow. The VFP, [...] affirms that its initiative is supported by the population of Harbin as a whole. Academic as well as clerical and social groups will participate in the demonstration.¹⁴⁵

According to the fascists, the fight against the antireligious politics under communism was much more than a political issue. Rather, it was an unavoidable question of morality, culture and even human dignity of men. Regardless of political or social convictions, nationality, ethnicity, social status or occupation, all cultured and civilised men were to be united in their faith. Faith was the foundation of a civilised society. Therefore, the demonstration in defense of religiosity and faith might have been organised by the fascists, but it was and had to be a common mission for all Russian émigrés.

The “Week of Protest” began with a large general meeting at a mechanic’s workshop on 7 February. Delegates of all denominations participated: Catholics, Protestants, Old Believers, Orthodox, Buddhists, Shintoists, Jews and Muslims.¹⁴⁶ Such a gathering of religious dignitaries was unique in the history of Harbin. The audience comprised of around 2,000 people from all nationalities and social classes. The clergy prayed together and representatives of each denomination rose to speak. According to *Rupor*: “All speakers emphasised the importance of religious belief as the most valuable treasure of humankind, because without it morality and cultural improvement would be unthinkable, and they rebuked Godlessness as a rebellion of slaves against the Creator, who predares moral corruption and the collapse of society.”¹⁴⁷

The unity and consensus of all believers in Harbin and the fact that all religious denominations took part in the general protest meeting were particularly stressed in the media coverage. But this soon came to an end. In contrast to the general meeting, the “Week of Protest” gradually

turned into an anti-Semitic rally, culminating in the demonstration on 14 February. Although the secretary of the Jewish community Zimin had participated in the general meeting as a representative of the rabbinate, the Jews were soon singled out and, instead of being perceived as victims of the communist anti-religious policy like all other faiths, they were stigmatised as the party responsible for the persecution and oppression of believers in the Soviet Union. Of course, the fascists gave the decisive impulse for this perception, but after years of anti-Semitic agitation, the crowd had already been well primed.

During the entire week from 7 until 14 February, the All-Russian Fascist Party organised numerous protest gatherings throughout Harbin and the surrounding settlements: on the 10 February in the districts of Korpusnoi, Samannyi, Gospital'nyi Gorod and Pristan, one day later in in Modiagou and New Town, and two days later in in Chikhe, and on 13 February in Old Town and Alekseevka.¹⁴⁸ Apparently, all of those meetings were very well attended and sometimes attracted several hundred people.¹⁴⁹ Separate meetings for pupils, teachers and the congregations of different churches also took place.¹⁵⁰ Aside from very few exceptions, namely gatherings organised by the Muslim community and the Cossacks,¹⁵¹ members of the All-Russian Fascist Party regularly took center stage at those meetings. In particular Rodzaevskii, Lev Okhotin, Viktor Lagunov and Pastor Mukhin spoke daily at multiple assemblies. In the course of the week several thousand people in Harbin must have attended one of those meetings.¹⁵² At each assembly the Russian fascists repeated their anti-Semitic shibboleths like a mantra: the Jews as the henchmen of communism, seeking to destroy any other religion. The Russian fascists did not consider Judaism to be only a religion. Instead they saw in it an amalgamation of religion und nation, which paralleled to a certain extent the fascists' own idealised self-image. Reversing the argument, the fascists believed that the Jews would disappear as a nation without the religion. The next step in this logic was to assume that the Jews sought to suppress all other religions in order to destroy all other nations.¹⁵³

Even before the general meeting *Nash Put'* and the Russian fascists agitated against the Jews, claiming that Soviet Jewry would oppress Christians and other believers, steal from the churches and destroy them. Ranting about the "satanic endeavors" of the "Judeo-communists",

the fascists even claimed that the Jews were in league with the devil.¹⁵⁴ On the day of the general meeting itself, *Nash Put'* published an editorial written by Rodzaevskii entitled "In the name of God" that pitted the aspired unity of all religions against the anti-religious policies of the communist regime. Rodzaevskii wrote:

Our struggle with the Jewish Komintern, which subordinated the peoples of Russia, is not just a fight for Russia. This national war of the Russians against the Jewish occupiers of Russian territory and the exploiters of the Russian workers is not limited to a mundane plan. Our war against the Komintern is a religious war. Not only for Russia, but also for God.¹⁵⁵

Although their rhetoric had always been tinged with religion, the representation of the war against communism as a religious war was a new. Through this representation, the political aspects of the confrontation with communism again faded into the background. For a true believer there was only one side to choose.

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The success of the Russian fascists was due not only to their skillful agitation, but also to their effective cooperation with and penetration in civil society organisations in Harbin. The fascists had patiently built dense networks that they could now mobilise. Numerous non-fascist organisations, unions and associations followed the call of the Russian fascists and participated in the "Week of Protest" and the demonstration on 14 February. These included the scout organisation National Organization of Russian Scouts (NORS) and National Organization of Russian Pathfinders (NORR), the Musketeers, the Union of Russian Journalists, the Union of Russian Teachers, the Russian House, several Cossack unions and professional associations, like Russian Transport, the Union of Russian Traders and Manufactures, the Union of Russian House and Property Owners or the Union of Russian Artists.¹⁵⁶ All of these organisations had contact with the Russian fascists at some point, either through the party, one of its sub-organisations directly, or through the second department of the BREM and many had cooperated with them before. The Union of Russian Journalists, for example, had supported the establishment of the Russian Club as early as 1933.¹⁵⁷

The Union of Russian Teachers was complicit in the fascist effort to dominate the Russian youth.¹⁵⁸

Of course, individual members of any of these groups could have participated on their own account, but peer pressure certainly played a role as well. Moreover, the official participation of well-established groups, like the Union of Russian House and Property Owners, created the impression, probably not unfounded, that substantial parts of the émigré community supported the fascists on this occasion.

The list of organisations involved in the anti-Semitic manifestation of 14 February also bluntly illustrates how widespread and generally accepted anti-Semitic feelings and stereotypes were among the Russian population and Harbin's social elite, like clerics, intellectuals and economic magnates. Three years prior thousands had attended the funeral of Simon Kaspe to express their grief in response to the young man's horrible death. Now thousands followed Rodzaevskii's float through the same streets "For God against the Unbelievers. For the Nation against the Jewish International."

Conclusion

In all likelihood Rodzaevskii and his *sobraniki* were not directly involved in kidnapping Simon Kaspe, but his horrible death served the fascists to catalyse their crusade against Jewry in general and the Harbin community in particular. They skillfully took advantage of tensions and discords arising around the kidnapping, to which the French Vice-Consul Chambon made a significant contribution, to initiate and sustain conflicts between the Jews, the Russians and the Japanese. Although the victim of the crime was Jewish, the fascists portrayed the Jews as aggressors and émigré Russians as the actual victims. After having succeeded once in drawing a clear line between Russians and Jews, the fascists continued to incite their compatriots against the Jews in the following years.

In their anti-Semitic propaganda the fascists reverted to well-established prerevolutionary anti-Jewish libels and stereotypes, like ritual murders and the more modern myth of a Jewish world conspiracy and the specter of the "Jewish capitalist-communist". As during the debate on Freemasonry in 1933, the fascists would often transpose their anti-Semitic theories into a local context, and many members of the

Jewish community in Harbin, like Kaufman and Bent, served as personifications for their stereotypes

Rising anti-Semitism in Harbin was not so much characterised by an increase in anti-Jewish violence as by growing acceptance of anti-Semitism in public and the propagation of anti-Semitic stereotypes and prejudices among large segments of the population. This trend is aptly illustrated by the changing perception of the Kaspe murder and the participation of thousands at the demonstration in February 1937. Jewish emigrants were gradually excluded from the émigré society and were instead held responsible for the communist takeover and the misery it caused for the Russians, regardless of the fact that they shared the same fate as most Russians in the city.

CONCLUSION

A close relationship to society – that is the most important task of our Harbin branch [...] Society will be divided in three categories: friends, neutrals and opponents [...] In relation to friends we will find concrete forms of cooperation, so that each can, within their powers and possibilities, support the VFP. In relation to neutrals – workers of the VFP will be attached to each [group] to make them into friends. In relation to opponents – we will make assiduous efforts to turn them into neutrals and then into friends.¹

This interview excerpt, conducted by *Nash Put'* with the leader of Harbin branch of the Russian fascists, again clearly illustrates how much the fascists valued cooperation with and infiltration of civil society and how systematically they pursued this strategy. It also shows that the fascists were hardly interested in cooperation on equal terms, but rather to co-opt other social, political or religious groups.

From a distance much fascist ideology, symbolism and they hysterical rhetoric seem rather grotesque – the endless repetition of the same slogans and the perpetual anti-Jewish propaganda can be tiresome. This assessment was probably shared by many contemporaries, but the Russian fascists were far from being a marginal group, instead playing a considerable role in the daily life of Russian émigrés. Their significance was not necessarily because of strong fascist sentiments among *Kharbintsy*, but because the fascists were actively involved in many areas of daily life, in particular youth, education and

culture. As has been shown in this work, the key to the success of the Russian fascists can be found in their dense network of associations, clubs and organisations, constituting a robust civil society, and how they leveraged these to exert influence on publics in Harbin. The effects of fascist engagement, which is to say the exclusion the Jews and certain other groups, became manifest during the demonstration in February of 1937. The demonstration also marked the zenith of the fascists' influence in Harbin, and like every climax, it also marked the beginning of their decline.

Changes in the Japanese policy regarding the Russian émigrés and their incorporation into the “people of Manchukuo,” which accompanied by restrictions on various freedoms, as described in Chapter 2, also affected the Russian fascists. To whatever extent the Japanese had fostered the fascists in the past, in the course of the *Gleichschaltung* (enforced conformity) from 1937 they quickly and unflinchingly spurned their former protégé. The fascist party became a reservoir for recruitment to the Manchukuo Army and convenient proxies of the Japanese Military Mission. Rodzaevskii also became unable to hold the party together. Burdened with dissension regarding the support of Hitlerism and the usefulness of anti-Semitism as a trademark issue, the party soon showed signs of disintegration. Ever more members turned their backs on the fascists because they did not want to support Hitler against Russia – communist or not – or out of disappointment with the predictable failure of Rodzaevskii's three-year-plan. The Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany of August of 1939 and the Japanese–Soviet ceasefire further weakened the All-Russian Fascist Party until the organisation was forbidden in 1943. After the Soviet invasion of Harbin, the remaining members disappeared in Soviet camps or were scattered throughout the world, unless they shared Rodzaevskii's fate, who was shot in the Lubianka on 30 August 1946.

Thereafter, the Russian fascists, their ideas and their ideology seemingly disappeared. However, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Rodzaevskii, the Manchurian fascists and their ideology are regaining popularity in Russia. In particular their anti-Semitic prejudice and the wild conspiracy theories are adopted by ultra-nationalistic and radical right groups. Books like Rodzaevskii's *Testament of a Russian Fascist* [Zaveshchanie russkogo fashista] on the Jewish world conspiracy

or Ivanov's *Ot Petra Pervogo do nasbikk dnei: Russkaia intelligentsia i masonstvo* are currently being reprinted in Russia.² Rodzaevskii even has his own Facebook profile, though he fortunately does not have many followers and friends.

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Unquestionably, Harbin represents a special case in many respects. First, commencing with the establishment of the city, Harbin's fate was determined above all by the relations among the three regional powers – China, Russia and Japan – and their respective interests and ambitions reflected by the repeated changes of power. The citizens of Harbin recurrently had to adapt to new circumstances, regimes and ideas. Especially the Russians in Harbin experienced quite a transformation from colonisers to colonials, from rulers to stateless refugees. Second, Harbin, in comparison to other Chinese port cities, like Shanghai, had no history of ethnic ghettos and concessions. Because of the scope of contact, exchange and entanglement between the various nationalities, especially between the Russians and the Chinese, living in Harbin was truly exceptional, even if interethnic relations were sometimes conflict-ridden and dominated by competition and feelings of superiority. For these reasons, Harbin and its history are unique, although the city has been compared with many other cities, like Shanghai, Chicago and Paris. Why is this book still of interest for those who might not focus on Harbin or, in other words, what is in this for non-Harbin-enthusiasts?

Regardless of the particular case, one can hope that the unbiased concept of civil society, developed in the course of this work will foster new research perspectives and questions. It is a promising concept for historians because of its versatility. Civil society organisations affect many other areas of communal life, like business, education, religion, charity and leisure, making them a domain where transcultural and micro-processes of transnational exchange, assimilation, acculturation as well as sharp differentiation and exclusion become pronounced. Analysing civil society can also inform about social networks, problems and concerns or the formation of public opinion. Civil society organisations have an impact on public opinion and public spheres by initiating or promulgating a public debate. The resulting constitution of identities in civil society shapes the perception and opinion of people participating in a public. This interrelation between civil society and

publics, neglected by Putnam and others, deserves further consideration and might provide deeper insight into the formation of public opinions. Finally, although the notion of civil society is a western European concept, it is applicable to other cultural contexts, provided one avoids the debate about classifying civil society as a sphere between the state, the market and the private to focus instead on the functions of civil society organisations.

Research in civil society, however, is frequently narrowed by normative bias and the prevalence of virtually millenarian expectations on civil society, which can distort the analysis, as can be observed in the evaluation of contemporary civil society in Russia and other East European countries. In this case the halting transition to a democratic and liberal state is commonly attributed to weak civil society,³ without taking into account that at the same time extreme nationalistic, ultra-Orthodox or far right organisations thrive.⁴ Therefore, I argue that, if we focus exclusively on the good side of civil society, we will overlook that anti-democratic, anti-liberal and xenophobic groups – what is call the sinister side of civil society – occupy the same social spaces fulfill the same functions. They also contribute to the *Weltanschauung* and personality development of their members by promoting certain norms and values. They foster processes of communitarisation and the development of networks and social ties. In short, they also transfer “Is” into “Wes”.

A functional and less biased concept of civil society can yield a more complex and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. It allows us to perceive phenomena that are often assumed to be in opposition to each other – like the Russian fascists and the YMCA in Harbin – as part of one development or one space. Such an open perspective should enable us to explain why civil society sometimes fails to fulfill our high expectations by not leading to more democracy, solidarity and tolerance, but instead can deepen social cleavages and aggravate social tensions, leading in some cases to totalitarianism, extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Charles Tilly once said: “The public sphere and civil society are morally admirable, but analytically useless.”⁵ I believe that both concepts can still be quite useful, provided that we are able to abandon normative constrictions and expectations to focus instead on the function of civil society and the public sphere(s).

NOTES

Introduction

1. *Los Angeles Times*, 1 June 1933, p. 1.
2. For the Russian Far East and the Chinese Eastern Railway, see: Nadezhda Evgen'evna Ablova, *Istoriia KVZhD i rossiiskoi emigratsii v Kitae (pervaya polovina XX v)* [The History of the KVZhD and the Russian Emigration in China (in the first Half of the Twentieth Century)] (Minsk, 1999); John Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford, 1994); Stephen Kotkin (ed.), *Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East* (Armonk, 1995); Steven Marks, *Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850–1917* (London 1991); Sören Urbansky, *Kolonialer Wettstreit: Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn* (Frankfurt a. M., 2008); Bruce Elleman and Stephen Kotkin (eds), *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History* (Armonk, New York and London, 2009).
3. Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York, 2008).
4. See, for example, *Rapor*, 24 January 1933, no. 21, p. 5.
5. Alexander Menquez (pseudo.), “Growing up in Manchuria in the 1930s: Personal Vignettes”, in Jonathan Goldstein (ed.), *Jews of China*, vol. 2: A Source Book and Research Guide (New York and London, 1999), pp. 70–84, here p. 82.
6. See, for example: Yaacov (Yana) Liberman, *My China: Jewish Life in the Orient 1900–1950* (Berkeley 1998); Yosef Tekoah, “My Developmental Years in China. Interview conducted by Steve Hochstadt”, in Goldstein (ed.), *Jews of China*, vol. 2, pp. 98–109. An exception was Emanuel Pratt, a Jew who lived in Harbin and Mukden. Pratt had contact to Chinese underground resistant groups fighting against the Japanese. Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry (in the following AHI), Interview with Emanuel Pratt conducted by Irene Eber 8 March 1973, p. 15.

7. See, for example: James Carter, "Struggle for the Soul of a City: Nationalism, Imperialism and Racial Tension in 1920s Harbin", *Modern China* 27, 1 (2001), pp. 91–116.
8. Hellmut Stern, *Saitensprünge* (Berlin, 1997), p. 50.
9. Revisionist Zionists became one of the dominant factions within the Jewish community in the 1930s. They were especially influential among the Jewish youth, though the majority of the community did not belong to the Revisionists, but to the so-called "general Zionists". Represented mostly by a secular Jewish middle class, the Revisionists constituted the nationalist and anti-socialist element within Zionism. The founder, Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky of Odessa, saw himself as the true heir and advocate of Herzl's political Zionism and sought to turn the Jewish people, especially the youth, into warriors for an independent Jewish homeland in Palestine and defenders of the Jewish people, their honour and their pride. His vehicle for this program was the youth organisation Betar. Jabotinsky emphasised militancy and violence for the transformation of the Jews into his vision of a modern nation, equal to all others. For the ideology and history of the Revisionist Zionists and their leader Jabotinsky see: Eran Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and its Ideological Legacy* (Madison, 2005); Yaakov Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925–1948* (London, 1988); Colin Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism: Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right* (London and New York, 2006); and the very polemic Leonid Brenner, *The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir* (London, 1984).
10. Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic", *World Politics* 49, 3 (1997) pp. 401–29; idem, "Gesellschaft, Konflikt und Zivilgesellschaft" [Society, Conflict and Civil Society], *Mittelweg* 36, 1 (2006), pp. 33–48; Stephen Hanson and Jeffrey Kopstein, "The Weimar–Russia Comparison", *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13, 3 (1997), pp. 252–83; for the United States, see: Jason Kaufman, *Common Good? American Civic Life in the Golden Age of Fraternity* (Oxford, 2002); for Africa, see: Augustine Ikelegbe, "The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, 1 (March 2001), pp. 1–24; for Russia: Susanne Hohler, "Radical Right Civil Society after the Revolution of 1905, in Frank Grüner, Felicitas Fischer v. Weikerthal, Susanne Hohler et al. (eds), *The Russian Revolution of 1905 in Transcultural Perspective: Identities, Peripheries, and the Flow of Ideas* (Bloomington, 2013), pp. 93–104; and from a comparative perspective: Omar Encarnacion, *The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil* (New York, 2003).
11. Another center of Russian fascism was the United States, and furthermore there were small groups of fascists in nearly all Russian émigré communities around the globe. See: Aleksandr Vasil'evich Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaiia emigratsiia: (1920–1945 gg.)* [Fascism and the Russian Emigration (1920–1945)] (Moscow, 2002).

12. Friction between White and Soviet Russians at the Faculty of Law in the mid-1920s led to the foundation of a fascist student organisation in 1925 and a so-called Union of the National Syndicate of Russian Workers run by the professor of law, N.I. Nikiforov. Erwin Oberländer, “All-Russian-Fascist-Party”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, 1 (1966), pp. 158–73, here p. 160.
13. For the Russian Fascists in Harbin, see: John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (London, 1978); Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 121–265; Nadezhda Evgen'evna Ablova, “Rossiiskaia fashistskaia partiia v Man'chzhurii” [The Russian Fascist Party in Manchuria], *Beloruskii zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* 2 (1999). Available at: http://evolutio.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=50 (Accessed 20 February 2015); Svetlana Viktorivna Onegina, “Rossiiskii fashistskii soiuz v Man'chzhurii i ego zapubezhnye sviazi” [Russian Fascist Union in Manchuria, and its Foreign Connections], *Voprosy istorii* 6 (1997), pp. 150–60; Iurii Mel'nikov, “Russkie fashisty Man'chzhurii (K.V. Rodzaevskii: tragediia lichnosti)” [Russian Fascists in Manchuria (K.V. Rodzaevskii: The Tragedy of an Individual)], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 2 (1991), pp. 109–21; 3: 156–64; Oberländer, “All-Russian-Fascist-Party”; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, in Dan BenCanaan, Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl (eds.), *The Transcultural Past of Northeast China* (Heidelberg and New York, 2013), pp. 133–58; Susanne Hohler, “Russian Fascism in Exile: A Historical and Phenomenological Perspective on Transnational Fascism”, *Fascism* 2 (2013), pp. 121–40.
14. For an overview of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, see, for example: Shin'ichi Yamamuro and Joachim A. Fogel, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion* (Philadelphia, 2006); Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1998).
15. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 52–3.
16. On the relation between fascism and civil society see: Rudy Koshar, *Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg 1880–1936* (Chapel Hill, 1986); Dylan Riley, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain and Romania, 1870–1945* (Baltimore, 2010); Robert Paxton, “Kultur und Zivilgesellschaft im Faschismus” [“Culture, Civil Society and Fascism”], in Thomas, Schlemmer (ed.), *Der Faschismus in Europa: Wege der Forschung* [Fascism in Europe: Research Perspectives] (München, 2014), pp. 35–43.
17. For the debate about the definition of civil society, see, for example: Jürgen Kocka, “Zivilgesellschaft als historisches Problem und Versprechen” [Civil Society as a Historical Problem and Promise], in Manfred Hildermeier (ed.), *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft in Ost und West: Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen* (Frankfurt a.M., 2000), pp. 13–40; John Keane (ed.), *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives* (New York and Oxford, 2006); Frank Adloff, *Zivilgesellschaft: Theorie und politische Praxis* [Civil Society: Theory and Political Practice] (Frankfurt a.M., 2005).

18. Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “Rethinking Civil Society”, *Democratization* 10, 3 (2003), pp. 1–14, here p. 5.
19. Robert Layton, *Order and Anarchy: Civil Society, Social Disorder and War* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 8.
20. Kocka, “Zivilgesellschaft als historisches Problem und Versprechen”, p. 17.
21. John Keane, “Who is in Charge here?”, *Times Literary Supplement*, 18 May 2001, no. 5120, p. 13.
22. Layton, *Order and Anarchy*, p. 13.
23. See: Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society”, *Political Theory* 29, 6 (2001), pp. 837–65, in particular pp. 840–4.
24. Kopecký and Mudde, “Rethinking Civil Society”; idem (eds), *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe* (New York, 2003).
25. Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York 2000); see also idem and Robert Leonardi: *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, 1994).
26. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (New York, 2004).
27. Amy Gutman, “Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay”, in idem (ed.), *Freedom of Association* (Princeton, 1998).
28. On “dark” civil society, see, for example: Chambers and Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society”; Kopecký and Mudde, “Rethinking Civil Society”; Roland Roth, “Die dunklen Seiten der Zivilgesellschaft” [The Dark Side of Civil Society], *Forschungsjournal neue soziale Bewegungen* 16, 2 (2003), pp. 59–73; Michael Foley and Bob Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, *Journal of Democracy* 7, 3 (1996), pp. 38–52; Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, “Modern European Democracy and Its Enemies: The Threat of the Extreme Right”, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 2, 1 (2001), pp. 52–72.
29. So far not much has been published about fascist youth groups in Harbin and Manchuria. See: Elena Aurilene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae* (1920–50) [The Russian Diaspora in China (1920–50)] (Khabarovsk, 2008), pp. 203–11.
30. I do not follow Habermas’ conception of the public sphere. I instead define publics here “as open ended flows of communication that enable also socially distant interlocutors to bridge social network positions, formulate collective orientations and generate psychical ‘working alliances’ in pursuit of influence over issues of the common concern.” See: Mustafa Emirbayer and Mini Sheller, “Publics in History”, *Theory and Society* 27, 6 (1998), pp. 727–79, here p. 738. This definition explicitly surpasses Habermas’s limits on the public debate by liberating it from the confines of critical-rational discourse. Therefore, it allows inclusion of other forms of exchange and publicity as well as the participation of individuals and groups who might not meet Habermas’s criteria of being able to engage in rational-critical discourse. Finally, this definition emphasises the interplay between publics and civil society by understanding publics as “interstitial networks of individuals and groups”. For critique of Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, see, for example: Nancy

- Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", *Social Text* no. 25/26 (1990), pp. 56–80; Joan Landes, "The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration", in Johanna Meehan (ed.), *Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse* (New York and London, 1995), pp. 135–63; Michael Schudson, "Was there ever a Public Sphere? And if so, when? Reflections on the American Case", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge and London, 1993), pp. 143–63.
31. This clearly does not apply for huge civil society organisations like the WWF where membership means sending money regularly and receiving e-mails or letters. For small groups, see: Gary Alan Fine and Brook Harrington, "Tiny Publics: Small Groups and Civil Society", *Sociological Theory* 22, 3 (2004), pp. 341–56.
32. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, *The Tsars and Jews and the Jews: Reform, Reaction and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772–1917* (Chur, 1993); idem, "Anti-Semitism at the Close of the Czarist Era", in Herbert Strauss (ed.), *Hostages of Modernization: Studies on Modern Anti-Semitism 1870–1933/39 Austria–Hungary–Poland–Russia* (Berlin, 1993), pp. 1188–207; Hans Rogger (ed.), *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Oxford, 1986); Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (Berkley, 2002).
33. See, for example: Harry Schneiderman, "Review of the Year", in *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 37 (1935–6), pp. 381–2.
34. On Soviet anti-religious policy, see, for example: Paul Froese, *The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization* (Berkeley, 2008); Arto Luukkanen, *The Religious Policy of the Stalinist State: A Case Study; The Central Standing Commission on Religious Questions, 1929–1938* (Helsinki, 1997).
35. David A. Snow, Robert D. Benford et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation", *American Sociological Review* 51, 4 (1986), pp. 464–81. A frame in this context is a set of experiences, convictions and stereotypes, determining how a person perceives, classifies and interprets events and issues. A frame "schema of interpretation – that is, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes – that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events." Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York, 1974), p. 21.
36. See: Thomas Lahusen, "A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a Centennial", *The China Quarterly* 154 (1998), pp. 400–10.
37. Elena P. Taskina and D.G. Sel'kina (eds): *Kharbin: Vетка russkogo dereva* [Harbin: A Branch of the Russian Tree] (Novosibirsk, 1991); Elena P. Taskina (ed.), *Russkii Kharbin* [Russian Harbin] (Moscow, 1998); Sosina, N.A., *Russkii Kharbin zapechatlennyi v slove* [Russian Harbin Retained in Language] (Blagoveshchensk, 2006); Oleg G. Goncharenko, *Russkii Kharbin* [Russian Harbin] (Moscow, 2009); Georgii V. Melikhov, *Belyi Kharbin: Seredina 20-kh.* [White Harbin: Mid 1920s] (Moscow, 2003); idem, *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v*

- Kitae, 1917–1924 gg.* [Russian Emigration to China 1917–24] (Moscow, 1997); N.I. Dubinina and Iurii N. Tsipkin, “Ob osobennostiakh dal’nevostochnoi vetyi rossiiskoi emigratsii: Na materialakh Kharbinskogo Pomoshchi Russkim Bezhentsam” [On the Singularities of the Branch of the Russian emigration in the Far East: From the Materials of the Harbin Society for the Help of Refugees] *Otechestvennaya Istorija* 1 (1996), pp. 70–84. On the historiography on Harbin, see also Soren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen (eds), *The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin* (Armonk and New York, 1995); Mark Gamsa, “Harbin in Comparative Perspective”, *Urban History* 37, 1 (2010), pp. 136–49; idem, “The Historiography of Harbin and the Imagery of Inter-Ethnic Contact”, *Asiatica Venetiana* 10–11 (2009), pp. 63–79.
38. Like other memoirs and autobiographies these come with advantages and defects. On the one hand, there are well-known problems concerning sources such as memoirs, interviews and reports from contemporary witnesses. Often they were recorded decades after the authors had left the city and are frequently nostalgic descriptions of growing up in Harbin. On the other hand, certain information can often only be found in such memoirs or interviews, like personal impressions and experiences, insights on family life in Harbin or the relationships between Jewish and non-Jewish school children. Therefore such sources will be only used sparsely, though Irene Ebert’s interviews with former Jewish inhabitants of Harbin and the memoirs of Igor Konstantinovich Koval’chuk-Koval’, *Svidanie s pamiat’iu (Vospominaniia)* [Rendezvous with Recollections (Memories)] have been useful indeed. For problems with memoirs in general for example, see: Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, *Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives* (Minneapolis, 2010); Wolfgang Weber, “*Mass of Trash*” or “*Veins of Gold*”? *An Investigative Report on the Relationship between Oral history and Archives* (Regensburg, 2000); and from Harbin in particular: see also Olga Bakich, “Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 51–73, p. 68. For memoirs of former inhabitants of Harbin see, for example: Elizaveta Rachinskaia, *Pereletnye ptitsy: Posviashchaetsia Kharbinu i Kharbinsam* [Birds of Passage: Dedicated to Harbin and its People] (San Francisco, 1982); Olga Sofonova, *Puti neveromye: Rossiia, Sibir', Zabaikal'e, Kitai, Filippiny 1916–1949* [Roads to the Unknown: Russia, Siberia, Transbaikalia, Philippines 1916–1949] (Munich, 1980); Igor Konstantinovich Koval’chuk-Koval’, *Svidanie s pamiat’iu (Vospominaniia)* [Rendezvous with Recollections (Memories)] (Moscow, 1996); Tania Zylewicz, *V pamiat' ob usopshikh v zemle Man'chzhurskoi i Kharbinsakh* [In Memory of Deceased in Harbin, Manchuria] (Glenroy, 2000); Nail’ Mansurovich Valeev, *Elabuga, Charbin, Sidney* [Elabug, Harbin, Sidney] (Kazan, 2007).
39. See, for example: James Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932* (Ithaca, New York and London, 2002); idem. “A Tale of Two Temples: Nation, Region, and Religious Architecture in

- Harbin, 1928–1998”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 97–119; Blaine Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer: Manchuria’s Russians under Chinese Rule, 1918–1929* (Vancouver, 2010); Frank Grüner, *Die Basare von Harbin: Kleinhandel und Alltag der mandschurischen Stadt Harbin in transkultureller Perspektive, 1898–1932* [The Bazars of Harbin: Petty Trade and Daily Life in the Manchurian City of Harbin in a Transcultural Perspective 1898–1932] (forthcoming); idem and Ines Prodöhl (guest editors), “Ethnic Ghettos and Transcultural Processes in a Globalized City: New Research on Harbin”, *Itinerario* 35, 3 Special Issue (2011), pp. 17–105; Dan BenCanaan, Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl (eds), *The Transcultural Past of Northeast China* (Heidelberg and New York, 2013).
40. This term usually excludes citizens from the Soviet Union who came to Harbin to work for the railway company during the period of the joint Sino-Soviet management.
41. An exception is: Elena Aurilene and Irina Potapova, *Russkie v Man’chzhou-digo: “Emigrantskoe pravitel’stvo”* [Russians in Manchukuo: Émigré Government] (Khabarovsk, 2004).
42. Zakharova’s book does not address the issue of Russians in Harbin. Galina Fominichina Zakharova, *Politika Iaponii v Man’chzhurii 1932–1945* [The Policy of the Japanese in Manchuria 1932–45] (Moscow, 1990).
43. Neither book focuses exclusively on the Russian Fascists in Harbin or Manchuria. Stephan also includes the American-based All-Russian Fascist Organisation (Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi organizatsii/VFO) under Anastasii Andreevich Vonsiatskii, who entered an abortive short-term alliance with fascists in Harbin, and Okorokov deals with fascist movements and organisations of the Russian emigration worldwide.
44. Ablova, “Rossiiskaia fashistskaia partiia v Man’chzhurii”; Onegin, “Rossiiskii fashistskii soiuz v Man’chzhurii i ego zapubezhnye sviazi”; Mel’nikov, “Russkie fashisty Man’chzhurii (K.V. Rodzaevskii: tragedia lichnosti)”; Oberländer, “All-Russian-Fascist-Party”.
45. Stephan, for example, focuses much more on developments and disputes inside the party and the relations between the Japanese and the fascists, which is probably a result of the accessibility of sources. One must consider that Oberländer’s article as well as Stephan’s book were published while access to primary sources was still rather difficult and restricted. Both authors had, for instance, only intermittent editions of *Nash Put’* and *Natsiia* at their disposal. The same applies to other publications of the *Biblioteka rossiiskogo fashista*, apart from very few exceptions. Okorokov, who consulted numerous sources, like *Nash Put’*, *Natsiia* and *Azbuka fashizma*, unfortunately provides only a collection of facts, which is not surprising in light of the scope of his work. The book is still very useful for a general overview on Russian fascists in Manchuria and other centers of Russian emigration.
46. Leonid K. Shkarenkov, *Agoniiia beloi emigratsii* [The Agony of the White Emigration] (Moscow, 1986), p. 149.

47. For an overview of available sources on Harbin, see: Olga Bakich, *Harbin Russian Imprints: Bibliography as History, 1898–1961: Materials for a Definitive Bibliography* (New York and Paris, 2002).
48. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov and Vladimir Vladimirovich Kibardin, *Azbuka fasbizma* [ABC of Fascism] (Harbin, 1935).
49. On the Russian press in Harbin, see: Amir Khisamutdinov, *Sleduiushchaia ostanovka – Kitai: K istorii rossiiskoi emigratsii v Kitae* [The Next Stop – China: A History of the Russian Emigration in China] (Vladivostok, 2003), pp. 160–75; Shaohua Diao, “Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine” [A brief Review of the History of the Russian Press in Harbin], *Revue des Etudes Slaves* 73, 2–3 (2001), pp. 403–45.
50. *Nash Put'* emerged from a newspaper called *Our Newspaper* (*Nasha gazeta*), which was taken over by the fascists in 1933.
51. From 1941 until 1943 the Shanghai branch of the Russian fascists again published a newspaper called *Nash Put'*, but the new edition differed from the original and did not contain as much local news.
52. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 74; Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 144–5.
53. On the contents of *Nash Put'*, also see: *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 8; *Nash Put'*, 7 November 1935, no. 284, p. 9.
54. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 74.
55. Ibid.; On *Zaria* also see: Yunhua Zhao, “Russkaia emigrantskaia pressa v Kitae v pervoi polovine XX v.” [The Russian Émigré Press in China in the first Half of the Twentieth Century], *Voprosy Istorii* 1 (2011), pp. 145–9.
56. Diao, “Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati”, p. 444.
57. On *Rupor* see: Ibid., p. 424.
58. For examples, see: *Rupor*, 13 February 1937, no. 40, p. 3; *Rupor*, 1 March 1937, no. 56, p. 6; *Rupor*, 2 March 1937, no. 57, p. 3; *Rupor*, 28 May 1937, no. 141, p. 4.
59. Khisamutdinov, *Sleduiushchaia ostanovka – Kitai*, p. 163; Frank Grüner and Rudolph Ng, “Borders in Daily Life and the Press: Harbin’s Russian and Chinese Newspapers in Early Twentieth Century”, *Comparative* 22, 5 (2012), pp. 27–46.
60. See, for example: National Archives and Record Administration (in the following NARA), RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7222, American Consul Hanson to Ambassador to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Refusal of Japanese to allow Chinese Newspapers to be delivered, 6 January 1932.
61. For the closure of the *Harbin Harold*, see: *New York Times*, 19 May 1933, p. 10; NARA, RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7222, American Consul Hanson to Ambassador to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, The Closing of a British owned Newspaper in Harbin, 11 May 1933.

62. Rudolph Lowenthal, “The Russian Daily Press in China”, *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 21, 3 (1937), pp. 330–40, here p. 332; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (in the following PAAA), R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 8.

Chapter 1 The Setting: Harbin

1. For a summary of the historiographical controversy see: Soren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen (eds), *The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin* (Armonk and New York, 1995), pp. 3–21.
2. Thomas Lahusen, “A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a Centennial”, *The China Quarterly* 154 (1998), pp. 400–10; see also Blaine Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer: Manchuria's Russians under Chinese Rule, 1918–1929* (Vancouver, 2010), p. 10–11.
3. I am aware of the problematic nature of the term “Manchuria”, but since the term is still widely used in contemporary English as well as many sources, I will still use “Manchuria” for the sake of intelligibility. In the context of this book “Manchuria” is used to identify the geographical region without undue political connotation whatsoever. For a discussion of the term “Manchuria”, see: ibid., p. 229n3. Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The ‘Japanese’ in ‘Manchuria’”, *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, 2 (May 2000), pp. 248–76, here p. 249.
4. Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer*, p. 18.
5. For the treaty see: Treaty of Alliance between China and Russia, May 1896 (Old Calendar), in John MacMurray (ed.), *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1894–1919*, vol. 1 (New York, 1921), p. 81.
6. Three versions of the contract existed, one in Russian, one in Chinese and one in French, but only the French text was legally binding. When the Chinese representatives signed the contract, they were only familiar with the Russian and Chinese versions, but not the French. Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer*, pp. 22–3.
7. On the Boxer Rebellion in Harbin see: David Wolff, *To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria 1898–1914* (Stanford, 1999), pp. 29, 32–3; Sarah C.M. Paine, “The Chinese Eastern Railway from the First Sino-Japanese War until the Russo-Japanese War”, in Bruce Elleman and Stephen Kotkin (eds), *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History* (Armonk, New York and London, 2009), pp. 13–36, here pp. 21–2; on the Boxer Rebellion in Manchuria see for example: Alena N. Eskridge-Kosmach, “Russia in the Boxer Rebellion”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 21, 1 (2008), pp. 38–52; Konstantin Porfir'evich Kushakov, *Iuzhno-Man'čžurskie Besporiadki v 1900 godu, ili Bokserskoe Vosstanie* [South Manchurian Disturbances in 1900, or the Boxer Rebellion] (Moscow, 2009).
8. Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer*, p. 19.
9. See: Wolff, *To the Harbin Station*, pp. 96–103.

10. Frank Grüner, “Russians in Manchuria: From Imperial to National Identity in a Colonial and Semi-Colonial Space”, in Brian D. Behnken and Simon Wendt (eds), *Crossing Boundaries: Ethnicity, Race, and National Belonging in a Transnational World* (Lanham, 2013), pp. 183–205.
11. Groups of over one hundred residents included Russians (34,313), Chinese (23,537), Jews (5,032), Poles (2,556), Japanese (696), Germans (564), Tatars (234), Latvians (218), Georgians (183), Estonians (172), Lithuanians (142) and Armenians (124). Olga Bakich, “Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 51–73, p. 3. For Harbin before 1917, see: Rosemary Quested, *Matey Imperialists?: The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895–1917* (Hong Kong, 1982); Olga Bakich, “Origins of the Russian Community on the Chinese Eastern Railway”, *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 27, 1 (1985), pp. 1–14; idem, “A Russian City in China: Harbin before 1917”, *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 28, 2 (1986), pp. 129–48.
12. On the 1920s in Harbin, also see: James Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932* (Ithaca, New York and London, 2002); Chia Yin Hsu, “The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the Making of Russian Imperial Orders in the Far East” (PhD dissertation, New York University, 2006); Georgii V. Melikhov, *Belyi Kharbin: Seredina 20-kh* [White Harbin: Mid 1920s] (Moscow, 2003).
13. See Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, pp. 68–71; Chiasson, *Administrating the Colonizer*, pp. 44–6.
14. For this process, see: Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, pp. 94–6; Chiasson, *Administrating the Colonizer*; Nadezhda Evgen'evna Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskoi emigratsii v Kitae: Mezhdunarodnye i politicheskie aspekty istorii (pervaya polovina XX v)* [The History of the KVZhD and the Russian Emigration in China: International and Political Aspects of the History (in the First Half of the Twentieth Century)] (Moscow, 2005), pp. 85–198.
15. On the creation of the Special District of the Three Eastern Provinces, see: Chiasson, *Administration the Colonizer*, Chapter 3, in particular pp. 48–55; Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, pp. 96–7.
16. Petr Vasil'evich Vologodskii, *Vo Vlasti i v izgnanii: Dnevnik Prem'er-ministra Antibol'shevistskikh Pravitel'stv i emigranta v Kitae: 1918–1925 gg.* [In Power and in Exile: The Diary of the Prime Minister of the anti-Bolshevik Government and Emigrant in China 1918–25] (Riazan, 2006), pp. 349, 366–7.
17. Chiasson, *Administrating the Colonizer*, pp. 61–3, 99, 101; Chia Hsu, “Railroad Technocracy, Extraterritoriality, and Imperial Lieux de Mémoire in Russian Émigrés’ Manchuria, 1920–1930s”, *Ab Imperio* 4 (2011), pp. 59–105.
18. On the joint Sino-Soviet management see: Chiasson, *Administrating the Colonizer*, pp. 109–19; Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia*, pp. 145–76.
19. For the Russian Emigration into Manchuria and China, see: *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia na Dal'nem Vostoke* [The Russian Emigration in the Far East] (Vladivostok, 2000); Natal'ia Nikolaevna Ablazhei, *S vostoka na vostok:*

- Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Kitae* [From the East to the East: The Russian Emigration in China] (Novosibirsk, 2007); Elena Aurielene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae* (1920–50) [The Russian Diaspora in China (1920–50)] (Khabarovsk, 2008); Olga Bakich, "Charbin: Russland jenseits der Grenzen in Fernost" [Harbin: Russia beyond the Borders in the Far East], in Karl Schlögel (ed.), *Der große Exodus. Die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren 1917 bis 1941* (München, 1994), pp. 304–28; N.I. Dubrinina and Iuriii N. Tsiplkin, "Ob osobennostiakh dal'nevostochnoi vetyi rossiiskoi emigratsii: Na materialakh Kharbinskogo pomoshchi russkim bezhentsam" [On the Singularities of the Branch of the Russian Emigration in the Far East: From the Materials of the Harbin Society for the Help of Refugees] *Otechestvennaia Istorija* 1 (1996), pp. 70–84. For stories about border-crossing in memoirs, see, for example: Grigory Pasternak and Eugene Raleigh, *To Reach this Season: A Russian's Odyssey to the West* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 77–101.
20. *Zaria*, 13 July 1920, no. 72, p. 3.
 21. Iustina Vladimirovna Kruzenshtern-Peterets, "Vospominaniia Iustina Vladimirovna Kruzenshtern-Peterets" [Memories of Iustina Vladimirovna Kruzenshtern-Peterets], *Rossiane v Azii: Literaturno-istoricheskii ezhegodnik* 4 (1997), pp. 124–209; 5 (1998), pp. 25–83; 6 (1999) pp. 29–104 and 7 (2000), pp. 91–149 here 4 (1997), p. 187.
 22. Bakich, "Émigré Identity", p. 58; see also: Vera Sergienko and Elena Aurielene, "The Legal Status of Russians in Manchuria (the 20s)", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 36,1 (2008), pp. 135–44.
 23. Kruzenshtern-Peterets, "Vospominaniia Iu. V. Kruzenshtern-Peterets", *Rossiane v Azii* 4 (1997), p. 209.
 24. Aurielene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae* (1920–1950), p. 28.
 25. On the Sino-Soviet conflict, see: Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, "The Russo-Chinese Conflict in Manchuria", *Foreign Affairs* 8 (October 1929–July 1930), pp. 52–68; George Alexander Lensen, *The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises 1924–1935* (Tallahassee, 1974).
 26. Chiasson, *Administrating the Colonizer*, pp. 217–18; see also, for example: Helen Yakobson, *Crossing Borders: From Revolutionary Russia to China to America* (New York, 1994), pp. 56–7.
 27. On the Japanese presence in Manchuria until the establishment of Manchukuo, see: Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria 1904–1932* (Cambridge, 2003); Christopher T. Nieh, "Japan's Manchuria Policy from the Kwantung Leased Territory to the Formation of Manchukuo" (PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1993).
 28. On Zhang Zuolin see: Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea* (Stanford, 1977).
 29. On the invasion, see, for example: Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, "Managing Occupied Manchuria, 1931–1934", in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton,

- 1996), pp. 97–135; Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–33* (London, 2002).
30. For a description and debate on Chinese and Japanese claims over Manchuria at the League of Nations, see, for example: Willoughby Westel, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore, 1935); Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, 2003), pp. 52–9; Andrew Reed Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity: Japanese Education in Manchukuo, 1931–1945” (PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2004), pp. 63–73.
 31. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, pp. 1–3 and 59–65; Suk-Jung Han, “The Problem of Sovereignty: Manchukuo, 1932–1937”, *positions* 12, 2 (2004), pp. 457–78; Thomas David Dubois, “Inauthentic Sovereignty: Law and Legal Institutions in Manchukuo”, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 69, 3 (August 2010), pp. 749–70.
 32. See for example Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, pp. 4 and 28; Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 241–303, Michael Baskett, “Goodwill Hunting: Rediscovering and Remembering Manchukuo in Japanese ‘Good-will Films’”, in Mariko Asano Tamanoi (ed.), *Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire* (Honolulu, 2005), pp. 120–49.
 33. For example, it is often said that membership in the called “Concordia Society” was mandatory for all adults and served as an instrument of control. This is undoubtedly true for the later period, but until 1937 ordinary people were actually banned from joining. Dan Shao, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation: Manchus, Manzhouguo, and Manchuria (1911–1952)” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2002), pp. 118–19.
 34. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, pp. 70–1. On the regimes brutality and crimes against humanity on part of the Japanese in China during the Manchukuo period, see: Daniel Barenblatt, *A Plague Upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan’s Germ Warfare Operation* (New York, 2004); Mark Felton, *Japan’s Gestapo: Murder, Mayhem and Torture in Wartime Asia* (Barnsley, 2009); Hal Gold, *Unit 731 Testimony* (Tokyo, 1996); Jing-Bao Nie (ed.), *Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: Comparative Inquiries in Science, History, and Ethics* (Abingdon, 2010).
 35. For Chinese resistance, see: Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000).
 36. For examples of debates about the education policy, see: Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, pp. 21 and 35.
 37. For a similar division of the history of Manchukuo, see for example: ibid.; Dubois, “Inauthentic Sovereignty”; Suk-Jung Han, “Puppet Sovereignty: The State Effect of Manchukuo, from 1932 to 1936”, 2 vols (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1995); idem, “The Problem of Sovereignty”.
 38. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 1; Dan, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation”, pp. 107–8.

39. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, pp. 75–9.
40. *Velikaia Man’chzhurskaia Imperiia: K desiatilet nemu Iubileiu* [The Great Manchurian Empire: For the Tenth Anniversary] (Harbin, 1942), p. 14.
41. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 76; Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, pp. 62–3; Dan, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation”, p. 114.
42. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 79. On the Chinese roots of the “harmony of the races” also see: Dan, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation”, pp. 109–10.
43. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 102.
44. In this context “will of the people” should not be understood in terms of modern democracy. “Will of the people” did not necessarily mean that the ruler need actually be democratically elected by the people. See also *ibid.*, pp. 118–19.
45. Quoted in Ying Xiong, “Confucianism and the Failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo: A Study of Tachibana Shiraki’s Sinology”, p. 3. Available at http://asaa.asn.au/ASAA2010/reviewed_papers/Xiong-Ying-Michel.pdf (accessed 16 February 2015).
46. On Dairen, see: Christian Hess, “From Colonial Port to Socialist Metropolis: Imperialist Legacies and the Making of ‘New Dalian’”, *Urban History* 38, 3 (December 2011), pp. 373–90; *ibid.*, “Gateway to Manchuria: The Port City of Dalian under Japanese, Russian and Chinese Control, 1898–1950”, *Comparative*, Special Issue: Borders in Imperial Times. Daily Life and Urban Spaces in Northeast Asia 22, 5 (2012), pp. 47–58. In Harbin itself no institutionalized spatial segregation between the different ethnicities existed. On Japanese privileges in Manchukuo, see also: Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 90; Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, pp. 76–7.
47. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, pp. 120–1.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 6. See also: Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Pan-Asianism in the Diary of Morisaki Minato (1924–1945), and the Suicide of Mishima Yukio (1925–1970)”, in *ibid.* (ed.), *Crossed Histories*, pp. 184–206.
49. Tachibana Shiraki had worked for the SMR since 1925 and was associated with the Manchurian Youth League, whose journal he edited. After the Mukden Incident he became one of the main advisers of the Kwantung Army and head of the Concordia Association, which over time developed into a state-sponsored mass organisation in Manchukuo.
50. Quoted in Dan, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation”, p. 117; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, pp. 276, 283–5; for Tachibana Shiraki also see: Xiong, “Confucianism and the Failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo”.
51. Cited after Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 86.
52. Dubois, “Inauthentic Sovereignty”, p. 754.
53. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, pp. 33–4.
54. For the New Education Movement in Japan and the Kwantung Territory, see: *Ibid.*, pp. 29–32; Margaret Mehl, “Lessons from History? Obara Kuniyoshi (1877–1987), New Education and the Role of Japan’s Educational Traditions”, *History of Education* 38, 4 (July 2009), pp. 525–43.

55. Quoted in Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity”, p. 34.
56. Ibid., pp. 37 and 92. On the teaching of Japanese in Manchukuo, also see: ibid., pp. 133–223.
57. Ibid., pp. 85 and 125.
58. Ibid., p. 78.
59. *Gun Bao*, 3 January 1932, no. 1561, p. 9; *Gun Bao*, 4 January 1932, no. 1562, p. 1; *Kharbinskoe Vremya*, 3 January 1932, no. 3, p. 7; *New York Times*, 4 January 1932, p. 3; *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 January 1932, p. 1; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 5 January 1932, p. 8.
60. For the occupation of Harbin, see, for example: British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office confidential Print, Part II, Series E Asia 1914–1939, vol. 41: China, July 1932–April 1933, Doc. 732: Harbin Consular District: Political Report for the Quarter ended March 31, 1932, pp. 409–11.
61. Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, p. 187.
62. British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series E Asia 1914–1939, vol. 41: China, July 1932–April 1933, Doc. 372, Harbin Consular District, Political Report for the Quarter ended March 31, 1933, p. 410; National Archives and Record Administration (in the following NARA), RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7166, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Attitudes of the foreign Communities towards the Manchurian Question, p. 3. John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (London, 1978), p. 63; Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, p. 188.
63. Chiasson, *Administrating the Colonizer*, p. 183; Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, p. 189.
64. See, for example NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7148, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political report for the Harbin Consular District, November 1932, pp. 17 and 19; Box 7166, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Conditions in North Manchuria during the Month of February 1933, pp. 10–11 and 29–30;
65. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, p. 73; on the Concordia Association also see pp. 73–6.
66. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (in the following PAAA), R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 27; Elena Aurilene and Irina Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go: "Emigrantskoe pravitel'stvo"* [Russians in Manchukuo: “Émigré Government”] (Khabarovsk, 2004), p. 38.
67. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 27.
68. Olga Bakich, “Russian Education in Harbin, 1898–1962”, *Transactions of the Association of Russian–American Scholars in the U.S.A.* 26 (1994), pp. 269–94, here p. 271.

69. Ibid., p. 273.
70. For the early period of Russian schools in Harbin, also see: Amir Khisamutdinov, *Sleduiushchaya ostanovka – Kitai: K istorii rossiiskoi emigratsii v Kitae* [The Next Stop – China: A History of the Russian Emigration in China] (Vladivostok, 2003), pp. 78–83; Wolff, *To the Harbin Station*, pp. 40–1.
71. Bakich, “Russian Education”, p. 274.
72. Ibid., p. 275.
73. See, for example: *Gun Bao*, 28 February 1935, no. 2613, p. 5.
74. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 30.
75. For the postponed school reform in 1935, see: *Gun Bao*, 10 March 1935, no. 2620, p. 4; *Gun Bao*, 25 October 1935, no. 2845, p. 5; *Gun Bao*, 15 November 1935, no. 2865, p. 5; *Gun Bao*, 29 November 1935, no. 2880, p. 5.
76. On BREM, see: Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia*, pp. 305–20; Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, pp. 38–77; Amir Khisamutdinov, “K istorii sozdaniia Biuro no delam rossiiskikh emigrantov i sud’ba ego arkhiva” [The History of the Creation of the BREM and the Fate of its Archive], *Rossiane v Azii: Literaturno-istoricheskii ezhegodnik* 3 (1996), pp. 293–309; with reservations: Elena Chernolutskaia (ed.), *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Man'chzhurii: Voenno-politicheskaiia deiatel’nost’ (1920–1945). Sbornik dokumentov* [The Russian Emigration in Manchukuo: Military-Political Activities] (Juzhno-Sachalinsk, 1994), pp. 86–104; *Velikaia Man'chzhurskaia Imperiia*, pp. 293–311.
77. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 39; Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia*, pp. 305–6.
78. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 41.
79. On scares of espionage and undercover agents, see, for example: *Gun Bao*, 30 December 1935, no. 2911, p. 5; *Zaria*, 30 December 1935, no. 355, p. 5; see also for example NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7148, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report for February 1934, p. 12.
80. NARA, RG 165 Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Division “Regional File” 1922–1944, Box 2427, Organization of White Russians, 22 April 1936, p. 1.
81. Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia*, p. 307.
82. Dubois, “Inauthentic Sovereignty”, p. 762.
83. Though slightly outdated, see: Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 64–9. See also Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, pp. 30–7.
84. Igor Konstantinovich Koval’chuk-Koval, *Svidanie s pamiatiu (Vospominanii)* [Rendezvous with Recollections (Memories)] (Moscow, 1996), p. 125; Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia*, p. 306.
85. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 42; Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia*, p. 307.

86. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7149, American Consul Walter Adams to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report for August 1935, p. 11.
87. George C. Guins, *Professor and Government Official: Russia, China, and California. An Interview, conducted by Boris Raymond* (Berkeley, 1966), p. 329, see also Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, p. 125.
88. See: *Zaria*, 15 February 1936, p. 4. Altman says that the Jewish organisation joined the BREM against Russian resistance, but he relies on the memoirs of General Higuchi, which Altman admits are of questionable reliability. Avraham Altman, "Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style", in Roman Malek (ed.), *Jews in China. From Kaifeng ... to Shanghai* (Sankt Augustin, 2000), pp. 279–317, here p. 290. I could not find any primary sources indicating that the Jews ever formally joined the BREM.
89. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 40; the number of 33,500 émigré Russians in Harbin is taken from a census in November 1934. See: *Rupor*, 4 November 1934, no. 301, p. 8.
90. For example, the Legitimists, a monarchist organisation, was dissolved in Manchukuo and the remaining members were incorporated into the so-called Military Union of the Far East. See Sabine Breuillard, "General V. A. Kislitsin: From Russian Monarchism to the Spirit of Bushido", *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 121–42, here pp. 125–7.
91. For the Revisionist Zionists and their youth group Betar in Harbin, see: Yaacov (Yana) Liberman, *My China: Jewish Life in the Orient 1900–1950* (Berkeley 1998); *Betar in China/Betar v Kitae 1929–1949* (Tel Aviv, 1973); Betar's newspaper, "Hagadel" (The Flag) and the newspaper of the "Allgemeine" Zionists "Evreiskaia Zhizn'" (Jewish Life); *Zaria*, 29 June 1939, no. 171, p. 3; Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry (in the following AHI), Interview with Alexander Gurvich and his wife Raya conducted by Irene Ebert 11 January 1977, pp. 7–19.
92. Ibid., p. 16; similarly AHI, Interview with Emanuel Pratt conducted by Irene Eber 8 March 1973, p. 11 and p. 13.
93. But the longtime president of the Union was apparently forced to leave his post since he refused to head the BREM. Amir Khisamutdinov, *Russkie v Kitae* (Vladivostok, 2000), p. 38.
94. For meetings of the Parents Committee, see, for example: *Gun Bao*, 23 February 1935, no. 2608, p. 4; *Gun Bao*, 2 May 1935, no. 2671, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5; *Gun Bao*, 14 December 1935, no. 2895, p. 5.
95. *North China Daily News*, 19 February 1936, p. 5.
96. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 27.
97. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 17 December 1935, no. 323, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 27 May 1937, no. 136, p. 5.

98. Miriam Lynn Kingsberg, "The Poppy and the Acacia: Opium and Imperialism in Japanese Dairen and the Kwantung Leased Territory" (PhD dissertation, Brandeis University, 2003), p. 90.
99. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 30.
100. Wave of arrests and torture occurred periodically, often in the wake of important events like for example the visit of the emperor Pu Yi. See: NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7169, American Consul Adams to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Terrorism in Harbin, 18 December 1935.
101. Hall, "Constructing a 'Manchurian' Identity" p. 47; Dubois, "Inauthentic Sovereignty", pp. 751, 759–61; Han, "Puppet Sovereignty: The State Effect of Manchukuo", p. 153.
102. Hall, "Constructing a 'Manchurian' Identity", p. 94.
103. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7169, American Consul Walter Adams to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report for October 1937, p. 11.
104. Hall, "Constructing a 'Manchurian' Identity", pp. 123–4; see also: Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, pp. 65–7.
105. Isabelle Maynard, *China Dreams: Growing up Jewish in Tientsin* (Iowa City, 1996), p. 102.
106. Hall, "Constructing a 'Manchurian' Identity", pp. 91 and 123.
107. See for example: Jinbao Qian, "Lugouqiao, 1937: Chinese Politics and the Outbreak of War with Japan" (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2004); for the Second Sino-Japanese War see for example: Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary and Ezra F. Vogel (eds), *China at War: Regions of China, 1937–1945* (Stanford, 2007); Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven (eds), *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945* (Stanford, 2011).
108. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7223, American Consul George Merrell to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Manchurian Labor Association, 1 March 1938, pp. 1–3.
109. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, p. 75; Dan, "Ethnicity in Empire and Nation", p. 188.
110. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7223, American Consul George Merrell to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Possible Dissolution of the Japanese Society, 16 February 1938, p. 2.
111. Ibid., 24 June 1938, p. 3.
112. Ibid., p. 3.
113. Ibid., p. 5.
114. Ibid., p. 2.
115. Ibid., p. 3.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., pp. 4–5.

118. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7149, American Consul George Merrell to the American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report from November 1937, pp. 8–9.
119. On the National Council of Far Eastern Jewish Communities, see, for example: Altman, “Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style”; *Rupor*, 29 December 1937, no. 355, p. 2; *Evreiskaia Zhizn'*, 29 December 1937, no. 52, pp. 34–5; Special Issue of *Hagadel*, 1 January 1938, no. 1 (132), pp. 1–4.
120. Altman, “Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style”, pp. 310–11.
121. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 31.
122. On the reform in 1937, see, for example: *Zaria*, 8 July 1937, no. 179, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 15 October 1937, no. 273, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 15 December 1937, no. 334, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 22 December 1937, no. 341, p. 5; PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, pp. 30–1.
123. Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, p. 148; Bakich, “Russian Education”, p. 276; PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 31.
124. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 72; Bakich, “Russian Education”, p. 276; PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, pp. 30–1; *Zaria*, 5 June 1937, no. 147, p. 5.
125. Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ identity”, p. 92.
126. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 72, also see pp. 114–21.
127. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 28.
128. Ibid., p. 31.
129. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7223, Merrel, New School Law and Foreign Schools in Harbin, 7 February 1938, p. 1.
130. Khisamutdinov, *Russkie v Kitae*, p. 40; Breuillard, “General V.A. Kislytsin”, p. 129.
131. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 15.
132. See also: *ibid.*, p. 22.
133. *Velikaia Man'chzhurskaia Imperia*, p. 293. Emphasis by author.
134. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 4.
135. Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, p. 125; George C. Guins, “Russians in Manchuria”, *Russian Review* 2, 2 (1943), pp. 81–7, here p. 85.
136. Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskaya emigratsiya*, p. 316.
137. Breuillard, “General V.A. Kislytsin”, p. 130.
138. For the Asano Brigade, see Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 196–9.
139. Khisamutdinov, “K istorii sozdaniia Biuro no delam rossiiskikh emigrantov i sud'ba ego arkhiva”, p. 304.

140. Breuillard, “General V.A. Kislytsin”, p. 125; Khisamutdinov, “K istorii sozdaniia Biuro no delam rossiiskikh emigrantov i sud’ba ego arkhiva”, pp. 304–5.

Chapter 2 The All-Russian Fascist Party

1. See, for example Helen Yakobson, *Crossing Borders: From Revolutionary Russia to China to America* (New York 1994), pp. 56–7.
2. Blaine Chaisson, *Administering the Colonizer: Manchuria’s Russians under Chinese Rule, 1918–1929* (Vancouver, 2010), pp. 115–17.
3. Olga Bakich, “Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 51–73, p. 58.
4. Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer*, p. 77; Bakich, “Émigré Identity”, pp. 57–8.
5. A.P. Koretskii, “Epopeia russkogo emigranta (bez geroiki)” [Epic of a Russian Émigré (without Heroics)], *Rossiiane v Azii: Literaturno-istoricheskii ezhegodnik* 3 (1996), pp. 111–68, here pp. 133–4; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, in Dan BenCanaan, Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl (eds), *The Transcultural Past of Northeast China* (Heidelberg and New York, 2013), pp. 133–58, pp. 137–8.
6. See Aleksandr Vasil’evich Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia (1920–1945 gg.)* [Fascism and the Russian Emigration (1920–1945)] (Moscow, 2002), pp. 122–4.
7. Mikhail Alekseevich Matkovskii was born in 1903 in St. Petersburg. His father was a general and taught at the academy of Ministry of War. The family arrived in Harbin in 1921, where Matkovskii studied at the Faculty of Law. He was arrested in 1945 and spent 10 years in a soviet labor camp. Matkovskii died in the Soviet Union in 1970.
8. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 122.
9. John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (London, 1978), pp. 48–50.
10. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 125.
11. Erwin Oberländer, “All-Russian-Fascist-Party”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, 1 (1966), pp. 158–73, p. 161.
12. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 125–8; Igor Konstantinovich Koval’chuk-Koval’, *Svidanie s pamiat’iu (Vospominaniia)* [Rendezvous with Recollections (Memories)] (Moscow, 1996), pp. 135–7.
13. Vladimir Dmitrievich Kos’mnin was a member of the White Army in Siberia during the Civil War. He came to Harbin in 1922, where started to work for an American bank. Before he joined the Russian fascists, Kos’mnin was a member of several monarchist and anti-Soviet organisations, like the “Russian Brotherhood of Truth” (Bratstvo russkoi pravdy). Since 1932 he worked for the Kwantung Army to recruit soldiers among the Russian émigré. Kos’mnin died in Sydney in 1950.

14. Rodzaevskii, as a longer time member of the Komsomol, was probably quite familiar with the methods of the communists in Russia.
15. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 56.
16. *New York Times*, 18 April 1932, p. 7.
17. Konstantin Ivanovich Nakamura lived in Harbin long before the Japanese invasion. His name suggests that he converted to Orthodoxy. Nakamura is said to have been a drug dealer and a pimp who is said to have employed extremely young girls. Amleto Vespa, an Italian who worked for different secret agencies in Harbin, also accused Nakamura of being involved in the famous Kaspe murder (see Chapter 5). During the Manchukuo period Nakamura officially worked as an interpreter for the Kempeitai and held several representative posts in different organisations. Amleto Vespa, *Secret Agent of Japan: A Handbook to Japanese Imperialism* (London, 1938), pp. 31–2 and 199–207; Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 70–1.
18. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 134.
19. Vespa, *Secret Agent of Japan*, p. 50.
20. Amleto Vespa, born in Italy but since 1924 a Chinese citizen, was a mercenary and previous to the Japanese invasion had worked for a Chinese warlord. He claims that the Japanese forced him to collaborate by kidnapping his family. Vespa is a source that should be handled with care, since he has a strong tendency to hyperbolise and possibly even to fabricate. For example, he also claims to have fought in the Mexican Revolution and to have married to a Polish countess. For a biography of the so-called James Bond d'Abruzzo see: Ilario Fiore, *La spia di Harbin* [The Light of Harbin] (Turin, 1996).
21. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 68–9.
22. Ibid., p. 71.
23. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 154; Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 73.
24. The Legitimists supported Kirill Vladimirovich Romanov as the legitimate heir after the death of Nikolas II and his family, while the “unpredetermined” wanted to determine a new tsar by popular vote. For the Legitimists in Harbin and Manchuria, see: Sabine Breuillard, “General V.A. Kislitsin: From Russian Monarchism to the Spirit of Bushido”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 121–42; Elena Chernolutskaia (ed.), *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Man’chzhiirii: Voenno-politicheskaiia deiatel’nost’* (1920–1945). *Sbornik dokumentov* [The Russian Emigration in Manchukuo: Military–Political Activities] (Juzhno-Sachalinsk, 1994), pp. 33–40.
25. For the fascist plan for a future Russian state, see pp. 53–9.
26. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov and Vladimir Vladimirovich Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma* [ABC of Fascism] (Harbin, 1935), pp. 49–50.
27. For other fascist or Russian organisations associated with fascism, see: Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 5–63; Stephan, *Russian*

- Fascists*, pp. 16–30. For those in Germany see: Denis Jdanoff, “Russische Faschisten: Der nationalsozialistische Flügel der russischen Emigration im Dritten Reich” [Russian Fascists: The National Socialist Wing of the Russian Emigration in the Third Reich] (Master thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2003); Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 335–77.
28. For a detailed description of Vonsiatskii and his organisation as well as his encounters with the Russian fascists in Manchuria, see: Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, Chapter 7, 8, 14, 15 and 17; Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 266–334.
 29. Ataman Gregorii Mikhailovich Semenov, a former general of the Imperial Russian Army and one of the leaders of the White movement during the Civil War in the Transbaikal, was the leader of the Transbaikal Cossacks in Manchuria. Building on their cooperation during the Civil War and the Siberian intervention, Semenov and the Japanese continued to work together during the Manchukuo period. It was apparently also the Japanese who insisted on the inclusion of Semenov. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 142. Semonov was not particularly keen of Vonsiatskii either as a letter to the editor of the newspaper *Slovo* in Mai 1934 shows, in which Semonov characterised him as noisy and self-praising. The letter is printed in: A.F. Kiseleva (ed.), *Politicheskaiia istoriia russkoi emigratsii, 1920–1940 gg.: Dokumenty i materialy* [Political History of the Russian Emigration 1920–1940: Documents and Materials] (Moscow, 1999), pp. 316–17.
 30. Vonsiatskii also entrusted a Jewish company to design and produce the uniforms for his organisation, and he wanted to place advertisements and propaganda materials in American Jewish newspapers. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 161.
 31. The party changed its name again in 1937 to Russian Fascist Organization. But to avoid confusion I will refer to the party as All-Russian Fascist Party throughout this work.
 32. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 130. According to their own account the All-Russian Fascist Party had branches in most bigger cities throughout Manchukuo and China, as well as in the United States, Germany, Australia, Slovakia, Chile, Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, Spain, France, Belgium, Morocco, Egypt, Japan, Mongolia, Poland, Switzerland and Canada. Ibid., pp. 161–8.
 33. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 91–4.
 34. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 135–8.
 35. *Rapor*, 18 March 1933, no. 74, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 4; *New York Times*, 14 November 1935, p. 11. Also see: Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 187–95, Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 135–9.
 36. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 193–4; Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, p. 141.

37. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 196.
38. Nadezhda Evgen'evna Ablova, "Rossiiskaia fashistskaia partiia v Man'-chzhurii" [The Russian Fascist Party in Manchuria], *Belorusskii zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* 2 (1999), p. 334. Available at: http://evolutio.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=50 (accessed 20 February 2015); Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 326–51; Löwe, "Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria", p. 135.
39. It still remains unclear to what the degree the National Socialists ever took an interest in the Russian fascists in Manchuria. On the one hand, German propaganda specialists knew and apparently even used propaganda material produced by the All-Russian Fascist Party for propaganda campaigns. A selection of leaflets and other materials can be found in the Military Archive in Freiburg. I am indebted to Heinz-Dietrich Löwe and Viktoria Silvanovich for bringing this to my attention. On the other hand, repeated attempts by Rodzaevskii and others to establish closer ties to the National Socialists apparently failed. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 311 and 365.
40. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 187–8.
41. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 200.
42. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 190.
43. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 310.
44. Ibid., p. 320.
45. Rodzaevskii's letter to Stalin is published as: "Pismo K.V. Rodzaevskogo I.V. Stalini" [Letter from Rodzaevskii to Stalin], in Kisileva (ed.), *Politicheskaiia istoriia russkoi emigratsii, 1920–1940 gg.*, pp. 318–28.
46. Ataman Semenov, General Aleksei Proklovich Baksheev, ataman of the Transbaikal Cossacks and head of the BREM between 1937–8, General Lev Filippovich Vlasevskii, a former member of Semenov's army and the last head of the BREM in Harbin, Boris Nikolaevich Shepunov, an employee of the Kempeitai and Ivan Adrianovich Mikhailov, the former Minister of Finance of the Omsk government and advisor of the Japanese Military Intelligence, died together with Rodzaevskii. On the trial and the execution see: Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 199; Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 351–4.
47. The theses are published in Kisileva (ed.), *Politicheskaiia istoriia russkoi emigratsii 1920–1940gg.*, pp. 306–7; see also: Löwe, "Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria", pp. 137–8.
48. On ideology, see: Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, *Chto takoe demokratia* [What is Democracy] (Harbin, 1935); idem, *Chto takoe liberalizm* [What is Liberalism] (Harbin, 1935); Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov, *Fashizm i religiia* [Fascism and Religion] (Harbin, 1936); Mikhail Vasil'evich Kaliamin, *Natsional'noe chzoiaistvo budushchei Rossii* [The National Economy of the Future Russia] (Harbin, 1936); Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii and Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov, *Natsional'nye sovety i soiuzy: Na smienu kommunisticheskim sovetam i profsoiuzam* [National Soviets and Unions instead of Communist Soviets and Unions] (Harbin, 1936); Gennadii Viktorovich

Taradanov and Vladimir Vladimirovich Kibardin, *Lichnost' natsii natsional'noe gosudarstvo v fashistskom ponimanii* [The Character of the Nation in the National State according to a Fascist Understanding] (Harbin, 1936); Mikhail Vasil'evich Kaliamin, *Fashizm i krest'ianstvo* [Fascism and Peasantry] (Harbin, 1937); Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov and Mikhail Vasil'evich Kaliamin, *Fashizm i rabochii klass* [Fascism and the Working Class] (Harbin, 1937); S.P. Shvalov and Viktor Viktorovich Lagunov: *Fashizm i kazachestvo* [Fascism and Cossacks] (Harbin, 1937); Aleksandr A. Vinogradov, *SSSR segodnia i zavtra* [The USSR Today and Tomorrow] (Harbin, 1940).

On the All-Russian Fascist Party and their tactics, see: Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, *Chto delat'? Nasha fashistskaia treblyetka – protiv kommunisticheskikh piatiletok – general'nyi plan VFP* [What Should be Done? Our Fascist Three-Year-Plan – Against the Communist Five-Year-Plan – Master Plan of the All-Russian Fascist Party] (Harbin, 1935); P. Borisov, *Istoriia rossiiskago fashistskago dvizheniya* [The History of the Russian Fascist Movement] (Harbin, 1936); Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, B. Sedov and F. Diukov, *Cherez Natsional'nuiu Revoliutsiu k Natsional'nomu Stroitel'stu (Osnovy taktiki Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii)* [Nation Building through the National Revolution: The Basics Tactics of the All-Russian Fascist Party] (Harbin, 1936); Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii and Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov, *Zadachi rossiiskago fashistskago dvizheniya* [The Task of the Russian Fascist Movement] (Harbin, 1936); Vladimir Petrovich Mazein, *Za i protiv fashistskoi treblyetki (General'nyi plan VFP)* [For and Against the Three-Year-Plan (Master Plan of the All-Russian Fascist Party)] (Harbin, 1936).

49. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, Introduction to the First Edition of *Azbuka fashizma*, in idem, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, p. 3.
50. All references refer to the second edition of 1935.
51. Nikolai Ivanovich Bucharin and Evgenii Alekseevich Preobrazhenskii, *Azbuka kommunizma: Populiarnoe ob'iasnenie programmy rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii bol'shevikov* [ABC of Communism: Popular Explanation of the Program of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks] (Moscow, 1920).
52. Nothing is known about the early life of Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov or his life in Harbin. After the war Taradanov voluntarily returned to the Soviet Union in 1947, where he was imprisoned. He was released in 1949 and started to work for the "Voice of the Motherland" (*Gолос Родины*), a newspaper published by the Soviet Union for Russians living abroad. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 129.
53. Vladimir Vladimirovich Kibardin was one of the editors of *Nash Put'*. He was arrested after the Soviet invasion of Harbin and sentenced to 25 years in jail. His sentence was reduced significantly in 1955, but Kibardin died soon afterwards in a labor camp close to Khabarovsk. Some of his testimonies given in 1954 after his appeal to reduce his sentence are printed in: Kiseleva (ed.), *Politicheskaiia istoriia russkoi emigratsii, 1920–1940 gg*, pp. 60–4.

54. Reportedly 607 people had passed the final exam on the ABCs of Fascism in 1936, at which time the most conservative estimates place the party's membership at 4,000 or more in Harbin and its environs. Chernolutskaia (ed.), *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Man'chzhurii. Voenno-politicheskaiia deiatel'nost'* (1920–1945), p. 47.
55. See for example, Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 10–13, 48–9 and 51–3.
56. The *Stürmer*, edited by Julius Streicher, was very popular and among the most anti-Semitic weekly newspapers in Germany. The *Stürmer* often focused on Jewish sexuality as a threat to the Aryan nation. Streicher and his employees published an abundance of stories about German women and girls being seduced or raped by Jewish men, but also about ritual murders and the Jewish world conspiracy. The famous sentence by Heinrich von Treitschke “*Die Juden sind unser Unglück*” [The Jews are our misfortune] was printed on every front page. The newspaper was heavily promoted by the National Socialists, who installed display cases at public places, called “*Stürmerkästen*” (*Stürmer boxes*), where everyone could read it for free. For the *Stürmer* and Julius Streicher, see: Franco Ruault, *Neuschöpfer des deutschen Volkes. Julius Streicher im Kampf gegen Rassenschande* [New Creator of the German People. Julius Streicher in the Fight against Racial Defilement] (Frankfurt, 2006); Daniel Roos, *Julius Streicher und “Der Stürmer” 1923–1945* [Julius Streicher and “Der Stürmer” 1923–45] (Paderborn, 2014).
57. For articles of the *Stürmer*, see, for example: *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, p. 19; *Nash Put'*, 26 January 1937, no. 21, p. 2.
58. Oberländer, “All-Russian Fascist Party”, pp. 170–1.
59. Ustrialov returned to the Soviet Union in 1935, but, probably due to his past, was unable to find employment. Like so many others, Ustrialov fell victim to the great purges and was shot in 1937 for espionage and anti-Soviet agitation. For his life, particularly his time in Harbin, see: Viacheslav Konstantinovich Romanovski, “Nikolai Ustrialov – Professor at the Harbin Law School”, *Far Eastern Affairs* 35, 2 (April 2007), pp. 118–25. For his ideology and outlook see: idem, “N. V. Ustrialov: Razmyshleniia o tendentsiakh mirovogo razvitiia v XX. veke” [Nikolai Vasil'evich Ustrialov: Reflections on Trends in World Development in the Twentieth Century], *Novaia i Noveishaiia Istoriiia* 3 (May 2006), pp. 185–97; Mikhail Agursky, “Defeat as Victory and the Living Death. The Case of Ustrialov”, *History of European Ideas* 5, 2 (June 1984), pp. 165–80.
60. Nikolai Vasil'evich Ustrialov, *Ital'ianskii fashizm* [Italian Fascism] (Harbin, 1928); idem, *Germanskii natsional-sotsializm* [German National-Socialism] (Harbin, 1933); on the impact of Ustrialov also see: Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, pp. 144–5.
61. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, *Sovremennaia iudizatsiia mira ili evreiskii vopros v XX stolietii* [Modern Judaism of the World or the Jewish Question in the Twentieth Century], second edition (Harbin, 1943), p. 267.

62. See, for example: Nadezhda Evgen'eva Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskoi emigratsii v Kitae: Mezhdunarodnye i politicheskie aspekty istorii (pervaia polovina XX v)* [The History of the KVZhD and the Russian Emigration in China: International and Political Aspects of the History (in the First Half of the Twentieth Century)] (Moscow, 2005), Chapter 4.4; Iurii Mel'nikov, "Russkie fashisty Man'chzhurii (K.V. Rodzaevskii: tragediia lichnosti)" [Russian Fascists in Manchuria (K.V. Rodzaevskii: The Tragedy of an Individual], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 2 (1991), no. 2, pp. 109–21, p. 119; Oberländer, "All-Russian Fascist Party", p. 171; Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 56.
63. Löwe, "Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria", pp. 154–6.
64. For Zubatov and his police socialism, see: Theodore Karasik, "The Early Years of Zubatov's Experiment in police-supported Socialism in late Imperial Russia", *UCLA Historical Journal* 18 (January 1999), pp. 27–46; Jeremiah Schneiderman, *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, 1976).
65. For Stolypin and his reforms, see: Abraham Ascher, *P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia* (Stanford, 2001). For the influence of Zubatov and Stolypin and the Russian fascists' perception of them see also: Löwe, "Russian Fascists in Harbin and Manchuria", pp. 145–6.
66. The term "Black Hundreds" was a collective term for different far right parties and organisations, which emerged after the first Russian Revolution of 1905. It mainly referred to the Union of the Russian People (Soiuz russkogo naroda) and its sub-organisations, but also included smaller parties like the Union of the Russian People of the Archangel Michael (Soiuz russkogo naroda Mikhaila Arkhangela) or the Union of Russian Men (Soiuz russkikh liudei). But the label was, especially in the media, also often used for crowds of people who were involved in pogroms and other forms of collective violence and terrorism in and after the Revolution of 1905. For the Union of the Russian People and other far right parties dubbed as Black Hundreds, see: John Joseph Brock, *The Theory and Practice of the Union of the Russian People, 1905–1907: A Case Study of "Black-Hundred" Politics* (Ann Arbor, 1977); Vadim V. Kozhinov, *Chernosotentsy* [Black Hundreds] (Moscow, 2004); Igor' Vladimirovich Omel'iananchuk, *Chernosotennoe dvizhenie v rossiiskoi imperii, 1901–1914* [The Movement of the Black Hundreds in the Russian Empire] (Kiev 2007); Hans Rogger, "Was there a Russian Fascism? The Union of Russian People", in idem (ed.), *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 212–32; Sergei A. Stepanov, *Chernaia sotnia* [Black Hundreds] (Moscow, 2005).
67. Mel'nikov, "Russkie fashisty", p. 109; F.T. Goriachkin, *Pervyi russkii fashist Petr Arkadevich Stolypin* [The First Russian Fascist Petr Arkadevich Stolypin] (Harbin, 1928).
68. How much Russians in Harbin actually knew about the situation and the circumstances within the Soviet Union is still a matter of debate, especially in the connection with the so-called "remigration" in 1935/6, when many Russians

accepted the invitation of the communist regime to return to the fatherland. But many émigrés probably heard rumors or even received censored and encoded letters from relatives who lived in the Soviet Union. See also: Vinogradov, *SSSR Segodnia i zavtra*. According to the consular reports of the American Consul in Harbin Russian émigré in Harbin were often quite well informed, for instance through local and international newspapers or refugees coming from the Soviet Union. See for example: National Archives and Record Administration (in the following NARA), RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7148, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Conditions in North Manchuria during the Month of July 1933, pp. 28–9.

69. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, p. 52 and pp. 60–1.
70. Ibid., p. 52.
71. Ibid., pp. 60–1 and pp. 77–8.
72. Ibid., pp. 76–8.
73. Ibid., pp. 80–2; see also: Kaliamin, *Natsional'noe choziaistvo*; Löwe, “Russian Fascists in Harbin and Manchuria”, p. 150.
74. For the influence of Stolypin also see: Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 58–60.
75. Goriachkin, *Pervyi russkii fashist*, p. 5.
76. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 85–6. For the situation of Russian workers under Stalin, see: Jeffrey J. Rossman, *Worker Resistance under Stalin: Class and Revolution on the Shop Floor* (Harvard, 2005).
77. On the collectivisation and its outcomes, see: Andrea Graziosi, *Stalinism, Collectivization and the Great Famine* (Cambridge, 2009); Lynne Viola (ed.), *The War against the Peasantry: 1927–1930* (New Haven, 2005); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (New York, 1996).
78. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, p. 86.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p. 87, see also: Kaliamin, *Fashizm i krest'ianstvo*.
82. *Azbuka fashizma* states about the conditions of workers in the Soviet Union somewhat exaggerated: “The worker in the USSR is a beggar and a slave. He officially receives high wages, but in practice his wages hardly give him the chance to lead the most beggarly existence. The Russian worker is undressed, barefoot and starves. The Russian workers received slavery instead of possession of factories and are slaves of the factories. In the USSR there is now actually such a saturation that the worker is attached to the facility where he works, without having the right to leave it. The 7-hour working day of the Russian worker has turned into the 10 and even the 11-hour (working day), thanks to many competitors and shock-brigades (*udarnichestvo*).” Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, p. 83; see also: Kaliamin, *Fashizm i rabochii klass*.
83. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 84–5.

84. Ibid., p. 84; see also Löwe, “Russian Fascists in Harbin and Manchuria”, p. 151.
85. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, p. 14.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., p. 63.
88. Ibid., pp. 55–6, 58 and 64–9. For details of the economic policy see: ibid., pp. 76–83; see also: Rodzaevskii and Taradanov, *Natsional'nye sovety i soiuzy*; and Kaliamin, *Natsional'noe choziaistvo*.
89. The historically documented “*Sobory*” merely served to inform the ruler without any decision making authority and usually did not include the people as a whole, but only nobles and magistrates. For the Russian fascists and the *Zemskii Sobor* see: Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 57; Oberländer, “The All-Russian Fascist Party”, p. 171.
90. Georgii Konstantinovich Guins (or Gins), born in 1887, worked as a public servant for the Tsarist administration and was a member of the Cadets. After the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917, he joined the Kolchak government in Siberia. Guins came to Harbin in 1920 and started to teach at the Faculty of Law. In 1941 he managed to emigrate to the United States via Japan. He later worked as a professor in California, where he died in 1972. For his life see: George C. Guins, *Professor and Government Official: Russia, China, and California: An Interview, conducted by Boris Raymond* (Berkeley, 1966).
91. Ibid. His dissertation *Vodnoe pravo i predmety obshchego pol'zovaniia* was published in two volumes in Harbin. See also his earlier works on water supply: Georgii Konstantinovich Guins, *Deistvuiushchee vodnoe pravo Turkestana i budushchii vodnyi zakon* [The Contemporary Water Law in Turkestan and the Future Water Law] (St. Petersburg, 1910); idem, *Osnovnyia nachala proekta vodnago zakona dlja Turkestana* [The Basic Beginnings of the Project of the Water Law for Turkestan] (St. Petersburg, 1912); and *Na putiach k gosudarstvu budushchego: Ot liberalizma k solidarizmu* [On the Path to the State of the Future: From Liberalism to Solidarism] (Harbin, 1930). On the influence of Guins also see: Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, pp. 144–5.
92. Guins knew Rodzaevskii as his student, but apparently did not like him very much, because of his “self-confidence” and his “repulsive traits of character”. Guins, *Professor and Government Official*, p. 330.
93. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation – in the following GARF] f. 10073, opis’ 3, delo 55, l. 782: *Krasnoarmeitsy!* [Members of the Red Army!].
94. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 51–2.
95. Ibid., pp. 12 and 17.
96. Mel’nikov, “Russkie fashisty”, p. 109.
97. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 57; Oberländer, “The All-Russian Fascist Party”, p. 171; Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, pp. 145–6.
98. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 14 and 17.
99. Ibid., pp. 13–14.

100. Löwe, “Russian Fascists in Harbin and Manchuria”, pp. 149–50; see also Konstantin Rodzaevskii, *Russkii put'* [The Russian Way] (Harbin, 1939), p. 82. I will return to the cultural and educational work of the Russian fascists in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
101. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fasbizma*, p. 57.
102. Ibid., p. 56.
103. Ibid., p. 58.
104. *Natsiia*, 1 February 1939, no. 2 (26), 1939, p. 2; see also: *Nash Put'*, 25 May 1937, no. 134, p. 2. This article refers briefly to a conflict between Russian and Ukrainian members of the All-Russian Fascist Party.
105. See Oberländer, “All-Russian Fascist Party”, p. 72; Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 56.
106. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fasbizma*, pp. 73–4.
107. Ibid., p. 71.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., pp. 70–1.
110. *Natsiia*, 1932, no. 1, p. 1; *Natsiia*, 1934, no. 5, p. 7.
111. For an overview see: Roger Griffin, Werner Loh and Andreas Umland (eds), *Fascism Past and Present, West and East: An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right* (Stuttgart, 2006); Sven Reichhardt, “Neue Wege der vergleichenden Faschismusforschung” [New Perspectives in Comparative Fascist Studies], *Mittelweg* 36 (2007), pp. 9–25; António Costa Pinto (ed.), *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2011); Kevin Passmore, *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2014); Thomas Schlemmer (ed.), *Der Faschismus in Europa: Wege der Forschung* [Fascism in Europe: Research Perspectives] (München, 2014).
112. Passmore, *Fascism* (Oxford, 2014), p. 6.
113. See for example Robert Paxton’s five stages of fascism. Robert Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism”, *The Journal of Modern History* 70 (1998), pp. 1–23.
114. Stanley Payne, *A History of Fascism 1914–1945* (Madison, 1995), pp. 462–70; Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945* (London, 2003), pp. 13–14; Emilio Gentile: “Der Faschismus: Eine Definition zur Orientierung”, *Mittelweg* 36, 2007, pp. 81–99.
115. The existence of fascism outside of Europe is still highly controversial and rejected by many researchers on the grounds that the necessary preconditions for the rise of fascism existed only in interwar Europe. These assumptions have in turn been criticised by others, arguing, for instance, that World War I as a global event also affected countries outside of Europe. For an extensive study on fascism outside of Europe see: Larsen Stein Ugelvik (ed.), *Fascism Outside of Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism* (New York, 2001).
116. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London, 1993), p. 26; see also idem, *Fascism Past and Present*, p. 41.
117. Gentile, “Der Faschismus”, p. 85.

118. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 22–32 and pp. 69–70.
119. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–1.
120. Dylan Riley, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain and Romania, 1870–1945* (Baltimore, 2010).
121. Robert Eatwell, *Fascism: A History* (New York, 1995), p. 11.
122. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, pp. 31–2 and pp. 73–4; Löwe, “Russian Fascism”, p. 145.
123. Passmore, *Fascism*, p. 17.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
125. “Fascism” or, more aptly, “fascist” was not always a label used by opponents. Although the National-Socialists and even Italian fascists rarely referred to themselves as “fascist”, some “minor” groups labeled themselves with exactly that term, like the British Union of Fascists, the Imperial Fascist League, the All-Russian Fascist Party or the National Fascist Community in Czechoslovakia, or at least in their writings and by association. The International Fascist Congress, which was initiated by the CAUR and held in December 1934 in Montreux, attracted representatives from dozens of organisations across Europe. This indicates that the reflexive identification with the term “fascist” was quite common.
126. For a similar argument, see: Samuel Huston Goodfellow, “Fascism as a Transnational Movement: The Case of Inter-War Alsace”, *Contemporary European History* 22, 1 (February 2013), pp. 87–106.
127. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 24 September 1932, no. 262, p. 4.
128. Rodzaevskii, *Russkii put'*, p. 9.
129. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 28 September 1932, no. 266, p. 4.
130. Rodzaevskii, Taradanov and Kibardin, *Azbuka fashizma*, p. 9.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
132. See for instance Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists, the Rexist Movement in Belgium or the Dutch Nationaal Socialistische Beweging. Arnd Bauerländer, *Der Faschismus in Europa 1918–1945* [Fascism in Europe 1918–1945] (Stuttgart, 2006); Kevin Passmore, *Fascism – A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2014).

Chapter 3 “Dark” Civil Society

1. *Ustav soiuza fashistskoi molodezhi* [Statute of the Fascist Youth] (Harbin, 1936), p. 1.
2. Aleksandr Vasil’evich Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia (1920–1945 gg.)* [Fascism and the Russian Emigration (1920–1945)] (Moscow, 2002), pp. 128–9; *Nash Put'*, 2 February 1937, no. 28, p. 2; *Instruktsiia No. 24 Kandidatov Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii. Utverzhdennaia verkhovnym sovetom Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii* [Instructions No. 24 for Candidates of the All-Russian Fascist Party. Approved by the Supreme Council of the All-Russian Fascist Party] (Harbin, 1936), pp. 3–4.

3. On the question of political parties as part of civil society, see for instance: Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “Rethinking Civil Society”, *Democratization* 10, 3 (2003), pp. 1–14; Michael Foley and Bob Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, *Journal of Democracy* 7, 3 (1996), pp. 38–52.
4. See: Richard Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, *Party Politics* 1, 1 (1995), pp. 5–28.
5. John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (London, 1978), p. 71 and p. 139; Svetlana Viktorivna Onegina, “Rossiiskii fashistskii soiuz v Man’chzhurii i ego zapubezhnye sviazi” [Russian Fascist Union in Manchuria, and its Foreign Connections], *Voprosy istorii* 6 (1997), pp. 150–60, here p. 151.
6. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (in the following PAAA), R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Entstehung, Organisation und allgemeine Aufgaben des “Allrussischen Faschistischen Verbandes”, p. 6.
7. Chapter 3, paragraph 10 sub item f, in: *Ustav soiuza fashistskoi molodezhi*, p. 3.
8. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Entstehung, Organisation und allgemeine Aufgaben des “Allrussischen Faschistischen Verbandes”, p. 5; *Ustav soiuza fashistskoi molodezhi*, p. 5.
9. The “Day of Hunger” refers to an initiative of the Russian Women’s Fascist Movement. The idea was to abstain from lunch for one day and instead donate the money to the party. PAAA, R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Entstehung, Organisation und allgemeine Aufgaben des “Allrussischen Faschistischen Verbandes”, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 30 November 1935, no. 307, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 30 December 1935, no. 335, p. 4.
10. PAAA, R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Entstehung, Organisation und allgemeine Aufgaben des “Allrussischen Faschistischen Verbandes”, p. 6.
11. Vladimir Petrovich Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniiia: Otchet o znamenitykh disputakh o masonstve v iiule. 1933 g. v Kharbine* [Basic Principles of the Jewish and Freemasons Dominance. Report on the Famous Dispute on Freemasonry in 1933] (Harbin, 1936), p. 78.
12. For example, Vladimir Nikolaevich Vasilenko, who was the treasurer of the Russian Fascist Party from 1933 until 1938 and one of the publishers of *Nash Put'* at the time. He owned a shop that sold equipment for restaurants and bars. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 121.
13. See also Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 177.
14. For the financial independence of civil society organisations see also: Kopecký and Mudde, “Rethinking Civil Society”, pp. 6–8.
15. For the relation between civil society and violence see: Sven Reichardt, “Zivilgesellschaft und Gewalt. Einige konzeptionelle Überlegungen aus historischer Sicht” [Civil Society and Violence. Some Conceptionell Considerations form a Historical Perspective], in Jürgen Kocka, Paul Nolte, Shalini Randeria and Sven Reichardt, *Neues über Zivilgesellschaft. Aus historisch-*

- sozialwissenschaftlichem Blickwinkel* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 45–80; Dieter Gosewinkel and Sven Reichardt (eds), *Ambivalenzen der Zivilgesellschaft. Gegenbegriffe, Gewalt und Macht* [Ambivalence of Civil Society. The Antonyms Violence and Power], Discussion Papers/Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Zivilgesellschaft, Konflikte und Demokratie, Arbeitsgruppe Zivilgesellschaft: Historisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoir-110312>; Sven Reichardt, “Gewalt und Zivilität im Wandel: Konzeptionellen Überlegungen aus historischer Sicht” [Civility and Violence: Conceptional Considerations from a Historical Perspective] in Dieter Gosewinkel, Dieter Rucht, Wolfgang van den Daele and Jürgen Kocka (eds), *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational* (Berlin, 2003), pp. 61–81; Arnd Bauerkämper, Dieter Gosewinkel and Sven Reichardt, “Paradox oder Perversion? Zum historischen Verhältnis von Zivilgesellschaft und Gewalt” [Paradox or Perversion? The Historical Relationship between Civil Society and Violence], *Mittelweg* 36 15, 1 (2006), pp. 22–32.
16. Keane cited after Reichardt, “Zivilgesellschaft und Gewalt”, p. 49.
 17. There are some groups in which the use of violence is a common occurrence and even constitutive for the group, reinforcing the group’s cohesion. Good examples of such organisations would be boxing clubs or ice hockey teams, but also some German fraternities that still practice fencing. The difference is that in such groups the violence is restricted by rules emanating either from the group itself or from a higher body, like the National Hockey League.
 18. For more on the Kaspe kidnapping, see Chapter 5.
 19. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 10 January 1933, no. 8, p. 4; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 10 January 1933, no. 8, p. 4; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 10 January 1933, no. 8, p. 4.
 20. For the Musketeers, see Chapter 4.
 21. Elena Aurilene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae* (1920–1950) [The Russian Diaspora in China (1920–50)] (Khabarovsk, 2008), p. 28; “O Soiuze mushketerov” [On the Union of Musketeers], in Chernolutskaia (ed.), *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Man’chzhurii: Voenno-politicheskaiia deiatel’nost’* (1920–1945). *Sbornik dokumentov* [The Russian Emigration in Manchukuo: Military–Political Activities] (Juzhno–Sachalinsk, 1994), pp. 17–27, here p. 17; Georgii Vasil’evich Melikhov, *Rossiiskaia Emigratsiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh na Dal’nem Vostoke* 1925–1932 [The Russian Emigration in the International Relations in the Far East] (Moscow, 2007), p. 250.
 22. Iustina Vladimirovna Kruzenshtern–Peterets, *Vospominaniia Iustina Vladimirovna Kruzenshtern–Peterets* [Memories of Iustina Vladimirovna Kruzenshtern–Peterets], in *Rossiane v Azii: Literaturno–istoricheskii ezhegodnik* 4 (1997), pp. 124–209; 5 (1998), pp. 25–83; 6 (1999), pp. 29–104 and 7 (2000), pp. 91–149, here (1998), p. 35.
 23. On violence against members and sympathisers of the Russian fascists, see: *Nash Put’*, 26 December 1933, no. 86, p. 5; *Nash Put’*, 19 August 1937, no. 218, p. 5. On violence between fascist and Soviet youth, see, for example: *Nash*

- Put'*, 18 October 1933, no. 16, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 30 December 1933, no. 86, p. 5.
24. *Nash Put'*, 25 October 1933, no. 23, p. 5.
25. *Nash Put'*, 21 November 1933, no. 55, p. 6.
26. *Zaria*, 8 February 1933, no. 34, p. 5.
27. On violence between fascist and Jewish youth, see: *Nash Put'*, 5 January 1937, no. 4, p. 3; Yaacov (Yana) Liberman, *My China: Jewish Life in the Orient 1900–1950* (Berkeley, 1998), p. 60; Alexander Menquez (pseudo.), “Growing up in Manchuria in the 1930s: Personal Vignettes”, in Jonathan Goldstein (ed.), *Jews of China*, vol. 2: A Source Book and Research Guide (New York and London, 1999), pp. 70–84, p. 75.
28. Interview with Charles Clurman conducted by Irene Clurman, 29 October 1982, transcripts on http://www.shtetlinks.jewishgen.org/harbin/Charles_%28Ruvim%29_Isaac_Clurman.htm (accessed 16 February 2015).
29. Ibid.
30. Menquez, “Growing up Jewish in Manchuria”, p. 75.
31. Ibid.
32. Liberman, *My China*, p. 60.
33. For street violence during the Weimar Republic, see, for example: Dirk Schumann, *Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik 1918–1933: Kampf um die Straße und Furcht vor dem Bürgerkrieg* [Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918–33: The Contest for the Streets and the Fear of a Civil War] (Essen, 2001); Sven Reichardt, *Faschistische Kampfbünde. Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadristismus und in der deutschen SA* [Fascist Militias: Violence and Community in Italian Squadism and the German SA] (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 2002); idem, “Violence and Community: A Micro-Study on Nazi Strom Troopers”, *Central European History* 46 (2013), pp. 275–97.
34. Hellmut Stern, *Saitensprünge* (Berlin, 1997), p. 50.
35. *Ves' Kharbin' na 1923 god': Adresnaia i spravochnaia kniga* [Entire Harbin in 1923: Address and Reference Book] (Harbin, 1923), pp. 121–3; *Ves' Kharbin' na 1926 god': Adresnaia i spravochnaia kniga*, [Entire Harbin in 1926: Address and Reference Book] (Harbin, 1926), pp. 124–36.
36. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 147.
37. On the administrative structure and its development, see, for example: Nadezhda Evgen'eva Ablova, *KVZhD i rossiiskoi emigratsii v Kitae: Mezhdunarodnye i politicheskie aspekty istorii (pervaya polovina XX v)* [The History of the KVZhD and the Russian Emigration in China: International and Political Aspects of the History (in the First Half of the Twentieth Century)] (Moscow, 2005), pp. 57–80; and with a more critical evaluation Blaine Chiasson, *Administering the Colonizer: Manchuria's Russians under Chinese Rule, 1918–1929* (Vancouver, 2010), pp. 25–37.
38. Before 1932 the adjoining Chinese settlement of Fujiadian did not belong to Harbin proper and was administratively separated from Harbin.

- Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl, “Ethnic Ghettos and Transcultural Processes in a Globalized City: New Research on Harbin”, *Itinerario* 35, 3 (2011), pp. 17–22, here p. 18.
39. For the Association for the Help for Invalids see: *Ustav dal'nevostochnogo obshchestva pomoshchi russkim invalidam* [Statute of the Far Eastern Association for the Help for Invalids Harbin] (Harbin, 1919); Vasilii Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, 1919–1944: *Iubileynyi sbornik Kharbinskogo obshchestva pomoshchi russkim invalidam* [Anniversary Collection of the Harbin Association for the Help for Invalids] (Harbin, 1944); for the Harbin's Harbin Relief Committee of Russian Emigrants in North Manchuria see: *Ustav Kharbinskogo komiteta pomoshchi russkim bezhentsam* [Statutes of the Harbin Relief Committee of Russian Emigrants] (Harbin, 1925); *Otchet o deiatel'nosti Kharbinskogo komiteta pomoshchi russkim bezhentsam s 1923–1938 god* [Report on the Activities of the Harbin Relief Committee of Russian Emigrants 1923–1938] (Harbin, 1938); N.I. Dubinina and Iurii N. Tsipkin, “Ob osobennostyakh dal'nevostochnoi vetyi rossiiskoi emigratsii: Na materialakh Kharbinskogo pomoshchi russkim bezhentsam” [On the Singularities of the Branch of the Russian Emigration in the Far East: From the Materials of the Harbin Society for the Help of Refugees] *Otechestvennaya Istoriiia* 1 (1996), pp. 70–84.
 40. The Chinese Eastern Railway Company still had a veto in all decisions made by the municipal government.
 41. On the Jewish community and its organisations, see, for example: Boris Bresler, “Harbin's Jewish Community, 1898–1958: Politics, Prosperity, and Adversity”, in Goldstein (ed.), *The Jews of China*, vol. 1: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, pp. 200–15; Zvia Bowman, “The Construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Origin of the Harbin Jewish Community, 1898–1931”, in Goldstein (ed.), *The Jews of China*, vol. 1, pp. 187–99; David Wolff, “Evrei Man'chzhurii: Kharbin, 1903–1914 gg.” [The Jews of Manchuria: Harbin, 1903–1914], *Ab Imperio*, 4 (2003), pp. 239–70; Victoria Romanova, “Rossiiskie evrei v Kharbine” [Russian Jews in Harbin], *Diaspora* 1 (1999), pp. 115–42; *Velikaia Man'chzhurskaia Imperiia: K desiatiletiiu Iubileiu* [The Great Manchurian Empire: For the Tenth Anniversary] (Harbin, 1942), pp. 314–16.
 42. For organisations and activities of the different ethnic groups in Harbin see: Ibid., pp. 312–20; see also: Elena Chernolutskaia, “Religious Communities in Harbin and Ethnic Identity of Russian Émigrés”, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 99, 1 (2000), pp. 79–96.
 43. *Ves' Charbin na 1926 god'*, p. 134.
 44. For the YMCA in Harbin, see Chapter 4.
 45. Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry (in the following AHI), Interview with Alexander Gurvich and his wife Raya conducted by Irene Eber, 11 January 1977, p. 16.

46. AHI, Interview with Evsey Domar conducted by Irene Eber, 24 April 1986, p. 17.
47. Ibid., p. 53.
48. *Instruktsia iunoi fasbistke* [Instructions for Young Fascists (Girls)] (Harbin, 1937), p. 6.
49. Evlamija Georgievna Okhotina, born in 1912, came to Manchuria during the Civil War in 1918. The family first lived in Khailar and moved to Harbin in 1928. Okhotina joined the Russian fascists in 1933. In 1945 she was arrested and sentenced to 10 years of hard labor. She survived the camps and died in 1981. *Nash Put'* suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 24; Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 172.
50. Ibid., pp. 171–2; for the Russian Women's Fascist Movement, see: S. Lazareva, "Soiuz russkikh zhenschin so svastikoi" [The Union of Russian Women under the Swastika], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 3 (1994), pp. 151–4; *Nash Put'* suppl., 24 May 1935, pp. 23–4 and the newspaper of the Russian Women's Fascist Movement "*Nashe Probuzhden'e*" (Our Awakening).
51. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 171.
52. On the spread of the Russian Fascist Party, see: ibid., pp. 159–68; Onegin, "Rossiiskii fashistskii soiuz v Man'chzhurii", pp. 150–60.
53. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 52; *Nash Put'*, 8 September 1935, no. 223, p. 8. For fascist youth organisations in Italy, see: Tracy Koon, *Believe, Obey, Fight: Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922–1943* (Chapel Hill, 1985); Ute Schleimer, *Die Opera Nazionale Balilla bzw. Gioventù Italiana del Littorio und die Hitlerjugend. Eine vergleichende Darstellung* [The Opera Nazionale Balilla or Gioventù Italiana del Littorio and the Hitler Youth: A Comparative Analyses] (Münster, 2004).
54. *Nash Put'*, 10 January 1937, no. 6, p. 2; Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 174.
55. The Union of Young Fascists, for example, had branches in Pristan', New Town, Gondatevka and Modiagou. *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 3; see also: Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 159–61.
56. PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, pp. 29 and 33.
57. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, pp. 25–6.
58. Zoia Grigor'evna Bulycheva was born in Tashkent in 1911. With her parents she fled to Harbin in 1920, where she graduated in 1933 from the pedagogical institute. One year later Zoia Grigor'evna Bulycheva joined the Russian Fascist Party. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 33.
59. *Nash Put'*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5.
60. Pavel Ivanovich Prokof'ev was born 1907 in Kazan and moved with his parents to Zabaikal in 1911. Already a cadet, he lost contact to his parents during the Civil War in 1918 and never saw them again. In 1922 his cadet corps was cut off from the rest of the White Army. The loss of his parents at the

- age of 11 and the Civil War were certainly traumatic experiences. Somehow Prokof'ev managed to escape to Japan and then moved to Harbin in 1923. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 33.
61. *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 3.
 62. *Ustav soiuza fashistskoi molodezhi*, p. 1.
 63. According to Okorokov, many professors from Harbin and Shanghai taught there. For example, the Dean of the Faculty of Law offered a course entitled "By the means of studying the Soviet Union – to the knowledge of the enemy, by the means of this knowledge – to victory. All the forces of national revolution!". For more on the academy, see: Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 182–5.
 64. For an overview of the curriculum, see: *ibid.*, pp. 176–9.
 65. Paragraph 4, paragraph 10 and paragraph 12 in: *Ustav soiuza fashistskoi molodezhi*, pp. 2–3.
 66. *Nash Put'*, 7 June 1936, no. 142, p. 15.
 67. Cited after Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 169.
 68. For the statute of the student group, see: *Nash Put'*, 23 February 1937, no. 44, p. 2.
 69. For the organisational structures of the All-Russian-Fascist Party, see: PAAA, R 9208/ 2410, Peking II, Wussow, Entstehung, Organisation und allgemeine Aufgaben des "Allrussischen Faschistischen Verbandes", pp. 2–3.
 70. *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 2.
 71. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1935, no. 314, p. 9.
 72. *Ibid.*
 73. *Ibid.*
 74. *Ibid.*
 75. *Ibid.*
 76. *Nash Put'*, 5 August 1937, no. 204, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1935, no. 314, p. 9.
 77. *Nash Put'*, 25 July 1937, no. 194, p. 2.
 78. *Nash Put'*, 10 January 1937, no. 6, p. 2.
 79. *Nash Put'*, 15 December 1935, no. 321, p. 8.
 80. *Ibid.* (Emphasis from the original).
 81. *Nash Put'*, 25 July 1935, no. 194, p. 2.
 82. *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 3; *Nash Put'*, 15 December 1935, no. 321, p. 8.
 83. *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 3.
 84. *Nash Put'*, 8 September 1935, no. 223, p. 8.
 85. *Ibid.*
 86. *Ibid.* The classes in the quote refer to the system of ranks in cadet schools.
 87. *Ibid.*
 88. Victoria De Grazia, *How Fascism ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley, 1993).
 89. *Nash Put'*, 8 July 1937, no. 177, p. 7. See also: Pats-Pomarnatskaia, "Zadachi mestnykh organiztsii RFS" [Tasks of the Local Organization RFS], *Avangardistka* (Harbin, 1938), p. 2.

90. *Nash Put'*, 25 July 1937, no. 194, p. 2.
91. *Ustav soiuza iunykh fashistov "Avangard"* [Statute of Union of Young Fascist "Vanguard"] (Harbin, 1935), p. 3.
92. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 25.
93. *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 5. See also: *Nash Put'*, 6 September 1935, no. 225, p. 3.
94. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 25.
95. *Nash Put'*, 10 May 1937, no. 119, p. 5.
96. For a more detailed description of the play, see: *Nash Put'*, 18 December 1937, no. 324, p. 9.
97. For a more detailed description of the play, see: *Nash Put'*, 25 May 1937, no. 134, p. 2.
98. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 25; *Nash Put'*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5.
99. *Nash Put'*, suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 25.
100. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation – in the following GARF], f. 9145, 1. 287, ll. 9–17: *Azbuka iunykh fashistok avangardistok* [ABC of the Young Fascists Vanguards (Girls)] (Shanghai, 1935), p. 4.
101. Ibid., p. 6.
102. *Nash Put'*, 15 December 1935, no. 321, p. 8; *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, pp. 2–3.
103. *Ustav soiuza iunykh fashistov "Avangard"*, p. 9; *Azbuka iunykh fashistok avangardistok*, p. 4.
104. *Nash Put'*, 2 November 1935, p. 4; *Azbuka iunykh fashistok avangardistok*, pp. 2–3.
105. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
106. PAAA, R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Weisrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 33.
107. See, *ibid.*, p. 3.
108. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 175.
109. *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 6. For women in the All-Russian Fascist Party, see: *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 9.
110. Rodzaevskii is said to have tried to establish a cult around himself, taking Hitler and Mussolini as an example. This interpretation, however, is flawed. Especially within the party Rodzaevskii never managed to gain an unchallenged position like Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin, but had to make compromises and share power in particular with people like Matkovskii.
111. *Nash Put'*, 14 September 1935, no. 233, p. 3.
112. *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 7. On the crusade of the Russian Fascist against the foxtrot, see: *Nash Put'*, 1 November 1933, no. 29, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 15 November 1933, no. 44 p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 22 November 1933, no. 51, p. 4.
113. *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 8.
114. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

115. Ibid., p. 5.
116. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 175.
117. *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 9.
118. Ibid., p. 9.
119. *Instruktsiia No. 28: Fashistke* [Instructions No. 28: Fascists (Women)] (Harbin, 1936), pp. 3–4.
120. *Nash Put'*, 27 May 1937, no. 136, p. 7.
121. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 175.
122. See: *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, p. 9; *Ustav soiuza iunykh fashistov "Avangard"*, p. 5; Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 175.
123. *Nash Put'*, 2 November 1935, no. 279, p. 4; *Azbuka iunykh fashistok avangardistok*, p. 1.
124. See, for example: *Rupor*, 8 November 1934, no. 305, p. 5; *Rupor*, 13 February 1937, no. 40, p. 3; *Rupor*, 1 April 1937, no. 87, p. 5.
125. Little has been written about drug abuse in Manchukuo. For the problem of drug abuse in Harbin, see: Elena Aurilene and Irina Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go: "Emigrantskoe pravitel'stvo"* [Russians in Manchukuo. Émigré Government] (Khabarovsk, 2004), p. 62; Amleto Vespa, *Secret Agent of Japan. A Handbook to Japanese Imperialism* (London, 1938), pp. 96–103. For drug abuse under Japanese rule, see: John Jennings, "The Forgotten Plague: Opium and Narcotics in Korea under Japanese Rule, 1910–1945", *Modem Asian Studies* 29, 4 (1995), pp. 795–815; Miriam Lynn Kingsberg, "The Poppy and the Acacia: Opium and Imperialism in Japanese Dairen and the Kwantung Leased Territory"; Norman Smith, *Intoxicating Manchuria: Alcohol, Opium and Culture in China's Northeast* (Vancouver, 2012); see also, for example: National Archives and Record Administration (in the following NARA), RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7210, Walter A. Adams, Open Sales of Narcotics in Harbin, Harbin, 28 September 1934; Walter A. Adams, *The Narcotic Situation in North Manchuria*, Harbin, 21 October 1935.
126. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 26 April 1936, p. 9.
127. *Novosti Vostok*, 24 May 1934, no. 140, p. 5; *Rupor*, 3 November 1937, no. 299, p. 4.
128. *Rupor*, 14 November 1937, no. 310, p. 7.
129. *North China Daily News*, 30 June 1936, p. 5. For reports on dead addicts in the Russian newspapers, see, for example: *Novosti Vostok*, 20 June 1934, no. 167, p. 5; *Rupor*, 8 November 1934, no. 305, p. 5; *Rupor*, September 1937, no. 241, p. 4; *Zaria*, 11 July 1939, no. 183, p. 4.
130. For attempts to fight drug use, see, for example: *Gun Bao*, 28 December 1935, no. 2909, p. 5; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 9 November 1936, no. 303, p. 7; *Rupor*, 17 August 1937, no. 222, p. 4; *Zaria*, 27 May 1937, no. 138, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 6 August 1937, no. 205, p. 4.
131. Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 77; Helen Yakobson, *Crossing Borders: From Revolutionary Russia to China to America* (New York, 1994), p. 69.

132. *Nash Put'*, 22 August 1937, no. 220, p. 5. For similar campaigns to close opium dens and other drug suppliers by the Russian fascists, see: *Nash Put'*, 17 December 1935, no. 323, p. 4.
133. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 26 April 1936, p. 9.
134. *Nash Put'*, 9 July 1937, no. 178, p. 5.
135. *Nash Put'*, 8 September 1935, no. 223, p. 8.
136. *Nash Put'*, 25 October 1933, no. 23, p. 5. See also: *Nash Put'*, 14 September 1935, no. 233, p. 3.
137. On the summer camps of the Russian Fascists, see, for example: *Nash Put'*, 12 July 1937, no. 181, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 5 August 1937, no. 204, p. 7.
138. For Boy Scout organisations in Harbin and their relations to the Russian fascists see Chapter 4.
139. See, for example: *New York Times*, 6 January 1935, p. 8; *Nash Put'*, 1 December 1935, no. 308, p. 7; Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, Series 2; 2, 20, Far Eastern Affairs, May 20, 1933–November 5, 1936, Doc. 148, Harbin Consular District Political Report for the Quarter ended September 30, 1935 (London, 1984), pp. 229–30; ibid., Series 2; 2, 21 Far Eastern Affairs, November 6, 1936–July 27, 1938, Doc. 212, Harbin Consular District Political Report for the Quarter ended December 31, 1936, pp. 348–9.
140. Aurilene and Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go*, p. 54; on unemployment in Harbin, also see: *Nash Put'*, 1 December 1935, no. 308, p. 7.
141. Family violence, with all its terrible consequences, was fairly common in Harbin. For example, see the story of Vladimir Astashkin. Astashkin's father shot his mother on New Year's Day in 1933, when he was 17, after years of abuse. After his father was sentenced to death, Astashkin was turned adrift and became a thief and a drug addict. He died in July 1937 at the age of 21 due to an overdose. For the story of Astashkin, see: *Zaria*, 3 January 1933, no. 2, p. 5; *Rupor*, 18 February 1934, no. 45, p. 6; *Rupor*, 31 July 1937, no. 205, p. 4.
142. *Rupor*, 20 February 1934, no. 47, p. 3; *Rupor*, 13 March 1934, no. 68, p. 4; *Gun Bao*, 16 September 1935, no. 2806, p. 25; *Rupor*, 20 April 1937, no. 106, p. 3; *North China Daily News*, 7 January 1936, p. 5.
143. *New York Times*, 6 January 1935, p. 8; Tim Wright, "The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression", *Modern Asian Studies* 41, 5 (2007), pp. 1073–112. For the economic policy in Manchukuo, see Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 183–240.
144. Olga Bakich, "Russian Education in Harbin, 1898–1962", *Transactions of the Association of Russian-American Scholars in the U.S.A.* 26 (1994), pp. 269–94, in particular pp. 277–89. For education in Harbin, also see Chapter 4.
145. *New York Times*, 8 January 1933, p. 2. See also, for example, the difficulties of Hellmut Stern to leave Manchukuo temporarily to seek medical treatment. Stern, *Saitensprünge*, p. 57.

146. Steven Merritt, "Matushka Rossiiia, primi svoikh detei" [Mother Russia, accept your Children], in *Rossiiane v Azii: Literaturno-istoricheskii ezhegodnik*, 5 (1998), pp. 221–6; Svetlana V. Oneginina, "The Resettlement of Soviet Citizens from Manchuria in 1935–36: A Research Note", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 6 (1995), pp. 1043–50; see also the project of memorial in Krasnoyarsk with returnees from Harbin and other cities and settlements in the Far East online on <http://www.memorial.krsk.ru/>.
147. Bakich, "Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin", *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 51–73, p. 60.
148. See, for example: Yakobson, *Crossing Borders*, pp. 68–9; *Nash Put'*, 6 October 1937, no. 264, p. 3.
149. *Rupor*, 7 December 1934, no. 334, p. 3; *Zaria*, 25 November 1935, no. 320, p. 5; *Rupor*, 9 August 1937, no. 214, p. 4.
150. The vast number of youth suicides would make providing exhaustive references impractical. The following are therefore just exemplary: *Kharbinskoe Obozrenie*, 5 May 1932, no. 101, p. 2; *Rupor*, 10 January 1934, no. 6, p. 5; *Gun Bao*, 20 October 1935, no. 2840, p. 1; *Rupor*, 4 April 1937, no. 90, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 2 August 1937, no. 201, p. 4.
151. *Zaria*, 25 November 1935, no. 320, p. 5.
152. *Ustav soiuza fashistskoi molodezhi*, p. 1. See also, for example: *Ustav soiuza iunykh fashistov "Avangard"*, pp. 2–3; *Nash Put'*, 20 October 1935, no. 266, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 17 June 1937, no. 157, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 11 November 1937, no. 300, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 11 November 1937, no. 300, p. 7.
153. Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York 2000), pp. 19–24. As I demonstrated before the values and norms promoted by civil society organisations be no means necessarily need to be neither democratic nor universal. They can be racist and xenophobic, limited to a specific group, for instance apply only to men or white people. See, for example: Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society", *Political Theory* 29, 6 (2001), pp. 837–65, in particular pp. 840–4; Jason Kaufman, *Common Good? American Civic Life in the Golden Age of Fraternity* (Oxford, 2002); Kopecký and Mudde, "Rethinking Civil Society"; Roland Roth, "Die dunklen Seiten der Zivilgesellschaft" [The Dark Side of Civil Society], *Forschungsjournal neue soziale Bewegungen* 16, 2 (2003), pp. 59–73.
154. "If a Young Fascist does not belong to the Orthodox Church, but another faith he should keep the pact and meet the demands." *Instruktsiia iunoi fashistke*, pp. 4–5.
155. *Nash Put'*, 7 July 1935, no. 194, p. 2.
156. For Patriot, see: *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 5. For Gypsy, see *Nash Put'*, 4 November 1937, no. 293, p. 8. For Leonid Nikolaev, see: *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 5.
157. Rolf Giesen and Hobsch, Manfred, *Hitlerjunge Quex, Jud Süß und Kolberg. Die Propagandafilme des Dritten Reiches: Dokumente und Materialien* [Hitler Youth

- Quex, Jew Stüss and Kolberg. Propaganda Movies of the Third Reich: Documents and Materials] (Berlin, 2005); Eric Rentschler, “Emotional Engineering: Hitler Youth Quex”, *Modernism/Modernity* 2, 3 (September 1995), pp. 23–44. For the screening of the movie in Harbin, see: *Nash Put'*, 11 March 1937, no. 64 p. 1; *Nash Put'*, 14 March 1937, no. 67, p. 6.
158. See also, for example, the letter of Young Hero of Hitler's Germany to Gypsy: *Nash Put'*, 14 October 1937, no. 272, p. 8.
 159. *Nash Put'*, 14 September 1935, no. 233, p. 3.
 160. Gypsy to Princess Svetlana: *Nash Put'*, 18 November 1937, no. 307, p. 8; Leonid Nikolaev to Marfusha: *Nash Put'*, 14 September 1935, no. 233, p. 3.
 161. On the Kirov murder, see, for example: Matthew Lenoe, *The Kirov Murder and Soviet History* (New Haven, 2010); Amy W. Knight, *Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin's Greatest Mystery* (New York, 1999).
 162. Black Swastika to Leonid Nikolaev: *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 5.
 163. Ibid.
 164. *Nash Put'*, 14 September 1935, no. 233, p. 3.
 165. See, for example, his letter to Blue Eyes: “Blue Eyes. I would agree to correspond with you, but forgive me if I ask you some questions: Are you in the Vanguard? Do you like the Russian fascist movement? [...] Glory to Russia! Leonid Nikolaev.” *Nash Put'*, 4 December 1935, no. 311, p. 7; see also his letter to Olia: *Nash Put'*, 11 December 1935, no. 317, p. 7; Gypsy to Young Hero of Hitler's Germany: *Nash Put'*, 14 October 1937, no. 272, p. 8; Patriot to Nimfa and Nimfa to Starfish: *Nash Put'*, 18 November 1937, no. 307, p. 8.
 166. See for example Gypsy to Young Hero of Hitler's Germany: *Nash Put'*, 4 November 1937, no. 293, p. 8; Patriot to Nymfa: *Nash Put'*, 18 November 1937, no. 307, p. 8.

Chapter 4 Russian Fascists and Harbin Civil Society

1. *Instruktsiia No. 24 Kandidatu Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii. Utverzhdennaiia verkhovnym sovetom Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii* [Instructions No. 24 for Candidates of the All-Russian Fascist Party. Approved by the Supreme Council of the All-Russian Fascist Party] (Harbin, 1936), p. 5.
2. Aleksandr Vasil'evich Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia: (1920–1945 gg.)* [Fascism and the Russian Emigration (1920–1945)] (Moscow, 2002), pp. 121–2.
3. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 24 September 1932, no. 262, p. 4; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 28 September 1932, no. 266, p. 4.
4. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 23 January 1933, no. 19, p. 7. For more examples, see *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 18 February 1933, no. 40, p. 7.
5. On the flood in Harbin, see: *Evreiskaia Zhizn'*, 5 September 1932, no. 29–30, pp. 21–6; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 16 August 1932, no. 223, p. 4; *Washington Post*, 10 August 1932, p. 2; *Washington Post*, 13 August 1932, p. 3; *New York Times*, 10 August 1932, p. 9.

6. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 10 August 1932, no. 217, p. 4; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 16 August 1932, no. 223, p. 4.
7. *Ibid.*
8. See: *Ustav russkago kluba v gorode Kharbine* [Statute of the Russian Club in the City of Harbin] (Harbin, 1932), p. 1.
9. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 23 January 1933, no. 19, p. 7; *Zhurnalisty na pomoshch' russkomu klubu* [Journalists in Support of the Russian Club], 4 January 1933, p. 1.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Politisches (in the following PAAA), R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 8.
12. See: *Nash Put'*, 26 November 1933, no. 55, p. 3.
13. *Zhurnalisty na pomoshch' russkomu klubu*, 4 January 1933, p. 1.
14. *Ibid.*; Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 161.
15. *Ustav russkago kluba v gorode Kharbine*, p. 1.
16. See: Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, "Government Policies and the Tradition of Russian Anti-Semitism, 1772–1917", *Patterns of Prejudice*, 27, 1 (1993), pp. 47–63; Bernard K. Johnpoll, "Why they left: Russian–Jewish Mass Migration and Repressive Laws, 1881–1917", *American Jewish Archives* 47, 1 (1995), pp. 17–54; Jan Kusber, "Zwischen Duldung und Ausgrenzung: Die Politik gegenüber den Juden im ausgehenden Zarenreich" [Between Toleration and Exclusion: The Policy towards the Jews in the Tsarist Empire], *Jüdische Welten in Osteuropa* (2005), pp. 45–64.
17. *Zhurnalisty na pomoshch' russkomu klubu*, 4 January 1933, p. 1.
18. Lifelong membership was granted those willing to pay an entrance fee of 100 Manchukuo dollars. *Ustav russkago kluba v gorode Kharbine*, p. 2.
19. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 23 March 1933 no. 78, p. 5.
20. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, *Russkii put'* [The Russian Way] (Harbin, 1939), p. 81.
21. Cited from John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (London, 1978), p. 14.
22. Elena Aurilene and Irina Potapova, *Russkie v Man'chzhou-di-go: "Emigrantskoe pravitel'stvo"* [Russians in Manchukuo: "Émigré Government"] (Khabarovsk, 2004), pp. 25–6 and 31–2; Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, pp. 67–9.
23. *Zhurnalisty na pomoshch' russkomu klubu*, 4 January 1933, p. 1.
24. *Nash Put'*, 6 October 1933, no. 4, p. 1.
25. *Nash Put'*, 26 November 1933, no. 55, p. 3.
26. *Zhurnalisty na pomoshch' russkomu klubu*, 4 January 1933, p. 2.
27. *Nash Put'*, 6 October 1933, no. 4, p. 1.
28. *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, p. 3.
29. For the debate, see: *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 9 April 1933, no. 95, p. 26; *Rapor*, 10 April 1933, no. 96, p. 3.
30. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 23 March 1933, no. 78, p. 5.

31. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 124.
32. No list of members of the Russian Fascist Party exists anymore. Therefore it is extremely difficult to trace individual members. Hence I cannot exclude the possibility that other participants, namely A.E. Makarov, Vasilii Dmitrievich Marakulin, I.I. Kunin or Enborisov were also party members.
33. *Rupor*, 10 April 1933, no. 96, p. 3.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 9 April 1933, no. 95, p. 26.
36. *Rupor*, 10 April 1933, no. 96, p. 3.
37. *Ibid.*
38. This rule also implied that Aryans without a German passport were excluded from the club. *Mitteilungs- und Verordnungsblatt der Landesgruppe Ostasien der N.S.D.A.P.*, 45/5 February 1936, p. 77.
39. In one report the leader of the party in Northern China praised the local Nazis in Harbin for supporting their fellow German citizens during the Jewish anti-German boycott in 1933, even if eight of them were unemployed. The mention of this trivial detail indicates that the Party, at least in Harbin, had so few members that he must have known most of them personally. *Mitteilungs- und Verordnungsblatt der Landesgruppe Ostasien der N.S.D.A.P.* 9/1 February 1934, p. 26. For the NSDAP in China and the Far East, see: Donald McKale, “The Nazi Party in the Far East 1931–1945”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 12 (1977), pp. 291–311; Astrid Freyeisen, *Shanghai und die Politik des Dritten Reiches* [Shanghai and the Policy of the Third Reich] (Würzburg, 2000). For the Jewish-boycott in Harbin, see: Susanne Hohler, “Harbinger of Trouble: Anti-German Protest and Power Relations in a Manchurian City 1933”, in Dan BenCanaan, Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl (eds), *The Transcultural Past of Northeast China* (Heidelberg and New York, 2013), 119–31.
40. According to the German envoy Wussow, the Russian Fascist repeatedly tried to establish closer contacts to German Nationalist Socialists in Harbin, but these attempts failed since the German government had enacted a so called “Verkehrsverbot” (contact prohibition). PAAA, R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 17.
41. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 July 1933, no. 185, p. 6. The fascists even claim that 6,000 people attended the debate. Preface to Vladimir Petrovich Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia. Otchet o znamenitykh disputakh o masonstve v iiule. 1933 g. v Kharbine* [Basic Principles of the Jewish and Freemasons Dominance. Report on the Famous Dispute on Freemasonry in 1933] (Harbin, 1936), p. 4. The American Consul in Harbin also confirmed that “the lectures were attended by many people, who each paid fifty cents for the privilege.” National Archives and Record Administration (in the following NARA), RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7166, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, North Manchuria during the Month of July 1933, p. 8.
42. Preface to Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia*, p. 4.

43. Some of the lectures were reprinted in *Kharbinskoe Vremia* or were published 1936 in an offprint by the All-Russian Fascist Party. *Ibid.*
44. Namely Iakir Vasil'evich Lavoshnikov, Matkovskii, Nikolai Petrovich Medi, one of the founding members of the Russian Fascist Party, G. Trifonov, Pakhomo, and Konstantin Aleksandrovich Gerasimov.
45. Those photographs are published in: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Karmilov, *Masonry v Kharbine* [Freemasonry in Harbin] (Harbin, 1933), pp. 17–21. See also: Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia*, pp. 60–2.
46. Karmilov, *Masonry v Kharbine*, p. 15.
47. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 July 1933, no. 185, p. 6. See also: Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov and Vladimir Vladimirovich Kibardin: *Azbuka fashizma* [ABC of Fascism] (Harbin, 1935), pp. 33–43.
48. See also: S.A. Sergeev, “Masonstvo v emigratsii: Puti bor’by” [The Freemasons in the Emigration: Ways of Fighting], in Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia*, pp. 43–68 here pp. 65–6. Ironically, in 1937, during the war between Japan and China, Rodzaevskii accused the Freemasons of supporting the Kuomintang. See: *Nash Put'*, 1 September 1937, no. 230, p. 4.
49. See also: Sergeev, “Masonstvo v emigratsii”, p. 53.
50. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 July 1933, no. 185, p. 6.
51. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, “Vystuplenie” [Address], in Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia*, pp. 68–79, here p. 70.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–1.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 74–5.
54. Preface to Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia*, p. 3.
55. For the Russian Radical Right in the Tsarist Empire, see, for example: Hans Rogger (ed.), *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Oxford, 1986), in particular pp. 203–32; Sergei A. Stepanov, *Chernaia sotnia* [Black Hundreds] (Moscow, 2005); Igor' Vladimirovich Omel'iananchuk, *Chernosotsennoe dvizhenie v rossiiskoi imperii, 1901–1914* [The Movement of the Black Hundreds in the Russian Empire] (Kiev, 2007).
56. Reprint of the Protocols in: Stephen Eric Bronner, *A Rumor about the Jews: Reflections on Anti-Semitism and the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* (New York, 2000), p. 25.
57. For example, see: Julii Isidorovich Gessen, *Evrei v masonstve (opyt istoricheskago issledovaniia)* [The Jews in Freemasonry (Experiences from Historical Research)] (St. Petersburg, 1903); Georgii Butmi, *Fran-masonstvo i gosudarstvennaia izmena* [France, Freemasonry and Treason] (St. Petersburg, 1906).
58. See: V. Vladimirov, *Bich narodov* [Scourge of the people] (Harbin, 1923), Hoover Archives, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 22, folder 10; D. Gautamov, *Vvedenie v kul’t kosmopolita* [Introduction in the Cosmopolitan Cult] (Harbin, 1925); Anonymous, *Evreistvo – satanizm* [Jewry – Satanism] (Shanghai, 1927); Spektator, *Masonstvo, vsemirnaia revoliutsia i katolichestvo* [Freemasonry,

- World Revolution and Catholicism] (Harbin, 1931); Vsevolod Nikanorovich Ivanov, *O Masonakh* [On the Freemasons] in the paper *Svet* in 1924 later republished as *Ogni v tumane* [Fires in the Mist] (Harbin, 1932); Evgenii Vershinin, *Mir v lapakh satany: Iudaizm, masonstvo i kommunizm* [The World in the Clutches of Satan. Judaism, Freemasonry and Communism] (Shanghai, 1933).
59. Vasilii Fedorovich Ivanov, *Ot Petra Pervago do nashikh dnei: Russkaia intelligenstsia i masonstvo* [From Peter the Great until our Days: The Russian Intelligentsia and Freemasonry] (Harbin, 1934); idem, *Pravoslavnyi mir i masonstvo* [The Orthodox World and Freemasonry] (Harbin, 1936); idem, *Tainaia diplomatiia: Vneshniaia politika Rossii i mezhdunarodnoe masonstvo* [Secret Diplomacy: Russia's Foreign Policy and International Freemasonry] (Harbin, 1937); idem, *A.S. Pushkin i masonstvo* [Pushkin and Freemasonry] (Harbin, 1940); Maurik Fara, *Masonstvo i ego deiatel'nost'* [Freemasonry and its Activities] (Harbin, 1937); Iurii' Nikolaevich Lukin, *Masonstvo v russkom skautizme* [Freemasonry and Russian Scouts] (Harbin, 1935); idem, *V mire simvolov: K poznaniu masonstva* [In the World of Symbols: To the Knowledge of Freemasonry] (Harbin, 1936); idem, *Komu sluzhit sovremennoe evreistvo* [Who serves the Contemporary Jewry] (Harbin, 1936); idem, *Kratkii kurs masonovedeniia* [Short Course in Freemasonry] (Harbin 1937); idem, *Orden rozenkreiterov* [Order of the Rosicrucians] (Harbin, 1938).
60. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 121; Iurii Mel'nikov, "Russkie fashisty Man'chzhurii (K.V. Rodzaevskii: tragediia lichnosti)" [Russian Fascists in Manchuria (K.V. Rodzaevskii: The Tragedy of an Individual)], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 2 (1991), pp. 109–21; 3: 156–64, p. 109; Heinrich-Dietrich Löwe, "Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria", in Dan BenCanaan, Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl (eds), *The Transcultural Past of Northeast China* (Heidelberg and New York, 2013), pp. 133–58, p. 138.
61. *Rapor*, 28 July, 1933, no. 201, p. 5.
62. For example, the topic was revisited on the occasion of the two-year anniversary of *Nash Put'*: *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 8.
63. Mazein (ed.), *Osnovy iudo i masono-vedeniia*.
64. N.H. Butmi, *Tainye obshchestva i iudei* [Secret Societies and the Jews] (Shanghai, 1934).
65. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 28 August 1935, no. 218, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 8 October 1935, no. 255, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 21 November 1935, no. 298, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 10 July 1937, no. 179, p. 1.
66. *Nash Put'*, 6 October 1933, no. 4, p. 1.
67. See, for example: Igor Konstantinovich Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu (Vospominaniia)* [Rendezvous with Recollections (Memories)] (Moscow, 1996), p. 132; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Slobodchikov, *O sud'be izgnannikov pechal'noi ... Kharbin, Shanghái* [On Sad Fate of People in Exile ... Harbin, Shanghai] (Moscow, 2005), p. 170.

68. *Nash Put'*, 10 January 1937, no. 6, p. 5.
69. *Zaria*, 16 January 1939, no. 13, p. 4.
70. For a picture, see: Stephan, *Russian Fascists*, p. 326.
71. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 July 1933, no. 185, p. 6.
72. *Ibid.*
73. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7166, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, North Manchuria during the Month of July 1933, p. 8.
74. On the YMCA in China, see: Charles Andrew Keller, "Making Model Citizens: The Chinese YMCA, Social Activism, and Internationalism in Republican China, 1919–1937" (PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 1996); On the YMCA in Harbin, see: S. Avenarius, "Pervye gody russkogo ChSML v Kharbine" [The First Years of the Russian YMCA], in Elena P. Taskina (ed.), *Russkii Kharbin* (Moscow, 1998), pp. 227–8; Maksim Dubaev, "Khristianskii soiuz molodyykh liudei i russkaia emigratsiia v Kitae. Kul'turologicheskii aspect vzaimodeistviia russkoi obshchiny s molodezhnymi émigrantskimi organizatsiiami" [The Young Men's Christian Association of the Russian Emigration in China. Cultural Aspects of the Interaction of the Russian Community with the Emigrant Youth Organization], *Istoriia i sovremennost'* 1, 1 (2009), pp. 33–44. See also in *Rupor* and *Zaria*, regarding the tenth anniversary of the YMCA: *Rupor*, 8 November 1934, no. 305, p. 4; *Zaria*, 8 November 1934, no. 304, p. 5.
75. In 1925 many Russian schools came under Soviet administration, whereupon émigré children and teachers had to leave those schools. Hence, several former teachers and professors as well as parents approached the YMCA and requested the opening of a school for higher learning for émigré children. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7223, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, New Technical School in Harbin by the Young Men's Christian Association, 22 October 1932.
76. For the youth organisation, see: M.A. Prozorova, "Skautizm russkogo vostochnogo zarubezh'ia" [(The Phenomenon of) the Scout Movement in Russian Eastern Countries], in *Rossiskaia emigratsiia na Dal'nem Vostoke* (Vladivostok, 2000), pp. 100–6.
77. Dubaev, "Khristianskii soiuz molodyykh liudei i russkaia emigratsiia v Kitae", pp. 35–6.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
79. Ironically, among some members of the Jewish Community in Harbin the YMCA had the reputation of being fascist, despite the accusation of being part of the "Judeo-Masonic" conspiracy. Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry (in the following AHI), Interview with Evsey Domar conducted by Irene Eber on the 24 of April 1986, p. 17.
80. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 July 1933, no. 185, p. 6.
81. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 19 March 1933, no. 74, p. 11.
82. *Rupor*, 3 May 1933, no. 116, p. 7.

83. The name Churaevka was inspired by Grebenschchikov's book "*The Brothers Churaev*". On the Churaevka, see: Valerii Pereleshin, *Russian Poetry and Literary Life in Harbin and Shanghai, 1930–1950: The Memoirs of Valerii Pereleshin*, edited by Jan Paul Hinrichs (Amsterdam, 1987); Li, Meng, "Russian Émigré Literature in China: A Missing Link", 3 vols, vol. 1 (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2004); Slobodchikov, *O sud'be izgnannikov pechal'noi*, pp. 134–64.
84. Meng, "Russian Émigré Literature in China", p. 116.
85. Khristianskii soiuz molodykh liudei v Kharbinie, *Churaevka* (Harbin, 1932–4).
86. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Slobodchikov, "Churaevka", in Taskina (ed.), *Russkii Kharbin*, pp. 65–83.
87. Meng, "Russian Émigré Literature in China", p. 121.
88. *Nash Put'*, 3 October 1933, no. 1, p. 4.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
90. *Zhurnalisty na pomosch' russkomu klubu*, 4 January 1933, pp. 3–4.
91. *Nash Put'*, 3 October 1933, no. 1, p. 4.
92. *Churaevka* 4/10 (1933), p. 1, cited in: Meng, "Russian Émigré Literature in China", p. 122.
93. Arsenii Nesmelov was born in Moscow in 1889. During the Civil War he fought in the White Army. In Harbin he worked for several Russian newspapers and journals under different pseudonyms. For Nesmelov's literary works, see: *Ibid.*, pp. 171–339.
94. For the usage of Nesmelov's poems by the Russian fascists, see: *Nash Put'*, 8 November 1935, no. 285, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, pp. 3–4; *Rutpor*, 3 April 1937, no. 89, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 7 May 1937, no. 116, p. 4. For an example of Nesmelov's poems for the All-Russian Fascist Party see his poem on the occasion of the parties sixth anniversary *Nash Put'*, 23 May 1937, no. 132, p. 1.
95. Nikolai Dozorov, *Tol'ko takie! Stikhi o bor'be za rodinu* [Only Those! Poems about the Fight for the Fatherland] (Shanghai, 1936).
96. *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, p. 3.
97. Boris Mikhailovich Iul'skii was born to a gentry family in Irkutsk in 1912 and came to Harbin with his family in 1921. After his graduation from the First Harbin Modern Secondary School, he studied for two years at the Polytechnic Institute of the YMCA. Iul'skii left Harbin 1938 to work for the forest police, after he had been accused in *Nash Put'* of being a drug addict. After the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, he was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. In 1950 he escaped and disappeared. On Iul'skii and his literary work, see: Meng, "Russian Émigré Literature in China", pp. 130–5.
98. For the Musketeers, see pp. 128–9.
99. Meng, "Russian Émigré Literature in China", p. 133; Pereleshin, *Russian Poetry and Literary Life in Harbin*, p. 51.

100. Meng, “Russian Émigré Literature in China”, p. 131. His drug addiction was doubtfully the only reason, since Iul'skii had been consuming cocaine already in 1933 or 1934. According to Pereleshin, Iul'skii was sent to the countryside by the Japanese authorities to save him from himself. Unfortunately, Pereleshin fails to explain why the Japanese were so fond of Iul'skii. Pereleshin, *Russian Poetry and Literary Life in Harbin*, pp. 51 and 53.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
102. *Ibid.*
103. Slobodchikov, *O sud'be izgnannikov pechal'noi*, p. 160. During the debate on Freemasonry at the Russian Club Rodzaevskii ranted about satanic masses and ritual murders, which were allegedly committed by the Freemasons. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 July 1933, no. 185, p. 6.
104. See, for example, the famous proceedings against Mendel Beilis in Kiev 1911–1913. Beilis was accused of killing a 13-year-old Christian boy to use his blood for matzah. He was acquitted for a want of evidence, but many were still convinced that a ritual murder actually had taken place. John Klier, “Cry Bloody Murder”, *East European Jewish Affairs* 36, 2 (2006), pp. 213–29. See also the publication by the Russian fascists: *Obvinitel'nyi akt o meshchanine Menakhime-Medele-Teveve Beilise* [The Indictment of Menakhim-Medele-Tevye Beilis] (Shanghai, 1934).
105. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7149, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report for November 1933, p. 3.
106. For the double suicide of Georgii Granin and Sergei Sergin in Russian newspapers, see: *Rupor*, 6 December 1934, no. 333, p. 5; *Rupor*, 7 December 1934, no. 334, p. 1 and p. 5. See also: Slobodchikov, *O sud'be izgnannikov pechal'noi*, pp. 169–73; Olga Bakich, “Georgii Granin”, *Rossianae v Azii: Literaturno-istoricheskii ezhegodnik* 3 (1998), pp. 3–10.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
109. *Rupor*, 3 March 1934, no. 58, p. 3.
110. Khristianskii soiuz molodykh liudei, *Administrativnyi otchet Starshego Sekretaria Kb.S.M.L Sobraniyu Deistvitel'nykh Chlenov* [Administrative Report from the Senior Secretary of the YMCA to the Assembly of Full Members] (Harbin, February 1935), p. 12.
111. Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, pp. 151–2.
112. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 13 September 1935, no. 232, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 24 October 1935, no. 269, p. 3; *Nash Put'*, 13 December 1935, no. 319, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 22 February 1937, no. 48, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 23 April 1937, no. 106, p. 2; *Nash Put'*, 15 December 1937, no. 334, p. 6.
113. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1935, no. 314, p. 5.
114. On Harbin's architecture, see: Yukiko Koga, “The Atmosphere of a Foreign Country’: Harbin’s Architectural Inheritance”, in Anne M. Cronin and Kevin Hetherington (eds), *Consuming the Entrepreneurial City: Image, Memory,*

- Spectacle* (London, 2008), pp. 221–53; James Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932* (Ithaca, New York and London, 2002).
115. On education in Harbin, see: Olga Bakich, “Russian Education in Harbin, 1898–1962”, *Transactions of the Association of Russian–American Scholars in the U.S.A.* 26 (1994), pp. 269–94; Oksana Anatol’evna Kosinova, *Pedagogicheskie traditsii russiiskogo zarubezh’ia v Kitae v kontse XIX – pervoi polovine XX vekov* (1898–1945 gg.) [Pedagogical Traditions of Russians abroad in China at the End of the Nineteenth Century to the First Half of the Twentieth Century] (Moscow, 2008); see also Chapter 1.
 116. *Ustav soiuza iunykh fashistov “Avangard”* [Statute of Union of Young Fascist “Vanguard”] (Harbin, 1935), p. 3.
 117. *Nash Put’*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5.
 118. PAAA, R 9208/2410, Peking II, Wussow, Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 29.
 119. *Nash Put’*, 12 September 1935, no. 231, p. 4; *Nash Put’*, 24 September 1935, no. 242, p. 4. For the gymnasium of the BREM, also see: *Zaria*, 11 November 1935, no. 306, p. 4; *Gun Bao*, 11 November 1935, no. 2862, p. 3.
 120. See, for example: *Rupor*, 23 December 1937, no. 349, p. 4.
 121. See, for example: *Hagadel*, 15 December 1937, no. 23–4, p. 19; *Rupor*, 1 November 1937, no. 296, p. 4.
 122. *Hagadel*, 21 May 1936, no. 9–10, pp. 40–2.
 123. See, for example: *Gun Bao*, 10 October 1935, no. 2620, p. 4; *Gun Bao*, 24 December 1935, no. 2905, p. 5.
 124. See, for example: *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 13 June 1936, no. 155, p. 2; *Nash Put’*, 1 January 1937, no. 1, p. 4.
 125. *Nash Put’*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5.
 126. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiya*, p. 171; *Nash Put’*, 24 April 1937, no. 107, p. 2.
 127. *Nash Put’*, 1 January 1937, no. 1, p. 4.
 128. *Nash Put’*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, pp. 2–3.
 129. *Nash Put’*, 1 January 1937, no. 1, p. 4.
 130. *Nash Put’*, 22 May 1937, no. 131, p. 2.
 131. For the Russian House, see: *Russkii Kharbinskii priiut-uchilishche* [Harbin Russian Orphanage and School] (Harbin, 1928); *Zaria*, 26 March 1933, no. 82, p. 10; “*Russkii dom*”: *Iubileinyi al’bom* [“Russian House”: Anniversary Album] (Harbin, 1933).
 132. *Nash Put’*, 6 December 1935, no. 312, p. 5.
 133. *North China Daily News*, 30 March 1936, p. 5; for the inadequate payment of teachers, also see: PAAA, R 9208/2410, Peking II: Wussow: Die weissrussische Emigration in Manchukuo, p. 29; *Nash Put’*, 27 August 1935, no. 218, p. 6.
 134. Russian fascist were also involved in several other civil society organisations. For example, the head of the Union of Russian Journalists Nikolai Ivanovich

- Nikiforov and the head of the Union of Russian Contractors (Soiuz podriadchikov) Uskov as well as, for example the head of the Union of Russian Transport on the Sugari were members of the fascist party. Elena Aurilene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae* (1920–1950) [The Russian Diaspora in China (1920–1950)] (Khabarovsk, 2008), p. 71; Aleksei Bujakov, *Znaki i nagrady rossiiskikh emigrantskikh organizatsii v Kitae* (1921–1949 gg.) [Signs and Awards of Russian Emigrant Organizations in China (1921–1949)] (Vladivostok, 2005), p. 186; *Nash Put'*, 13 February 1935, no. 39, p. 5.
135. *Nash Put'*, 9 November 1935, no. 286, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 16 August 1937, no. 215, p. 5. Lavoshnikov was not the only fascist in the Parents' Committee. For example, the well known fascist G. Trifonov was also a member. *Nash Put'*, 24 October 1935, no. 269, p. 5.
136. *Gun Bao*, 23 February 1935, no. 2608, p. 4.
137. On hooliganism in the Russian media in 1934/35, see, for example: *Novosti Vostok*, 5 January 1934, no. 4, p. 5; *Novosti Vostok*, 5 June 1934, no. 152, p. 5; *Rupor*, 20 February 1935, no. 47, p. 3; *Rupor*, 14 March 1935, no. 69, p. 7; *Rupor*, 6 November 1935, no. 303, p. 3; *Gun Bao*, 4 April 1935, no. 2647, p. 5.
138. *Gun Bao*, 23 February 1935, no. 2608, p. 4.
139. *Nash Put'*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5.
140. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 10 October 1935, no. 266, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 3 November 1935, no. 280, p. 7.
141. *Nash Put'*, 1 September 1935, no. 221, p. 3.
142. *Nash Put'*, 3 November 1935, no. 280, p. 7.
143. On activities of the youth groups, see, for example: *Nash Put'*, 24 November 1935, no. 301, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 15 December 1935, no. 321, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 1 September 1935, no. 221, p. 3; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 21 December 1935, no. 344, p. 5; *Zaria*, 1 September 1935, no. 235, p. 10.
144. *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 12; *Nash Put'*, 22 September 1935, no. 240, p. 7.
145. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1935, no. 314, p. 5.
146. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 27 August 1935, no. 218, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 1 September 1935, no. 221, p. 3.
147. Proof of membership: *Nash Put'*, 9 November 1935, no. 286, p. 6.
148. *Nash Put'*, 29 September 1935, no. 246, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 15 September 1935, no. 233, p. 6.
149. *Nash Put'*, 10 October 1935, no. 266, p. 7; *Nash Put'*, 3 November 1935, no. 280, p. 7.
150. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, pp. 127, 130.
151. Ibid., p. 175.
152. *Nash Put'*, 10 November 1935, no. 287, p. 9.
153. Ibid.; for similar events with involvement of the Russian fascists, see: *Nash Put'*, 1 December 1935, no. 321, p. 5.
154. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 20 October 1935, no. 226, p. 7.

155. *Nash Put'*, 10 October 1935, no. 266, p. 5.
156. *Instruktsiia No. 24 Kandidatu Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii. Utverzhdennaiia verkhovnym sovetom Vserossiiskoi fashistskoi partii* [Instructions No. 24 for Candidates of the All-Russian Fascist Party. Approved by the Supreme Council of the All-Russian Fascist Party] (Harbin, 1936), p. 5.
157. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 18 June 1933, no. 159, p. 6.
158. For NORM, see also: *Nash Put'*, 25 October 1933, no. 23, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 1 November 1933, no. 29, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 15 November 1933, no. 44, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 22 November 1933, no. 51, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 13 December 1933, no. 70, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 18 December 1933, no. 73, p. 4.
159. *Nash Put'*, 1 December 1935, no. 308, p. 5.
160. *Nash Put'*, 29 September 1935, no. 246, p. 7.
161. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 27 August 1935, no. 218, p. 6; *Gun Bao*, 17 November 1935, no. 2868, p. 6.
162. *Zaria*, 16 April 1935, no. 101, p. 7.
163. *Nash Put'*, 27 August 1935, no. 218, p. 6.
164. Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, pp. 86–7.
165. *Nash Put'*, 26 August 1935, no. 217, p. 5.
166. *Nash Put'*, 23 May 1937, no. 132, p. 13. The Russian fascists also organised special “Cups of Tea” for the leaders of BREM youth groups. *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, pp. 2–3.
167. *Nash Put'*, 30 March 1937, no. 83, p. 4.
168. Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, p. 192.
169. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 3 September 1936, no. 237, p. 7.
170. See Chapter 1, pp. 40–3.
171. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 28 October 1936, no. 282, p. 5.
172. *Gun Bao*, 3 February 1935, no. 2589, p. 5.
173. Ibid.
174. Prince Nikita Aleksandrovich was the son of Aleksander Mikhailovich, the brother in law of Nikolas II.
175. For the Musketeers, see: Aleksandr Vasil'evich Okorokov, *Molodezhnye organizatsii russkoi emigratsii (1920–1945 gg.)* [Youth Organizations of the Russian Emigration (1920–1945)] (Moscow, 2000), pp. 67–8; Aurilene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae*, pp. 28–9; Special page, *Zaria*, 8 July 1937, no. 179, p. 3; *Soiuz ego vysochestva kniazia Nikity Aleksandrovicha mushketerov, 1924–1937* [The Union of the Musketeers of His Highness Prince Nikita Aleksandrovich] (Harbin, 1937); and the organisations own journal “*Mushketer*”.
176. Viktor Semenovich Baryshnikov was born in Krasnoyarsk in 1905. He came to Harbin with his mother and his sister in 1922 to be reunited with his father, who already lived in Harbin. After finishing school, Baryshnikov studied at the polytechnic institute. He left for the United States in 1930, but returned to Harbin only five years later, after failing to find any proper employment in America. Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, p. 144.

177. “Sobstvennoruchnoe pokazanie osuzhdennogo, byvshego zamestitelia nachal’nika 3-go otdela GBREM V.V. Kibardina o Soiuze mushketerov 25 fevralia 1949” [Autographic Testimony by the Convict, the former Deputy Chief of the GBREM V.V. Kibardin about the Union of the Musketeers 25 February 1949], printed in Elena Chernolutskaia (ed.), *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Man’chzurii: Voenno-politicheskaiia deiatel’nost’ (1920–1945). Sbornik dokumentov* [The Russian Emigration in Manchukuo: Military–Political Activities] (Juzhno–Sachalinsk, 1994), p. 143.
178. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 138.
179. *Nash Put’*, 3 October 1937, no. 261, p. 6.
180. *Nash Put’*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, pp. 2–3.
181. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 269.
182. *Nash Put’*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 4. See also, with reservations: “Sobstvennoruchnoe pokazanie osuzhdennogo”, pp. 25–6.
183. *Nash Put’*, 28 July 1937, no. 197, p. 6.
184. *Nash Put’*, 24 May 1936, suppl., p. 42.
185. After World War II most chapters of the NORR in Europe closed. But the NORR is still active in the United States today. For the NORR worldwide, see: Okorokov, *Molodezhnye organizatsii russkoi emigratsii*, pp. 43–53. For the NORR in Harbin, see: Aurilene, *Rossiiskaia diaspora v Kitae*, pp. 29–30; Okorokov, *Molodezhnye organizatsii russkoi emigratsii*, pp. 46–50; *Natsional’naia organizatsiia russkikh razvedchikov* [National Organization of Russian Pathfinders] (Harbin, 1936).
186. P.N. Bogdanovich, *Kratkii ocherk istorii* [A Short History] (Harbin, 1936), p. 16.
187. “Iz protokola doprosa S.G. Sonina 24 oktobra 1945” [From the Protocol of the Interrogation of G. Sonin 24 October 1945], printed in Chernolutskaia (ed.), *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Man’chzurii*, p. 31; “Iz protokola doprosa S.G. Sonina 17 marta 1945” [From the Protocol of the Interrogation of G. Sonin 17 March 1945], printed in, ibid., pp. 32–3, here p. 33.
188. Prozorova, “Skautizm russkogo vostochnogo zarubezh’ia”, pp. 100–6.
189. Unfortunately, there exists nearly no literature on Russian Boy Scouts prior 1917 as yet. But, in light of the popularity of Boy Scout organisations in exile, one can assume that they had also been quite popular in Russia proper before the Bolshevik coup. On Russian Boy Scouts before 1917, see: Jim Riordan, “The Russian Boy Scouts”, *History Today* 38, 10 (October 1988), pp. 48–52; A.M. Viazmitinov (ed.), *Russkie skauty 1909–1969* [Russian Scouts 1909–1969] (San Francisco, 1969); Okorokov, *Molodezhnye organizatsii russkoi emigratsii*, pp. 35–6.
190. On Bader Powell and the history of Boy Scouts, see, for example: Nelson R. Block and Tammy M. Proctor: *Scouting Frontiers: Youth and the Scout Movement’s First Century* (Cambridge, 2009); Tim Jeal, *Baden-Powell* (New Haven, 2001).
191. On the NORS in Manchuria, see: *Russkie skauty: Iubileinyi sbornik* [Russian Scouts: Jubilee Collection] (Harbin, 1939); A.M., Viazmitinov, “Natsional’noi

- organizatsii russkikh skautov v Man'chzhurii”, in idem (ed.), *Russkie skauty*, pp. 190–236.
192. Khristianskii soiuz molodykh liudei, *Administrativnyi otchet* p. 12; Georgii Vasil'evich Melikhov, *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh na Dal'nem Vostoke 1925–1932* [The Russian Emigration in the International Relations in the Far East] (Moscow, 2007), pp. 240–3.
 193. Lukin, *Masonstvo v russkom skautizme*; Viazmitinov, “Natsional'noi organizatsiia russkikh skautov v Man'chzhurii”, p. 234.
 194. Lukin, *Masonstvo v russkom skautizme*, p. 28.
 195. The letter mentions Gennadii Taradanov, Konstantin Mikhailovich Nosov, A. Popov, Nikolai Pavlovich Gorlov, Boris Andrianovich Dmitruk and Zoia Grigor'evna Bulycheva by name. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 16 July 1936, no. 188, p. 7.
 196. *Nash Put'*, 4 November 1937, no. 293, p. 7.

Chapter 5 Russian Fascists, Anti-Semitism and the Public

1. *Israel's Messenger*, 3 May 1936, no. 4, pp. 6–7.
2. On the Hotel Modern see: Mark Gamsa, “The many Faces of the Hotel Modern”, *East Asian History* 37 (2011), pp. 27–38.
3. Some researchers claim that Kaspe refused to pay out of principle. Others argue that Kaspe was unable to pay the ransom because he transferred ownership of the Hotel Modern and his other assets to his sons, who were French citizens, to prevent the Japanese from expropriating his property. Sabine Breuillard, “A New Review of the Kaspe Affair. Documents reported and published by Sabine Breuillard”, pp. 4–5. Available at <http://www.jews ofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=937> (accessed 7 February 2015); Dan Ben-Canaan, *The Kaspe File. A Case Study of Harbin as an Intersection of Cultural and Ethnical Communities in Conflict 1932–1945* (Harbin, 2008), pp. 203–4, 253–6.
4. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 14 June 1936, no. 156, p. 8.
5. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 30 January 1937, no. 26, p. 4.
6. For examples on kidnappings in Harbin, see: *Zaria*, 22 January 1933, no. 19, p. 5; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 22 January 1933, no. 18, p. 9; *The Angus*, 9, February 1933, p. 7; *New York Times*, 19 August 1933, p. 9; *Los Angeles Times*, 11 June 1935, p. 11; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 4 May 1936, 116, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 13 July 1937, no. 182, p. 4; for more kidnappings of Russians and Chinese in Harbin and surrounding see: National Archives and Record Administration (in the following NARA), RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7148, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Conditions in North Manchuria during the Month of September 1933, p. 10.
7. Amleto Vespa, *Secret Agent of Japan: A Handbook to Japanese Imperialism* (London, 1938), p. 195.

8. On the kidnapping of Kofman, see: *Kharbinskoe Obozrenie*, 5 May 1932, no. 101, p. 2; *Kharbinskoe Obozrenie*, 19 May 1932, no. 113, p. 5; Vespa, *Secret Agent of Japan*, pp. 191–4; *Pravda*, 18 June 1932, no. 167 (5332), p. 2.
9. For the Kaspe Case see: Breuillard, “A New Review of the Kaspe Affair”; Ben-Canaan, *The Kaspe File*; Grigorii Belii, “Delo Kaspe: Obzor literatury” [The Kaspe-Case: Literature Review], in Rena Parkhomovskaya and Isaak Reznik (eds), *Cherez Dal’ni Vostok – na Blizhnii* (Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 153–73.
10. *Zhid* is a very insulting name for Jews in Russian. Igor Konstantinovich Koval’chuk-Koval’, *Svidanie s pamiat’iu (Vospominaniia)* [Rendezvous with Recollections (Memories)] (Moscow, 1996), p. 183.
11. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 30 January 1937, no. 26, p. 4.
12. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 15 June 1936, no. 157, p. 2.
13. Breuillard, “A New Review of the Kaspe Affair”; Ben-Canaan, *The Kaspe File*.
14. Breuillard, “A New Review of the Kaspe Affair”, p. 4.
15. Due to the sheer volume of these transcripts – *Kharbinskoe Vremia* alone published over 20 and *Zaria*, 13 in 1936 alone – I will not list them individually. For examples, see: *Zaria*, 20 July 1935, no. 192, p. 5; *Gun Bao*, 28 September 1935, no. 2818, p. 4; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 1 April 1936, no. 88, p. 7; *Zaria*, 7 April 1936, no. 92, p. 8; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 29 April 1936, no. 112, p. 7.
16. *Zaria*, 24 March 1936, no. 78, p. 5.
17. See, for example: Mara Moustafine, “My Family and its City: Fifty Years in Harbin”, Paper given at the International Seminar on the History and Culture of Harbin Jews 30 August – 2 September 2004, Harbin, p. 5. Available <http://www.jewsofchina.org/jewsofchina/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=932> (accessed 26 February 2015).
18. *Ves’ Kharbin na 1925 god’: Adresnaia i spravochnaia kniga*, [Entire Harbin in 1926: Adress and Reference Book] (Harbin, 1925), p. 116; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 21 September 1934.
19. Kabalkin had to resign in January 1934. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 16 January 1934.
20. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 13 April 1933, no. 100, p. 8.
21. *Ves’ Kharbin 1925*, p. 114.
22. Yaacov (Yana) Liberman, *My China: Jewish Life in the Orient 1900–1950* (Berkeley, 1998), p. 23.
23. *Rupor*, 6 December 1933, no. 332, p. 7.
24. For Chambon’s report, see: “The Kaspe Affair a Summary by A. Chambon, at the Request of L. Reynaud”, in Breuillard, “A New Review of the Kaspe Affair”, pp. 14–19.
25. *Rupor*, 10 December 1933, no. 336, p. 3.
26. He also reported that some people believed Simon was kidnapped by Soviet agents while others even suspected enemies of Joseph Kaspe within the Jewish community. See “The Kaspe Affair A Summary by A. Chambon, at the Request of L. Reynaud”, p. 14.

27. *Nash Put'*, 6 December 1933, no. 63, p. 1; *Nash Put'*, 7 December 1933, no. 64, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 10 December 1933, no. 67, p. 4; 11 December 1933, no. 68, p. 4; 12 December 1933, no. 69, p. 5 and 13 December 1933, no. 70, p. 6.
28. *Nash Put'*, 7 December 1933, no. 64, p. 4.
29. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5.
30. *Nash Put'*, 10 December 1933, no. 67, p. 1.
31. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5.
32. *Rupor*, 6 December 1933, no. 332, p. 7.
33. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5.
34. Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry (in the following AHI), Interview with Evsey Domar conducted by Irene Eber 24–30 April 1986, p. 40.
35. See also Chapter 1, pp. 28–9.
36. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5.
37. See three different articles on page five in *Nash Put'*: *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5.
38. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 5.
39. Ibid.
40. *Rupor*, 10 December 1933, no. 336, p. 14.
41. *Nash Put'*, 9 December 1933, no. 66, p. 4.
42. *Rupor*, 10 December 1933, no. 336, p. 14; see also: *Nash Put'*, 11 December 1933, no. 68, p. 4.
43. *Nash Put'*, 7 December 1933, no. 64, p. 4.
44. For such claims in *Nash Put'*, see: *Nash Put'*, 6 December 1933, no. 63, pp. 3 and 4.
45. *Nash Put'*, 7 December 1933, no. 64, p. 4.
46. *Israel's Messenger*, 2 February 1934, vol. 21, p. 13.
47. *Nash Put'*, 8 December 1933, no. 65, p. 4.
48. Ibid.
49. The concept of “urban space” is also sometimes invoked in this context, but there is as yet no coherent definition of it, especially in contrast to public space. In this work, the latter is at least formally accessible to everyone, while access to some urban spaces, like an amusement park, depends on wealth or some other criterion. Therefore, every public space is also a urban space, but not the other way around.
50. See James Carter, “A Tale of Two Temples: Nation, Region, and Religious Architecture in Harbin, 1928–1998”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 97–119; idem., *Creating a Chinese Harbin. Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932* (Ithaca, New York and London, 2002), Chapter 5.
51. *Kharbinskii Vestnik*, 19 June 1907.
52. Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin*, pp. 106–107.
53. Ibid., pp. 152–3.
54. For religious processions, for example, see: *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 20 January 1934; *Gun Bao*, 21 January 1935, no. 2576, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 21 January 1937, no. 16,

- p. 5. For parades and marches of different youth organisations, see, for example: *Rupor*, 5 March 1934, no. 60, p. 3; *Rupor*, 8 May 1934, no. 119, p. 8; *Zaria*, 3 June 1935, no. 148, p. 5; *Zaria*, 5 May 1939, no. 117, p. 6; Liberman, *My China*, p. 75; for holidays, anniversaries and other kinds of celebrations, see, for example: *Zaria*, 20 May 1935, no. 133, p. 17; *Zaria*, 11 June 1937, no. 153, p. 5.
55. Liberman, *My China*, p. 33.
56. See, for example: *Gun Bao*, 16 September 1935, no. 2806, p. 3; *Zaria*, 3 March 1936, no. 57, p. 4; *Zaria*, 15 August 1938, no. 217, p. 5.
57. For attacks on Kaufman, see: *Nash Put'*, 10 December 1933, no. 67, p. 5 and 11 December 1933, no. 68, p. 3.
58. *Nash Put'*, 29 December 1933, no. 84, p. 6. In 1937 *Nash Put'* again tried to discredit Matlin by claiming that he, as a member of the supervisory board of the hippodrome, discriminated against the Russian members and tried to incite them against each other. *Nash Put'*, 24 August 1937, no. 222, p. 5.
59. For the plague and other epidemics in Manchuria and Harbin, see: Mark Gamsa, "The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 1910–1911", *Past & Present* 190, 1 (2006), pp. 147–83; Lien-teh Wu (ed.), *Manchurian Plague Prevention Service* (Shanghai, 1934); Cornelia Knab, "Plague Times: Scientific Internationalism and the Manchurian Plague of 1910/1911", *Itinerario* 35 (2011), pp. 87–105.
60. *Nash Put'*, 10 December 1933, no. 67, p. 5 and 11 December 1933, no. 68, p. 3.
61. Ibid. *Nash Put'* run a couple of basically similar stories all indented to represent the Jews as people, who only cared for their own kind – for instance a story about a Jew, who was said to have killed a Russian because of a redcurrant bush. *Nash Put'*, 9 December 1933, no. 66, p. 4.
62. *Israel's Messenger*, 6 December 1935, no. 9, p. 16.
63. *Nash Put'*, 17 September 1935, no. 235, p. 5.
64. *Nash Put'*, 12 October 1935, no. 259, p. 6.
65. *Israel's Messenger*, 6 December 1935, no. 9, p. 16; *Israel's Messenger*, 1 November 1935, vol. 32, no. 8, p. 17; on similar libels, also see: *Nash Put'*, 14 December 1935, no. 320, p. 1.
66. *Israel's Messenger*, 2 February 1934, p. 5.
67. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 19 October 1933, no. 17, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 8 September 1935, no. 227, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 1 January 1937, no. 1, p. 12.
68. See, for example: *Nash Put'*, 7 November 1935, no. 284, p. 2; *Nash Put'*, 7 November 1935, no. 284, pp. 4–5; *Nash Put'*, 16 November 1935, no. 293, p. 3.
69. See, for example: *Put'*, 22 October 1935, no. 267, p. 4.
70. *Nash Put'*, 7 November 1935, no. 284, p. 2.
71. See the front page of *Nash Put'* on, 7 November 1935, no. 284, p. 1. A reproduction of the front page can be found in John Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (London, 1978), p. 326; see also special issue of *Natsiia*, 10 July 1938, no. 6.

72. On the activities of Iakov Bent in Harbin, see: *Zaria*, 9 April 1933, no. 96, supplement, p. 3; on his social commitment, see, for example: *Rupor*, 24 March 1933, no. 80, p. 4.
73. On the strike, see: *Nash Put'*, 5 October 1935, no. 252, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 8 October 1935, no. 255, p. 5.
74. *Nash Put'*, 5 October 1935, no. 252, p. 5
75. *Nash Put'*, 28 November 1935, no. 305, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 30 November 1935, no. 307, p. 4.
76. *Nash Put'*, 27 November 1935, no. 304, p. 5.
77. *Nash Put'*, 2 October 1935, no. 249, p. 5. For similar stories on other merchants in Harbin, see, for example: *Nash Put'*, 6 November 1935, no. 283, p. 14.
78. *Israel's Messenger*, 1 November 1935, vol. 32, no. 8, p. 17.
79. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 18 November 1935.
80. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 19 January 1937; see also: *Israel's Messenger*, 2 February 1934, p. 13.
81. *Rupor*, 20 December 1934, no. 347, p. 5.
82. *Guo Bao*, 5 January 1935, no. 2564, p. 5.
83. *Israel's Messenger*, 1 July 1936, no. 5, p. 10.
84. AHI, Interview with Evsey Domar Interview conducted by Irene Ebert 24 April 1986, p. 18; similarly Alexander Menquez (pseudo.), "Growing up in Manchuria in the 1930s: Personal Vignettes", in Jonathan Goldstein (ed.), *Jews of China*, vol. 2: A Source Book and Research Guide (New York and London, 1999), p. 75; see also; *Harbin memories from Charles (Ruvim) Isaac Clurman*, Interview with Irene Clurman. Available at http://kehilalinks.jewishgen.org/harbin/Charles_%28Ruvim%29_Isaac_Clurman.htm (accessed 16 February 2015); Liberman, *My China*, p. 60.
85. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 11 June 1935; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 10 July 1935; *Los Angeles Times*, 11 June 1935, p. 11.
86. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 9 October 1935.
87. See, for example, the abduction of the son of the police chief in *Daowai: Nash Put'*, 13 July 1937, no. 182, p. 4.
88. Other Jewish victims include Meier Kopman, Isaak Clurman and Mark Abramovich. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 15 August 1938.
89. On non-state sponsored violence against the Jews in Germany until 1939, see, for example: Michael Wildt, *Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung: Gewalt gegen Juden in der deutschen Provinz 1919 bis 1939* [The National Community as Self-Empowerment: Violence against Jews in the German Province] (Hamburg, 2007); Stefanie Fischer, "Clashing Gears: Jewish Cattle Traders, Farmers, and Nazis in Conflict, 1926–35", *Holocaust Studies: A Journal for Culture & History* 16, 1/2 (2010), pp. 15–38.
90. *Rupor*, 10 March 1934, no. 65, p. 4.
91. On the celebration in Harbin, see: NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7148, American Consul Hanson to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler

- Johnson, Political Report for February, 1934, p. 10; 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7148, American Consul Coville to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report for March, 1934, p. 11.
92. *Rupor*, 10 March 1934, no. 65, p. 4.
93. On Dmitri Nikolaevich Bodisko and his library see: *Rupor*, 16 February 1934, no. 43, p. 3; on the accident, see: *Rupor*, 16 February 1934, no. 43, p. 3.
94. *Rupor*, 16 February 1934, no. 43, p. 3.
95. Avraham Altman, “Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style”, in Roman Malek (ed.), *Jews in China. From Kaifeng ... to Shanghai* (Sankt Augustin, 2000), pp. 279–317, here pp. 307–8; Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, “The Policy of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards Jewish Refugees” (PhD dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1996), pp. 82, 85–99.
96. See: David G. Goodman and Miyazawa Masanori, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (Lanham, New York and Oxford, 2000); Heinz Eberhard Maul, “Juden und Japaner. Studie über die Judenpolitik des Kaiserreiches Japan während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1945” [The Jews and Japanese. A Study on the Policy regarding the Jews of the Empire Japan during the Time of National Socialism 1933–1945] (PhD dissertation, Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 2000).
97. Gerhard Krebs, “The ‘Jewish Problem’ in Japanese–German Relations, 1933–1945”, in E.B. Reynolds (ed.), *Japan in the Fascist Era* (New York, 2004), pp. 107–32, here p. 111.
98. Gary Dean Best, “Financing a Foreign War: Jacob H. Schiff and Japan, 1904–05”, *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 61 (1972), pp. 313–24; Priscilla Roberts, “Jewish Bankers, Russia, and the Soviet Union, 1900–1940: The Case of Kuhn, Loeb and Company”, *American Jewish Archives Journal* 49 (1997), pp. 9–37; Cyrus Adler, *Jacob Henry Schiff: A Biographical Sketch* (Eastbourne, 2007).
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100. See: Altman, “Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style”, pp. 283–7, 291–6, 309–4.
101. *Zaria*, 24 February 1935, no. 51, p. 9.
102. On the campaign of *Israel's Messenger*, see: *Israel's Messenger*, 7 December 1934, vol. 31, no. 9, p. 15; *Israel's Messenger*, 4 January 1935, vol. 31, no. 10, pp. 10–11; *Israel's Messenger* 1 February 1935, vol. 31, no. 11, p. 6; *Israel's Messenger*, 6 October 1936, vol. 33, no. 7, p. 25; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 16 January 1935; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 4 February 1935; on protest of other Jewish organisations, see, for example: *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 6

- February 1935; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 7 May 1935; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 19 January 1937.
103. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7149, American Consul Adams to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Political Report for February, 1935, pp. 6–7.
104. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 5 April 1935.
105. For articles directed more towards a Polish readership in 1935, see, for example: *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 4, *Nash Put'*, 3 September 1935, no. 223, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 31 August 1935, no. 220, p. 1; *Nash Put'*, 13 November 1935, no. 290, p. 2. Furthermore the *Israel's Messenger* reported, that in 1936 *Nash Put'* started a special series by Vladimir Sholohoff entitled "From the Battlefield between Jews and Poles". *Israel's Messenger* 1 July 1936, vol. 33, no. 5, p. 10. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain many issues from *Nash Put'* from 1936.
106. *Israel's Messenger*, 1 October 1935, vol. 32, no. 7, p. 12.
107. Ibid.
108. *Israel's Messenger*, 1 November 1935, vol. 32, no. 8, p. 17.
109. *Israel's Messenger*, 3 April 1936, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 24.
110. Harry Schneiderman, "Review of the year 5696", in *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 38 (1936–7), pp. 175–394, here pp. 381–2.
111. *Nash Put'*, 8 September 1935, no. 227, p. 5; *Nash Put'*, 14 November 1935, no. 291, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 15 November 1935, no. 292, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 7 December 1935, no. 313, p. 4.
112. *Israel's Messenger*, 6 October 1936, vol. 33, no. 7, p. 25.
113. NARA RG. 59, Decimal Files 1930–1940, Box 7169, American Consul Adams to American Ambassador Nelson Trusler Johnson, Terrorism in Harbin 18 December 1935.
114. *Israel's Messenger*, 1 October 1935, vol. 32, no. 7, p. 19.
115. On the criticism of *Nash Put'* and the Russian fascists on the part of *Rupor*, see: *Rupor*, 13 February 1934, no. 40, p. 5; *Rupor*, 3 March 1934, no. 5, p. 3; *Rupor*, 20 March 1934, no. 85, p. 3.
116. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 September 1936, no. 246, p. 2.
117. On the pogroms in the Ukraine and Petliura, respectively, see, for example: William W. Hagen, "The Moral Economy of Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwów, November 1918", in Robert Blobaum (ed.), *Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland* (Ithaca, 2005), pp. 124–47; Alexander Victor Prusin, "The 'Stimulus Qualities' of a Scapegoat: The Etiology of anti-Jewish Violence in Eastern Poland, 1918–1920", *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts* 4 (2005), pp. 237–56; Lars Fischer, "Whither Pogromshchina – Historiographical Synthesis or Deconstruction?", *East European Jewish Affairs* 38, 3 (December 2008), pp. 303–20. On the assassination of Petliura and the trial against Schwartzbard, see: Boris Czerny, "Paroles et Silences: L'Affaire Schwartzbard et la Presse Juive Parisienne (1926–1927)" [Words and Silence. The Schwartzbard Affair and the Parisian Jewish Press], *Archives Juives* 34, 2

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118. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 15 June 1936, no. 161, p. 5.
 119. *Evreiskaia Zhizn'*, 25 June 1936, no. 17, pp. 8–9.
 120. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 15 June 1936, no. 161, p. 5.
 121. See, for example: *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 23 June 1934, no. 164, p. 7; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 18 April 1936, no. 101, p. 6.
 122. See, for example: *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 19 August 1933, no. 223, p. 7.
 123. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 9 March 1933, no. 84, p. 5; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 22 April 1933, no. 105, p. 7.
 124. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 23 September 1933, no. 258, p. 7.
 125. For examples on the “fight against communism”, see: *Zaria*, 27 September 1937, no. 260, p. 4; *Nash Put'*, 6 November 1937, no. 295, p. 2; *Nash Put'*, 1 November 1937, no. 290, p. 5; *Natsiia*, 1 September 1938, no. 11, p. 2; on Jewish involvement, see, for example: *Evreskaia Zhizn'*, 6 May 1938, no. 18–19, p. 26.
 126. On the relation between Germany, Japan, Manchukuo and the Jews, see: David Kranzler, *Japanese, Nazis & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938–1945* (New York, 1976); Bernd Martin and Gerhard Krebs (eds), *Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin–Tôkyô* [Formation and Fall of the Axis Berlin–Tokyo] (Munich, 1994) and in particular the article by Françoise Kreissler, “Japans Judenpolitik (1931–1945)” [Japan’s Policy towards the Jews], pp. 187–210; Rotner, “The Policy of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards Jewish Refugees”; Maul, “Juden und Japaner”; Krebs: “The ‘Jewish Problem’ in Japanese–German Relations, 1933–1945”; Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich (eds), *Japanese–German Relations, 1895–1945: War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion* (London, 2006).
 127. *Israel's Messenger*, 1 July 1936, no. 5, p. 10; Koval'chuk-Koval', *Svidanie s pamiat'iu*, p. 184.
 128. *Nash Put'*, 14 May 1937, no. 123, p. 5.
 129. According to Olga Bakich of 44,086 Russian émigré were registered with BREM in October 1936, 25,942 were resident in Harbin. Olga Bakich, “Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, 1 (2000), pp. 51–73, p. 62.
 130. *Israel's Messenger*, 6 March 1935, no. 12, p. 7; see also, for example: *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 23 January 1934; *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 4 January 1935; *Telegraphic Agency*, 12 March 1935; *Zaria*, 24 February 1935, no. 51, p. 9.
 131. *Nash Put'*, 15 February 1937, no. 41, p. 2; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 15 February 1937, no. 42, p. 5.
 132. Ibid.; *Nash Put'*, 15 February 1937, no. 41, p. 2.
 133. On earlier campaigns for atheism, see, for example: Daniel Peris, “The 1929 Congress of the Godless”, *Soviet Studies* 43, 4 (August 1991), pp. 711–32;

- Sandra Dahlke, “Kampagnen für Gottlosigkeit: Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Legitimation, Mobilisierung und Partizipation in der Sowjetunion der Zwanziger Jahre” [Campaigns for Godlessness. About the Connection between Legitimating, Mobilisation and Participation in the Soviet Union during the Twenties], *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 50, 2 (May 2002), pp. 172–85.
134. *Rupor*, 29 January 1937, no. 25, p. 4.
135. For the Russian fascists and religion, see: Gennadii Viktorovich Taradanov (ed.), *Fashizm i religija* [Fascism and Religion] (Harbin, 1936); F.T. Goriachkin, *Russkii pravoslavnyi fashist* [The Russian Orthodox Fascist] (Harbin 1928); *Nash Put'*, 1 January 1937, no. 1, p. 3; *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, p. 3; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia: (1920–1945 gg.)* [Fascism and the Russian Emigration (1920–1945)] (Moscow, 2002), pp. 180–2; Erwin Oberländer, “All-Russian-Fascist-Party”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, 1 (1966), pp. 158–73, p. 169; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, “Russian Fascism in Harbin and Manchuria”, in Dan BenCanaan, Frank Grüner and Ines Prodöhl (eds), *The Transcultural Past of Northeast China* (Heidelberg and New York, 2013), pp. 133–58, here pp. 152–4.
136. For examples, see, Pastor Mukhin and Pastor Kochergi. Pastor Mukhin was a member of the board of the Fascist Youth and the Russian Women's Fascist Movement. Pastor Kochergi was a member of the board of the Vanguard Union and the Fascist Little Ones. *Nash Put'*, 7 January 1937, no. 5, p. 3.
137. Ibid.; *Nash Put'*, 28 July 1937, no. 197, p. 6 and p. 7.
138. For the picture, see: *Nash Put'*, 31 July 1937, no. 199, p. 1.
139. Olga Day is a celebration in honor of St. Olga of Kiev, who is said to be the first ruler of the Kievan Rus to have converted to Christianity.
140. *Nash Put'*, 9 November 1935, no. 286, p. 6; *Nash Put'*, 12 July 1937, no. 195, p. 2. For Filologov at fascist events, also see: *Nash Put'*, 31 July 1937, no. 199, p. 4.
141. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia*, p. 180.
142. Ibid., p. 181.
143. *Nash Put'*, 15 February 1937, no. 41, p. 2.
144. See *Nash Put'* (Shanghai), 22 March 1942, no. 48, p. 6.
145. *Nash Put'*, 13 February 1937, no. 39, p. 1.
146. *Rupor*, 8 February 1937, no. 35, p. 3; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 8 February 1937, no. 35, p. 5.
147. *Rupor*, 8 February 1937, no. 35, p. 3.
148. *Nash Put'*, 7 February 1937, no. 33, p. 3; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 7 February 1937, no. 34, p. 7.
149. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 February 1937, no. 39, p. 4.
150. *Nash Put'*, 7 February 1937, no. 33, p. 7; *Zaria*, 9 February 1937, no. 36, p. 3; *Nash Put'*, 8 February 1937, no. 34, p. 5.
151. For meetings by the Muslim community, see: *Nash Put'*, 9 February 1937, no. 35, p. 5; by the Cossacks: *Nash Put'*, 12 February 1937, no. 33, p. 3; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 7 February 1937, no. 34, p. 7.

152. *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 12 February 1937, no. 39, p. 4.
153. See *Nash Put'* (Shanghai), 22 March 1942, no. 48, p. 6.
154. *Nash Put'*, 3 February 1937, no. 29, p. 1.
155. *Nash Put'*, 7 February 1937, no. 33, p. 1. During a meeting at the Russian Club Rodzaevskii also proclaimed: “We declare that the communist power is Jewish power and Russian slavery [...] The Jews crucified Christ and the Jews crucified Russia” and, therefore, compared Russia indirectly with Christ. *Nash Put'*, 12 February 1937, no. 38, p. 3.
156. *Rapor*, 14 February 1937, no. 41, p. 3; *Kharbinskoe Vremia*, 15 February 1937, no. 42, p. 2; on the participation in the “Week of Protest”, see: *Nash Put'*, 8 February 1937, no. 34, p. 5.
157. *Zhurnalisty na pomoshch' russkomu klubu* [Journalists in support of the Russian Club], 4 January 1933, p. 1.
158. See Chapter 4, p. 121.

Conclusion

1. *Nash Put'*, 24 April 1935, no. 107, p. 2.
2. Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevskii, *Zaveschanie russkogo fashista* [Testament of a Russian Fascist] (Moscow, 2001). Ivanov's book was published 1997 in Moscow under the title *Russkaia intelligentsia i masonstvo. Ot Petra Pervogo do nashikh dnei*.
3. See, for example: Amy Caiazza, *Mothers and Soldiers: Gender, Citizenship, and Civil Society in Contemporary Russia* (New York, 2002); James L. Gibson, “Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, 1 (2001), pp. 51–68; Marc Morjé Howard, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (Cambridge, 2003).
4. See, for example: Stephen Hanson and Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Weimar–Russia Comparison”, *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13, 3 (1997), pp. 252–83; Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde (eds), *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe* (London, 2005); Andreas Umland, “Towards an Uncivil Society?”, *Demokratizatsiya* 10, 3 (2002), pp. 362–91; idem, “Russian Ultranationalist Party–Politics and ‘Uncivil Society’”, *Magisterium: Politychni studii* 31 (2008), pp. 30–9.
5. Charles Tilly, “Civil Society and Revolution” paper delivered at the Conference on Civil Society, New School for Social Research, April 1992.

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